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This collection includes eighteen essays that introduce the concept of 
unpopular culture and explore its critical possibilities and ramif ications 
from a large variety of perspectives.  Proposing a third term that operates 
beyond the dichotomy of high culture and mass culture and yet offers a 
fresh approach to both, these essays address a multitude of different topics 
that can all be classif ied as unpopular culture. From David Foster Wallace 
and Ernest Hemingway to Zane Grey, from Christian rock and country to 
clack cetal, from Steven Seagal to Genesis (Breyer) P-Orridge, from K-pop to 
The Real Housewives, from natural disasters to 9/11, from thesis hatements 
to professional sports, these essays f ind the unpopular across media and 
genres, and they analyze the politics and the aesthetics of an unpopular 
culture (and the unpopular in culture) that has not been duly recognized 
as such by the theories and methods of cultural studies.
Martin Lüthe is an associate professor in North American Cultural Studies 
at the John F. Kennedy-Institute at Freie Universität Berlin.
Sascha Pöhlmann is an associate professor in American Literary History at 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich.
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What is Unpopular Culture?
Martin Lüthe & Sascha Pöhlmann
It all started with Anal Cunt. That is probably neither a sentence you thought 
you’d ever read in an academic text, nor is it one we thought we’d ever write 
in one. But it is true anyway, and so this introduction has to start with it, 
since what it is about started with it, too. One day, over the very unpopular 
food in the cafeteria at the Amerika-Institut of LMU Munich, we compared 
notes with some colleagues on what might be the most outrageous and of-
fensive music. No such discussion worth its salt can occur without reference 
to Anal Cunt, a band who were very strong contenders for the disputed title 
of ‘the most offensive band in the world’ until main member Seth Putnam 
died in 2011. Abbreviating their own name to A.C. on album covers was 
about the only concession the band ever made to the rules of the music 
market or good taste. Their f irst EPs—such as the 88 Song EP and the 5643 
Song EP—do not feature any song titles or even songs or lyrics that were 
written before the recording process, and the music fully deserves the 
‘noisecore’ label (a genre that has its roots in what could be considered a 
classic of unpopular culture, Lou Reed’s 1975 album Metal Machine Music). 
When Anal Cunt signed to the Earache record label, they discovered what 
would become their trademark: while their short songs, usually under a 
minute in length, never quite reached the musical excellence of grindcore 
greats such as early Napalm Death or Brutal Truth, their song titles ensured 
their place in the history of extreme music. Adolescent, nihilistic, ridiculous, 
and (self-)ironic, Anal Cunt perfected the art of the titular insult, trying to 
indiscriminately offend everyone, including their own fans, their record 
label, other bands, any social minority or majority, and even themselves. 
Their 1994 album Everyone Should Be Killed begins with ‘Some Songs’ and 
‘Some More Songs’, but also already includes gems such as ‘I’m Not Allowed 
to Like A.C. Any More Since They Signed to Earache’, ‘When I Think of True 
Punk Rock Bands, I Think of Nirvana and the Melvins’ or ‘Selling Out by 
Having Song Titles on This Album’. Their 1997 album I Like It When You Die 
presents their trademark use of the second-person address in song titles 
such as ‘You Keep a Diary’; ‘You Are a Food Critic’; ‘You Have Goals’; ‘You 
Play On a Softball Team’; ‘You Go to Art School’; ‘Your Best Friend Is You’; 
‘Your Favorite Band Is Supertramp’; ‘You Live in a Houseboat’; ‘You Are an 
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Interior Decorator’; ‘You’re Old (Fuck You)’, ‘You (Fill in the Blank)’ and the 
classic ‘Your Kid Is Deformed’, which is even a pretty good song. The next 
album, Picnic of Love (1998), did yet another unpopular thing by offering 
lyrics so sweet they make your teeth hurt just by reading them, with song 
titles such as ‘Saving Ourselves For Marriage’; ‘Greed Is Something That We 
Don’t Need’; ‘I Couldn’t Afford to Buy You a Present (So I Wrote You This 
Song)’; or, ‘In My Heart There’s a Star Named After You’. Yet, the album that 
followed, It Just Gets Worse (1999), turned out to have a prophetic title, and 
with this record the band pushed things too far, for critics and fans alike. 
Like many underground bands in extreme music scenes, their relative 
popularity was heavily dependent on their cultivation of unpopularity, 
with music that was too noisy and lyrics that were too offensive for most 
people, pleasing those in the know who wish to irritate, if not shock others 
with their taste in art (a phenomenon not limited to youth cultures, but also 
found in high culture, perhaps exemplif ied best by Dadaism).
Yet, Anal Cunt managed to offend even those who enjoyed offending 
others with their music, since the humor in their song titles became increas-
ingly questionable, going for a wholesale insensitivity toward anyone and 
everyone by intensifying the homophobic, racist, and misogynist themes 
that had been present before, and which had been somewhat accepted 
as conforming to the rules of a transgressive genre by a heteronormative 
scene that was predominantly white, male, and lower- to middle class. 
With songs such as ‘I Sent a Thank You Card to the Guy Who Raped You’, 
‘I Sent Concentration Camp Footage to America’s Funniest Home Videos’, 
or ‘Laughing When Leonard Peltier Gets Raped in Jail’, the self-irony didn’t 
seem to cut it anymore, and the limits of political correctness kicked in 
with those who had previously enjoyed their violation with adolescent 
rebellious glee. While the declaration that ‘Everyone in Anal Cunt Is Dumb’ 
might have added suff icient irony to make I Like It When You Die a joke 
many people could laugh at, a similar move of stating that ‘Being Ignorant 
Is Awesome’ was no longer enough to sustain the precarious balance, and it 
was all downhill from there. Media such as the German Rock Hard magazine 
stopped covering the band after main member Seth Putnam made some 
particularly anti-Semitic statements, and the grindcore scene—which is 
traditionally rooted in anarchism and still espouses (extreme) left-wing 
values to a signif icant extent today—partly turned its back on Anal Cunt, 
especially as Putnam collaborated with extreme right-wing bands. While 
the band had always sought to be controversial, it was now controversial 
in the very scene that has always espoused an aesthetics and politics of 
provocation and controversy, and it thus uncovered some of the rules of 
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transgression in a transgressive discourse.1 True to form, Anal Cunt refused 
to rescind their provocations and return to the limits of the acceptable 
on later albums, declaring ‘I’m Glad Jazz Faggots Don’t Like Us Anymore’ 
while throwing out songs such as ‘Ha Ha Holocaust’ or ‘Even Though Your 
Culture Oppresses Women, You Still Suck You Fucking Towelhead’. At the 
same time, the band did not hesitate to offend its potential new audience 
by informing them that ‘The South Won’t Rise Again’ or that, quite simply, 
‘All Our Fans Are Gay’. This hard-earned unpopularity with everyone even 
entered Seth Putnam’s obituaries when he died of a drug-related heart 
attack in 2011, which often declared in one way or another that ‘he may not 
be universally mourned’ (MyDeathSpace), though not necessarily in such 
euphemistic terms.
Anal Cunt were a thorn in the side of a grindcore scene that considers 
itself a thorn in the side of the mainstream. Indeed, grindcore thrives on 
provocation and explores extremes to counter what is perceived as a shal-
low and lukewarm f ield of mainstream music, and Anal Cunt managed to 
alienate even a scene that usually has no trouble at all with being highly 
ironic and dead serious at the same time. Yet, the band also poses a chal-
lenge to something larger and more abstract, namely to our conceptions 
of popular culture and of the ‘unpopular/popular divide’. This, then, is 
how we f inally arrive at the larger project introduced by this essay. As 
we discussed bands such as Anal Cunt among colleagues who all work in 
one way or another on popular culture, it became increasingly (if only at 
f irst intuitively) clear that one would not even label their musical genre 
of grindcore or noisecore popular culture, not to mention the band itself, 
which has managed to marginalize itself even further from a marginalized 
sphere of cultural production. If this is not popular culture, and if we can just 
as instinctively rule out that other half of the traditional binary opposition, 
high culture, then the simplest and most obvious answer seems to be that 
it must be unpopular culture. This resonated with those of us who consider 
themselves affiliated with subcultures that embrace and value unpopularity 
in one way or another, or even make unpopularity one of their def ining 
traits. Yet of course, this simple answer is not simple at all, since it begs the 
question we would like to begin to address in this introduction, and which 
the contributors to this volume will tackle in many different ways in their 
respective essays: what is unpopular culture?
This is the guiding theme of the present essay collection, which is the 
result of a four-day conference on unpopular culture held at Amerika Haus 
Munich in fall 2013. In this volume, the authors will explore the possible 
meanings and uses of the term and concept in various ways, sometimes 
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more theoretically, sometimes with regard to particular artifacts that can be 
classif ied as unpopular culture rather than pop or high culture. The variety 
of approaches is intentional, as we did not provide a f ixed framework of 
analysis when asking for contributions via our call for papers. While we had 
our own ideas about the potential of the concept—which we will elaborate 
below—we simply invited people to take the term and run with it in what-
ever direction it might take them, to see what results a communal effort of 
definition and discussion would bring. This openness produced the variety 
within the present volume, but it did not produce a single dictionary-style 
definition of unpopular culture. Instead, we were guided by questions such 
as the following: How does unpopularity come about? How is it constructed 
and defined, how are such constructions maintained, and by whom? How 
do the mechanisms of the unpopular change over time? What histories 
of the unpopular could we tell? How does unpopularity relate to popular 
and high culture? Can there even be such a thing as unpopular culture, or 
is the unpopular at odds with culture itself? What are the politics of the 
unpopular? What is its importance as a category of inclusion and exclusion, 
for the self-proclaimed ‘subcultural underground’ and ‘the mainstream’? 
How do particular cultural artifacts represent unpopularity, and to what 
end? Can we describe an aesthetics of the unpopular? What particular 
f ields of popular and high culture distance themselves from or embrace the 
unpopular? How do particular cultural artifacts become unpopular, and 
why? How is the unpopular related to value judgments such as ‘offensive’, 
‘controversial’, ‘cool’, ‘ugly’, ‘(un)fashionable’, or ‘bad’?
Evidently, these questions are of the kind that cannot be answered de-
f initively or completely but need to be addressed nonetheless. Like popular 
culture and high culture, unpopular culture remains—and surely will 
remain—a concept that is f luid and fuzzy, prone to change and criticism, 
characterized by family resemblances rather than a f ixed set of charac-
teristics that allows for easy characterization and labeling. Like so many 
concepts in cultural studies, it might be more appropriate to always think 
of unpopular cultures in the plural, in order to avoid giving the impression 
of a monolithic, coherent, and homogenous theoretical construct. Therefore, 
as the following essays show, it is the sum of answers to that def initional 
question given here that matters, and it is rather the proliferation than the 
reduction of meanings that testif ies to the productivity and usefulness of 
the concept, and the desirability and even necessity of exploring it beyond 
what this collection and this introduction can offer.
What we do offer is this. The volume opens with Martin Butler’s essay 
‘Why We Talk the Talk We Talk: On the Emptiness of Terms, the Processual 
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Un/Popular, and Benefits of Distinction—Some Auto-Ethnographical Re-
marks’, in which he theoretically explores the way in which conceptions 
of popular and unpopular culture are used as categories of self-positioning 
and identitarian capital, rather than as analytical categories.
Dominika Ferens then takes the consideration of unpopular culture to 
the f ield of literature in ‘Big Fish: On the Relative Popularity of Zane Grey 
and Ernest Hemingway’, comparing two authors whose works, careers, 
and commercial and critical reception raise questions about the criterion 
of ‘popularity’ used to classify writers. Ferens argues that Grey and Hem-
ingway consistently traded in the not-yet-popular, used similar strategies 
of controlling their public image to boost book sales, and were both read 
by millions, though perhaps not the same millions. She addresses how 
Hemingway the Modernist was torn between a desire and fear of popular 
recognition and draws on biographical sources for Grey to show how he 
dealt with his own waxing and waning popularity.
James Dorson takes this writerly concern with (un)popularity a step 
further in ‘How (Not) to Make People Like You: The Anti-Popular Art of 
David Foster Wallace’, reading his story ‘A Radically Condensed History 
of Postindustrial Life’ as well as The Pale King as exemplary of a more 
general desire in Wallace’s f iction to oppose what Dorson calls ‘popularity 
culture’, or art that primarily seeks approval, not money or distinction, as 
well as a sociability in which approval is the overriding end. Historicizing 
and contextualizing Wallace’s texts by connecting them to David Ries-
man’s sociology of ‘other-direction’, Dorson reads Wallace’s concern with 
sincerity and recursivity, as well as his critique of postmodernist literary 
aesthetics, as part of an engagement with work and life in post-industrial 
society.
Elizabeth Kovach closes this section with her essay ‘Dissenting Com-
modities: Negotiations of (Un)popularity in Publications Critical of Post-9/11 
U.S.-America’, in which she discusses three generically diverse pieces of 
writing that are critical of U.S.-American foreign policy and society since 
9/11: Jane Mayer’s The Dark Side, Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom, and Juliana 
Spahr’s thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs. She argues that these texts have 
been mostly read as dissenting, critical, and counter-hegemonic depictions 
of the direction that the US has taken since 9/11, but little attention has 
been paid to the commodif ied nature of such writerly dissent. In her own 
analysis—drawing particularly on the work of Jacques Rancière—she 
explores the tensions and ambivalences regarding issues of unpopularity 
and popularity that affect writers who strive for political impact while they 
participate in a market logic that inevitably dampens the blow.
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The volume moves from literary to televisual culture with Dan Udy’s 
essay ‘Secrets, Lies and The Real Housewives: The Death of an (Un)Popular 
Genre’. Conceiving of the un/popular as that which splits viewers into two 
opposing factions, where ardent fans clash with critics and wider audiences, 
Udy presents the reality TV or docusoap show The Real Housewives and 
the wider media network it is part of as an example of how audiences that 
embrace such productions simultaneously reject them, based on a norma-
tive notion that they should reject them by certain cultural standards. Thus, 
Udy identif ies the unpopular as both closely related to camp and as the 
productive force behind the complex cultural notion of the guilty pleasure.
Jeroen de Kloet and Jaap Kooijman consider a similarly un/popular media 
phenomenon in ‘Karaoke Americanism Gangnam Style: K-pop, Wonder 
Girls, and the Asian Unpopular’, highlighting particularly how unpopular 
culture helps describe issues of cultural transfer, translatability, and, indeed, 
marketability in a globalized world. They analyze why K-pop remains 
globally unpopular and propose the notion of ‘karaoke Americanism’ to 
understand global cultural f lows and disjunctures. They examine the 
pop act Wonder Girls as an example of this, describing not only their (un)
popularity in different cultures, but also their appropriation in different 
contexts that attest to the political potential of karaoke Americanism. 
While they acknowledge that this speaks of the continuous power of the 
United States when it comes to the production of popular culture, they also 
describe recent developments in terms of geopolitics, fragmentation, and 
the digitization of culture that may help challenge this hegemony.
Florian Zappe continues this intermedial approach in a different way 
in his essay ‘“When order is lost, time spits”: The Abject Unpopular Art 
of Genesis (Breyer) P-Orridge’. Zappe draws on the work of Julia Kristeva 
to theorize an abject unpopular culture at the radical fringes of popular 
culture, which rejects its empty gestures of rebellion by dwelling on the 
threshold of the unsettling and intangible qualities of the abject. He does 
so by analyzing the work of performance artist Genesis (Breyer) P-Orridge, 
whose use of abjection as an aesthetic principle on all levels of his life and 
work—particularly in the context of projects such as COUM Transmis-
sions and Throbbing Gristle—locates him not only in the excluded middle 
between the two poles of bourgeois ‘high’ and popular ‘low’, but in the 
intangible center of a triangle consisting of ‘high’, ‘low’, and ‘pop’ culture.
Christian Schmidt then shifts the focus of the collection more f irmly 
towards music in his essay ‘“Famous in a Small Town”: The Authenticity of 
Unpopularity in Contemporary Country Music’. He explores the ways in 
which popularity and unpopularity are part and parcel of contemporary 
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country music, a genre that is both commercially successful and, at the 
same time, aspires to self-consciously distance itself from the perceived 
artif iciality of popular culture and thereby become regarded as the true 
music of the common American folk. Schmidt shows how country music 
simultaneously taps into a discourse of American popular culture and 
styles itself as this popular culture’s unpopular other by staging a notion 
of authentic Southern and Dixie identity in and through the music and its 
visual representation in music videos. Drawing on Judith Halberstam’s no-
tion of metronormativity, he argues that country music is popular culture, 
yet at the same time pinpoints the particular strategies used by the country 
music industry, its artists, and its audiences to mark their distance to it and 
construct an image of country music as the more authentic counterpart to 
supposedly artif icial popular culture.
Bärbel Harju addresses similar issues from a very different perspective 
in ‘Making Christianity Cool: Christian Pop Music’s Quest for Popularity’, 
as she analyzes Christian pop music’s shifting engagement with ‘secular’ 
society and mainstream pop culture since the late 1960s. She examines 
the genre’s unique situation between religion, commerce, and music, along 
with its (self-)perception as unpopular and its continuous struggle with the 
mechanisms, values, and demands of pop culture, arguing that this also 
sheds light on American evangelicalism as well as American culture at 
large. Harju reads the genre’s attempts to join the mainstream as part of the 
broader evangelical movement and its strategic embrace of popular culture.
C. Richard King then scrutinizes an even more unpopular f ield of musi-
cal production in ‘Listening to Bad Music: White Power and (Un)Popular 
Culture’, f inding in white power music a form of expressive culture that 
breaks with social convention as its overt racism, advocacy of violence, and 
palpable rage transgress accepted limits of speech and sentiment. Yet, King 
offers a more complex interpretation that complicates prevailing accounts 
of white power, musical expression, and popular culture. He argues that 
white power music may be unpopular but is not isolated or idiosyncratic, 
since it actively engages with and appropriates musical styles to commu-
nicate its message, build audiences, create community, recruit members, 
and to crossover to more mainstream spaces. He also shows how, in the 
course of the twentieth century, white supremacist music has moved from 
pervading popular culture and public life to its margins, as it draws upon 
and deploys popular stylings but has little claim beyond a bounded social 
f ield on audience, desire, or fashion.
Paola Ferrero focuses on the importance of a perceived unpopu-
larity for a genre’s self-conception in her essay ‘Hipster Black Metal? 
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Deafheaven’s Sunbather and the Evolution of an (Un)popular Genre’. 
Ferrero examines how the genre of Black Metal has shifted from the 
realm of the unpopular to that of the ‘cool’, effectively making a transi-
tion into indie music as its style evolved from its early Norwegian roots. 
To this end, she analyzes the receptive strategies of indie webzines 
reviewers of Black Metal records by using Deafheaven’s album Sunbather 
as a case study, arguing that the growing popularity of the genre in 
indie webzine is a result of the reif ication of this particular album as 
a paradigmatic shift in the history of genre, a reading counteracted by 
the fans’ own ideas concerning the nature of the genre as a historically 
unpopular one. The tension arising from this controversy reveals the 
way a music subculture as carefully protected as Black Metal polices its 
own boundaries and how processes of cultural appropriation threaten 
the very identity of the genre.
Barry Shank’s essay ‘Unpopular Culture and the American Reception 
of Tinariwen’ ends the section on music in this volume by arguing that 
the spread of popular music across signif icant geographic and political 
boundaries implicates new populations in enhanced and enlarged concep-
tions of the polis, the political form of the people. Shank asks whether it 
is possible for a shared aesthetic to change to the shape of the political in 
a meaningful way. He does so by discussing the case of Tinariwen, a band 
of Tuareg musicians who have been among the leading groups developing 
a particular style of what the West has come to call ‘desert blues’. As the 
Western popularity of Tinariwen’s music has increased, political chaos has 
descended upon Mali, the nation state that claims sovereignty over the 
territories from which Tinariwen and Tuareg music emerged. This forms 
the backdrop for Shank’s inquiry into the potential political force of music 
in the face of war’s destruction.
Dietmar Meinel then explores the dichotomy of the un/popular in refer-
ence to f ilm in his essay ‘Cultural Studies and the Un/Popular. How the 
Ass-Kicking Work of Steven Seagal May Wrist-Break Our Paradigms of 
Culture’. Tracing the Seagal oeuvre as he moved from acclaimed martial 
arts action star to bizarre media f igure, while remaining both consist-
ently unpopular and consistently popular, Meinel challenges a particular 
representational logic in cultural studies by drawing attention to unpopular 
texts that function only poorly as representations of their period and their 
social formations. He argues that the artifacts of unpopular culture, such 
as the later Seagal productions, question the representationalist paradigm 
in literary and cultural studies and necessitate novel approaches to con-
ceptualizing culture.
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Karsten Senkbeil utilizes the prism of the unpopular to examine sports in 
his essay ‘Unpopular Sport Teams and the Social Psychology of “Anti-Fans”’. 
Considering the apparent paradox that major sports teams across the world 
are simultaneously highly popular and unpopular, Senkbeil asks why fans 
unite in their overt contempt for a specif ic team, what the psychological 
setup and the sociocultural rationale of the ‘hater fan’ may be, and particu-
larly why people so fervently and outspokenly assign to themselves the role 
of a non-member of a certain fan group. Engaging critically with the theories 
of Pierre Bourdieu, John Fiske, and Michel Maffesoli, Senkbeil argues that 
many typical characteristics of fans of any type of pop culture can indeed 
be applied to anti-fans as well, and that economic reasons (symbolic class 
struggle, traditionalism, and jealousy toward the nouveau riche) combine 
with the dynamics of gender identities in bringing these characteristics 
about.
Catherine Bouko combines the perspectives of media and museum stud-
ies in her essay ‘Popular, Unpopular: When First World War Museums Meet 
Facebook’ to explore how the differences between popular and unpopular 
media practices have shifted in the digital age. She considers the historical 
museum as the traditionally ‘sacred space’ of high culture and its attempts 
to integrate the codes of popular culture to make the younger generations 
sensitive to themes they are likely to consider unattractive. In doing so, she 
analyzes the story of the f ictional WWI infantryman Léon Vivien that was 
disseminated on Facebook in 2013 on behalf of the Meaux Museum of the 
Great War, creating a media object that seeks to fuse History as presented 
in museums with a popular contemporary media culture as two paradigms 
of intimacy and connectivity intersect.
Susanne Leikam addresses a different kind of memorial culture with 
an American focus in ‘Unpopular American Natural Calamities and the 
Selectivity of Disaster Memory’, in which she presents selected ‘forgotten’ 
natural disasters and the (failed) processes of their memorialization that, 
at the time, prevented them from becoming productive parts of public 
discourses and to be visible in ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultural spheres. In refer-
ence to two case studies, Leikam argues that the unpopularity of natural 
calamities is not an inherent condition or arises arbitrarily, but rather is 
the result of economic, cultural, and political endeavors struggling for 
hegemony in American cultures and, as such, is also often directly related 
to the popularity of other historical moments.
Sebastian M. Herrmann closes the volume with an essay that takes the 
notion of unpopular culture to yet another abstract level by applying it to 
the field that comprises all the contributions collected here, the humanities. 
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In ‘The Unpopular Profession? Graduate Studies in the Humanities and 
the Genre of the “Thesis Hatement”’, Herrmann analyzes a polemic and 
conflicted genre that originates from within the humanities and warns 
against pursuing a career in its disciplines. This is indicative of the role 
the humanities and the academy play in contemporary U.S., if not Western 
society. Herrmann describes these texts’ precarious form of (mis)com-
munication as being marked by irony, hyperbole, and a particular set of 
tropes and metaphors. He also carves out their contradictory politics of 
labor, class, income, and academia. Finally, Herrmann discusses how these 
texts undermine their own presumed project.
While these considerations of unpopular culture are certainly original in 
their respective explorations of the concept’s potential, they are not without 
precedent in cultural studies, although explicit mention of the unpopular 
is scarce. For example, Andrew Ross makes an important gesture toward 
the unpopular within the study of popular and high culture in his 1989 
monograph No Respect: Intellectuals & Popular Culture, when he emphasizes 
that,
[w]hile it speaks enthusiastically to the feelings, desires, aspirations, 
and pleasures of ordinary people, popular culture is far from being a 
straightforward or unif ied expression of popular interests. It contains 
elements of disrespect, and even opposition to structures of authority, 
but it also contains ‘explanations’ […] for the maintenance of respect for 
those structures of authority. (3)
One could say that this dialectic of popular culture is driven by the unpopu-
lar; that is, the counternarrative within popular culture itself that prevents 
it from becoming what Ross dismisses as the ‘conspiratorial view of ‘mass 
culture’ as imposed upon a passive populace like so much standardized 
fodder, doled out to quell unrest and to fuel massive profits’ (4). Ross argues 
not only that the histories of high and popular cultures must be told together 
to make sense, but also that they need a history of intellectuals, or those
experts in culture whose traditional business is to define what is popular 
and what is legitimate, who patrol the ever shifting borders of popular and 
legitimate taste, who supervise the passports, the temporary visas, the 
cultural identities, the threatening ‘alien’ elements, and the deportation 
orders, and who occasionally make their own adventurist forays across 
the border. (5)
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Unpopular culture, then, can be imagined as the disputed territory between 
high and popular culture, a place that both lay claim to, but that none 
can ever own completely; it is a perpetual no man’s-land that presents a 
challenge to the very notion of permanent territorial inscription itself. 
Without using the term, Ross identif ies unpopular culture as a residue 
within two internally heterogeneous systems of culture that prevents and 
resists their respective attempts at homogenization and stabilization; not 
an outside force to disturb their internal coherence but always already an 
internal element of incoherence and disruption that must be continually 
managed, supervised, and controlled.
In the now canonized field of cultural studies, (popular) culture famously 
‘is the struggle over meaning, a struggle that takes place over and within 
the sign’ (Grossberg 157). This struggle over meaning and articulation, 
which critics like Stuart Hall, Lawrence Grossberg, and Dick Hebdidge 
have tackled, could be complicated through a serious analysis of practices 
of unpopular cultural articulation and appropriation and the way they 
might open up a space of socio-cultural criticism beyond and/or within the 
ironic. Accordingly, the politics of unpopularity and their relationship with 
hegemonic cultural articulation are what is at stake when we take cultural 
studies as a point of departure for assessing the unpopular. Unpopular 
culture invites us to question the rules of popular culture and high culture 
as a whole, and it offers us other options and not just a third, as for example 
validating high-quality segments of popular culture as popular arts does 
and has done, to evaluate and interpret cultural artifacts in their aesthetic 
and political signif icance. One cannot overestimate the fact that today 
popularity is most often measured in commercial terms, that this has been 
the case for a long time, and that, furthermore, our understanding of high 
culture relies heavily on commercial unpopularity.
These are a number of approaches to unpopular culture avant la lettre, 
but the term itself has also been used in different contexts by different 
people. That said, it has been employed in such specif ic ways that a more 
general inquiry into its meanings is in order, and its prior uses can already 
be considered part of this inquiry. For example, Bart Beaty used the term in 
the title of his monograph Unpopular Culture: Transforming the European 
Comic Book in the 1990s, to describe an area of cultural production that was 
often used as an epitome of popular culture while at the same time being 
unpopular—both part of mass culture and not part of it. In 2008, the artist 
Grayson Perry published his selection of works from the British Arts Council 
Collection under the title of Unpopular Culture, in which he seeks to provide 
an ‘alternative view’ of postwar British art that ‘moves away from facts, 
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dates and movements and towards a more subtle investigation of the mood, 
pace and preoccupations that underline British art of this period.’ This 
anti-mainstream attitude characterizes many considerations of unpopular 
culture. Moreover, it already points toward one of the most useful under-
standings of the term as a third concept that breaks open the dichotomy 
of high and pop culture, denoting that which is not part of a (perceived) 
mainstream mass culture but not part of a bourgeois high culture either. 
This was the mission of SCRAM magazine, ‘a journal of unpopular culture’, 
which chronicled ‘the neglected, the odd, the nifty and the nuts’ (SCRAM), 
or the now-defunct Tangents magazine. Similarly, the annual Festival of 
Unpopular Culture in Adelaide or the Institute for Unpopular Culture in 
San Francisco (IFUC) celebrate and support non-mainstream art. In its 
mission statement, the latter declares its determination to help ‘alleviate 
artists’ needs to cater to public taste and opinion in order to survive’ (IFUC).
The normativity behind such contrasts and distinctions is obvious: here, 
art is supposed to be absolutely autonomous, independent of commercial 
considerations and critical or public reception. Popularity is understood 
as something that should not even have to cross the artist’s mind in the 
process of creation since it is a potential source of corruption of the art 
itself, a view of art and artist that is rooted in Western Romanticism and 
especially Modernism. Unpopularity is therefore desirable for the ‘true’ 
artist, and maybe even a measure of the cultural value of his work. At 
the same time, the statement draws attention to the standards by which 
cultural popularity is most often measured today, and it defines ex negativo 
standards of unpopularity. The following aspects of un/popularity seem 
the most crucial to us:
1) Popularity is commercial popularity, i.e. measured according to sales. 
A cultural product is popular if it sells well, and it is unpopular if it is 
a commercial failure.
2) Popularity is critical popularity, i.e. measured according to a discourse 
between experts who declare a cultural product valuable. A cultural 
product is popular if a suff icient number of critics consume and value 
it, and it is unpopular if critics ignore it or do not value it.
3) Popularity is mass popularity, i.e. measured according to the number 
of consumers (though not necessarily in terms of sales). A cultural 
product is popular if a suff icient number of people consume it, and it 
is unpopular if the number is insuff icient.
4) Popularity is aesthetic popularity, i.e. a means of describing and 
quantifying pleasure in consuming a cultural product. A cultural 
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product is popular if a suff icient number of people like it, and it is 
unpopular if the number is insuff icient. (This is obviously related to 
but not identical with the previous point.)
5) Popularity is original popularity, i.e. something that originates from 
the people, i.e. measured according to its producers and its context of 
production. A cultural product is popular if it comes from the people, 
and it is unpopular if it is imposed on the many by the few. This is espe-
cially relevant in constructions of popularity with regard to imagined 
communities such as nations, where, for example, a ‘popular’ culture 
of traditions, folk songs, or fairytales was invented in Romanticism to 
construct a people in the f irst place and an invention of an unpopular 
culture might have always already functioned as said construction’s 
inherent Other.
Other categories of popularity and unpopularity can, of course, be found, 
and the essays in this collection certainly provide a few; yet, these strike us 
as the most relevant for the purpose at hand of conceptualizing unpopular 
culture as a third term that complicates and enriches the opposition be-
tween high and pop culture and that offers an entirely different perspective. 
We will return to these aspects later; for the moment, it is suff icient to note 
that the study of unpopular culture is interested in exploring, analyzing, and 
challenging the mechanisms and ideologies of (un)popularity mentioned 
above.
Stephen Redhead has done this from a combined perspective of law, 
sociology, and cultural studies in his 1995 Unpopular Cultures: The Birth of 
Law and Popular Culture, which provides a useful framework for thinking 
about unpopular culture at large, even though he does not really pursue 
the implications of the unpopular as far as possible. Redhead emphasizes 
from the start that his is not simply ‘a study of outlawed cultures,’ and 
that to ‘decide what, and who, is ‘deviant’ these days […] is not an easy, or 
straightforward task’ (3). In doing so, he draws attention to the problematic 
dichotomies of the normal, the mainstream, and the popular and the ab-
normal, the marginalized, and the unpopular. This differentiation is highly 
important to unpopular culture, but its rules and regulations are far from 
straightforward or unitary, and they are certainly subject to change over 
time and in different contexts. In this understanding of the term, unpopular 
culture distinguishes itself from popular culture rather than high culture, 
since it opposes a certain mainstream, and it assumes its meanings in 
opposition to popular culture as mass culture. Yet, unpopular culture is 
not simply a synonym for high culture that maintains the old dichotomy 
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of high and low, since it is often located in very different contexts and is 
opposed to, if not even hostile to, the bourgeois environment that def ines 
high culture. At the same time, works of unpopular culture do not buy into 
a simple dichotomy of class that would oppose a bourgeois elite (def ined 
by capital, education, etc.) to the masses of a homogeneous working class 
and their respective separate cultural spheres. Unpopular culture can be 
so elitist that even T.S. Eliot might want to tell its devotees to loosen up 
and live a little; try discussing the suff icient criteria of what makes for 
true Black Metal or Underground Rap, or the rules of selling out in any 
f ield of cultural production that opposes the mainstream, and you will 
f ind out soon enough that only very little is popular about these alleged 
f ields of popular culture. A conceptualization of unpopular culture may 
show that such strict conventions of inclusion and exclusion are similar 
but obviously not identical to those of high culture, which also demarcates 
its territory by carving out a particular sphere of the unpopular from mass 
culture; but, while it also justif ies its unpopularity aesthetically, it does so 
in reference to a very different notion of cultural value. Unpopular culture 
thus can be considered the disruptive element that resists and complicates 
the simplif ications of binary oppositions such as elite versus masses or 
highbrow versus lowbrow. Both high and pop culture can be unpopular 
culture, but neither def ines the term, nor do both concepts taken together 
do so.
What unpopular culture does is draw attention to the aesthetic and 
political value judgments that are at the heart of the high/pop culture 
divide, and it shows that, while Postmodernist theory has taught us to shy 
away from such judgments, we still make them every time we consider, 
appreciate, consume, and reflect upon a cultural artifact, as cultural critics 
and as fans. It highlights the fact that both high and pop culture are always 
loaded terms that can never be used neutrally, innocently, or merely descrip-
tively; if cultural studies has shown anything, then it is that such a thing as 
‘mere description’ is impossible. Unpopular culture thus intervenes in the 
alleged neutrality of this discourse, drawing attention to considerations of 
aesthetics—‘good’ music, a ‘really bad’ novel, a video game that ‘sucks’ but 
‘is fun’, a ‘camp’ performance, a ‘B’ movie, a ‘cult’ classic, ‘offensive’ lyrics, 
and so on—that have supposedly vanished from critical considerations 
of culture as they opened up toward the popular, but which, in fact, have 
only become implicit where one may as well make them explicit. Therefore, 
unpopular culture simultaneously highlights the normativity of high and 
pop culture and embraces its own normative position instead of pretending 
not to have one. Rather, it inquires into the rules of that very normativity 
introdUC tion 21
by considering what is deviant, abject, offensive, and marginalized, but 
also set aside as special, underground, visible or accessible only to a certain 
elite, a niche cultivated by its own caste of priests and devotees who are 
very particular about inclusion and exclusion (and this means Joyceans 
deciphering Finnegans Wake as much as avid readers of fan f iction speaking 
in their own code).
For this reason, as well as for its recognition of the intrinsic connection 
between the aesthetic and the political, the study of unpopular culture must 
necessarily follow Fredric Jameson’s famous slogan to ‘Always historicize!’ 
(ix). Just like any artifact might transition from high to pop culture or vice 
versa over time, it might also become part of unpopular culture, or stop 
being part of it, a process that may be connected to a categorization as high 
or pop, but does not necessarily have to be. This means that not only can 
something be high culture and unpopular culture but also popular culture 
and unpopular culture at the same time, even though the latter seems to 
be a contradiction in terms. However, it is only oxymoronic if one buys 
into the high/pop culture dichotomy in the f irst place and understands 
mass culture in an all too homogeneous way. Unpopular culture instead 
draws attention to the heterogeneities that characterize both high and 
pop culture, and to those spheres of cultural production and reception 
that are not adequately described in reference either to a certain cultural 
elite or a certain large group of people who are all too often cast as passive 
recipients rather than active critics of the works they consume. Evidently, 
this arcs back to the complex of cultural encoding and decoding that holds 
a prominent place in post-cultural studies inquiries of cultural forms and 
practices. Unpopularity and intentionality enter a meaningful relationship 
in this context, insofar as the ‘intentionally unpopular’ and the ‘accidentally 
unpopular’ illuminate the complexities inherent in meaning-making and 
cultural agency. After all, being purposefully ‘unpopular’, as in avant-garde 
or underground cultural production, is different from becoming or being 
made unpopular in the process of audience reception, re-articulation, and 
appropriation—especially in our times of digital media communication and 
its instantaneous, and instantaneously serial, aesthetics of unpopularity.
It was probably the elitist strands of Modernism that f irst cultivated 
the aesthetics of the unpopular and unpopularity as aesthetics, valuing 
art only if it was not for the people but rather for a selected few initiates. 
However, it is also true that quite a few Modernists were not at all averse 
to f inancial and, indeed, popular success, and so were cultivating aesthetic 
unpopularity while at the same time seeking commercial popularity. It is 
worth remembering that the f irst publication of Ulysses as a single book 
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was printed in different editions to suit different tastes and wallets,2 
while Joyce sought just the right kind of unpopularity, and by ‘resisting 
the critical appropriation of his writing into Culture, Joyce refused both 
the affable handshake of the biens culturels and remained aloof from 
ordinary readers’ (Nash 98). These complex rules of unpopularity as a 
measure of aesthetic quality that have been set in and by Modernism are 
still with us today, having, for example, seeped into musical subcultures 
in which ‘selling out’ is the worst an artist can do, thus winning and losing 
an audience at the same time. Postmodernism—in academia as well as in 
the larger cultural sphere—ultimately did not succeed in exorcising the 
specters of this high-cultural prejudice, nor did it manage to really ‘cross 
the border, close the gap’ (in Leslie Fiedler’s famous words) between high 
and popular culture, partial and signif icant successes notwithstanding. 
A conceptualization of unpopular culture can be considered part of this 
ongoing attempt to do so, using different tactics in an already established 
strategy of assaulting one of the most entrenched fortif ications of Western 
cultural tradition.
Questions of popularity have been haunting artists for more than a cen-
tury since Modernism became, somewhat paradoxically, both the epitome 
of high culture and at the same time a paradigm for what culture is in 
general, a standard of the exceptional that was met with resistance from 
Postmodernists as soon as it had completed its transition from subversion 
to establishment. One f ine pre-Modernist example is Henry David Thoreau, 
who reported in his diary on 28 October 1853 that he had received the 
brutally material proof of his commercial failure as a writer:
For a year or two past, my publisher, falsely so called, has been writing 
from time to time to ask what disposition should be made of the copies of 
‘A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers’ still on hand, and at last 
suggesting that he had use for the room they occupied in his cellar. So I 
had them all sent to me here, and they have arrived to-day by express, 
f illing the man‘s wagon,—706 copies out of an edition of 1000 which I 
bought of Munroe four years ago and have ever since been paying for, 
and have not quite paid for yet. The wares are sent to me at last, and I 
have an opportunity to examine my purchase. They are something more 
substantial than fame, as my back knows, which has borne them up two 
flights of stairs to a place similar to that to which they trace their origin. 
Of the remaining two hundred and ninety and odd, seventy-f ive were 
given away, the rest sold. I have now a library of nearly nine hundred 
volumes, over seven hundred of which I wrote myself. ( Journal 459)
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As Thoreau was reminded of his unpopularity as a writer, he reinscribes 
commercial failure as artistic and, indeed, personal liberation, declaring 
that it is precisely his lack of popularity that makes him a better writer, as he 
is now free from any intended or imagined audience in his writing process:
Nevertheless, in spite of this result, sitting beside the inert mass of my 
works, I take up my pen to-night to record what thought or experience I 
may have had, with as much satisfaction as ever. Indeed, I believe that this 
result is more inspiring and better for me than if a thousand had bought 
my wares. It affects my privacy less and leaves me freer. ( Journal 460)
Thoreau’s example indicates that unpopular culture is always related to 
failure in one way or another—failure to sell, failure to please the critics, 
failure to meet one’s own artistic standards, failure to save the world or 
at least change humanity, and so on—and therefore both exposes and 
challenges the very criteria that def ine success. As such, the queer art of 
unpopular culture can be considered part of Judith Halberstam’s ‘queer art 
of failure’ that can show potential among an oppressive actuality:
Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, 
undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may […] offer more creative, more 
cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world. […] The queer 
art of failure turns on the impossible, the improbable, the unlikely, and 
the unremarkable. It quietly loses, and in losing it imagines other goals 
for life, for love, for art, and for being. (2–3)
The study of unpopular culture, then, is a critical inquiry into these ‘certain 
circumstances’ as well as these ‘other goals’, and Halberstam’s work shows 
that it should not take itself too seriously if it wants to challenge what is 
all too serious, and that it must retain a questioning perspective on its 
own ideologies, as the case of Thoreau shows. After all, for him, as for the 
contemporary indie band, it is always easier to celebrate and romanticize 
one’s own commercial failure as true artistic integrity if one simply cannot 
get the damn public to buy one’s stuff. Many critics agree that it was this 
unpopularity that made Thoreau rewrite Walden so that it might be more 
popular and marketable: as Robert F. Sayre has it, the book ‘was advertised 
in A Week as soon to be published. But the commercial failure of his f irst 
book discouraged the publisher from undertaking a second, and throughout 
the early 1850s Thoreau reworked Walden into the form in which we know 
it’ (Thoreau, Walden 1052).
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As a contemporary countermodel to the Thoreau that professed to em-
brace unpopularity while seeking popularity, Walt Whitman tried very hard 
to become popular and sell his self-published book Leaves of Grass in 1855, 
not only reviewing it himself—very favorably as well as anonymously—but 
also famously using a letter from Emerson as a blurb for the second edition 
without seeking permission. Furthermore, he also ‘created a book that he 
hoped would “go into any reasonable pocket”, something the f irst edition 
clearly would not do’ (Folsom), so that it could truly be the people’s poetry he 
envisioned as his ‘Great Construction of the New Bible’ (Whitman, Notebooks 
353, emphasis in original). Yet, Whitman was clearly never as popular as he 
wanted to be, and his declaration that ends the preface of the f irst edition 
of Leaves of Grass that the ‘proof of a poet is that his country absorbs him 
as affectionately as he has absorbed it’ (25) remained wishful thinking, at 
least while he was alive. The number of artists who suffered similar fates of 
unpopularity that were then transformed into popularity—as high culture 
and pop culture, respectively or simultaneously—is legion; just think of 
Melville3 or Dickinson in the nineteenth century or David Markson, who 
ironically chronicled the unpopularity of artists in the vignettes of his 
later novels, in the twentieth. Some writers were too popular in their time 
to be considered high culture later on, with highbrow critics for a long 
time operating under the a priori assumption that popularity must equal 
aesthetic impoverishment. Edgar Allan Poe and William Shakespeare are 
probably the most striking examples of this high-cultural prejudice against 
popularity. Yet, their cases are obviously no warning to proponents of high 
culture that today’s pop culture might be tomorrow’s high culture (and vice 
versa), and that critics should not be deterred by the popularity of a work 
of art. Thus, Harold Bloom hoped in a Wall Street Journal article in 2000 
that ‘my discontent is not merely a highbrow snobbery’ but nevertheless 
went on to answer his own rhetorical question in such a way as to indicate 
as much: ‘Can more than 35 million book buyers, and their offspring, be 
wrong? Yes, they have been, and will continue to be for as long as they 
persevere with Potter.’ And as if just to make sure that we make no mistake 
about his highbrow snobbery, he wrote in 2003 that the ‘decision to give the 
National Book Foundation’s annual award for “distinguished contribution” 
to Stephen King is extraordinary, another low in the shocking process of 
dumbing down our cultural life’ (‘Dumbing Down’). Bloom is not just an 
obvious straw man here, an old conservative critic who rants in a jeremiad 
against the youth of today and their ridiculous reading habits that will one 
day surely ruin us all (although he is, and he does), but he is a powerful 
f igure in the discourse of literature and culture, and he is not in any way 
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exceptional when it comes to prejudice against the popular. (Just think of 
Adorno on jazz, a genre that probably has moved from pop to high culture 
like no other in music, but certainly not because of him.)
Instead, Bloom’s example draws attention to the aspect of power that 
marks the discourse of unpopular culture as much as any other discourse. 
Popularity and unpopularity do not just occur, they are produced, not (or 
only rarely) by a single person, but rather by complex cultural mechanisms. 
For example, one might frame the canon wars that started as early as the 
1960s and reached their culmination in the 80s and 90s in terms of unpopu-
lar culture, and as a consequence see that popularity and unpopularity are 
discursive tools and, indeed, weapons to construct and control meaning, 
signif icance, and ultimately ideology. For the canon, it is not important 
if a text is popular or unpopular; it has to be popular and unpopular with 
the right people to make it into ‘literature’. The standards of unpopularity 
are closely connected to the standards of literature and of the bourgeois 
conception of art itself. At the same time, unpopularity can be precisely 
what subverts these standards. Unpopular culture is not a unif ied f ield; 
the answers to the question ‘unpopular with who, and why?’ will always 
indicate as much, and they are therefore central to the study of unpopular 
culture, and central to its political and aesthetic outlook.
There is a similar popular bias against so-called high culture, which is 
notoriously unpopular, and often simply because it is framed as unpopular 
(diff icult, inaccessible, elitist, boring, intellectual, irrelevant, and so on). 
Unpopularity is thus connected to a certain set of expectations rather than 
aesthetic qualities. We are surprised when these expectations are not met 
and, for example, a text labeled as highbrow turns out to be entertaining 
and funny instead of boring and outdated, and it turns out to fulf ill our 
criteria of popularity but remains within the unpopular sphere of high 
culture because of its designation as such. Every reader will have their own 
examples of such revelations, just like we might be unable to explain the 
popularity of a cultural artifact even if our lives depended on it, or why it 
has become popular or unpopular as its historical context changed. This 
applies to critical honors as much as to bestseller lists: why is Peyton Place 
no longer read by just about everyone, as it used to be in the 1950s; how did 
Philip K. Dick’s stories move from pulp magazines to the Library of America; 
and why on earth did Rudyard Kipling ever get the Nobel Prize? And why 
has [insert name of your favorite author] not been given one?
Quite a few of the texts students of literature have thrust upon them in 
introductory classes are unpopular with them; perhaps they are unpopular 
with them precisely because they are thrust upon them. You might hate 
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having to read Franklin’s Autobiography when you have to, but enjoy it 
when you do it because you want to; or you might hate reading Pride and 
Prejudice no matter how free you were in choosing to do so, as Mark Twain 
kept saying, for example, when insisting in Following the Equator that ‘[j]ust 
that one omission [of Jane Austen’s books] alone would make a fairly good 
library out of a library that hadn’t a book in it’ (312). Unpopularity always 
has a context, and by def inition there is no unpopularity without context; 
the concept itself presumes a certain audience (even if it does not contain a 
single member), and it does not describe a property intrinsic to the cultural 
artifact itself, but one that is always somehow inscribed upon it. Twain does 
such inscribing on Austen’s texts in the quotation above, questioning her 
popularity by demanding her radical unpopularity; more often than not, 
however, such power lies not with individuals but with groups of people 
who exert suff icient influence over the discourse to attest or deny (un)
popularity. The study of unpopular culture, then, is also the study of audi-
ences, and it tends to be concerned more with the reception of cultural 
artifacts than with their production, since unpopularity presupposes an 
audience. At the same time, considerations and aspects of unpopularity 
are certainly part of production of the work as well as the work itself, and 
it would be reductive and misguided to consider the study of unpopular 
culture as a kind of reader-response criticism in which all popularity is 
produced solely in the recipient.
There are many different aesthetics of the unpopular, never f ixed but 
ever-changing in different times and cultural contexts, but present nonethe-
less, and they can be described in relation to their historical moment of 
production and reception. Unpopularity can be sought, produced, and 
used for different purposes; it can be a source of aesthetic liberation from 
the constraints of popular taste or from those of critical esteem. Yet, at 
the same time, popularity and unpopularity are always somewhat beyond 
control, even though manufacturing consent has been part of the capitalist 
cultural industry for a long time. This may be one of the strongest subversive 
potentials of the unpopular in a society that def ines popularity in terms of 
commerce, and this is where the aesthetics and the politics of unpopular 
culture become indistinguishable: its irreducible ability to surprise the 
cultural market, to deny popularity where it should be granted, to create 
something that cannot be used, to f ind the niches and loopholes and blind 
spots in a system of commerce that should not have any. At the same time, 
the unpopular is always in danger of being made popular, of being bought 
and sold, and any subversive potential can always be integrated within the 
very system it seeks to undermine. If ‘any System which cannot tolerate 
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heresy [is] a system which, by its nature, must sooner or later fall’ (Pynchon 
747), then capitalism has avoided its downfall by being exceptionally good 
at tolerating (i.e. incorporating) heresy against it. You can always offer the 
underground anarchist punk band a million-dollar record contract and 
ask them to become Blink 182; in fact, the Sex Pistols have always been a 
product of the very industry they allegedly attacked. (Then again, we can 
only imagine what would have happened if someone had offered Anal Cunt 
a similar contract.)
Nevertheless, unpopular culture can potentially subvert the very founda-
tion of the popular and offers ways of rethinking even the most dominant 
of ideologies. If popular culture—just as much as high culture—is being 
used to create the people in the f irst place, not as a culture for the people 
but a culture constructing the people as a people by giving them a history 
and an identity, then unpopular culture is the disruptive element in this 
construction, resisting its homogenizations and omissions, opposing the 
complete smoothing of a striated cultural space. In Empire, Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri f irst pose the crucial question ‘what is a people and how 
is it made?’ and then go on to argue that this construct is the result, and not 
the foundation, of the national and its Modern homogenizations: ‘Although 
“the people” is posed as the originary basis of the nation, the modern concep-
tion of the people is in fact a product of the nation-state, and survives only 
within its specific ideological context” (102, emphasis in original). Both high 
culture and popular culture have participated in this homogenizing process 
of identity formation, and one will f ind sites of resistance to this power of 
the national with the global unpopular cultures that offer a multitudinous 
Other to the Empire of high and low, pop, or mass cultures, although they 
also pervade and partake of them, and they both support and resist their 
mechanisms. Within this national and global cultural industry, it may well 
be unpopular culture that is still able to tell the stories and histories nobody 
wants to hear, sing the songs nobody else wants to sing, show the world what 
it does not want to see, and ultimately give the people what they don’t want 
because what they want was never what they really needed.
Notes
1. For a solid overview and brief history of grindcore and its political outlooks, 
see Salmhofer.
2. For an excellent study of Modernism and commercialism, see Catherine 
Turner‘s Marketing Modernism between the Two World Wars, in which she 
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argues that, ‘without embracing consumer culture wholeheartedly, the 
modernists saw that they had much to gain by reaching a détente with 
commerce. Their art remained sacred products of their own inspiration, 
but they also saw that if they really wanted to ‘make it new’—in the broad 
sense of changing human perception and experience in the world—they 
would have to reach an audience’ (4), or in other words: become popular.
3. For an excellent discussion of Melville’s (un)popularity and his relevance 
for popular culture, see Richard Hardack’s essay ‘“Or, the Whale”: Unpopular 
Melville in the Popular Imagination, or a Theory of Unusability’, in which 
he answers his question of ‘why most of Melville‘s works remain unknown 
or unpopular, not just resistant to interpretation, but almost invisible and 
‘unreadable’ in popular media’ (8) by usefully exploring the unpopular as 
the unutilizable.
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 Why We Talk the Talk We Talk
On the Emptiness of Terms, the Processual Un/Popular, 
and Benefits of Distinction—Some Auto-Ethnographical 
Remarks
Martin Butler
Granted, the term ‘unpopular culture’ adds some spice to the soup of terms 
we1 usually stir when we talk the talk we are used to (supposed to?) talk 
in the study of popular culture. ‘Unpopular culture’, to be precise, sounds 
somewhat more ‘exotic’, even subversive, compared to the more established 
repertoire of concepts that usually come in dichotomies—‘mass culture’, 
‘low culture’, ‘the mainstream’, as opposed to ‘elite culture’, ‘high culture’, 
‘avant-garde’, to mention perhaps the most prominent examples. But what’s 
in it, one might well ask, despite its challenging pref ix ‘un-’, which, indeed, 
somewhat surprisingly, irritates our set of taken-for-granted terms and 
concepts? My contribution takes this question as a starting point to explore 
if, and, if yes, in how far thinking and talking about ‘unpopular’ culture 
might be a fruitful exercise, not so much with regard to the examination 
of specif ic popular cultural practices and forms of expression, but rather 
with an eye on the ways we talk a talk in which the above-mentioned terms, 
including the ‘unpopular’, are used as categories of self-positioning, rather 
than as analytical categories.
The inspiration for this essay sprang from the long-winded discussions 
with my 18-year-old daughter on what is popular and what is not—discus-
sions that I get involved in quite regularly to learn why it is that I (and the 
things I am doing) are particularly unpopular. This is perhaps no coinci-
dence, as it is exactly these discussions that made me sensitive toward 
the contingency of the terms and concepts I regularly employ in scholarly 
discourse. To be more precise, the very fact that the conversations with 
my daughter happen in a non-academic context made me realize that the 
dynamics of the debate about what is popular and what is unpopular are 
highly dependent on the social environment in which the debate takes 
place. In other words: the debate as well as the actors’ positioning within 
that debate are processes that are distinctly context-specific. Consequently, 
claims of what is popular and what is not are, f irst, relational acts of creat-
ing difference, and second, charged with normative implications both in 
everyday and in scholarly discourse.
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Moreover, after some closer inspection of the situations I had in mind, 
I also came to the conclusion that in the conversations I have with my 
daughter we rarely use the term ‘popular’, and I think we hardly, if ever, 
use the term ‘unpopular’. Instead, we refer to a range of synonyms and 
alternatives, using a more nuanced vocabulary to navigate within this 
process of positioning ourselves, which, in fact, added to my curiosity 
about these situations. To be precise, when my daughter says ‘uncool’, 
she probably means ‘unpopular’, at least this is what I assume. Based on 
this assumption, then, I observe myself deliberately contradicting her, 
using ‘uncool’ as a synonym for what I think she would consider ‘popular’ 
in the f irst place, i.e. everything that is hit-listed, everything that is a 
must-have, everything that you have to acquire to be included and, at the 
same time, to be able to exclude those who cannot afford it. This is also 
everything I dislike—at least that’s what I keep on proclaiming in these 
very conversations.
So—I have been asking myself again and again—am I lured into believ-
ing in the somewhat too orthodox voice of Adorno telling me, as a parent, 
to be skeptical of whatever is termed ‘popular’ by my daughter? Me, who 
considers himself quite familiar with the Birmingham narrative of sub-
versive appropriation and the emancipatory potential of popular culture? 
Quite intuitively, and somewhat at odds with my academic socialization, 
it seems that I try to position myself in a debate that, though at least I 
should be aware that nobody will prevail, is still fought with passion and 
stamina. Perhaps this is what I do. And so does my daughter, and as the 
debate continues, I have the feeling that, somehow, both of us lose: my 
daughter, who is victimized by the culture industry (at least this is the 
position I observe myself taking), and me too, since I turn out to be worried 
after each and every conversation, exactly because I realize that I don’t 
really think that there is something intrinsically bad in popular culture 
(yet I keep on arguing along these lines).
In the following, I would like to take these highly anecdotal, auto-
ethnographic observations as a starting point for some ref lections on 
what we do when we talk about popular culture, and what this talk does 
both to us and to popular culture. I would like to begin my exploration by 
questioning the benefits of the category of the ‘unpopular’ in the f irst place. 
In other words: what is gained once we add to the range of dichotomies 
that scholars in the f ield of popular cultural studies have been keen to 
deconstruct, another term that, once related to these dichotomies, might 
run the risk of perpetuating rather than questioning them? Sure, a term 
such as ‘unpopular’ might contribute to irritating established concepts and 
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might thus complicate matters in a productive way, if we ask, as Lüthe and 
Pöhlmann do in the introduction to this volume: ‘How does unpopular-
ity relate to popular and high culture? Can there even be such a thing as 
unpopular culture, or is the unpopular at odds with culture itself? […] What 
particular f ields of popular and high culture distance themselves from 
or embrace the unpopular?’ (10) However, as irritating as these questions 
might be, one might as well argue that they indeed frame the unpopular 
by sketching (and thus perpetuating) a set of established notions and ideas, 
of popular culture, of high culture, and of certain ‘f ields’ that are said to 
exist in each domain.
But then again, how else should we approach the unpopular, if not 
through the creation of difference, through the search and identif ication 
of the ‘absent’ other, as has been the case with the established definitions 
of popular culture that all work on the basis of a logic of distinction? Yet, 
once we accept that ‘popular’ is a relational category and arrive at John 
Storey’s conclusion that ‘popular culture is in effect an empty conceptual 
category, one which can be f illed in a wide variety of often conflicting ways 
depending on the context of use’ (1), I think we need to acknowledge that 
the ‘unpopular’ might be equally empty. If this is the case, then how do we 
determine the ‘absent other’ of a conceptual category that itself is but an 
‘empty category’?
What adds to this epistemological dilemma that results from the double 
contingency of two ‘empty conceptual categor[ies]’ is the highly norma-
tive history of the term ‘popular’, which comes with a lot of ideological 
underpinnings and is charged with a range of connotations, depending, of 
course, on the specific ‘context of use’, as Storey would argue. Consequently, 
a concept such as the ‘unpopular’, through its built-in reference to the 
‘popular’ as its point of departure, is not only diff icult to grasp, but also 
highly contaminated.
Where, then, do we go from here, if we do not want to abandon the 
term and still believe that—despite its inherent problems as an analytical 
category—it might be worth exploring? One way of turning its contingency 
and its normative dimension from a bug into a feature might be to conceive 
(in the sense of Storey) of the ‘unpopular’ (e.g. as in ‘unpopular culture’) 
not as an ontological category, but as a discursive ascription. That is, not 
as an ‘organic’ or essential characteristic of specif ic cultural practices or 
artifacts, but as a highly precarious, momentous, and discursively assigned 
quality, which is constituted (and vanishes?) within processes of recep-
tion, appropriation, and commodif ication, framed by specif ic discursive 
settings which, in turn, operate according to a set of context-dependent 
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rules and regulations. Acknowledging this processual quality (i.e. the 
discursive constitution and the ‘situatedness’ of both categories) may help 
conceive of ‘popular’ and ‘unpopular’ not as a terminological or conceptual 
dichotomy, but as different moments in the ‘appropriation trajectories’ of 
cultural practices and artifacts.
Such a notion of the processual un/popular, then, may indeed unfold 
analytical potential, as it allows us to describe and understand the politics 
of positioning in a debate I regularly have with my daughter—a debate 
that could thus be conceived of as a process of drafting specif ic subject 
positions for both of us, subject positions that we accept or not, that we 
may conform to, but also struggle with or work against. Against this 
backdrop, the discourse on the popular and the unpopular, in which both 
terms are continuously redef ined, turns into a site for identity formation 
and transformation, in which different actors, non-academic as well as 
academic, continuously set out to situate and re-situate themselves, more 
or less successfully.
What might be helpful for a more precise conceptualization of what is 
at stake in these situational formations and arrangements is the notion of 
‘identitarian capital’ introduced by Sebastian Thies and Olaf Kaltmeier. 
Though they specif ically look at transcultural processes of identity forma-
tion in their theoretical outline of identitarian capital, the concept might 
serve well to add precision to the description of what is going in the discourse 
on the ‘unpopular’. With reference to Bourdieu, Thies and Kaltmeier argue 
that identitarian capital is negotiated on what they call ‘the f ield of identity 
politics’ (25 et passim), in which ‘all positions are informed by situational 
components and the interrelation with other actors in the f ield and can 
thus be seen as part of complex constellations’ (37).
Their notion of identitarian capital, then, is based on the idea that one can 
‘use’ his or her cultural identity as capital in processes of strategic position-
ing in that f ield, while these acts of positioning, in turn, may increase or 
diminish one’s ‘amount’ of identitarian capital, so to speak. For instance, 
in academic contexts, the identitarian capital accumulated through talks, 
publications, acquired funding, etc., is a resource scholars may rely upon 
to strategically position themselves and to draw attention to what they 
write. The same capital would perhaps affect things negatively in a different 
context, for instance, in a family argument about what is popular and what 
is not, where the subject position ‘scholar’ would not be acknowledged 
in the same way (if at all). In more abstract terms, ‘a person’s individual 
constellation of subject positions may in certain constellations facilitate 
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intervention […] or hinder it, while in other constellations the roles might 
be inversed’ (Thies and Kaltmeier 30).2
Accordingly, Thies and Kaltmeier describe identitarian capital as
a form of capital that merges together aspects of Bourdieu’s concepts 
of cultural, social and symbolic capital. Cultural identities comprise 
habitualized manners, language, education, and emotional belonging, 
all related to cultural capital as an incorporated form of knowledge about 
social distinction. Social capital bears on social networks, institutional 
belonging and political organization. (29–30)
‘Contrary to economic capital,’ they eventually conclude, ‘identitarian 
capital does not obey a logic of scarcity, but serves as a sort of credit by 
means of which a certain actor receives recognition and power from his 
social environment. In this way, it resembles the characteristics of symbolic 
capital’ (30). As already hinted at above, this credit is, of course, not so easily 
transferable from one social or discursive environment to another, nor do 
social or discursive environments automatically acknowledge the capital I 
bring—to be sure, this is exactly where the trouble starts, as when we talk 
the talk we talk, the credits associated with this talk is highly dependent 
on the specif ic context in which we talk this talk (cf. also Maase).
What’s in it, now, that would further our understanding of the tricky 
business of talking about the popular and the unpopular? I think the answer 
could be at least twofold: f irst, to label something or somebody as ‘popular’ 
or ‘unpopular’ becomes part of a ‘narration of identitarian positionings and 
positions’ (Thies and Kaltmeier 39), i.e. whenever I call something ‘popular’ 
or ‘unpopular’, it may actually tell you more about who I am than about 
what I have been trying to describe. Moreover, it def initely matters when 
and where I call something or somebody ‘popular’ or ‘unpopular’, as my 
authority to say so heavily depends on my identitarian capital, which, in 
turn, is determined and eventually affected—i.e. diminished, increased, 
transformed—by the very situational parameters that frame my discursive 
intervention.
And, to be sure, such narrations of identitarian positionings and posi-
tions that draw upon the ‘popular’ and the ‘unpopular’ are manifold and 
can be found in different contexts: there is, for instance, an Institute for 
Unpopular Culture, the IFUC, which is—and I quote from the website—
‘a San Francisco-based organization that supports emerging artists and 
promotes artistic attempts to challenge the status quo. By sponsoring 
subversive or ‘unpopular’ artistic visions, IFUC helps to alleviate artists’ 
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needs to cater to public taste and opinion in order to survive’ (IFUC). Thus, 
clearly aligning the unpopular with the subversive, ascribing a distinctly 
political momentum to it, the Institute presents and positions itself as a 
supporter of cultural ‘dissenters’ and marginalized voices. And, as a more 
historical part of this narrative of positioning suggests, the Institute seems 
to have been quite successful in this regard:
The founder of the IFUC, David Ferguson, produced, managed, and 
directed the careers of musicians like Johnny Rotten (Public Image, Ltd.), 
Billy Bragg, The Avengers, Lydia Lunch, and Henry Rollins. David also op-
erated a lecture agency in the 1970s which represented the Black Panther 
Party, Paul Krassner (founder of the Yippie Party), Stewart Brand (founder 
of the Whole Earth catalogue), and poet Michael McClure. (IFUC)
The Festival of Unpopular Culture, which took place in October 2013, set 
out to ‘blur the lines between high-art and pop culture,’ thus implying 
quite a different notion of the ‘unpopular’ (‘Festival’). SCRAM magazine, 
which calls itself ‘a journal of unpopular cultures,’ has been chronicling 
‘the neglected, the odd, the nifty and the nuts’ (SCRAM), whereas a past 
exhibition at the Southbank Centre in London called ‘Unpopular Culture’ 
featured a selection from the Arts Council Collection consisting of ‘modern 
British paintings, sculpture and photographs’, thereby associating with 
the unpopular a notion of avant-garde, or vice versa (‘Unpopular Culture: 
Grayson Perry’).
In all of these examples, the ‘unpopular’ implies something slightly dif-
ferent. What these narratives have in common, though, is that all of them 
use the term ‘unpopular’ not only as a descriptive category, but also, and 
more signif icantly so, as a normative category that serves the purpose of 
symbolic distinction. The term and concept of the ‘unpopular’, then, indeed 
becomes a signifier that is used to draw lines of demarcation and to position 
oneself. The discourse that draws on these terms and concepts is therefore 
‘primarily a political discourse’ (Tragaki 8). ‘The politics of who says what 
is ‘popular’ [or ‘unpopular’, M.B.],’ writes Dafni Tragaki, ‘what it means, 
and against what it is def ined, and of course, when, where, and for whom, 
reproduce ‘the popular’ [as well as the ‘unpopular’, M.B.] as an ideologically 
pregnant category’ (8). And though we all know, we sometimes forget that 
this discourse not only ‘happens’ in the f ield of cultural production, but 
also among those who observe this very f ield, i.e. us.
In other words, ‘observers are considered actors in the f ield which, just 
as all other actors, necessarily take the role of observers’, employing a 
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‘hermeneutics of the other’ (high culture, popular culture) to continuously 
position and re-position themselves and, as Thies and Kaltmeier explain 
further, ‘in relation to identity politics the f ield cannot be observed from 
a neutral perspective without the observer’s transforming the f ield by 
his power of vision and division’ (44). Starting from here, then, one may 
ask what or in how far this present volume contributes to the discourse 
on the popular and the unpopular respectively; or, to put it into a more 
Bourdieusian diction, to: ‘transforming the f ield by […] vision and division’ 
(Thies and Kaltmeyer 44)? What narrations of identitarian positions and 
positionings does it foster, and who or what is positioned where through 
these very narrations?
Perhaps I am writing about processes that we are all aware of anyway. 
And perhaps this sounds all too didactic. Still, I consider these issues worth 
remembering, because, I must admit, I sometimes forget about them; for 
instance, when I’m arguing with my daughter, i.e. when I am subjected to 
another discourse in a familiar and at the same time unfamiliar environ-
ment, in which my capital as a scholar does not facilitate, but, somewhat 
paradoxically, hinders discursive intervention in a debate that I think I am 
familiar with.
So what I would like to emphasize is the necessity of acknowledging 
that the descriptive and normative dimensions (and usages) of the terms 
‘popular’ and ‘unpopular’, as both categories of analytical differentiation 
and categories of social distinction are intertwined, at times even conflated, 
both in public and scholarly debates. In other words, the discussion on 
the difference between popular and unpopular is, more often than not, a 
discussion on the difference between you and me, or us and them, or X and 
Y, discussing the difference between popular and unpopular. And it is here, 
one might argue, where the double contingency mentioned above, i.e. the 
diff iculties in defining the unpopular because of the diff iculties in defining 
its other, turns out to be highly fruitful and productive, as it allows for a 
great diversity of narratives that serve the purpose of strategic positioning.
I believe that a critical awareness of both conflation and contingency is all 
the more important, as (most of the) scholars in the f ield of popular culture 
studies, I assume, take part in public and scholarly as well as private debates 
on the popular and the unpopular. At least I do. Consequently, the set of 
ideas and stories I produce about what is popular and what is not, in order to 
act according to the various subject positions ascribed to me—which, by the 
way, constitutes what Thies and Kaltmeier call the ‘microphyics of identity 
politics’ (31)—is always, and necessarily, framed by ‘multi-sited contextual-
ity’ (38). This contextuality, then, should make us conceive of actors in the 
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f ield, such as me and my daughter, as ‘networks of dispositions’ rather than 
‘homogenous, coherent, and entirely self-determined subjects’ (Thies and 
Kaltmeier 38). No wonder, then, that in our everyday life—negotiation of 
the identitarian capital we invest for strategic purposes—my daughter and 
I are not really talking to each other about what is unpopular and what is 
not. We are, in fact talking, about each other (and our relationship) without 
talking about each other (and our relationship) explicitly. If I told her that, 
she would not believe me. No way. Considering the aforesaid, however, this 
does not come as a surprise. It turns out to be part of the game.
Notes
1. Whenever I use ‘we’ in this essay, I refer to an implied readership that I 
assume works in the field of popular cultural studies and, thus, has become 
aware of the problems attached to the term ‘popular’. The ‘we’ is not at all 
meant to suggest any generally agreed upon consensus on terms, concepts, 
or normative implications, but—in accordance with the auto-ethnograph-
ical approach that this essay pursues—is supposed to denote a particularly 
self-reflexive dimension of the practice of talking about un/popular culture, 
which is central to my argument. Of course, this is not to imply either that 
‘we’ share the same or similar experiences with this practice and the ways 
of reflecting on it. In addition, the use of the first person pronoun both in 
the singular and plural form is also a deliberate attempt at self-positioning 
in a debate—why else should I write such a piece?
2. As already hinted at, Thies and Kaltmeier conceptualize identitarian capital 
in and for a different context, thus its applicability to what I describe here 
might be limited. Nevertheless, I allow myself to refer to their term and 
concept as it nicely captures the processes of negotiating and positioning 
that become visible in the debates on the ‘un/popular’.
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 Big Fish
On the Relative Popularity of Zane Grey and Ernest 
Hemingway1
Dominika Ferens
Why does a man with such great talent continually deny his sensitivity and 
overprotest his masculinity? He is so virile and so vast—why does he waste his 
time roughhousing with playboys, trying to catch the biggest f ish, 
to bring that f ish in the fastest […]?
—Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings on Ernest Hemingway (qtd. in Eby 94)
The rivalries between boatmen are keen and important, and they are fostered by 
unsportsman-like f ishermen. And f ishermen live among past associations; they 
grow to believe their performances unbeatable and they hate to see a new king 
crowned. This may be human, since we are creatures who want always to excel, 
but it is irritating to the young f ishermen. As for myself, what did I care how 
much the swordf ish weighed? He was huge, magnif icent, 
and game to the end of that four-hour battle.
—Zane Grey, Tales of Fishes (42)
This paper was born of a fascination with the overlapping lives of two Ameri-
can writers who made it their business to popularize the unpopular or the 
not-yet-popular. When they were not writing about not-yet-popular pursuits 
and places, they traveled, f ished, and hunted compulsively, leaving behind 
them long trails of publicity photographs. With the rise of the internet, 
hundreds of photographs of Grey and Hemingway with their trophies—big 
f ish, rhinos, lions, bulls, bullf ighters, and natural wonders—were uploaded 
onto fanpages and archive websites.2 Zane Grey (1872–1939) and Ernest 
Hemingway (1899–1961) frequented some of the same fishing resorts, includ-
ing Key West and Bimini, and while they never met, biographical sources 
on Gray make references to Hemingway, who is said to have so admired 
Grey’s non-f iction book Tales of Fishes that he bought several copies to give 
to friends. On hearing this, Grey wrote to Hemingway, inviting him on a 
round-the-world f ishing trip. Hemingway declined—perhaps fearing that 
prolonged association with the aging pulp f iction writer might damage his 
reputation (cf. May 149).
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While Hemingway requires no biographical introductions, few contem-
porary readers of American literature know that Grey was once the most 
revered writer of late-Romantic Westerns.3 At the height of his career, in 
the 1910s and ’20s, he took millions of Americans on vicarious trips to the 
Southwest, and many of his novels are still in print. One might assume 
that his choice of the Western genre guaranteed popularity. Yet, there was 
nothing inevitable about Grey’s rise to fame. Trained as a dentist, he should 
have spent his life f illing teeth. To relieve the boredom of dentistry, he began 
writing f iction based on his family’s pioneering days in eighteenth-century 
Ohio, and then moved on to stories of adventure set in the Southwest. 
But initially his choice of setting did not guarantee a wide audience. As 
cultural studies scholar Lee Clark Mitchell observes (and it is an electrifying 
observation), in the nineteenth century, when Grey was growing up, most 
Americans had little interest in what was going on in the West and no 
intention of ever going there (cf. 5). The cowboy was not yet a national icon. 
It was President Theodore Roosevelt and Owen Wister who valorized the 
West by writing about their ranching life for select audiences; it was Grey 
who f ictionalized it for millions.4
Meanwhile, Ernest Hemingway, a Modernist who expressed deep 
contempt for popularity, gradually won both critical and popular acclaim, 
to eventually become a ‘classic’ in the American canon. On the surface, 
then, it would seem that Grey and Hemingway are a perfect illustration 
of the two-tier system described by Pierre Bourdieu: the literary f ield 
sustains two economic structures, one that produces ‘bestsellers’, the other 
‘classics’. Large publishing houses with a rapid turnover and large print 
runs tend to invest in ‘bestsellers’; smaller houses use ‘talent-spotters’ who 
are able to ‘sense the laws of a market yet to come’. In a cultural climate 
in which ‘success is suspect’, such small publishers invest in little-known 
authors and groom them, with the help of reviewers and literary critics, 
to become ‘classics’, thus earning a long-term prof it on their (ostensibly) 
throwaway investment (cf. Bourdieu 101). Thus, the very features that 
potentially make a book popular in one period (such as the right propor-
tion of the familiar to the unfamiliar in an easily recognizable genre) may 
make it unpopular in another, or else popular with a different group (for 
instance, novels originally written for adults sometimes slide into the 
category of juvenile f iction). Conversely, books that usher in new genres, 
elude generic categorization, or challenge the broad reading public’s sense 
of decorum, sometimes manage to interpellate a new reading public, which 
builds its distinction around a preference for the unpopular. Eventually, 
with the right institutional backing, some originally unpopular books 
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enter national canons and are read by generations of high-school and 
university students.
But the case of Grey and Hemingway is not as clear-cut as Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theory of ‘bestsellers’ and ‘classics’ would suggest.5 It is worth 
discussing these two writers together because their works and careers raise 
questions about the criterion of ‘popularity’ used to sort writers into boxes, 
and about the cachet attached to ‘unpopularity’. In addition to thinking 
about (un)popularity in terms of the book marketplace, this paper will 
explore the thematic continuities in the work of Grey and Hemingway to 
question some of the distinctions made between popular and highbrow 
subjects and forms. What I see is an economy of the popular/unpopular, 
a continuous flow between these elusive categories. It is not that I want 
to reclaim Grey as an unrecognized ‘classic’; the formulaic character of 
most of his f iction does not permit such a repositioning. What I would 
like to show is that, writing in more or less the same period, Grey and 
Hemingway consistently traded in the not-yet-popular, which was often 
synonymous with the exotic; that they used similar strategies of controlling 
their public image to boost book sales; and that they were both read by 
millions, though perhaps not the same millions. These two Americans 
of respectable small-town middle-class background (Grey, the son of an 
Ohio dentist; Hemingway, the son of an Illinois doctor) both managed to 
write themselves out of the middle class by being popular with the middle 
class. Drawing on Robert W. Trogdon’s 2007 study of Hemingway’s lifelong 
relations with Scribners, I will try to show how Hemingway negotiated 
the problem of ‘popularity’, endlessly vacillating between desire and fear 
of popular recognition. As there is no comparable archival study of Zane 
Grey’s relations with his publisher, Harper and Brothers, I will draw on 
biographical sources to show how he dealt with the waxing and waning 
of his own popularity.
The Book Marketplace and Changing Readerships
Stuart Hall and Elizabeth Traube single out the early decades of the twenti-
eth century, when Grey and Hemingway made their careers, as a period of 
technological and social transformations that reorganized popular culture. 
‘Local entrepreneurs who catered to class-specif ic urban markets gave way 
to oligopolistic corporations producing for national markets’ (Stansell and 
Peiss qtd. in Traube 140). In the nineteenth century, print runs had been 
relatively small in comparison with those in the 1910s and ’20s. Grey’s books 
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were among the f irst to sell in hundreds of thousands. Even Hemingway’s 
avant-garde Modernist novels sold in tens of thousands.
Grey and Hemingway were both read by crossover audiences: Grey by 
middle- and low-brow audiences, Hemingway by middle- and high-brow 
audiences. Within their lifetime, a rift began to form within the middle-
brow readership: some continued to embrace the traditional ‘producer 
ethic based on work and self-denial’, while others were attracted to the 
‘emergent ethic of consumption’ and ‘a new promise of sensory excite-
ment, sexual expressiveness, and emotional release’ (Traube 140–41). Grey 
and Hemingway clearly espoused the ethic of consumption. Posing for 
publicity photographs, they modeled a lifestyle for their fans,6 as did their 
literary characters. If those characters chose to live modestly—even asceti-
cally—they did so in exciting, faraway places. The large print runs made 
possible by the new publishing industry meant generous royalties that 
gave both men the freedom to travel and write about places inaccessible 
to most of their contemporaries. Grey was one of the earliest tourists in the 
American Southwest; by writing about this region, he was able to tap into 
urban Americans’ longing for wide-open spaces. Rather than cash in on a 
pre-existing fad, he created the fad himself, and when masses of tourists 
following in his footsteps trampled his beloved natural wonders, he sought 
new pastures. Likewise, Hemingway drew his readers toward exotic places, 
from the Left Bank in Paris, through rural Spain and East Africa, to Cuba 
and the Florida Keys.
Both writers offered sensory excitement but learned to temper their im-
agination so as to maintain the middlebrow readership. For Grey this meant 
completely suppressing his interest in sex. As critic Jane Tompkins pointed 
out, Grey powerfully projected the erotic onto the Western landscapes—a 
skill that elevates him above the average pulp writer.7 Writing in the more 
sexually liberated post-First World War times, Hemingway frequently 
explored heterosexual relations but had to avoid overt depictions of the 
erotic and to suppress his interest in the non-heterosexual.
Like cultural change anywhere, the developments in the US of the early 
twentieth-century meant that ‘some cultural forms [were] driven out of the 
center of popular life […] so that something else [could] take their place’ 
(Hall 443). Grey’s romances, styled on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s and Robert 
Louis Stevenson’s, were increasingly pushed out of the center to be read 
mainly by immigrants and young adults. Meanwhile, middle-brow readers 
acquired a taste for Hemingway’s ascetic style and innuendos, embracing 
him as the voice of a generation. But this cultural process did not happen 
spontaneously. By examining Hemingway’s writings we can observe how 
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Hemingway actively pushed older, less modern writers out of the center to 
make room for ‘the new’.
The Western Legacy
Both Grey and Hemingway can be viewed as heirs to the rancher-turned-
president, Theodore Roosevelt8 and to Owen Wister9 who elevated the 
Western from pulp to classic in The Virginian. Aligning themselves with 
Roosevelt and Wister, Grey and Hemingway built their careers on an ethos 
Jane Tompkins identif ied (with reference to Grey) as ‘being, acting, and 
writing [which] formed a perfect continuum’ (163). Grey met his frontier 
hero Charles Jesse ‘Buffalo’ Jones at a lecture in New York and followed him 
out to Arizona. It was to Jones and the Mormon rancher Jim Emmett that 
he owed his f irst heady experience of pioneering in the desert, f ictionalized 
in The Last of the Plainsmen (cf. May 48-52). Henceforth, Grey would spend 
part of each year in the Southwest, hunting, trekking, and keeping notes 
that would later be transformed into f iction or articles for men’s magazines.
Hemingway, in turn, was a belated cowboy who spent long periods on 
‘dude ranches’ in Wyoming and Idaho. Few of his af icionados, however, are 
aware of these episodes because he wrote so little about them. Why he chose 
not to do so can be explained by the fact that by the 1930s pulp writers and 
Hollywood studios had thoroughly exploited the old frontier states. The 
logic of tourist and literary consumption drove Hemingway to seek other 
frontiers in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean, even though he sometimes 
retreated to the West to write (for instance during the Great Depression).10
The Masculine Code
Arguably, one of the sources of Grey’s and Hemingway’s popularity, par-
ticularly with male readers, was the fact that they were heirs to the ‘Code of 
the West’ popularized by Wister’s The Virginian. The eponymous narrator 
travels from the East Coast to a Wyoming Ranch, where he gradually learns 
the code by observing the modest, laconic, stoical Virginian. He sketches 
scenes that illustrate the Virginian’s protective attitude toward women and 
all weaker beings (including the narrator and an eccentric old hen) and the 
Virginian’s sense of responsibility for the local community. At times, being 
responsible means taking the law into his own hands. Like the Virginian, 
Wetzel in Betty Zane, Hare in Heritage of the Desert, and Lassiter in Riders 
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of the Purple Sage do not shirk from lynching cattle thieves, kidnappers, 
despots, and bad Indians. Grey took over the masculine code wholesale, 
creating a series of male characters who risk their lives to protect women’s 
honor, expecting nothing in return, not even love.
In line with Roosevelt and Wister, Grey believed the Frontier to be crucial 
for hardening white men in body and spirit. According to eugenicists, as a 
result of ‘overcivilization’, the white race could lose its dominant position 
in the United States and in the world.11 Whites were the only race capable of 
bringing progress and making full use of the continent’s natural resources. 
As critics Richard Slotkin and Lee Clark Mitchell have argued, the wide-
spread anxiety over the condition of white masculinity was associated with 
economic and cultural change. The industrial revolution had pressed the 
small farmers and entrepreneurs into factories and offices, where obedience 
and productivity was valued higher than individualism and resourcefulness. 
The Civil War and the First World War had stripped many men of the faith in 
righteous, heroic struggle. Rightly assuming that American male factory and 
office workers longed to identify with heroes who were their own antithesis, 
Grey created many hypermasculine protagonists who had the freedom 
to ride, track and shoot game, herd cattle across wide open spaces, and 
dispense justice. Yet, Grey was just as interested in disoriented, indecisive 
men weakened by illness. For instance, the Easterner Hare in Heritage of 
the Desert learns ranching and survival skills in the uplands of Utah, but 
he often hesitates to use arms, and spends days in hiding, outnumbered 
by thugs, and unable to make a heroic gesture. Critic Alf F. Wallee goes so 
far as to say that the gradual domination of society over the individualistic 
hero is what distinguishes Grey’s heroes from Wister’s Virginian.
Hemingway’s indebtedness to nineteenth-century models of masculinity 
is less apparent,12 but the fact that he jeered at heroic codes in his f iction 
should not blind us to the centrality of heroism in his f iction and to his 
insistence on developing codes of conduct better suited to life in the shadow 
of modern warfare. Equipped with a personal code of conduct, Hemingway’s 
heroes maintain dignity in a world where all authorities, human and divine, 
have failed. In the face of chaos and suffering they adopt a stoical stance. 
While they have few opportunities to mete out justice, they care about it 
profoundly. To allow the reader to observe how the personal code works, 
Hemingway juxtaposes his heroes with antiheroes who lack the inner 
compass and rely on second-hand codes. As a self-conscious modernist, 
Hemingway rejected idealism, but he continued to valorize some of the key 
themes of Romantic literature, including masculinity, death, and nature. 
Like the frontier mythmakers, he insisted on nature’s regenerative powers.13 
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It may well have been the presence of these themes that led Owen Wister to 
take an interest in Hemingway’s career and to put in a good word for him 
at Scribners (cf. Trogdon 74–75).
The Trouble with Femininity
Inflating the value of masculinity inevitably leads to the devaluation of 
femininity. Grey and Hemingway were both traditionalists, in the sense 
that they assumed only men are bound by hero code. Female characters 
(for instance, Grey’s Jane Withersteen or Hemingway’s Brett Ashley) may 
develop a code of their own, but they are usually too weak and emotional 
to stick to its rules.
Within Grey’s and Hemingway’s lifetime, the social position of white 
American women changed drastically. Large numbers of women began 
earning a living, f irst as factory and off ice workers, then, with greater 
access to education, in the better-paid professions. They began to show 
their ankles, practice sports, sue for divorce and, after 1920, to vote. With 
the increased migrations of rural populations to cities at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and the rise of rooming-house districts where men 
and women lived in rented apartments, far from the inquisitive gaze of 
families and neighbors, sexual norms grew less restrictive (cf. Meyerowitz 
92–115). The female characters in Grey’s and Hemingway’s f iction—fian-
cées, shepherdesses, ranchers, nurses, and guerilla f ighters—shared many 
features with the New Woman who no longer needed to be the ‘angel in 
the house’ to be admired. Though Grey liked to dress his New Woman in 
period costumes, she was arguably far more liberated and powerful than 
Hemingway’s New Woman who revealed her ankles, drank, and smoked. In 
fact, Grey devoted an entire novel, The Light of the Western Stars (1913), to a 
New Woman. Madeline Hammond, who comes to New Mexico from the East 
to recover and rebuild her life, becomes a successful businesswoman, and 
it is she who plays the role of rescuer in the novel: she crosses the Mexican 
border on horseback to save an American kidnapped by revolutionaries.
But healthy, active, and often f inancially independent though such 
f ictional characters might be, most of them depend on male protection. 
Grey’s androgynous Bess in Riders of the Purple Sage belongs to a band of 
horse rustlers and is known in town as the Masked Rider who can outride 
anyone. But when wounded in a scuffle, she becomes passive, completely 
dependent on the male protagonist, puts on weight, and starts looking 
like a woman. Hemingway’s Brett Ashley undergoes a similar, though less 
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obvious, transformation. Whereas initially she goes wherever she wants and 
is sexually adventurous, at the end of The Sun Also Rises she calls on the 
narrator to come to her rescue, acting the part of the traditional damsel in 
distress. In this respect, Hemingway’s paradigmatic Modernist novel is as 
traditional as most of Grey’s romances—a fact that may have contributed 
to its readability.
Nature as Asylum
Yet another popular theme that runs through the work of Grey and Heming-
way is the turn away from middle-class urban America toward the bosom 
of nature. Grey sought adventure in the Southwest, sublime landscapes, 
big game, and big f ish. For Hemingway it was adventure at war, at Spanish 
village f iestas, in Kenyan savannahs, and on deep-sea f ishing trips. In fact, 
he immersed himself in premodern worlds so obsessively that Saul Bellows 
made him the object of a burlesque, Henderson the Rain King (1959).
Since the turn of the nineteenth century, immersion in nature and the 
cultivation of primitive savagery in young boys had been advocated by 
American physicians as remedies for ‘overcivilization’, ‘effeminacy’, and 
‘neurasthenia’ to which white middle-class men were supposedly succumb-
ing (cf. Bederman 77–120). Such views gave rise to the scouting movement, 
of which Grey was a lifelong member and propagator. In his f iction, nature 
has regenerative power: it heals the sick and disheartened, gives shelter, 
disciplines the body, builds up the spirit, and, no less importantly, delights 
the eye. Grey’s protagonists immerse themselves in nature time and again. 
Perhaps the most idyllic natural asylum in Grey’s prose is Surprise Valley in 
Riders of the Purple Sage, which is only accessible through Deception Pass, 
overhung by the Balancing Rock. One of the protagonists comes across 
Surprise Valley by accident, and when he f irst takes a look around,
Rabbits scampered before him, and the beautiful Valley quail, as purple 
in color as the sage on the uplands, ran fleetly along the ground into the 
forest. It was pleasant under the trees, in the gold-flecked shade, with the 
whistle of quail and twittering of birds everywhere. (89)
There is a rambling brook, a spacious cave, and plenty of food. The cave 
is conveniently equipped with clay utensils—relics of an extinct Indian 
tribe. Surprise Valley gives shelter to two pairs of lovers in succession. It 
heals their wounds and erases painful memories. For the f irst couple it is a 
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temporary asylum, but for the second it is the f inal destination: Balancing 
Rock collapses and ‘the outlet to Deception Pass closed forever’ (238).14
Likewise, Hemingway as a boy was an amateur scout. He wrote memoirs 
of trips to the Illinois woods and Indian villages with his father, and in child-
hood photographs he is the splitting image of Huckleberry Finn, complete 
with dungarees, a straw hat, and a f ish dangling from his hand. We know 
that his romantic view of nature was severely shaken by the Second World 
War experience as well as naturalist philosophy, for nature in his f iction 
is usually indifferent to human dramas. Yet, Hemingway continued to 
treasure rituals associated with nature, and the longing for its regenerative 
power kept surfacing in his work—perhaps most forcefully in The Sun Also 
Rises. There, two American men experience the soothing power of a Spanish 
forest and a stream teeming with f ish. The shade of the trees protects the 
anglers from the midday sun; the stream cools their bodies and their wine 
bottles; overhanging the stream are ferns ideal for wrapping the f ish they 
catch. ‘We stayed f ive days at Burguete and had good f ishing. The nights 
were cold and the days were hot, and there was always a breeze even in 
the heat of the day. It was hot enough so that it felt good to wade in a cold 
stream, and the sun dried you when you came out and sat on the bank’ (125). 
The men cannot stay in this idyllic spot forever—they must return to their 
work and irresolvable conflicts—but they can always return to the stream 
in Burguete: the narrator has been there before, and no falling rock will bar 
access to it. Nature as asylum, nature as a regenerative force—such themes 
had been present in American literature since their introduction by the 
Transcendentalists. Tapping into these time-tried themes, both Grey and 
Hemingway appealed to a broad American readership.
Books as Commodities
Nothing could be further from the marketplace and base f inancial concerns 
than the ideal of living the ‘strenuous’ rather than the ‘good life’15 and 
retreating from time to time into premodern worlds. Yet, the books that 
convey these themes are commodities which transform aesthetic pleasure 
into capital. Hemingway’s posthumously published novel Islands in the 
Stream (1970) includes a humorous conversation about art that takes place 
in the Bahamas between a white painter and a black barman. What the 
black man has trouble understanding is how the white man manages to 
make a comfortable living by painting scenes from the everyday life of poor 
people like himself.
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‘You sell those pictures you paint all the time?’ [asks the barman]
‘They sell pretty good now’. [the painter replies]
‘People paying money for pictures of Uncle Edward. Pictures of Negroes 
in the water. Negroes on land. Negroes in boats. Sponge boats. Squalls 
making up. Water spouts. Schooners that got wrecked. Schooners build-
ing. Everything they could see for free. They really buy them?’
‘Sure they buy them. Once a year you have a show in New York and they 
sell them’. (16–17)
Note that the painter in this passage feigns lack of agency in the process of 
marketing his own work. He suggests that it becomes popular spontane-
ously. The barman asks, ‘You sell those pictures you paint all the time? […] 
They really buy them?’ obviously suggesting that such paintings would 
not sell in the Bahamas. To this the painter responds: ‘you have a show’ 
(instead of I have a show) and ‘they sell them’ instead of ‘I sell them’. I f ind 
this pronoun substitution telling, because it divorces art from the business 
of selling art. It also absolves the artist of any suspicion that he might be 
knowingly exploiting the exotic potential of the Bahamas. Yet, the f ictional 
artist’s choice of subjects is guided by the awareness of what is popular 
among some segments of New York society, as were Hemingway’s choices.
Hemingway’s literary settings are clearly the result of his search for not-
yet-popular literary terrains whose symbolic value was as yet undetermined. 
Spain was one such terrain. Encouraged by Gertrude Stein and Alice B. 
Toklas to attend a bullf ight, Hemingway traveled there. He subsequently 
spent years collecting insider knowledge about this spectator sport and 
writing a non-fiction book expressly designed to popularize something that 
for most Americans was an unfamiliar (and repulsive) subject.
To say that books about bullf ighting in Spain or deep-sea f ishing in the 
Caribbean were popular during Hemingway’s lifetime is, of, course, an over-
statement, since Scribner’s sold a total of just 20,780 copies of Hemingway’s 
non-f iction book about bullf ighting, Death in the Afternoon, and 133,650 
copies of The Old Man and the Sea. Nonetheless people in the United States 
did pay a great deal of money for ‘pictures of Uncle Edward’ (or someone 
very much like him—old Santiago in The Old Man and the Sea).
Unlike the artist in Islands in the Stream, though, Hemingway took an 
active interest in the marketing of all his work, badgering his publisher to 
spend more money on advertising, making sure his novels were serialized 
in prestigious magazines, and collecting far more review clippings from 
the syndicated press than Scribners did in their archive. For instance, in a 
letter to his editor, Hemingway wrote: ‘What about running a few chapters 
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from Death in the Afternoon [in Scribner’s Magazine] just before it comes 
out—Do you think that would be good for it. The book I mean?’ (qtd. in 
Trogdon 106). Such requests pepper his correspondence with Scribners, as 
do complaints that not enough money was being spent on publicity,16 even 
though the publisher’s advertising budget for some novels approximated 
his earnings (and, in the case of For Whom the Bell Tolls, exceeded $40,000 
[cf. Trogdon 260]).
The Unbearable Lightness of Popularity
Grey’s attitude to popularity can be described as ambivalent. There is no 
question that he sought it, writing the kinds of books that would appeal 
to the broadest possible readership. The following f igures reported by 
biographer Stephen J. May reflect the measure of Grey’s popular success: 
27 million copies of his books were sold in his lifetime; after his death, 
as late as 1991, his novels were still selling at the rate of 500,000 per year; 
at the height of his career Grey earned between $50,000 and $80,000 per 
serialized novel (in times when the dollar was worth more than ten times 
what it is today); nine of his novels made the bestseller list—the highest 
score of any writer before 1950 (May 149–51). Yet, his unpopularity with 
reviewers and critics caused him anguish, for he never abandoned the 
hope of becoming a great American author, remaining oblivious to the 
shifting distinction between middlebrow and highbrow literature, which 
followed aesthetic and philosophical rifts. Book reviews—which became 
increasingly disparaging as Grey’s f iction grew more formulaic—plunged 
him into depressions. But his career was brilliantly managed by his wife 
Lina Grey, who f inanced the publication of his f irst novels and, after 1910, 
negotiated lucrative contracts with book and magazine publishers. This 
left Grey free to do what he enjoyed most: traveling, hunting, f ishing, and 
writing.
Hemingway had to work much longer to become a household name 
in the United States, and while he scoffed at those more popular than 
himself, there is ample evidence that he longed for recognition. Early on, 
Hemingway’s talent was acknowledged and fostered by fellow writers such 
as Sherwood Anderson, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Owen Wister, and Harold Loeb. 
It was Fitzgerald who helped Hemingway secure his f irst contract with 
Scribners. For over two decades, Hemingway had his personal liaison and 
editor at Scribners, Maxwell Perkins, who cosseted and cajoled him into 
producing work that broke novelistic conventions yet was accessible to a 
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broad readership. But until the public got used to Hemingway’s style, he 
remained a promising minor author.
The fact that he came to be known as a novelist rather than a short-
story or non-f iction writer can be seen as a by-product of trying to secure 
popularity. Short f iction was his forte, but his f irst publisher, Liveright, 
and then Scribners pressured him to write novels in order to make his 
name, and then to remain popular (cf. Trogdon 19, 157). Scribners used 
his short stories strategically, placing them in Scribner’s Magazine and 
elsewhere, as a way to keep his name in the reading public’s mind during 
the long periods when he was unable to produce a novel. He found writ-
ing long f iction grueling and often asked for extended deadlines. When 
writing long f iction, his aesthetic judgment—unerring in the case of short 
stories—often failed him.
In correspondence with Perkins, Hemingway explained his understand-
ing of popularity: ‘you can’t be popular all the time unless you make a career 
of it like Mr. Galsworthy, etc. I will survive this unpopularity and with one 
more good book of stories (only these are going to be with plenty of action 
so they can understand them) and one good novel you are in a place where 
they will have to come around and eat shit again’ (qtd. in Trogdon 160). This 
passage suggests Hemingway was aware that some readers were baffled 
by his more experimental stories, so when sequencing short stories he 
alternated the more straightforward writing with the more opaque stories 
in which meaning is compressed between the lines. In correspondence with 
Perkins he explained: ‘If you want to make a living out of it, in addition every 
so often, without faking, cheating […] you have to give them something they 
understand and that has a story—not a plot—just a story they can follow 
instead of simply feel, the way most of the stories are’; ‘I know the book needs 
one more simple story of action to balance some of the diff icult stories it 
contains’ (qtd. in Trogdon 6). What we see here is Hemingway knowingly 
balancing popular and unpopular.
More ideas about popularity were occasioned by the planned release 
of The Green Hills of Africa. About this novel Hemingway write to Perkins:
It may be what people want to read. […] I believe it should sell better 
than 20,000 [it actually sold 12,532]—Winner Take Nothing had not one 
element of popularity and everything to make it unpopular. This book 
has so many elements that should make people like it—it has a long and 
good story […] plenty of story interest, suspense, and conversation, and 
it takes people bodily into a place where they have never been and most 
of them can never go. (qtd. in Trogdon 155)
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Courting popularity, Hemingway nonetheless professed contempt for the 
market reader, whom he sometimes imagined as a female member of the 
Book-of-the-Month Club. To please such clubwomen, he argued, publishers 
try to censor his prose: ‘[I] will not have any pressure brought to bear to 
make me emasculate a book to make anyone seven thousand dollars’ (qtd. 
in Trogdon 109). Elsewhere he wrote: ‘I’m the guy who’s been the worse 
emasculated of any in publishing’ (qtd. in Trogdon 116). As evidence, he 
collected cases when his competitors got away with the use of swearwords.17 
But he also made part-conciliatory part-provocative gestures toward the 
obnoxious clubwoman, even putting her into one of his books. Death in the 
Afternoon, a whimsical guidebook to bullf ighting in Spain, is repeatedly 
interrupted by the author’s dialogues with an imaginary lady-reader who 
is curious about bullf ighting but somewhat resistant to its appeal, easily 
bored, and inclined to stereotypes. For instance, during her third appear-
ance in the book they have the following exchange:
Now, what puzzles you, madame? What would you like explained?
Old lady: I noticed that when one of the horses was hit by the bull, sawdust 
came out. What explanation do you have for that, young man?
Madame, that sawdust was placed in the horse by a kindly veterinarian 
to f ill a void created by the loss of other organs.
Old lady: Thank you, sir. You made me understand it all. But surely the 
horse could not permanently replace those organs with sawdust?
Madame, it is only a temporary measure, and one that no-one can approve 
of. (79)
Although the most obvious function of these dialogues is to distinguish 
this book from standard guidebooks and provide comic relief, they are a 
poignant record of his anxiety about his work’s reception.
Even more obsessive than his imaginary bouts with the market reader are 
Hemingway’s efforts to avoid the aura of popularity. For instance, to control 
the cultural meaning of Death in the Afternoon, he refused Cosmopolitan’s 
offer to serialize several chapters (cf. Trogdon 107). He also balked at the 
proposition that it be offered to the Book-of-the-Month club to boost sales in 
a stagnating Depression Era market. ‘If anyone so acts as to put themselves 
out as a book of the month they cannot insist in ramming the good word shit 
or the sound old word xxxx down the throats of a lot of clubwomen’ (qtd. 
in Trogdon 109). (Signif icantly, in 1940 Hemingway did sign a contract with 
the Book-of-the-Month Club to publish For Whom the Bell Tolls [cf. Trogdon 
208–11]). Much of his correspondence with Perkins concerned the need to 
54 doMinik a FerenS 
eliminate/retain obscene language, particularly the words ‘fuck’ and ‘shit’. 
Perkins repeatedly warned that the inclusion of such words would lead 
to courts banning the books; Hemingway fought valiantly for each ‘fuck’ 
claiming that this word made his dialogues truly masculine and authentic.
Exposing himself to potential libel suits was yet another strategy for 
making himself unpopular. His f irst long piece of prose, Torrents of Spring, 
was an extended parody of Sherwood Anderson’s style. Such an exercise 
in self-positioning against a highly respected American author was bound 
to offend many. Throughout his career, Hemingway continued to shoot 
poisoned arrows (overtly and covertly) at his competitors. For instance, 
Scribners fought a veritable battle to prevent him from calling Gertrude 
Stein a ‘bitch’ in The Green Hills of Africa (cf. Trogdon 159–61). (Arguably, 
though, the very strategy which made Hemingway unpopular with some 
endeared him to others who enjoyed such irreverence.)
One of the most interesting attempts to position his art against popular 
literature is in the two opening chapters of The Sun Also Rises. Why the 
narrator Jake Barnes would spend two chapters gossiping about Robert 
Cohn, the most pathetic expatriate in Paris, only becomes clear when we 
interpret the novel’s opening as an exercise in self-positioning in the f ield 
of American literature and, simultaneously, in the f ield of morality. By 
devaluing Robert Cohn as a writer and a man, Jake introduces us to his 
own standards. He sniggers:
That winter Robert Cohn went to America with his novel and it was 
accepted by a fairly good publisher. […] The publishers praised his novel 
pretty highly and it rather went to his head. […] He had been reading W.H. 
Hudson. That sounds like an innocent occupation, but Cohn had read and 
reread The Purple Land. The Purple Land is a very sinister book if read 
too late in life. It recounts splendid imaginary amorous adventures of a 
perfect English gentleman in an intensely romantic land, the scenery of 
which is very well described. (8–9)
Hemingway could have easily substituted the late-Romantic novel The 
Purple Land with Zane Grey’s The Riders of the Purple Sage, which also 
abounds in ‘splendid amorous adventures’ and purple prose about ‘scenery’. 
Purple or popular prose serves Hemingway as the antithesis of the laconic 
fact-f illed cables Jake sends to an American newspaper. Since Hemingway 
tended to link literary style with moral conduct (calling his own ‘straight’ 
and ‘true’),18 he made the f ictional hack writer Robert Cohn a henpecked 
bore with dated chivalric notions. Thus, from the beginning of the novel 
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the reader is expected to trust Jake, a hard-boiled reporter with no romantic 
illusions.
Most people familiar with the Paris expatriate community instantly 
recognized in Robert Cohn a caricature of Harold Loeb, an American writer 
who had been supportive of Hemingway. Several years later, in Death in the 
Afternoon, Hemingway attacked another writer with romantic notions, 
Waldo Frank, whose travel narrative Virgin Spain had allegedly become 
popular through fakery and ‘bedside mysticism’ (46–47). But this was a 
head-on attack, unmitigated by a f ictional name. It is important to un-
derstand that Hemingway was not merely being petty when he maligned 
fellow-writers Harold Loeb and Waldo Frank; he refused to cut the poten-
tially libelous material because he clearly had a stake in driving out an old 
literary practice from ‘the center of popular life […] so that something else 
[could] take [its] place’ (Hall 443). That ‘something else’ was a literature 
distinguished by formal innovation and a quality that would come to be 
known as the hipster ethos.19
Conclusions
The literature Hemingway attempted to drive out on his way to popular 
success had not always been popular. It was Zane Grey, among others, 
who had made it popular. Hard as is it is to imagine, Harper and Brothers 
rejected Grey’s f irst three novels before he convinced them to publish his 
fourth, set in Utah, Heritage of the Desert (1910). It was billed as ‘a rushing 
story […] full of action, in which men are swayed by primitive motives, 
facing death carelessly’ (May 64). Having made a profit once, Harper and 
Brothers never let Grey go. Though the sales of his books eventually dropped 
off, some remain in print in Dover Thrift Editions. As the audience for the 
romance genre shifted from the middlebrow to the lowbrow, Grey’s chances 
of becoming a ‘classic’ dwindled while Hemingway’s increased. Unable to 
reconcile his aspirations with his actual status of a popular genre writer, 
ridiculed by reviewers for his ‘purple prose’, the 51-year-old Grey wrote but 
never published ‘My Answer to the Critics’. In it, he restates his creed that a 
writer should ‘use his gifts toward the betterment of the world’ and ‘write 
of the struggle of men and women toward the light’. Rejecting the critics’ 
assessment of his prose he asked them to refer to the real authorities—’your 
janitor, your plumber, the f ireman and engineer’ (qtd. in May 134). The audi-
ence for some of Hemingway’s f iction also grew younger and less aestheti-
cally sophisticated. A headline in the New York Times on 8 December 1968 
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read: ‘Ernest Hemingway and the pursuit of heroism: Hemingway makes 
an ideal hero for youth’. This headline also draws attention to the thematic 
continuity between Grey’s and Hemingway’s f iction; masculinity, courage, 
honor, and genuine risk-taking are central to both, even if Hemingway’s 
prose tends to emphasize ‘struggle’ over ‘light’. Thus, the overlapping careers 
of Grey and Hemingway show us the workings of ‘the cultural escalator’ 
imagined by Stuart Hall to explain how certain popular forms gradually 
appreciate in cultural value while others ‘cease to have cultural value and 
are appropriated into the popular’ (448).
Notes
1. Short fragments of this paper were previously published in an article in-
troducing Zane Grey to Polish audiences, ‘Zane Grey’, Amerykański western 
literacki w XX wieku. Między historią, fantazją a ideologią, eds. Agata Preis-
Smith and Marek Paryż (Warszawa: Czuły Barbarzyńca, 2013), 36–57.
2. There are 10,000 photos of Hemingway at the John F. Kennedy Library in 
Boston and 2,000 more in Havana, Cuba. 
3. Together with Grey’s record book sales, his world fishing records have fallen 
into oblivion. ‘The work of pioneers was jettisoned’, wrote a belated fan in 
1992. ‘There is no recollection of Zane Grey’s 582-pound broadbill swordfish, 
his 63-pound dolphin, his 758-pound tuna, or his 1,036-pound tiger shark. 
But the cruelest blow of all came when the larger Pacific sailfish, whose 
scientific name honored Zane Grey, was lumped with the smaller Atlantic 
subspecies’ (Reiger 236).
4. Eventually the millions turned to Western movies which Grey was, in fact, 
instrumental in popularizing. He sold movie rights to Hollywood studios, 
and when they insisted on shooting papier-mâché landscapes, Grey moved 
his family to Los Angeles and set up his own film company which shot on 
location (May 104–10).
5. Another author who has slipped in and out of the categories of the ‘popu-
lar’ and the ‘unpopular’ is Owen Wister, whose The Virginian (1903) started 
out as a ‘highbrow’ version of the ‘lowbrow’ Western. Highly praised by 
Henry James, it gradually entered the American literary canon. As the gen-
eral public grew more sophisticated, The Virginian lost its cachet. The 1987 
Polish translation is stacked in the children’s section of public libraries.
6. Grey’s lifestyle often made national news, as evidenced by the following 
New York Times headlines: ‘Zane Grey Buys Schooner’ (21 August 1924), 
‘Zane Grey Goes Fishing in Faraway Seas: Tells of Battles with Gigantic 
Swordfish, Tuna, and Sharks in the Blue Waters of the Pacific’ (12 July 1925); 
‘Zane Grey Gets Big Fish: Lands 582-Pound Swordfish after Five-Hour Fight 
off California’ (1 July 1926). The press also lionized Hemingway—so much 
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so that Gabriel Garcia Lorca, who had never met Hemingway but caught a 
glimpse of him once, recalled: ‘I recognized him immediately, passing with 
his wife Mary Welsh on the Boulevard St. Michel in Paris on a rainy spring 
day in 1957’ (New York Times 26 July 1981).
7. What Jane Tompkins intuited but did not know was that Grey had been 
immensely interested in sex and that he did, in fact, write about his sexual 
exploits, though not in print. As a public figure, Grey strictly adhered to the 
Victorian moral code. That he had led a sexually liberated life only became 
apparent in 2005, when his encrypted sex diaries came to light. See Thomas 
H. Pauly, Zane Grey: His Adventures, His Women (2005).
8. Hemingway once disparagingly wrote to his editor, ‘I am working on a long 
plan instead of trying to be popular every day like Mr. Roosevelt’ (qtd. in 
Trogdon 160). Yet, we know from biographers that Hemingway lionized 
Roosevelt as a huntsman and national hero. For an account of Hemingway’s 
safari in Kenya, where he hired the very same guide who had worked for 
Roosevelt 20 years earlier, see Reynolds (155-67). Hemingway’s grandson 
corroborates this story, giving the guide’s name, Philip Percival. He also 
explains that in the 1930s Hemingway ordered a ‘military version of the .30-
06 bolton-action rifle […] essentially the weapon that Teddy Roosevelt took 
with him to hunt in Africa’ (Patrick Hemingway xvi–xvii). 
9. Owen Wister actually supported Hemingway in the publishing business, 
advising Scribner’s to serialize A Farewell to Arms (cf. Trogdon 74).
10. Hemingway’s annual retreats to the L-T ranch in Wyoming are discussed, 
among others, by Vaill (62–65) and Hawkins (141–42).
11. Gail Bederman in Manliness and Civilization (1995) and Richard Slotkin 
in Gunfighter Nation (1992) examine white masculinity at the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. 
12. Masculinity in Hemingway’s prose is discussed in depth by Thomas Stry-
chacz in Hemigway’s Theatres of Masculinity (2003) In Ernest Hemingway: 
Machismo and Masochism (2005), Richard Fantina confronted the feminist 
accusations that Hemingway enacted the worst kind of masculinism. Most 
biographers and literary scholars who have written on Hemingway since 
the rise of gender studies make some reference to his fraught relation with 
masculinity.
13. Hemingway’s belief in the regenerative power of nature is less apparent 
than Grey’s because it is tempered by his fatalism. Yet, as Susan B. Fegel 
points out, Hemingway ‘grew up in the midst of an environmentalist awak-
ening [...]—the so-called back to nature movement’—a response to rapid 
industrialization and the hunting frenzy that eliminated countless animal 
species (239). Taught to appreciate the wilderness by his father, he sought 
contact with unspoiled nature in the Spanish highlands around Burguete 
(depicted in The Sun Also Rises), on the plains of the Serengeti (depicted in 
The Green Hills of Africa), and, throughout his life, out at sea which ‘once 
you are out of sight of land, [...] is the same as it has ever been since before 
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men ever went out on it in boats’ (Hemingway qtd. in Fegel 241). Even if one 
can only enjoy brief moments of respite from modernity in natural retreats, 
the compulsion to do so is evident in Hemingway’s fiction and in his life. 
14. Attesting to the lasting inspiration of Grey’s romantic vision of nature is the 
following blog http://desertspiritpress.net/2013/06/05/zane-grey-solitude-
and-the-western-hero/ posted by Brad Karelius on 5 June 2013. Karelius is 
the pen name of an academic and Episcopalian pastor, author of The Spirit 
in the Desert: Pilgrimages to Sacred Sites in the Owens Valley (2009).
15. ‘The Strenuous Life’ is the title of an influential 1899 speech by Theodore 
Roosevelt about ideal American manhood. It was subsequently expanded 
into The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (1900).
16. Trogdon gives the figures for Scribner’s advertising expenditures in Appen-
dix 2 (260). They range from in 1926–27 $6,557.93 for The Sun Also Rises to 
$43,567.09 in 1940–41 for For Whom the Bell Tolls.
17. Accusations of nihilism, the use of obscene words, as well as representa-
tions of sex, debauchery, and senseless death resulted in many of Heming-
way’s books being banned in Europe and the United States. 
18. For example, Hemingway wrote to his editor about The Green Hills of Africa 
that ‘it is straight and absolutely true autobiography with no pulling of 
punches or lack of frankness’ (qtd. in Trogdon 155). He defended Death in 
the Afternoon as ‘a straight book on bullfighting’ (qtd. in Trogdon 120). More 
interestingly, he used similar adjectives in a description of Pedro Romero’s 
style of bullfighting, which can be read as an exposition on Hemingway’s 
aesthetic values. Romero’s style ‘was straight and pure and natural in line’ 
and ‘gave real emotion, because he kept the absolute purity of line in his 
movements’, while his competitors ‘twisted themselves like corkscrews’ and 
elicited ‘fake’ emotions (The Sun Also Rises 167–68). 
19. According to Aleksandra Litorowicz, writers such as Ernest Hemingway, 
D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller were the direct intellectual forerunners of 
such hipsters as Norman Mailer (28).
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 How (Not) to Make People Like You
The Anti-Popular Art of David Foster Wallace
James Dorson
‘Forget so-called peer-pressure. It’s more like peer-hunger.’
— Infinite Jest 694
Few writers have catered to unpopular tastes with such great success as 
David Foster Wallace. Not only has his work consistently resisted easy 
consumption through its experimental style or sheer volume—as in the 1079 
densely annotated pages of Infinite Jest (1996)—it has often sought out the 
most unappealing topics, from the arcane, the cruel, the geeky, the awkward, 
and the repulsive to the infuriatingly complex and the insanely boring. He 
frequently imitates other styles, not just literary ones, but such trying forms 
as academic prose, statistical representation, dictionary entries, legal jargon, 
and bureaucratese. His novels and stories are not only diff icult to read, but 
often unpleasant as well, in their detailed accounts of bodily excretions and 
psychological neediness. Zadie Smith, in an essay on Wallace’s 1999 short 
story collection Brief Interviews With Hideous Men, sums it up well when 
she writes: ‘There are times when reading Wallace feels unbearable, and 
the weight of things stacked against the reader insurmountable: missing 
context, rhetorical complication, awful people, grotesque or absurd subject 
matter, language that is—at the same time!—childishly scatological and 
annoyingly obscure’ (275–76). This is from someone who has called Wallace 
her ‘favorite living writer’ (261), and whose laudatory blurbs appear on the 
front cover of several of his books.
But trying the patience of readers in this way serves an explicit purpose 
in Wallace’s work. It is not obstructionist but programmatic, not meant to 
provoke outrage but to shake up the institutions of writing and reading. 
While Smith reads his challenge to readers in the grain of high culture that 
makes them work hard for their aesthetic reward, the notorious diff iculty of 
his work is not only motivated by a resistance to popular culture, but even 
more fundamentally by a deep skepticism toward popularity as such. The 
idea of death by entertainment that Infinite Jest explores may have been a 
mordant satire of commercial culture, but Wallace’s problem with popular-
ity cuts across the high/low culture divide. From his essay ‘E Unibus Pluram: 
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Television and U.S. Fiction’ and interview with Larry McCaffery—both first 
published in 1993 and frequently cited as expressions of Wallace’s aesthetic 
program—to his widely circulated 2005 Kenyon College speech, he has 
made it clear that automatism and awareness are the two poles that make 
up his aesthetic map, with commercial art pushing toward the former, and 
what he called ‘real art-f iction’ (McCaffery 32) pushing toward the latter. 
Wallace embraced the view that the role of f iction should be ‘to comfort 
the disturbed and disturb the comfortable’ (McCaffery 21). To disturb the 
reader meant, in Smith’s words, ‘to break the rhythm that excludes thinking’ 
(268), which is an idea that harks back to the Russian Formalist view of art 
as de-automatized perception, and which was central to modernist aesthet-
ics. Such art makes use of what George Saunders, in reference to Wallace, 
described as a ‘shock methodology’, ‘a kind of stripping away of the habitual’ 
(53). But if ‘art-f iction’ could shock us into greater awareness, television for 
Wallace had the opposite effect. Television was what he called ‘the epitome 
of Low Art’, because ‘it engages without demanding. One can rest while 
undergoing stimulation. Receive without giving’ (‘E Unibus Pluram’ 37). If 
‘art-f iction’ wakes us up, television f ixes viewers ‘in an attitude of relaxed 
and total reception, rapt’ (‘E Unibus Pluram’ 26).
Crossing this automatism/awareness axis, which spans from television 
and advertising to ‘real art-f iction’, however, is another polarity in Wallace’s 
work that ranges from deceit to sincerity, and which cannot be divided 
into commercial versus non-commercial art. Whereas television made up 
the negative pole on the automatism/awareness axis, then metaf iction for 
Wallace had come to make up the negative pole of the deceit/sincerity axis. 
Metaf iction—and by extension the postmodern institutionalization of 
irony—did not represent popular culture, but rather what could be called 
popularity culture. In contrast to popular culture, popularity culture may 
be def ined not in commercial terms, although economic gain is often a 
byproduct of popularity, or in terms of symbolic capital or distinction, which 
is the currency of high culture, but rather in terms of approval. Popularity 
culture is art that primarily seeks approval, not money or distinction. The 
definition may be expanded to include not only art but a form of sociability 
in which approval is the overriding end. As I hope to show in the following, 
it is the reaction against popularity culture more than anything else that 
def ines Wallace’s f iction. It is what impelled him to explore avenues of 
unpopularity, but also what ultimately won him such popular approval. 
While many critics have engaged with Wallace’s relation to postmodernism, 
focusing especially on the relationship between irony and sincerity in his 
work, few have tried to uncover the historical reasons for his occupation 
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with sincerity.1 By reading Wallace through the lens of popularity culture, 
the following sections argue that Wallace’s beef with postmodernism should 
be understood in the context of his beef with another ‘post’, namely that 
of post-industrial society. By bringing some of the most important texts in 
Wallace’s oeuvre into dialogue with David Riesman’s classical sociology of 
‘other-direction’, the aim here is thus to historicize the signif icance that the 
key issues of sincerity and recursivity play in Wallace’s f iction with respect 
to work and life in post-industrial society, and ending with an account of 
unpopularity in his last novel, The Pale King (2011).
Popularity Culture and ‘Other-Direction’
Although Wallace is not known for brevity—even his essays had to be 
radically pruned in order to meet magazine standards—the short story 
with which Brief Interviews With Hideous Men begins shows that he was 
capable of compression as well as inflation. The story is called ‘A Radically 
Condensed History of Postindustrial Life’, and is quoted here in full:
When they were introduced, he made a witticism, hoping to be liked. 
She laughed extremely hard, hoping to be liked. Then each drove home 
alone, looking straight ahead, with the very same twist to their faces.
The man who’d introduced them didn’t much like either of them, though 
he acted as if he did, anxious as he was to preserve good relations at all 
times. One never knows, after all, now did one now did one now did one.
The f irst thing to note about the story is that it is located on page zero of 
the story collection, which suggests that Wallace thought of it as a sort 
of ground zero for contemporary life. The situation that it describes so 
tersely is meant to be representative of the human condition in its present 
shape, and it presents itself as a diagnosis of this condition. What the three 
characters—or rather caricatures—in the story have in common is a shared 
desire to be liked. They behave in a way meant to maximize their likeability; 
that is to say, their behavior is calculated and instrumental. This requires 
that each character has in mind an ideal model of likeable behavior to which 
they seek to adjust their own behavior. If they were seeking admiration or 
distinction, or in some other way to impress the others, the model they 
would seek to conform to would have to be based on what they imagine is 
somehow superior to those they seek to impress. But since their goal is only 
‘to be liked’, the ideal model has to be as much like those they seek to be liked 
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by as possible. In short, their conformity is not vertical but horizontal: what 
they seek to adjust to is one another, not some elevated model of behavior 
instilled in them prior to having met each other.
This is, of course, the form of peer adjustment that David Riesman so fa-
mously calls ‘other-direction’ in his 1950 landmark study of social character, 
The Lonely Crowd. In contrast to ‘inner-direction’, where parental authority 
has been internalized at such an early age as to become second nature, the 
‘other-directed’ character was not guided by an inner moral compass, but 
by the changing pressures of his or her social environment—in Riesman’s 
terms, not by a ‘gyroscope’ (16) but a ‘radar’ (25). On the upside, this means 
that the ‘other-directed’ character is far more receptive to signals from 
others than the rather single-minded ‘inner-directed’ character. On the 
downside, it means that the ‘other-directed’ person has ‘no clear core of 
self ’ (157). Those who are ‘other-directed’ are too receptive, lacking any 
autonomous sense of self that could protect them from the caprices of their 
environment. Although Riesman cautions against dismissing the qualities 
of ‘other-direction’ out of hand, by identifying the need for approval as the 
overriding desire of the social type he analyzes, his study inevitably creates 
the grounds for its disapproval. This is the paradox of popularity culture: 
the more evidently one seeks approval, the less likely it is that one receives 
it. As Riesman notes, ‘because it is approval for which one is competing one 
must repress one’s overt competitiveness’ (81). The recursivity in popularity 
culture requires that one dissimulates one’s feelings and behavior in order 
to manipulate those of others. But precisely because the relationship is 
recursive, and manipulation is most effective when it does not appear as 
such, it also requires that one dissimulates one’s dissimulation, and so on ad 
infinitum. The paradox is illustrated in ‘A Radically Condensed History’. The 
narrator’s explanatory comments on the ulterior motives for the behavior 
of the characters—’hoping to be liked’, ‘anxious as he was to preserve good 
relations at all times’—effectively undermine their attempts to be liked in 
the eyes of the reader. Their desire to be liked, which is emphasized in the 
story to the extent that it becomes a parody of popularity culture, is what 
makes them unlikable. Instead of likable, it is more probable that they are 
perceived as fake, behaving not as they are or how they feel, but as they 
think they should behave in order to be liked.
This perception of being ‘fake’ was, in effect, how Riesman’s study con-
tributed to make a whole generation feel. But the strength of his account 
and its continued relevance today was the historical and social processes 
that underlay the transformation of character. The ‘inner-directed’ type for 
Riesman was a product of the industrial era, where ‘technical competence’ 
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(129) had been the key to advancement. In his own era of bureaucracy and 
mass consumption, the key to success had become ‘social competence’ 
(129), as work increasingly required the manipulation of people instead 
of things. This shift from an economy based on production to one largely 
based on consumption implied a fundamental change in social relations. 
To a far greater extent than before, the degree to which people were able 
to get along—with coworkers or customers—determined how success-
ful they were at their work. Social skills had become a prerequisite for 
upward mobility; it had become necessary ‘to preserve good relations at 
all times’, as ‘A Radically Condensed History’ has it. But social competence 
involves a level of complexity far greater than that of any technical com-
petence. While natural resources can be manipulated independently of 
the relationship between manipulator and manipulated, this is not the 
case in the manipulation of people. The successful manipulation of rocks 
or trees does not depend on our behavior toward them, but the successful 
manipulation of people does. Post-industrial work relationships are inher-
ently more recursive than industrial ones. The engineer with technical 
expertise does not need to be popular in order to succeed, but the off ice 
worker among off ice workers competing for the favor of the manager does. 
From the emergence of personnel departments and the Human Relations 
Movement in the early decades of the twentieth century to the training of 
emotional intelligence and the recruitment of ‘Happiness Engineers’ in the 
workplace today, corporate self-help books and managerial practices in the 
past century may be characterized as the search for ever better methods 
for manipulating what used to be called ‘the human element’.2
Popularity culture is the direct outgrowth of this development: the 
increasing correlation between personal and professional success. Post-
industrial work relations demand to an ever greater degree that the emo-
tional and personal qualities of people are counted as assets. For Eva Illouz, 
in her account of what she calls ‘emotional capitalism’, the intertwining of 
work and affect has made ‘the economic self emotional and emotions more 
closely harnessed to instrumental action’ (23). When personal life enters 
the workplace, work also enters personal life. The result is that the risk of 
manipulation seeps into every aspect of social interaction. If not being 
liked jeopardizes not only one’s personal relationships but also one’s work 
relationships, then it is never clear whether one seeks approval for reasons 
of pure sociability or for instrumental ends. As the line between work and 
personal life becomes blurred, every act may or may not be a calculated 
one, because every act may or may not serve instrumental purposes. ‘One 
never knows, after all, now did one now did one now did one’, as the trailing 
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voice of Wallace’s story says. But not only does it become diff icult to know 
the motives of others, it becomes diff icult to know one’s own motives. If 
other people may seem like frauds, one may also feel like a fraud oneself.
This dilemma is played out in Wallace’s story ‘Good Old Neon’ from 
Oblivion (2004). The story is narrated by a character who has already killed 
himself and is now explaining why. It begins with the character describing 
his problem:
My whole life I’ve been a fraud. I’m not exaggerating. Pretty much all I’ve 
ever done all the time is try to create a certain impression of me in other 
people. Mostly to be liked or admired. It’s a little more complicated than 
that, maybe. But when you come right down to it it’s to be liked, loved. 
Admired, approved of, applauded, whatever. (141)
As an account of how the character could not quiet his ‘mind’s ceaseless 
conniving about how to impress people’ (160), it is a stark confession of 
‘other-direction’ and its discontents. In characterizing his trouble, he identi-
f ies what he calls the ‘fraudulence paradox’:
The fraudulence paradox was that the more time and effort you put 
into trying to appear impressive or attractive to other people, the less 
impressive or attractive you felt inside—you were a fraud. And the more 
of a fraud you felt like, the harder you tried to convey an impressive or 
likable image of yourself so that other people wouldn’t f ind out what a 
hollow, fraudulent person you really were. (147)
The recursive trap is typical of Wallace’s work. Here, the recursion inherent 
in popularity culture—where seeking approval is a cause for disapproval 
which causes one to seek approval—has been internalized. The recursive 
game that one plays with others, one also plays with oneself. The effect is 
not only that a wedge is driven between people who may feel that others 
are fraudulent, but that one feels fraudulent oneself. As the character in the 
story says: ‘I actually seemed to have no true inner self, and that the more 
I tried to be genuine the more empty and fraudulent I ended up feeling 
inside’ (160). Seeking approval empties out the self because it introduces a 
level of calculation to our sense of self, which we believe should be free of 
calculation in order to be genuine. The trap is that the more empty inside 
one feels, the more one needs approval, which in turn makes one feel all the 
more empty. As such, if the ‘other-direction’ prompted by twentieth-century 
transformations of work results in us having ‘no clear core of self’, as Riesman 
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said, then having no clear core of self makes us more ‘other-directed’. The 
effect is that we are caught in a loop of calculation that appears to isolate us 
from each other and alienate us from ourselves—which would explain the 
feeling of despair beneath the parody of ‘A Radically Condensed History’, 
when ‘each drove home alone, looking straight ahead, with the very same 
twist to their faces’.
But while the characters in ‘A Radically Condensed History’ clearly fall 
toward the deceit end on the deceit/sincerity axis that structures Wallace’s 
f iction, the story itself is also deceptive. It is not the history that the title 
promises. By inflating the ‘other-directed’ insecurity of the characters into 
a caricature, they become the butt of a joke shared by narrator and readers. 
In recognizing the insecurity of the characters we automatically become 
superior to them. In other words, the story flatters us. We may like it for 
sharing a joke with us over the heads of its characters, yet we may also 
dislike it for this very reason, for its smug appeal to our sense of superiority. 
Its radical condensation makes it look like the witticism made by the f irst 
character, as if it itself were ‘hoping to be liked’. In this sense, it resembles 
the metaf iction that Wallace sought to distance himself from. While the 
ironic mode of metaf iction—always self-consciously undercutting its 
own narrative—at f irst served to deflate the conceits of realism and the 
conformity of the early postwar era, by the late 1980s Wallace felt that it 
had outlived its purpose. Irony, now as ‘the dominant mode of hip expres-
sion’ (‘E Unibus Pluram’ 67), had itself become oppressive. For Wallace, the 
formal stunts of metaf iction often served no other purpose than to exhibit 
the skills and astuteness of the writer, as if to say, as he phrased it in his 
interview with McCaffery, ‘Hey! Look at me! Have a look at what a good 
writer I am! Like me!’ (25). Revealing the deceits of art had devolved into its 
own deceit. And if the anticipatory logic of calculation in popularity culture 
was lethal to personal relationships, it was also lethal to f iction. The f iction 
writer seeking approval from an audience was just another manifestation 
of ‘other-direction’. As the narrator of the story ‘Octet’ from Brief Interviews 
warns the reader: ‘there is no quicker way to tie yourself in knots and kill 
any human urgency in the thing you’re working on than to try to calculate 
ahead of time whether that thing will be “liked”’ (129).
Of course, being open about this problem inevitably raises the reader’s 
suspicion about whether by confessing this ‘Octet’ is itself only trying to 
be liked. The reflexivity about self-reflexivity so characteristic of Wallace’s 
work has been described by critics as a form of metafictional self-implosion 
that reverts into its opposite.3 But perhaps a more accurate description of 
what goes on here is that the reader becomes implicated in the calculated 
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exchanges that his stories parody. Whether it is the anxious platitudes in ‘A 
Radically Condensed History’ or the account of the corrosive writer/reader 
relationship in ‘Octet’, neither narrator nor reader are ever above suspicion. 
If the joke at f irst appears to be on the ‘other-directed’ characters of the 
stories, the joke ends up being on us, the readers, because we are not able to 
extract ourselves from the recursive processes that the story demonstrates. 
The reader will also have to ref lect that, in a culture where everything 
may always be tainted by instrumentality, ‘one never knows’. The cynical 
knowingness that he found so discomfiting about metaf ictional irony is 
undermined by the uncertainty of popularity culture that he imposes on 
the reader. Characteristically, Wallace’s stories not only depict the recursive 
process of popularity culture but actually perform it, drawing readers ever 
further into its exasperating loops, in effect making us complicit with it.
The Problem of Sincerity
While N. Katherine Hayles in an article on Infinite Jest has convincingly 
shown how the novel performs ‘the fact of recursivity’, it should be clear that 
Wallace was not only interested in trapping readers, but also in discover-
ing ways out of the trap. The sense of isolation and loneliness that runs 
through his work is thus not only a result of the popularity trap, but also a 
potential remedy for it. In his biography of Wallace, D.T. Max suggests that 
he had a penchant for ‘universalizing his neurosis’ (94). This may sound like 
solipsism, but it was in the act of universalizing what he felt that Wallace 
sought a way to counter the sense of isolation he found in post-industrial 
life. By linking the sense of isolation and loneliness that he felt def ined 
the human condition to the postmodern and post-industrial condition, 
we might also say that he historicized his neurosis. In a crucial passage 
in Infinite Jest, where the narrator reflects on what ails the troubled main 
character Hal Incandenza, we are told that ‘inside Hal there’s pretty much 
nothing at all’ (694). The narrator then goes on to generalize Hal’s condi-
tion: ‘We enter a spiritual puberty where we snap to the fact that the great 
transcendent horror is loneliness, excluded encagement in the self. Once 
we’ve hit this age, we will now give or take anything, wear any mask, to f it, 
be part-of, not be Alone, we young’ (694). Again we have the ‘fraudulence 
paradox’: in order to escape loneliness we seek to conform, which in turn 
alienates us from what we truly feel—loneliness. The key theme of addiction 
in Infinite Jest is presented in the same way as something characters are 
drawn into because it blunts their feeling of inner destitution, but which 
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only aggravates the condition they seek to escape. Earlier in the novel, Hal 
says about playing tennis that ‘[w]e’re each deeply alone here. It’s what we 
all have in common, this aloneness’, to which another character responds: 
‘E Unibus Pluram’ (112). Wallace’s f iction is full of lonely crowds—is that not 
essentially what ‘out of one, many’ means?4 At the same time, however, as 
‘aloneness’ is a common feeling at this particular moment in history, it is also 
one that may be shared, and thus possibly revoke the isolating recursions 
of popularity culture. Still, if Wallace looked to the sharing of feelings for 
an alternative to popularity culture, like everything in his work, this was 
easier said than done.
‘Octet’ dramatizes the problem of sharing succinctly. Presented as ad-
vice on how to write good f iction, the narrator of the story underlines the 
importance of making readers empathize with characters by feeling ‘some 
sort of weird ambient sameness in different kinds of human relationships’ 
(131-32). This suggests another form of ‘other-direction’ at work in Wallace’s 
f iction. ‘Octet’ even uses the term ‘other-directedness’ (117), not in Riesman’s 
sense, but as synonymous with empathy. In spite of its radar-like sensitivity, 
Riesman’s ‘other-direction’ is rather what Smith described as the ‘other 
blindness’ (291) of the hideous men in Brief Interviews, as their concerns 
for how they are perceived by others effectively blocks their perception of 
them. Against Riesman’s ‘other-direction’, Wallace’s other ‘other-direction’ 
aims not at winning the approval of others but at sharing a sense of ‘urgent 
interhuman sameness’ (‘Octet’ 133). The problem, then, is how to know when 
another person is feeling as you do. The story offers the following solution:
The trick to this solution is that you’d have to be 100% honest. Mean-
ing not just sincere but almost naked. Worse than naked—more like 
unarmed. Defenseless. ‘This thing I feel, I can’t name it straight out but it 
seems important, ‘do you feel it too?’—this sort of direct question is not 
for the squeamish. For one thing, it’s perilously close to ‘Do you like me? 
Please like me,’ which you know quite well that 99% of all the interhuman 
manipulation and bullshit gamesmanship that goes on goes on precisely 
because the idea of saying this sort of thing straight out is regarded as 
somehow obscene. (131)
If sharing a sense of the human predicament in post-industrial life 
was, for Wallace, a way in which to remedy it, then sincerity becomes 
imperative as the precondition for this sharing. But there is a f ine line 
between emotional sharing and emotional manipulation. Being open 
about one’s feelings requires that others are equally open about theirs. It is 
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an all-or-nothing proposal: if all parties are sincere, the cycle of deception 
may be broken; if they are not, it is intensif ied, as lowering one’s defenses 
makes one prey to greater manipulation. As ‘Octet’ makes clear, there 
can be no compromise: ‘Anything less than completely naked helpless 
pathetic sincerity and you’re right back in the pernicious conundrum’ 
(131).
Wallace’s proposed solution to the problem of recursivity in popularity 
culture only presented him with a new problem, namely that of knowing 
when one is ‘100% honest’. This is, of course, a problem that dates back at least 
to St. Augustine’s Confessions, and which with Rousseau’s secularization of 
the confessional mode in the late eighteenth century became a hallmark of 
modern culture. The aim of confession is to flush out hidden deceits that 
may be lurking in the inmost recesses of the self. Self-examination through 
self-revelation purif ies as it proceeds, as every impurity discovered and 
revealed is an impurity cleansed by the fact that it is no longer hidden. As 
confessions are cathartic, a form of self-erasure that wipes the slate clean, 
it follows that the greater the depravity exposed the greater the relief from 
it and the cleaner the slate. This is the logic of the AA meetings in Infinite 
Jest, described as a form of ‘deprogramming’ (369). The litanies of personal 
horror and humiliation that its members reveal at the fervent incitement 
of their fellow ex-abusers seem almost like a contest in self-deprecation. 
However, the confession must be received as sincere by its audience. This 
was the key to a successful AA confession, as the former addict Don Gately 
reflects: ‘Speakers who are accustomed to f iguring out what an audience 
wants to hear and then supplying it f ind out quickly that this particular 
audience does not want to be supplied with what someone else thinks it 
wants’ (367-68). Premeditation is as unwelcome here as in the writer/reader 
relationship in ‘Octet’: ‘It can’t be a calculated crowd-pleaser, and it has to 
be the truth, unslanted, unfortif ied. And maximally unironic’ (Wallace, 
Infinite Jest 369).
Wallace made use of this confessional mode frequently as a narrative ploy 
both in his f iction and non-f iction. His infamous footnotes often function 
as correctives ‘in the spirit of 100% candor’, as one note in ‘Octet’ proclaims 
(125), and metaf iction on the whole is aimed at revealing narrative deceits. 
Yet, the confessional mode in Wallace cuts deeper than this because it per-
vades his style. Like J.D. Salinger’s ingenuous narrative voice, Wallace’s voice 
often employs a highly informal tone that brings about a degree of intimacy 
with the reader that a more formal prose style could not do. Wallace’s style 
draws the reader into confidence, and this was wholly intentional. As he 
told one interviewer, he thought of his relationship with the reader as being 
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like ‘a late-night conversation with really good friends, when the bullshit 
stops and the masks come off’ (qtd. in Max 221).
At the same time, Wallace knew that the colloquial tone he used to 
give readers a feeling of intimacy was not only subject to manipulation, 
but was the quintessential trick of the conf idence man. His essay on 
John McCain’s bid for the 2000 Republican presidential nomination is a 
case in point. The essay, published in Consider the Lobster (2005) as ‘Up, 
Simba’, begins with a disclaimer to the reader—addressed as ‘Dear Person 
Reading This’ (156)—that the essay is ‘just meant to be the truth as one 
person saw it’ (157).5 But even as the style of the essay begins by drawing 
the reader into conf idence, conf idence is precisely what it goes on to 
problematize. Describing his road trip as a journalist with McCain on his 
campaign bus the ‘Straight Talk Express’ (171), Wallace seeks to resolve 
the contradiction between McCain’s candid appearance—his ‘straight 
talk’, suggesting that he is not merely catering to public opinion—and 
his need as a presidential candidate for popular approval. McCain may 
have been sincere, ‘all conspicuously honest and open and informal and 
idealistic and no-bullshit’ (228), but at the same time his sincerity was 
highly effective self-promotion. The essay concludes that it was impossible 
‘to tell whether John McCain is a real leader or merely a very talented 
political salesman’ (228), and ends with an appeal to the reader: ‘whether 
he’s truly “for real” now depends less on what is in his heart than on what 
might be in yours’ (234).
In his essay on ‘David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American 
Fiction’, Adam Kelly writes that sincerity ‘can always be taken for ma-
nipulation, and this risk is fundamental—it cannot be reduced by appeal 
to intention, or morality, or context—because true sincerity, if there is 
ever such a thing, must take place in the aporia between the conditional 
and the unconditional’ (140). This non-identity of sincerity means that its 
only identity is relational, that ‘the possibility of sincerity depends upon 
its becoming dialogic in character, always requiring a response from the 
other to bring it into play’ (Kelly 141). Wallace’s appeal to the reader—and 
specif ically the reader’s heart—in ‘Up, Simba’ is thus symptomatic of how 
he deals with the problem of sincerity. Rousseau in The Confessions (1782) 
may have thought that he ‘unveiled [his] inmost self’ (3), but for Wallace 
the medium of language through which the self must be unveiled is itself 
suspect. The ‘whole’ self that sincerity implies cannot possibly be unveiled 
through language. ‘Good Old Neon’ is told in the confessional mode with the 
f irst person narrator seeking to account for his fraudulence, but at the same 
time he admits to the impossibility of self-revelation through confession. 
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He points out the vast discrepancy between what we are and how little of 
ourselves we are able to represent to others:
As though inside you is this enormous room full of what seems like 
everything in the whole universe at one time or another and yet the only 
parts that get out have to somehow squeeze out through one of those tiny 
keyholes you see under the knob in older doors. As if we are all trying to 
see each other through these tiny keyholes. (178)
The keyhole is language, which for Wallace presents a barrier to sharing as 
great as that posed by manipulation. Language is by def inition mislead-
ing as it only represents a fraction of our experiences. But if the problem 
of language is postmodern and that of manipulation post-industrial, the 
solution for Wallace appears to be the same. It may be impossible to squeeze 
one’s whole self through the keyhole of language, but as ‘Good Old Neon’ 
informs us, ‘the door can open’ (178). Opening the door to the self for the 
other to enter only requires that the mask of language be removed, which 
is why ‘it feels so good to break down and cry in front of others, or to laugh, 
or speak in tongues, or chant in Bengali—it’s not English anymore, it’s not 
getting squeezed through any hole’ (‘Good Old Neon’ 179). If the sincerity 
of the whole self cannot be revealed through the language of confession, 
perhaps it is disclosed in the breakdown of language. Disgusted by the 
barrier that language poses to sincerity, the narrator of ‘Good Old Neon’ 
ends on a decisive note: ‘Not another word’ (181).
‘Not another word’ may not seem like the right coda for a writer famous 
for his verbose style, but the compulsion to confess is as much a part of the 
problem for Wallace as it is of the solution. This is especially the case when 
his f iction addresses the modern variant of confession: therapy. In ‘The 
Depressed Person’ from Brief Interviews, Wallace demonstrates how the 
sharing of feeling can lead to a destructive spiral of narcissistic reflexivity 
that obstructs any possibility of genuine sharing. The story begins grimly: 
‘The depressed person was in terrible and unceasing emotional pain, and 
the impossibility of sharing or articulating this pain was itself a component 
of the pain and a contributing factor in its essential horror’ (31). But after 
almost thirty pages of trying to articulate and share her emotional pain 
with her therapist and ‘Support System’ (32)—her name for those friends to 
whom she obsessively confesses her feelings—the story ends with no com-
municative progress whatsoever having been made: ‘How was she to decide 
and describe—even to herself, looking inward and facing herself—what all 
she’d so painfully learned said about herself?’ (58) The question is itself the 
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problem that keeps her trapped. On the one hand, we are as much trapped 
within her looping therapeutic logic as she is because the story compels us 
to participate in her self-analysis. On the other hand, by representing her 
allegorically as ‘the depressed person’, the story makes her representative of 
a cultural condition: it universalizes her neurosis. The real question of the 
story is not what it says about her but what it says about us. The more she 
tries to share her feelings the less she is able to. Her sharing impedes rather 
than facilitates communication since it is not reciprocal but one-sided, as 
in her relationship with her therapist or ‘Support System’. The only way out 
of her recursive trap would be not to ask what she had learned said about 
herself, but to ask what it said about being a human being. In other words, 
she would have had to ask, ‘do you feel it too?’6
Accounting for Unpopularity
‘The Depressed Person’ is Wallace’s cruelest rendering of what Christopher 
Lasch called The Culture of Narcissism (1979). Lasch provides the same 
general historical account of the transformation of character as Riesman. 
With the bureaucratization of society, he argues, ‘ambitious young men 
now had to compete with their peers for the attention and approval of 
their superiors’, with the result that ‘[t]he management of interpersonal 
relations came to be seen as the essence of self-advancement’ (114). But while 
Riesman’s study inspired a countercultural response to such behavior, Lasch 
wrote after the counterculture had run its course. The counterculture for 
Lasch may have been radical, but what it had radicalized was the structure 
of dependence that the process of bureaucratization f irst gave rise to. The 
rejection of cultural restraints for personal gratif ication had not led to 
autonomy but turned the screw of conformity another notch: ‘Strategies 
of narcissistic survival now present themselves as emancipation from the 
repressive conditions of the past, thus giving rise to a “cultural revolution” 
that reproduces the worst features of the collapsing civilization it claims to 
criticize’ (21). The search for authenticity against calculated behavior had 
only deepened a ‘therapeutic sensibility’ (33), because, like the bureaucratic 
erosion of tradition and community, it served to further detach the self 
from the continuity of the past. As ‘The Depressed Person’ suggests, the 
examination of the self turns into self-excoriation once it rejects the social 
ties that constitute the self. Like the hollowing out of self effected by the 
internalization of calculated behavior, the self-fulf illment that therapy 
promises is self-defeating to the extent that it treats the self as an intellectual 
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problem apart from its social context. The rejection of dependence that 
the search for personal authenticity implies erodes the very self that is 
sought, thus making the self more and not less dependent on others for its 
aff irmation. Instead of autonomy, the rejection of calculated behavior in 
favor of personal authenticity only meant its narcissistic transformation, 
which Lasch described as a kind of intensif ied ‘other-direction’:
Notwithstanding his occasional illusions of omnipotence, the narcissist 
depends on others to validate his self-esteem. He cannot live without 
an admiring audience. His apparent freedom from family ties and insti-
tutional constraints does not free him to stand alone or to glory in his 
individuality. On the contrary, it contributes to his insecurity, which he 
can overcome only by seeing his ‘grandiose self’ reflected in the attentions 
of others, or by attaching himself to those who radiate celebrity, power, 
and charisma. (38)
Lasch’s account of the intensif ication of dependence as a result of its rejec-
tion in favor of personal authenticity is indicative of the cultural trap that 
Wallace was trying to write himself out of.7 His investment in sincerity was 
his attempt to counter the desire for approval that accompanied the attenu-
ation of self. But at the same time, as he shows by repeatedly performing 
the failure to pin down sincerity, he was aware that this investment was 
susceptible to misuse. Sincerity involves a leap of faith, but there is no way 
of telling whether one’s trust will be betrayed. What passes for openness, 
as Infinite Jest warns, may well turn out to be ‘a purposive social falsehood 
[…] a pose of poselessness’ (1048). Wallace’s unfinished novel The Pale King, 
published posthumously in 2011, is his f inal jab at the problem of sincerity 
as a way out of the cycle of post-industrial manipulation. The Pale King in 
many ways unfolds against a backdrop of an ‘other-directed’ or narcissistic 
culture, but it departs from the accounts of both Lasch and Riesman in one 
crucial way. While the bureaucratization of society was responsible for the 
social changes that Riesman and Lasch each documented, The Pale King 
suggests that bureaucracy itself may be a key to the reversal of these changes. 
Riesman and Lasch’s accounts were written against the backdrop of the 
bureaucratic welfare state. In the 1980s, when Wallace came of age, however, 
anti-bureaucratic sentiment had not only gone mainstream but had itself 
become institutionalized with the Reagan administration and, specif ically, 
in the shape of neoliberal reform. In the intervening years between the 
publication of Lasch’s indictment of dependence and Wallace’s work on The 
Pale King, nothing had become more unpopular than bureaucracy itself.
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The choice of a bureaucracy for the setting of The Pale King—a regional 
IRS center in Peoria, Illinois—provides Wallace with both an arena for 
the further exploration of sincerity and for the direct engagement with 
something as unhip as one could possibly imagine. In ‘E Unibus Pluram’, 
Wallace famously called for a new rebellion against the hegemony of hip:
The next literary ‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as some weird 
bunch of anti-rebels, born oglers who dare somehow to back away from 
ironic watching, who have the childish gall actually to endorse and 
instantiate single-entendre principles. Who treat of plain old untrendy 
human troubles and emotions in U.S. life with reverence and conviction. 
Who eschew self-conscious and hip fatigue. These anti-rebels would be 
outdated, of course, before they even started. Dead on the page. Too 
sincere. Clearly repressed. Backward, quaint, naïve, anachronistic. Maybe 
that’ll be the point. Maybe that’s why they’ll be the next rebels. Real 
rebels, as far as I can see, risk disapproval. (81)
If this was Wallace’s manifesto for unpopularity, The Pale King imagines the 
‘anti-rebel’ as a bureaucrat. IRS examiners are trained to detect fraudulence 
in tax returns, just as Wallace’s own prose is geared toward detecting fraudu-
lence in readers by drawing us into the recursions of popularity culture. 
While irony is about undercutting the equivalence between what is stated 
and what is meant, accounting is about determining it. And what could be 
more unpopular than holding people to account for what they state in their 
tax returns? The Latin motto ascribed to the IRS in the novel—translated by 
one character as ‘He is the one doing a difficult, unpopular job’ (244)—leaves 
no doubt about how unpopular the bureaucrat is. The IRS employee is not 
one who seeks approval, but one who risks disapproval. The Pale King even 
goes as far as to recast this as a form of heroism. In an epiphanic moment, 
one character recounts a lecture by his Jesuit accountancy teacher:
‘True heroism is a priori incompatible with audience or applause or even 
the bare notice of the common run of man. In fact,’ he said, ‘the less 
conventionally heroic or exciting or adverting or even interesting or 
engaging a labor appears to be, the greater its potential as an arena for 
actual heroism, and therefore as a denomination of joy unequaled by any 
you men can yet imagine’. (230)
With his bow tie and business fedora, the Jesuit teacher himself seems ‘a 
hundred percent indifferent about being liked or seen as cool or likeable 
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by the students’ (226-27). He appears to be the embodiment of the heroic 
‘anti-rebel’ in an era def ined by what another character in the novel calls 
‘tyranny of conformist nonconformity’ (149).
While many critics have taken Wallace’s comments about ‘anti-rebels’ 
as a trumpet call for a New Sincerity, others have more wisely suggested 
that his own work seeks rather to combine cynicism and naïveté.8 As such, 
it should be clear that a champion of unpopularity such as the Jesuit in 
The Pale King is not meant as a positive model. He is a caricature of ‘inner-
direction’ in the same way that needy characters elsewhere in Wallace’s 
f iction are caricatures of ‘other-direction’. He is indeed ‘dead on the page’, 
and only comes to life as a counterpoint to his approval-starved contem-
poraries. Wallace’s method was far too dialectic to actually live up to the 
‘post-postmodern’ rebellion against irony that he has been revered as the 
progenitor of. But his search for a counterpoint to popularity culture in a 
character such as the Jesuit is also indicative of the problem he faced. The 
Jesuit’s indifference to approval is the result of his commitment to such 
‘single-entendre principles’ that Wallace suggested defined the ‘anti-rebel’. 
Yet, those principles in The Pale King are beside the point. The point of the 
novel is not taxation or accounting as such, but what the commitment to 
such principles entails.9 Tax accounting in The Pale King is not important for 
its civic value, as it is for the Jesuit, but for how it may serve as a counterpoint 
to popularity culture. Accounting is interesting to Wallace only insofar as 
it inoculates the Jesuit against popularity. He is drawn to bureaucracy not 
because of what it stands for but because it is unpopular.
The unpopular is the equivalent of the authentic to the extent that it 
claims to be indifferent to approval. But just as the search for personal 
authenticity for Lasch only made the individual further dependent, the 
search for unpopularity only broadens the scope of popularity culture by 
consigning all value that is claimed as unpopular to the absolute value of 
approval or disapproval. Thus, even as the Jesuit’s social commitment places 
him beyond the loop of popularity culture, the novel’s representation of his 
commitment in terms of unpopularity draws him back into that very loop. 
As a revolt against popularity culture, the search for unpopularity is inher-
ently a part of what it rejects. Just as popularity culture turns every value 
into a vehicle for the attainment of approval, the revolt against popularity 
relegates all value to the attainment of disapproval. It trades in the same cur-
rency as popularity culture only with the valences reversed, which means 
that every other possible incentive—from money to morals—is devalued. 
This was the risk that Wallace ran when he made sincerity the only value 
that counted. By committing himself so exclusively to the dissection of 
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popularity culture, his work in effect became complicit in its devaluation 
of any actual commitment that might transcend it. As the poles of deceit 
and sincerity along which he strung his f iction were ultimately a product 
of popularity culture itself, the harder he pushed toward the sincerity end 
of the spectrum the more entangled he became in the popularity trap.
One character in The Pale King refers to a f ictional self-help guide with 
the title ‘How to Make People Like You: An Instant Recipe for Career Success’ 
(302). This is a lightly-masked reference to Dale Carnegie’s classic How to 
Win Friends and Influence People (1936), which was one of the f irst self-
help books to equate popularity with professional success, and which thus 
contributed to the post-industrial conundrum that Wallace found himself 
in. But as Wallace’s own soaring popularity in the past decade shows, the 
criteria for how to make people like you greatly varies. While the goal of 
peer-approval in a society that depends on it has not changed, the means 
for reaching it has. Ironically, in large part because Carnegie made the link 
between our social popularity and professional achievements so disagree-
ably evident, the rejection of popularity has long been a f ixed staple in the 
search for approval, and thus success. Under such circumstances, nothing 
that is valued mainly for its unpopularity could ever offer an alternative 
to popularity, only a new means for attaining it. Wallace’s signif icance is 
not that he showed us a way out of popularity culture, but that his inspired 
attempts to extract himself from it made its consequences so painfully clear.
Notes
1. One important exception is chapter two of Mary K. Holland’s Succeeding 
Postmodernism: Language and Humanism in Contemporary American Litera-
ture (2013), which reads Wallace in terms of Christopher Lasch’s critique of 
‘the culture of narcissism’. For an overview over what has already come to 
be called ‘David Foster Wallace Studies’, see Adam Kelly’s ‘David Foster Wal-
lace: the Death of the Author and the Birth of a Discipline’. 
2. For the most comprehensive account to date of this new managerial revolu-
tion, see Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism 
(1999). For the concept of ‘Happiness Engineers’ at work, see Burkeman.
3. For instance, A.O. Scott describes Wallace’s fiction as ‘meta-ironic,’ turning 
‘irony back on itself.’ Marshall Boswell similarly suggests that ‘Wallace uses 
irony to disclose what irony has been hiding […] to recover a learned form 
of heartfelt naïveté’ (17).
4. Although not as conceptually productive as Riesman’s study, Robert D. 
Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000) provides a more recent sociological context 
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for Wallace’s millennial loneliness. Echoing Wallace’s ‘E Unibus Pluram’, he 
partly blames the erosion of social capital on the individualizing effects of 
the ‘massive telecommunications and entertainment industries’ (216). 
5. Telling ‘the truth as one person saw it’ has, of course, been the very hall-
mark of the essay form since it was pioneered by Montaigne in the six-
teenth century, and as such goes a long way to explain Wallace’s affinity for 
the genre.
6. For a good account of the importance of the interpersonal in Wallace’s 
work, see Nicole Timmer’s study of post-postmodernism, which borrows its 
title from this quote, Do You Feel It Too? The Post-Postmodern Syndrome in 
American Fiction at the Turn of the Millennium (2010). 
7. For a more extensive reading of the relationship between Wallace and 
Lasch’s critique of narcissism than I am able to provide here, see Holland. 
8. See especially the first chapter of Boswell. 
9. This is most evident in the novel’s allegory of the boy who tries to press his 
lips to every part of his body. The boy is described as ‘self-contained’ (401) 
due to his ‘daily discipline and progress toward a long-term goal’ (396). The 
point of the passage is clearly not the value of contortionism, but what the 
adherence to a goal—any goal—implies.
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 Dissenting Commodities
Negotiations of (Un)popularity in Publications Critical of 
Post-9/11 U.S.-America
Elizabeth Kovach
I. (Un)popularity and Marketability
This essay discusses three generically diverse pieces of writing that are 
critical of U.S.-American foreign policy and society since 9/11: Jane Mayer’s 
The Dark Side (2008), Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom (2010), and Juliana Spahr’s 
thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs (2005). These texts—journalistic, 
novelistic, and poetic—are dissenting, critical, and counter-hegemonic 
depictions of the direction that the USA has taken since 9/11. They have 
been written, marketed, and successfully sold to well-established sectors 
of the reading public. While there is a signif icant body of scholarly work 
that focuses on how such examples of post-9/11 writing offer discourses 
counter to those perpetuated by top policymakers and mainstream media 
outlets, little attention has been paid to the commodif ied nature of such 
writerly dissent. In my analyses of these texts, I explore the tensions and 
ambivalences regarding issues of unpopularity and popularity that affect 
writers who strive for political impact while they participate in a market 
logic that inevitably dampens the blow.
I thus conceive of popularity and unpopularity in terms of marketability. 
Raymond Williams writes in Keywords that the word ‘popular’ began as 
‘a legal and political term’, referring to what was generated by the people, 
but f inds that ‘[t]he transition to the predominant modern meaning of 
‘widely favoured’ or ‘well-liked’ is interesting in that it contains a strong 
element of setting out to gain favour’ (236-37). That which sets out to be 
popular is strategically designed to fall within the parameters of what is 
known to be favorable. Popular cultural artifacts, news outlets, and political 
messages generally enter the realm of the familiar and acceptable, abide 
by established tastes and sensibilities, and match desires and expectations 
prevalent within the public sphere. They are, simply put, produced with 
their markets in mind.
The unpopular is that which does not set out to gain favor. It does not 
purposefully appeal to a market, even though it will likely f ind one, however 
small. Within a neoliberal age that accommodates virtually any form of 
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cultural expression (even the extreme levels of offense pursued by the 
band Anal Cunt mentioned in this volume’s introduction), the unpopular is 
more of an aspiration—a fantasy of unadulterated and autonomous expres-
sion that does not pander to anyone or anything—than a fully realizable 
phenomenon. Pursuits of the unpopular are nonetheless attempts to break 
out of established paradigms, and, even if in failure, they perform politics. 
Jacques Rancière’s concept of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ is helpful in 
this context (cf. Aesthetics 12–19). Changes made to this distribution of what 
can be known, sensed, and imagined at any given place and time are, for 
Rancière, the essence of politics. I posit that pursuits of the unpopular have 
more potential to disrupt this distribution than the purposefully popular, 
as the latter is tailored to fall largely within its bounds.
Rancière’s theoretical framework offers a productive perspective for 
thinking about issues pertaining to unpopularity and popularity as they 
f ind expression within, and amongst discourses surrounding, politically 
and socially critical writing about U.S.-America’s post-9/11 era. My conten-
tion is that such writing engages in politics in the manner that Rancière 
conceptualizes, by adding to the ways we sense and perceive the post-9/11 
political and social horizon. Naturally, this happens in ways that are in 
accordance with the segmentation of the literary market and the media 
landscape at large. The impulse to engage in political and social critique is 
thus channeled through specif ic market structures that position the mean-
ing and reception of these texts, determine who their audiences will be, etc. 
This process is one that generates complex negotiations regarding issues 
of popularity and unpopularity—what I have respectively framed as the 
pursuit of market-friendliness and the refusal to make such a blatant appeal.
After elaborating upon Rancière’s concept and relating it to notions 
of the unpopular and popular (section II), I proceed with the three case 
studies (section III). While I discuss the content of these three texts, I also 
consider paratextual information (III.1), authorial comments (III.2), and the 
selection of genre (III.3), respectively, to understand the positioning of these 
texts as products. These dissenting commodities engage in the politics of 
aesthetics while they are also framed within the limitations that the logic 
of the market places on this endeavor.
II. Political Dissent and the Distribution of the Sensible
The premise that sensory perception is contingent upon social, political, 
and historical regimes offers a powerful framework with which to consider 
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(un)popularity. Rancière establishes the phrase ‘distribution of the sensible’ 
to refer to a system of boundaries that def ine what is generally sensed 
within a community. For Rancière, politics ‘consists in interrupting the 
distribution of the sensible by supplementing it with those who have no 
part in the perceptual coordinates of the community, thereby modifying 
the very aesthetico-political f ield of possibility’ (Rockhill 3). Politics is the 
integration of that which has previously been excluded from view, the 
subjectivization of those not formerly acknowledged as speaking, acting 
subjects.
According to such a framework, something can become popular if it falls 
within the realm of what is recognizable to the senses. The unpopular, on 
the other hand, confounds the senses; it arises from outside the frame of 
what is knowable, visible, or audible—from an uncanny, non-normative 
place excluded from dominant frames. The unpopular thus performs 
politics by f irst disrupting and consequently reconfiguring the distribution 
of the sensible. According to this extension of Rancière’s framework onto 
notions of (un)popularity, politics is the introduction of the unpopular into 
the f ield of the sensible. It involves bestowing something or someone with 
the chance to be sensed—with legitimate and ontological presence—as 
well as with the ability to influence the distribution to which it/he/she 
belongs. The unpopular is both political and aesthetic because it alters the 
purview of perception; it rearranges the coordinates of what is knowable, 
visible, and imaginable.
As any form of cultural expression, non-f ictional and f ictional litera-
ture can exert pressure on the distribution of the sensible. Rancière often 
stresses the difference between speech and noise in discussions of the 
literary: speech is voiced by those participating in the distribution of the 
sensible, while the latter is the din of the excluded. Political activity ‘makes 
audible as speaking beings those who were previously heard only as noisy 
animals’ (Aesthetics 4). For Rancière, most literature as we know it today has 
emerged from an aesthetic revolution epitomized by the realism of Balzac 
and Flaubert. In producing works that paid indiscriminate, impartial, 
democratic attention to the minute details, objects, and artifacts of banal, 
everyday life, these writers tore down hierarchies that ‘governed […] the 
appropriateness of expression’ (Literature 10). They shifted to the ‘social 
and political promotion of ordinary human beings’ (Literature 11). Instead 
of portraying the actions of heroes, Rancière states that:
The sentences of Balzac and Flaubert may well have been mute stones. 
[…] They don’t have voices like princes, generals or orators. But they only 
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speak all the better as a result. They bear on their bodies the testimony of 
their history. And this testimony is more reliable than any speech offered 
by human mouth. It is the truth of things as opposed to the chatter and 
lies of orators. (Literature 14)
Sentences like mute stones, I suggest, are sentences that communicate 
without appealing to an audience. They are not crafted with the same kind 
of rhetorical and political intentions as the sentences of ‘princes, generals 
or orators’ and thus embrace the tenets of the unpopular as I have def ined 
it. This literary aesthetic was revolutionary, according to Rancière, because 
it pulled the ‘testimony’ and ‘the truth of things’ from the realm of ‘noisy 
animals’ into the f ield of speech.
I would add here that what were once revolutionary narrative tactics 
during the time of Balzac and Flaubert have lost their singularity within 
the logic of postmodernism. In an essay on philosophical honesty in post-
modern literature, Timothy Bewes stresses how sentences can no longer 
appear like mute stones—autonomous and true—because ‘(1) a sphere 
outside the administered realm of the market seems unimaginable at the 
moment’ and ‘(2) because of the theoretical and philosophical objections 
to the concept of aesthetic autonomy which arise in postmodernism’ (428). 
Within a neoliberal market designed to absorb all human action (cf. Harvey 
3), and with intertextuality and pastiche overriding the notion of ‘aes-
thetic autonomy’, attempts at literary ‘testimony’ and ‘truth’ are inevitably 
compromised by a cultural and economic sphere from which an escape 
‘seems unimaginable’. The unpopular is always already swallowed up by 
the market’s highly obliging distribution of the sensible.
The distribution of the sensible could perhaps also be construed as 
the distribution of the marketable. It seems that the more expandable 
and accommodating this market distribution becomes, the less it can be 
perturbed or produce signif icant counterweights to the speech of off icial 
policymakers—the ‘princes, generals [and] orators’. As Jodi Dean writes, 
the USA witnesses a signif icant discrepancy between ‘the circulation of 
content and official policy. Both are politics, just politics of different sorts, at 
different levels’ (20). Referring specifically to the post-9/11 era, she notes how 
the Bush administration, for example, acknowledged what was a significant 
deluge of dissent within various media channels and in the form of mass 
protests on the streets as preemptive war on Iraq drew near. Yet, this was 
acknowledgement of a right to express disagreement—of the fact that 
people are entitled to their opinions, just as the administration had a right 
to its own. The communication of dissent did not exert pressure on the 
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powers that were. A democratic openness of expression that continuously 
revises the limits of the sensible proves to be compatible with a disjoint in 
the mechanisms of democracy: ‘dense, intensive global communications 
networks actually relieve top-level actors (corporate, institutional, and 
governmental) from the obligation to answer […]’ (Dean 20).
These dynamics, I would venture, generate a desire amongst those 
unsatisf ied with the status quo for unvarnished, true communication and 
a form of politics different from the actual ‘normative political sphere’ that 
‘appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites’ 
(Berlant 227). Ironic as it may be, in October 2003, Bush himself expressed 
the wish to ‘go over the heads of the f ilter and speak directly to the people’ 
(qtd. in Berlant 223). Lauren Berlant discusses this comment in her book 
Cruel Optimism, suggesting that the f ilter, which sorts out noise to make 
communication possible, creates clear speech and strategic messaging, 
as opposed to affective noise. Bush’s comment reveals a desire for ‘true 
soul-to-soul continuity between politicians and their public’ (Berlant 226). 
Such continuity would be democracy in an ideal state and communication 
in its purest form.
This political fantasy of getting to the side of noise is what unpopular 
artistic and aesthetic endeavors entertain. Pursuits of the unpopular, 
while they cannot presuppose radical rupture within the postmodern 
paradigm, nevertheless strive to bring untapped ideas and affects to light 
and make them available for reflection. The texts presented in the next 
section perform this kind of politics. They portray certain facts, stories, 
and sentiments, drawing them into the purview of the sensible. I would 
suggest that they stem from a desire for unfiltered politically and socially 
critical expression. This desire, however, takes a transformational journey: 
it is translated into words on paper, picked up by the appropriate publishing 
houses, and packaged and publicized to meet the demands of the market 
in which it ultimately circulates.
III. Commodified Critique: Three Case Studies
III.1 The Dark Side
In his description of writers like Balzac and Flaubert, Rancière emphasizes 
how f iction, when democratically chronicling the minutiae of unremark-
able objects and lives, enters the same realm as testimony. It reports and 
lays bare material to the reader’s eyes. The testimony that results from 
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investigative journalism, I would argue, attempts a similar type of politics. 
With what became a bestseller within the American market, Jane Mayer 
chronicles the way black sites such as Abu Graib, Guantanamo, and the case 
for invading Iraq, among other things, were made possible. The Dark Side 
suggests that Bush, Cheney, and close advisors obtained what many found 
to be dubious legal opinions to sanction, for example, forced confessions, 
extrajudicial detention, and the expansion of executive power. White House 
insiders—not even political opponents but in-house lawyers, top military 
and intelligence off icials, allies and the British Intelligence Service—were, 
as Mayer’s research attests, marginalized and penalized for challenging 
decisions and expressing dissent. Much of this dissent remained hidden, 
as these matters were protected by claims of national security. The admin-
istration essentially controlled and protected a specif ic ‘distribution of the 
sensible’ and resisted attempts to rearrange its coordinates.
While it is interesting to consider the ‘distribution of the sensible’ and 
the controlling of what could become popular inside the post-9/11 White 
House, this is not my main intention in discussing this text. Rather, I mean 
to highlight the politics of Mayer’s journalism itself, which gives voice to 
many politicians, aides, intelligence workers, lawyers, military person-
nel and military psychologists—not to mention detained terror suspects 
and victims of torture—who had been silenced. Her collection of details, 
interviews, and researched facts about the course of events are laid out 
chronologically. The book’s politics is about giving things presence, offering 
them, making them available for recognition and acknowledgement. It pulls 
information into the purview of the sensible—or, in Ranciere’s words on 
literature, it ‘intervenes […] in the carving up of space and time, the visible 
and invisible, speech and noise’ (Literature 4).
With a title like The Dark Side, the book also loudly announces itself as a 
work that reveals concealed truths, the Other of the government’s off icial 
narrative. Its purposefully f launted appeal is the access it gives the reader 
to unvarnished reality. As the review blurbs covering my edition claim, 
this account, which became a f inalist for the National Book Award, is 
‘deeply troubling’, ‘shocking’, ‘unsettling’; it is lauded as an ‘essential’ book 
‘that should be read by every concerned American’ (this is the Anchor 
Books edition, 2009 [2008]). The Washington Post writes that ‘[t]o dismiss 
these [f indings] as wild, anti-American ravings will not do. They are 
facts, which Mayer substantiates in persuasive detail’; Bloomberg News 
says that the narrative takes the reader through ‘the processes by which 
practices and methods we associate with tyrannies become off icial U.S. 
policy’. What these reviewers consistently claim is that Mayer’s work 
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brings new facts to light, and that it is vital that they reach the public. 
The book did, indeed, reach many readers, as its bestseller status proves. 
It surely informed a signif icant number of U.S.-Americans about post-9/11 
political realities largely excluded from the mainstream media’s cover-
age. When reviewers write that such a journalistic account is important 
and essential, the question is to what ends does such importance and 
essentiality aim?
One blurb is particularly striking in a different way than the others, 
and it moves me toward a tentative answer. A reviewer for Slate is quoted 
as stating: ‘Stunning…. If you’re a fan of 24, you’ll enjoy The Dark Side’. In 
other words, viewers of the f ictional television series 24 about Counter 
Terrorism Unit agent Jack Bauer will also enjoy the heart-racing tale of 
American tyranny Mayer reports. What the selection of this blurb for 
the front matter (i.e. the pages proceeding the actual text) of this edition 
indicates is that The Dark Side is marketed as a consumer experience and 
form of entertainment. While I do not wish to insinuate that a TV series 
like 24 is not critical in its own right, its critique operates metaphorically 
while Mayer’s work of investigative journalism speaks directly of the facts 
and gives voice to flesh-and-blood witnesses. The paratextual reference to 
24 implicitly relegates The Dark Side to the same market segment occupied 
by viewers of f ictional television.
The selection of this blurb is symptomatic of an effort to gain favor—a 
positioning of the book within a large and established consumer market. 
In his work on the forms and functions of paratexts, Gérard Genette writes 
that every paratext is
a privileged place of a pragmatics and a strategy, of an inf luence on 
the public, an influence that—whether well or poorly understood and 
achieved—is at the service of a better reception for the text and a more 
pertinent reading of it (more pertinent, of course, in the eyes of the author 
and his allies). (2)
The paratextual strategy of this blurb’s selection is to mobilize a consumer 
segment. It sets the stage for a page-turning experience rather than for 
collective outrage to which policymakers would have to answer. The impor-
tance and essentiality of the narrative that Mayer presents is thus packaged 
as a politically dissenting, shockingly true document that is destined for 
likeability amongst a certain milieu, rather than the grounds for the policy 
changes Mayer implicitly begs for throughout the account she provides. 
There is a push for popularity written all over this book’s packaging, while 
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its message is meant to function in an unpopular manner in the sense of 
perturbing the status quo.
This packaging and presentation of disturbing information as ‘likeable’ 
is strange, though it is easy to overlook the strangeness of such a scenario 
at f irst glance, because it has arguably become a naturalized phenomenon 
within the current cultural logic. The ‘like’ function on Facebook comes to 
mind as an analogy: awkward moments arise when users post troubling 
information that friends, wishing to acknowledge the importance of such 
content, end up ‘liking’ for lack of an alternative response mechanism. In a 
similar sense, The Dark Side circulates as a product within the book market 
and, as such, participates in a logic in which favorability-as-marketability 
is its driving force. Its outrage-inducing content stands in tension with its 
commodif ication.
III.2 Freedom
Jonathan Franzen’s novel Freedom supplements perception about American 
politics, culture, and society with the breadth of politically charged themes 
and plotlines pertaining to the post-9/11 era that it covers. It is a family 
saga that begins just after 9/11 and traces the interrelated fates of various 
protagonists. One of them is the family son, Joey Berglund, who has just 
begun his college career when the 9/11 terrorist attacks occur. Imbued with 
a sense of entitlement, Joey resents the attacks for their interference in his 
college experience:
Joey Berglund had received numberless assurances that his life was 
destined to be a lucky one. […] The world had given unto him, and he was 
f ine with the taking. […] [C]ollege looked like it would be an extension of 
the world as he had always known it, only better. He was so convinced of 
this—took it so much for granted—that on the morning of September 11 
he actually left his roommate, Jonathan, to monitor the burning World 
Trade Center and Pentagon while he hurried off to his Econ 201 lecture. 
Not until he reached the big auditorium and found it all but empty did 
he understand that a really serious glitch had occurred. […] [T]he deep 
chagrin he’d then experienced […] became the seed of his intensely 
personal resentment of the terrorist attacks. […].
In the days after 9/11, everything suddenly seemed extremely stupid to 
Joey: It was stupid that a ‘Vigil of Concern’ was held for no conceivable 
practical reason, it was stupid that people kept watching the same disaster 
footage over and over, it was stupid that the Chi Phi boys hung a banner 
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of ‘support’ from their house, it was stupid that the football game against 
Penn State was canceled, it was stupid that so many kids left Grounds to 
be with their families […]. (232–33)
The novel performs politics in the way Rancière describes it not simply 
because Joey’s perspective obviously counters post-9/11 discourses of 
trauma, redemption, and heroism that bolstered the hegemony’s tightly 
controlled distribution of the sensible. Rather, in portraying a character 
like Joey, the novel performs politics in the detailed, democratic attention it 
pays to the psyche of a young adult who is unremarkable, unadmirable, and 
has absorbed neoliberal individualism to such a degree that he ‘personally’ 
resents national, collective tragedy. This is not a story of actors or heroes 
but that of mundane living and, according to Rancière, ‘what literature pits 
against the […] privileging of action over life, is writing seen as a machine 
for making life talk’ (Literature 14). Franzen’s novel is a reporting on life that 
integrates the unpopular into its fabric, thereby presenting it as an artifact 
available to perception.
As Franzen states in an essay on novel-writing entitled Why Bother?, his 
aims as a writer are not explicitly political nor does he expect the aesthetics 
of his work to have much societal impact:
I can’t pretend the mainstream will listen to the news I have to bring. 
I can’t pretend I’m subverting anything. […] I can’t stomach any notion 
that serious [literature] is good for us. It’s hard to consider literature a 
medicine, in any case, when reading it serves mainly to deepen your 
depressing estrangement from the mainstream. […] Expecting [literature] 
to bear the weight of our whole disturbed society—to help solve our 
contemporary problems—seems to me a peculiarly American delusion. 
To write sentences of such authenticity that refuge can be taken in them: 
Isn’t it enough? Isn’t it a lot? (73–74)
Here, Franzen expresses a conviction in small, sentence-sized forms of 
poetic truth, along with a professed disdain for the mainstream. As a writer, 
he aims to offer refuge as opposed to calls for action. Novel writing is, for 
him, not about political agendas and there is nothing particularly heroic 
about the effort. The ‘bother’ is about refuge, retreat, reflection, and a sense 
of connection between readers and sentences on the page.
When Oprah Winfrey, the highest-rated talk show host in U.S.-American 
television history, announced that Franzen’s novel The Corrections, which 
was published before Freedom, had been chosen for her book club, Franzen 
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publically expressed concern about what his instant popularity would 
mean. He worried that his association with Winfrey’s pop-iconic status 
would alienate his writer friends and the types of readers he most wanted 
to reach. His reaction, not surprisingly, caused a wave of controversy and 
motivated Winfrey to rescind the selection (cf. Kachka). The controversy 
was nonetheless effective in putting Franzen on the map.
Franzen, especially by the time he wrote and published Freedom, had 
become a brand name with a marketing machinery behind him poised 
and ready to push his products and more or less ensure their commercial 
success. His post-9/11 realism reaches a widespread public, because it is 
presented as a high-demand commodity. The ‘Oprah incident’ suggests 
that Franzen is not fully comfortable with the phenomenon he has become. 
He wishes to satisfy the desires of those who value the unpopular and 
feel a ‘depressing estrangement from the mainstream’. This, not hype and 
attention, is the source of his pride as a writer. There is certainly something 
snobbish and judgmental about this desire to be unpopular. It presupposes 
that mainstream audiences lack the subtlety or acumen to take refuge in 
sentences according to Franzen’s design, that the realm of the popular 
glosses over and fails to grasp the text’s poetic truth.
Yet, perhaps Franzen’s discomfort is more accurately about the politics of 
aesthetics. When a book is hyped in the way Freedom is, it becomes diff icult 
if not impossible to discern if its success, in terms of sales, truly depends 
on its content or marketing and publicity. Its popularity is anything but 
spontaneous or surprising and its circulation among readers is by no means 
autonomous. What is more, the reading process becomes prefigured, or pre-
mediated, by the hype. This is a potential conflict of interest for the politics 
of Franzen’s novelistic aesthetics. When they are lauded as coming from the 
greatest American novelist of our time, Franzen’s sentences are loaded with 
platitudes and an imposed weightiness that they are not meant to possess. 
In depicting Joey’s reaction to 9/11, for instance, Franzen is arguably not 
voicing political opinion through his character, but rather attempting to 
transcribe the noise of life into discernable speech. The novel’s politics, as 
in this particular scene, lies in its embrace of an unremarkable, unlikable, 
self ish college student. Joey’s personal resentment towards the 9/11 attacks 
as well as the outpouring of emotion and campus activity they unleash is a 
depiction of an unpopular, post-9/11 structure of feeling.
Like the un-heroic and un-admirable Joey, Franzen’s own aesthetic is 
meant to be un-heroic in itself, not met by an applauding Oprah-show 
studio audience or interpreted as the def initive social portrait of our times. 
Its aim is to expand the distribution of the sensible into the f lat, banal, 
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embarrassingly human stuff of U.S.-American experience since 9/11. This is 
the politics and the aesthetic that the novel’s popularity might overshadow 
and the potential source of Franzen’s controversial reaction to the main-
stream favorability that the phenomenon of Winfrey’s book club selection 
guarantees.
III.3 thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs
The degrees of (un)popularity of a published text depend on its genre. 
Mayer’s non-f ictional ‘current events’ book and Franzen’s literary novel 
represent two of the most readily bought and sold genres on the market. 
By choosing to write poetry, a writer also inherently accepts the limited 
extent of her own (un)popularity. Even the most renowned poets would 
not garner the kind of media hype or sales f igures that a popular novelist 
would. Juliana Spahr published a series of personal and political poems 
written from her home in Hawaii between 2001 and 2003, which she enti-
tled thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs; it begins with a poem about 9/11, 
followed by others concerned with its political aftermath. The spirit and 
structure of Spahr’s lyrics are in the tradition of Walt Whitman. Formally 
and thematically, they cultivate notions of connectedness. The ethos of 
these poems is clearly to expand the distribution of the sensible into an 
all-encompassing whole.
Spahr’s words aim to refigure notions of selfhood that banish individual-
ity and self ishness to create an ethical mode of being that fosters awareness 
of the contingency between the cells, the body, personal space, the state, 
nation and international spheres, through to the limitless expanses of 
outer-space. In the 11 March 2003 entry she writes:
Bush keeps saying he will go it alone if he has to.
Huge protests continue, protests without alone and against alone.
It is the word alone, beloveds, the word alone.
When I speak of alone I speak of how there is no alone as Pakistan
claims it is moving in on bin Laden, as Iran’s nuclear plant is
nearing completion, as Oscar organizers announce that the show
will go on in the event of war.
……………………
It is an uneventful day as we sit here waiting for news.
The television promises updates on the situation with Iraq on the
half hour.
Our apartment is small and is buried between two other apartments,
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one above and one below.
Beloveds, my desire is to hunker down and lie low, lie with yous
in beds and bowers, lie with yous in resistance to the alone, lie
with yous night after night.
But the military industrial complex enters our bed at night.
We sleep with levels of complicity so intense and various that our
dreams are of smothering and of drowning and of the military outside
our door and we f ind it hard to get up in the morning. (61–63)
In Frames of War, Judith Butler responds to U.S. foreign policy since 9/11 by 
asking that we reconsider subjectivity in a way that ‘implies living socially, 
that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. 
It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know’ 
(14). Spahr engages in a similar reframing by resisting ‘the alone’—resisting 
a sense of enclosure to accept complicity, resisting a narrow distribution of 
the sensible to cultivate a globally scaled form of awareness. She advocates 
a sensibility through which the discrete boundaries of bodies and things 
dissolve and frames collapse.
This wish for an all-inclusive distribution of the sensible is a wish for 
the end of politics in the way Rancière def ines it: with no noise waiting to 
be turned into discernible speech, with nothing excluded awaiting entry 
into the purview of perception, the post-political, democratic vision Spahr 
cultivates is utopian. She f igures a space in which everything is awarded 
ontological presence, legitimacy, and equal footing—in which terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, and preemptive war would be rendered use-
less. But, as Spahr acknowledges, the ‘military industrial complex’ persists 
and waits ‘outside our door’.
Ultimately, Spahr’s poetry cultivates a vision that self-consciously admits 
to its own limitations. Rancière describes writing that tries to prefigure the 
future and write new life into being as inherently thwarted by the fact that 
it can only draw from the world available at the time of its composition. 
Instead of envisioning new forms of life out of nothing, writing is ‘a powerful 
machine for self-interpretation and for the re-poetization of life, capable 
of converting all the rubbish of ordinary life into poetic bodies and signs 
of history’ (Literature 29). The notion of a ‘new body that sings the hymn 
of the new world is destined to remain a utopia, at once necessary and 
unrealizable, by means of which the regime of literary writing projects itself 
beyond itself’ (Literature 29). Instead of forging the new, the writer can only 
really convert what is unpopular and excluded into the distribution of the 
sensible. Boundaries are not collapsed but shifted.
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Spahr pursues what is ‘necessary but unrealizable’, not merely in terms 
of what her poetry can achieve but also, I would argue, by choosing to be a 
poet herself. Successful and recognized as she is, she devotes her energies 
to a relatively unpopular mode of cultural production. Her efforts go into 
words that will shift thought and experience within an intimate circle. As 
she writes of her apartment, framed by others on all sides, social experi-
ence is ultimately one of compartmentalization, not fusion. The military 
industrial complex waiting outside her door blocks the extension of social 
engagement that she is able to cultivate domestically and creatively. She 
engages in a small form of politics in the sense that the message of her 
poetry is limited by the market of readers for which contemporary poetry is 
packaged and marketed. The impetus for writing is thus not revolutionary 
but a modest contribution to latent and untapped realms of perception, to 
honing and preparing the senses for new configurations of reality not yet 
fully imaginable. Spahr produces an inherently unpopular type of text yet 
still bothers to bring it into existence, and thus she upholds the conviction 
that even the smallest contributions to the distribution of the sensible are 
worth our while.
IV. Conclusion: Framing Counter-discourse
I have covered a range of different genres of text. Yet, from Mayer’s laying 
out of facts to Franzen’s depiction of mundane subjects to Spahr’s verses 
about complicity and connectedness, all these texts perform politics, or at 
least attempt to add to the way we sense and perceive the social and political 
contexts they address. This kind of politics is about illuminating parts that 
have no part (to paraphrase Rancière). It is about giving the unpopular the 
option to become popular and to ‘introduce lines of fracture’ (Rancière, 
Aesthetics 39) into arrangements of perception. A discourse counter to those 
disseminated by top policymakers and the mainstream media takes shape, 
is circulated and documented, via such publications.
Instead of simply focusing on how the case studies presented here 
function in counter-discursive manners, however, my aim has been to 
understand the fate of counter-discursive publications within the logic 
of the publishing market. Mayer’s investigative journalism is packaged as 
a thrilling experience as much as it comprises a document of potentially 
serious political consequence. Franzen’s literary f iction seeks to honestly 
portray American society and tap into a truthfulness of experience that pan-
dering to a market arguably taints; yet, his novels are hyped more than those 
of almost any other contemporary U.S.-American novelist today. Spahr’s 
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poetry funnels dissenting expression into an intimate sphere, making her 
global vision knowingly utopian and inevitably limited. All of these cases 
have exposed a tension between the degrees of popularity (the purposeful 
setting out to gain favor and market viability) and unpopularity (expression 
free of targeted appeal) that such texts symbolize. I have thus explored 
how these publications embody tensions surrounding (un)popularity. This 
essay is meant as an impulse for further inquiries in such a direction—into 
reading critical texts not simply for their messages but also for how such 
messages are framed for the market, and what this does to the channeling 
and fate of dissent.
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 Secrets, Lies and The Real Housewives
The Death of an (Un)Popular Genre
Dan Udy
‘I’m from this town, I know what’s real and what’s fake.’
—Kyle Richards, The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills, season 4 opening credits
Through the course of this compendium, my fellow contributors and I 
aim to work through what it is that makes up ‘unpopular culture’. This is 
no easy task, and if any conclusion is to be drawn it is that there is, quite 
simply, no single def inition. Where does one draw the limit on ‘culture’? 
Are we speaking of productions, people, or practices? And what do we 
mean by ‘popular’? To identify these ambiguities hardly breaks new critical 
ground, yet to consider them in light of the unpopular is to venture into 
relatively uncharted territory. Our rubric brings together two terms that 
are multivalent and broad in scope, and this essay does not intend to sketch 
out all its possible manifestations or provide a unifying answer to the ques-
tions raised above. What this collection instead aims to do is break down 
unpopular culture into its constituent parts. When viewed as a whole, 
maybe our examples will provide a more coherent image of the myriad 
directions these cultural forms can spread. Before moving forward, though, 
some ref inements are needed, and by re-distributing ‘unpopular’ into a set 
of sub-categories the theoretical grounding for what is to follow may become 
clearer. These adjustments are made by way of punctuation, an academic 
technique that, according to an old professor of mine, ‘was fashionable 
about ten years ago’. Amusingly f itting, then, for use here.
Underground music, the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) and Justin 
Bieber could all be described as ‘unpopular’, but the disparities between 
them show that with each use of the term we mean subtly different things. 
For example, fans of bands with a strong presence on Pitchfork, but not the 
Billboard Hot 100, position themselves outside the general public. Audiences 
are small in size, but are united in a shared appreciation for a genre. They 
are, to use the Latin root, not of the ‘populus’. Denunciation of the WBC 
is shared by politicians and ordinary individuals across the globe, and 
although these two examples may seem radically different, they do, in fact, 
share a common trait. They incite homogenous audience behaviors, both 
96 dan Udy 
taking different interpretations of ‘popular’ (audience size and positive 
appreciation) and inverting them completely. An essay could be devoted to 
unpacking distinctions and relations between the two, but I merely claim 
that ‘unpopular’ is in these cases appropriate. Other cultural f igures and 
productions, though, require a reconstruction of the term to reflect the 
complex behavior of those who interact with them.
The un/popular, here exemplif ied by Justin Bieber, splits its audiences 
into two opposing factions where ardent fans clash with critics and wider 
audiences. A slash literalizes this process through its double meaning, 
signifying not only a punctuation mark but also an act of violent divi-
sion. Tensions between fans and critics are often played out across online 
social networks and blogs, and it is through such confrontations that the 
dialectic of un/popularity is maintained. In negotiating this virtual space 
fans also sometimes inhabit both sides of the binary division: self-fashioned 
tribal groups (Lady Gaga’s ‘Little Monsters’, Justin Bieber’s ‘Beliebers’, One 
Direction’s ‘Directioners’, etc.) engage in hostile exchanges, defending their 
chosen idols while viciously attacking others.
A second reconstruction of ‘unpopular’ further muddles the coherence of 
a viewing demographic. The (un)popular’s audience is not homogenous, but 
nor is it singularly defined by internal conflict. While the un/popular fosters 
a semantic antagonism between its composite parts, the (un)popular’s 
inverted popularity is subjugated through a bracketing. It is what audi-
ences ‘hate to love’ instead of ‘love to hate’, and although the boundaries 
between these separate permutations of unpopularity are by no means 
rigid, objects of (un)popularity are often subject to a more light-hearted 
approach. Audiences that embrace these productions simultaneously reject 
them, or are aware that they should reject them, and this process establishes 
the (un)popular as a close cousin of camp (it is no coincidence that there 
is signif icant overlap between examples of the two). Such behavior is, of 
course, by no means unanimous across all individuals who engage with 
these cultural forms; for every media text declared ‘trashy’ or ‘tasteless’ 
there will be those who genuinely invest in it, lacking the cultural capital 
that tells them they should, apparently, know better. However, when a 
substantial proportion of an audience decry the music they repeatedly listen 
to or the television show they can’t bear to miss, an (un)popular category 
of forms—the guilty pleasure—is born.
When preparing to deliver an early form of this essay, mention of its 
topic was often met with a laugh or smirk. There was an amusing incon-
gruence to a conference paper on a lowbrow Reality TV show. Potentially 
subversive and definitely comic, discussing The Real Housewives would be 
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an unpopular gesture in most academic circles, and even when presented at 
a conference titled Unpopular Culture it did not fail to elicit the occasional 
giggle. To conduct scholarly work on a brazenly vapid television series was 
funny because, quite simply, it felt like breaking the rules. Despite the 
decades that have passed since cultural studies formed a discipline in its 
own right, the notion that scholarship must be ‘serious’ if one wants to get 
an academic job has somehow managed to persist. All of us in that room 
were—not for the f irst time that weekend—deviating from this apparent 
norm, and (un)popular, in this particular context, came to signify more 
than ‘guilty pleasure’: it is the not-serious, the playful, the improper and 
the out-of-place.
The Real Housewives of Orange County was developed by Scott Dunlop in 
2004, and, after being bought by the American network Bravo, premiered on 
21 March 2006. It was the third in a sequence of television programs focusing 
upon the affluent residents of Orange County, California, beginning with 
teen drama series The O.C. (Fox, 2003-2007) followed by Laguna Beach: The 
Real Orange County (MTV, 2004–2006), replacing the former’s f ictional char-
acters with real-life group of adolescents. The f igure of the Orange County 
housewife—surgically enhanced, permanently medicated and devoted 
to a full-time schedule of social engagements—featured as a peripheral 
element to both, and was mythologized as a distinctly local phenomenon. 
Further influenced by the recent success of Desperate Housewives (ABC, 
2004–2012), the show capitalized upon the popularity of affluent female 
subjects by following a group of women living behind the gates of Coto de 
Caza, a private residential community. In the years since its premiere the 
franchise has reached unprecedented levels of success, with a rumored value 
in excess of half a billion dollars and a peak rating of 3.1 million viewers 
over The Real Housewives of Atlanta season f ive. At the time of writing, six 
more U.S. editions have aired (set in New York City, Atlanta, New Jersey, 
Washington D.C., Beverly Hills and Miami) alongside seven spin-offs, and 
it is the f irst docusoap to franchise overseas with international editions 
in Greece, France, Canada and Australia. Its (un)popularity is evidenced 
through an all-pervasive cultural reach: a 2012 Hollywood Reporter cover 
story declared the franchise to be ‘the guiltiest pleasure on television’ 
(Bruce), and it even earned a humorous acknowledgment in a speech by 
President Obama the same year. In a recent interview, Dunlop declared 
that ‘[y]ou can love the show, you can hate the show but you really can’t 
ignore it’ (qtd. in Day 16).
After undergoing ref inements through its early seasons, each edition 
of The Real Housewives now follows a relatively standardized format. Cast 
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members are documented as they navigate the trials and tribulations of 
female friendship, formed in part by pre-existing bonds but also through the 
show’s artif icial augmentation of social groups. Narratives unfold amongst 
patterns of relentless consumption: exotic holidays, plastic surgery, extrava-
gant parties and luxury shopping trips form the rotating background against 
which the drama of each season takes place. Fly-on-the-wall documentary 
footage forms the bulk of each episode, interspersed with video confession-
als that, although f ilmed retrospectively, deny their temporality through 
a present-tense narration of each woman’s thoughts and feelings. Polished 
aesthetics characterize these segments: a green-screen is replaced with 
images of opulent domestic interiors, coupled with soft lighting, expensive 
dresses and heavy make-up. At the closing credits for each episode a cast 
member’s voice-over directs viewers to Bravo’s website, where off icial blogs 
by each of the housewives are posted to offer further thoughts on the footage 
and enable additional interaction with their fans. At the end of each season 
the cast are brought together by Bravo vice president Andy Cohen for a 
reunion episode (or episodes, sometimes split into multiple parts), in which 
protagonists are shown footage from the past season and asked for their 
thoughts on the events that transpired.
Similar to unpopular culture, the category of ‘docusoap’ is marked by 
ontological incoherence. Its trajectory is diff icult to precisely chart, given 
the gradual process of hybridization through which it occurred and the 
historical analysis that grouped programs into new generic clusters. PBS’s 
An American Family (1973) is often identified as the genre’s earliest and most 
prominent example, in which a documentary used the narrative structure 
of soap opera to chronicle the lives of the Loud family from Santa Barbara, 
California. Cameras captured the unexpected dissolution of the domestic 
unit when Pat Loud asked her husband Bill for a divorce, and also followed 
their eldest son Lance move to New York City and immerse himself in the 
downtown queer arts scene. This identif ication as a docusoap, though, is 
a retrospective one, and the use of the term in relation to contemporary 
media did not occur until two decades later. Although the focus of this essay 
is restricted to American visual culture, the simultaneous emergence of the 
docusoap on both sides of the Atlantic can yield some useful context; Janet 
Jones’s survey of British journalism shows the term entering our lexicon 
most prominently in 1998 (cf. 76), so it would be accurate to assume the 
genre emerged a few years prior.
Experiments in format between the realms of factual and f ictional 
programming produced a range of new generic types, in which dramas such 
as E.R. and NYPD Blue adopted the visual grammar of the documentary, 
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while MTV’s The Real World used documentary footage and confessional 
interviews to narrativize the lives of a group of strangers picked to live 
together. This particular mode of production quickly proved unpopular 
with critics, who bemoaned the undermining of documentary’s founding 
principles in favor of mass entertainment, and expressed frustration with 
the quick proliferation of cheaply-produced programming and its cast of 
interchangeable, everyday people. The visual format employed by The 
Real World has since developed into the most culturally prolif ic form of 
docusoap today, to the extent that it has become synonymous with Real-
ity television—in fact, a sprawling array of diverse media—in the public 
imagination. Now continuing into its third decade on the air, the show’s 
structure has remained largely unchanged and is reflected in a huge number 
of popular programs across a global array of broadcasting networks. The 
Real Housewives displays many hallmarks of internationally successful 
docusoaps such as Jersey Shore and Keeping Up With the Kardashians: it 
combines fly-on-the-wall footage with direct-to-camera interviews, narra-
tivizing its content through soap opera-esque edits and dramatic music.
A continuity of cast members between seasons charts their develop-
ment from ‘normal’ women to public f igures, and in doing so the show 
produces a self-reflexive documentation of the perks and pitfalls of Reality 
TV fame. As their public prof ile increases, the women adapt their behavior 
and appearance accordingly—original Orange County Housewife Lauri 
Peterson describes the cast of season one as ‘virgin housewives’ who quickly 
substituted ‘no make-up and sweatpants’ for more glamorous fare once 
they witnessed themselves on screen (‘100th Episode Special’). Alongside the 
manifest pressures of the f ilm crew’s presence, the cameras of the paparazzi 
eventually come to exert their influence. After encountering their mediated 
representations the women react to their appearance on screen and in print, 
and as viewers we witness the trajectory of this peculiar phenomenon. By 
allowing the process of celebrif ication to feature within its tightly-edited 
narratives The Real Housewives maintains a precarious link between Real-
ity and reality that carves its own space within a crowded genre whilst 
simultaneously undermining its numerous, and necessary, f ictions.1
Within the franchise, degrees of authenticity are modelled according 
to the multiple footage types used, forming a Chinese box structure. Each 
segment purports itself to be the location of authentic thoughts and feelings, 
yet as these move outwards cast members reflexively analyze themselves 
and others to reveal to their audience their ‘real’ opinions. Confessionals 
reflect upon the core documentary footage, off icial blogs analyze episodes 
as a whole and f inal reunions examine the contents of all three, during 
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which editing techniques, on-screen personas and off-camera events are 
all discussed. As seasons progress and the housewives’ celebrity status de-
velops, digital tabloid media emerge as a powerful force which reformulates 
this structure from both its epicenter and periphery. Interactions between 
storylines and the internet and tabloid press begin to occur, disrupting its 
episodic narrative by the immediacy of gossip blog and social media posts 
that reveal to Bravo’s audience the chasm between transmission dates 
and the actual time of production. Stories relating to the cast, particularly 
‘behind-the-scenes’ gossip, are delivered with up-to-the-minute speed by 
outlets such as TMZ and Radar Online, providing information on ‘real-life’ 
drama beyond the confines of the show and the extent to which scenes 
are contrived by Bravo. When these become embroiled within the show’s 
storylines, a new hybrid R/reality is produced; as an active and temporal 
construct, it is maintained by and dependent upon the tensions between 
real life and its augmentation.
This symbiosis produces a genre in perpetual flux. Tied as it is to the im-
mediacy and frenetic turnover of the tabloid media, docusoap programming 
presents diff iculties for scholarly work. The categorical ‘presentness’ of the 
viewing experience makes retrospective viewing surreal and incomplete, and 
this takes an admittedly comic turn with the unrelenting pace of surgical 
upkeep (watching old seasons appears to make breasts deflate and noses 
grow). Translating such temporalities into the permanence of the written 
word, then, risks fast becoming irrelevant, if not incorrect. In the short 
period between this essay’s original presentation and the time of writing, 
new seasons of the franchise have come and gone, and more will inevitably 
follow. A strategy for the most accurate representation of such media texts 
is to engage with very recent and current programming, yet the original 
examples used are now, of course, already comparatively dated. For now, 
though, this essay’s main proposals continue to be demonstrated, and I will 
use my original examples alongside some more recent case studies. My focus 
will be restricted to two particular instalments of the franchise which have 
exemplif ied the tumultuous relationship between Reality and reality, and 
its mediation through tabloid gossip. The intermedial nature of The Real 
Housewives of New Jersey (2009–present) and The Real Housewives of Beverly 
Hills (2010–present) is demonstrated through cast members’ engagement with 
stories online and in print, where articles published by TMZ, Radar Online, 
People magazine and US Weekly become anchor points between which plot 
lines are drawn and from which dramatic confrontations are frequently 
provoked. This phenomenon is hardly limited to these two instalments, but 
for the sake of coherence within this survey it is necessary to refine my scope.
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With its setting in the affluent Los Angeles suburb, The Real Housewives 
of Beverly Hills is situated in the epicenter of the tabloid and entertain-
ment industries, an area housing major TV and f ilm studios as well as 
the headquarters of numerous print and digital media outlets. Its cast 
are embedded within a social circle that features many high-prof ile 
celebrities—current housewives Kim and Kyle Richards are aunts to 
Paris Hilton—and interactions between its cast and tabloid journalists 
or paparazzi occur with a higher frequency than other installments of 
the franchise. Street photographers are evident as a peripheral element 
of everyday life for the city’s wealthy residents, concentrated within 
particular areas where the Housewives live and socialize. The relative 
normalization of tabloid encounters amongst the residents of Beverly Hills 
eases their transition into public f igures, initiating conflicts and develop-
ing narratives with which audiences are able to directly engage. One 
particular confrontation exemplif ies the feedback loop between online 
gossip and events within the show, and is constructed through a web of 
dialogic exchange between cast members and journalists. Although it is 
by no means the only instance of such conflict, it succinctly demonstrates 
the complexities of this process.
In the reunion episode for season two, cast members Lisa Vanderpump 
and Adrienne Maloof trade accusations regarding the selling of stories. 
When Vanderpump alleges that Maloof’s chef leaked information to the 
tabloids, the latter responds by claiming that Vanderpump had sold articles 
to Radar Online for the amount of $25,000. For viewers wanting to decipher 
the truth to these contradictory claims, the website itself posted articles 
covering its inclusion in the episode:
The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills all have one thing in common—they 
love RadarOnline.com! In the reunion episode that aired Monday night, 
Radar was the center of attention, because we apparently really get under 
their skin. […]
So was Adrienne right? Did RadarOnline.com pay Lisa $25,000? Find the 
answer on twitter at @IMPerel.
(‘Real Housewives Fight At Reunion—Over Radar!’)
Through directing readers to the page of Twitter user IMPerel—a.k.a. David 
Perel, the company’s Executive Vice President—the normally mediated 
exchange between journalists and the cast is transformed into direct com-
munication. Indeed, the use of Twitter by the Housewives serves a key role in 
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the expansion of the show’s narrative to a real-time space, equalizing three 
forms of subject (cast, journalists and viewers) within the same interac-
tive virtual domain, and allowing the possibility for viewers to enter into 
conversation. In a follow-up story on the website, quotes are taken from 
Perel’s Twitter conversations with Vanderpump and Maloof and it transpires 
the argument was apparently a misunderstanding.
After talking to both ladies, Perel f igured out who had communicated 
the false information to Adrienne and the air was cleared.
‘@IMPerel Thank you for your support, I know what @TheRealCamilleG 
and I were told. Moving fwd in a positive direction! xoA’ Adrienne tweeted 
on Tuesday to Perel.
‘Thank u!! following you @IMPerel glad we can move on to more impor-
tant things! Have a great day!! XoxoA’
Lisa also tweeted in support: ‘@radar_online thank you for supporting 
me and not that bullsh*t…means a lot’.
(‘Lisa Vanderpump & Adrienne Maloof Feud Over Radar: All A Big 
Misunderstanding!’)
Negotiations of authenticity and attempts to establish ‘the truth’ feature 
heavily throughout The Real Housewives, and are often the primary catalyst 
for its narratives. Considering the relative stability of their affluent lifestyles, 
the show’s dramatic events must be constructed predominantly from the 
fabric of inter-personal relationships.2 As public f igures with lucrative 
personal brands, the cast are aware that reputation is tightly linked to 
f inancial gain; Bravo’s viewers are, in essence, consumers, targets of subtle 
(and frequently unsubtle) product placement of the books, clothing and 
beauty products the Housewives endorse. Indeed, the inclusion of business 
ventures and products, alongside pay increases, has even been factored into 
contract deals for popular returning characters (‘Exposed!’). Rose and Wood 
explicitly address this model of viewership in their article ‘Paradox and the 
Consumption of Authenticity through Reality Television’, and conclude 
that audiences ‘increasingly value authenticity in a world where the mass 
production of artifacts causes them to question the plausibility of the value’ 
(286). In a competitive effort to self-market along these lines, proclama-
tions of ‘realness’ and authenticity abound as the women collectively try to 
determine who is, or is not, ‘fake’. In this case, the context of Beverly Hills 
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provides a backdrop of normalized ‘fakeness’ against which the Housewives 
position themselves: alongside surgical enhancement, superf icial perso-
nas are touted as a well-known stereotype of wealthy Angelenos, leading 
Yolanda Foster to ask Lisa Vanderpump in season 4 episode 17, ‘Are you a 
Hollywood friend or a real friend?’ (‘Lines in the Sand’).
These conflicts are magnified within reunion shows, in which a legalistic 
mise-en-scène evokes the theatrical arrangement of the courtroom. Host 
and Bravo executive Andy Cohen is f lanked by the cast on opposing sofas 
and mediates in sometimes violent altercations. Damaging rumors are 
traced back to their source, and cast members exchange accusations of lying 
in an attempt to maintain and accumulate authenticity as a valuable form of 
social capital. Objects of ‘proof’ are used as evidence in their pre-meditated 
confrontations, in which photos, text messages and print-outs of e-mails are 
brought by the Housewives to make their case for truthfulness before the 
jury of their fellow cast and viewers at home. The literal value of authenticity 
in this case, as a determining factor in viewer popularity, could be perhaps 
conceived as an economic drive behind such conflicts, in which social 
capital stands in for its f inancial equivalent. Postmodern philosophical 
scholarship, however, cannot be entirely ignored in favor of a purely Marxist 
approach: this search for authenticity can be, and often is, formulated as a 
response to the postmodern condition itself. Instead, the clear f inancial mo-
tives behind establishing ‘authenticity’ could be seen to merely exacerbate 
the epistemological uncertainties felt by subjects of postmodern culture. 
That the differentiation between fact and f iction occurs both within and 
beyond the bounds of the camera’s frame is testament to the prevalence 
of this cultural anxiety, and is demonstrated by efforts of fans to peel back 
façades of production. The timed, dated interactions between cast members 
and viewers through social media are used to re-chronologize the show, 
matching dates of tweets and sightings of the cast with events portrayed 
on screen. Through exposing the re-arrangement of events to form satisfy-
ing narratives, independent bloggers collude with tabloid media in their 
galvanization of cynical, suspicious viewers. If chronological adjustments 
can easily be de-coded, then what other elements of reality have been 
manipulated? Whilst edits can, with in-depth detective work, be unveiled, 
what about producer interventions, or performative elements that influence 
the raw footage?
The disorientating generic hybrid of the docusoap induces unsettling ef-
fects upon its audience, captured in Annette Hill’s observation that ‘viewers 
describe themselves as watching a bad dream, trying to work out what is 
real or not in the topsy-turvy world of reality entertainment’ (89). Reality 
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television—as manifested in the docusoap—is, then, characteristically 
postmodern in its in-betweenness, and the viewing experience is theorized 
as such. Rose and Wood point to a ‘postmodern paradox’ (286) at the heart 
of this search for authenticity, whilst Janet Jones describes the process in 
a 2000 article title as ‘The Postmodern Guessing Game’. Jones’s essay is 
telling in its particular phrasing: the docusoap is not a postmodern guessing 
game, it is the guessing game. This is not to say that uncertainty is only 
inherent in encounters with the docusoap—far from it, in fact, as one could 
argue a similar response through the spectrum of postmodern cultural 
productions—but rather that the multiple anxieties brought to bear upon 
the viewing experience typify the concerns of our contemporary epoch.
Here, I follow the view that postmodernity is ongoing, and while this 
perspective is certainly open to debate (countless variations of ‘post-
postmodernism’ have been proposed, but few–if any–have gained traction), 
general consensus points to its beginnings in the late 1970s. From this mo-
ment onwards, postmodernism’s most transformative effects can be seen 
the f ield of subject-image relations. Coupled with a broader suspicion of 
grand narratives and a burgeoning discourse on the politics of representa-
tion, the photographic image was deconstructed along lines of race, class, 
and gender by both visual artists and critics. Documentary photography’s 
claim to neutrality formed an easy target for this cultural interrogation, 
and the digital turn only heightened such suspicion when its claim to 
verisimilitude—indexicality—was removed. As a consequence, the drive 
to challenge documentary’s ‘truthfulness’ is exacerbated when its already 
contestable forms are merged with the inherent f ictions of entertainment. 
Audiences are prompted to work through its mesh of realities to distinguish 
its constituent parts, and the unique quality of The Real Housewives is the 
bleeding of this process through the screen. When this crisis is addressed 
within episodes of the show it reveals a unique degree of self-reflexivity, 
but also slowly begins to expose and unravel its inner workings.
Not only are anxiety-driven responses to The Real Housewives character-
istic of docusoap programming, but the specific discourse of differentiation 
also forms the genre itself. Building upon the discourse model of cultural 
genre theory in which genres are maintained through locating a text in 
identif iable clusters, the interactive commentary on tabloid websites and 
social media can be seen to create, and perpetuate, the docusoap genre 
through the very nature of its investigations. In ‘A Cultural Approach to 
Television Genre Theory’, Jason Mittell proposes that ‘a more satisfying 
macro-account of a genre’s history’ can be built ‘from the bottom up, by 
collecting micro-instances of generic discourses in historically specif ic 
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moments and examining the resulting large-scale patterns and trajectories’ 
(10). Specif ic events within the Beverly Hills and New Jersey instalments 
document confrontations between fact and f iction that hallmark The Real 
Housewives’ contributions to the docusoap genre. They pinpoint new R/
realities created by the show, yet also indicate a compulsive drive to self-
revelation threatening to wreak havoc upon the genre it inhabits. In such 
instances, legal threats have prompted Bravo to remove large proportions 
of footage, transforming the symbolic presence of the law (the reunion as 
trial; the use of evidence or proof) into a literal one, and shifting its agency 
from an internal negotiation to an external force. This shift occurs via 
a complex middle ground in which cast members themselves invoke its 
authoritative presence.
Efforts to maintain a distinction between Reality and reality are 
frequently demonstrated by the Housewives, such as in Kyle Richards’s 
book Life Is Not a Reality Show: Keeping it Real with the Housewife Who 
Does It All. When this occurs alongside a simultaneous drive towards 
authenticity, though, the two come into a destructive collision, and this 
is most acutely shown in a plot line starting from season 3 episode 6 of 
The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills. When in a group conversation with 
other cast members, Brandi Glanville expressed frustration with the ‘lies’ of 
fellow Housewife Adrienne Maloof, and in her efforts to expose ‘the truth’ 
revealed an apparently shocking piece of information. That this gesture 
was controversial was only deducible from reaction shots, after lawyers 
acting at Maloof’s behest forced producers to cut the content from the 
show. The ongoing conflict initiated by this revelation, however, provided 
the central storyline for the season, and the audio of Glanville’s allegation 
was simply removed, leaving collateral information behind. The gaps in 
audio prompted an online discourse of docu-/soap differentiation, which 
attempted to re-insert Glanville’s words into the Housewives narrative. Her 
continual utterance of this void in the media commentary accompanying 
the furor (when asked, she replied that she was banned from discussing it) 
urged viewers to complete her forbidden declaration by searching, through 
the usual online channels, for what exactly was removed. Tabloid gossip 
outlets quickly revealed that the information Maloof had been so intent on 
silencing was that she had used a surrogate for her youngest two children, 
despite claiming that she had given birth naturally. After forcing Bravo 
into extensive and costly re-edits she confirmed the rumor in an US Weekly 
cover story, and subsequently refused to appear for the reunion show taping. 
Maloof’s handling of the allegation eventually resulted in her f iring from 
the show, with host Andy Cohen explaining in his opening monologue that
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This season was hard on Adrienne, as you all know. A secret about her 
family was revealed by Brandi. And from that moment on, Adrienne 
refused to speak directly about it. We know that frustrated you in the 
audience, and that frustrated all of us too. If you read the tabloids you 
might have theories on what the secret is, but Adrienne won’t be here to 
tell her side of the story. Not only is she absent tonight, but she won’t be 
on the show next season. (‘Reunion: Part One’)
Her decision to abstain from the reunion was not followed by Paul Nassif, 
Maloof’s then ex-husband from whom she announced her separation in 
the season f inale. Choosing to appear through a pre-recorded interview, 
he dismissed the accusation propagated by his ex-wife that Glanville was 
responsible for the breakdown of their marriage, instead blaming the moment 
when ‘Reality became reality’ as a catalyst for his divorce (‘Reunion: Part Two’).
Here, the show’s construction of the Real forms a pattern of simultaneous 
in-/exteriority. This transformation emerges again within case studies—Mit-
tel’s ‘historically specific moments’—that chart a broader unravelling of the 
genre, where lawsuits from external individuals have been brought against 
cast members, production companies and Bravo itself, causing f issures 
within the precariously maintained docu-soap structure. These points of 
rupture take the form of narrative voids which similarly led viewers to tabloid 
websites in order to uncover the secrets of absent footage. Two examples from 
seasons 4 and 5 of The Real Housewives of New Jersey differ in post-production 
editing technique, ranging from a complete and seamless removal of foot-
age to explicit omissions that frame invisible content through remaining 
shots. They both, however, share a degree of signif icance with regards to 
the docusoap’s disintegration: they expose the means through which drama 
is orchestrated, and the contractual agreements used to maintain control 
over the cast, their mediated representations and, by extension, reality itself.
Whilst f ilming during a holiday in the Dominican Republic for season 4, 
internet rumors began to spread of a large-scale brawl at the bar of the Hard 
Rock Resort in Punta Cana, which culminated in the detainment of cast 
members by local police (‘EXCLUSIVE’). In a 42-page complaint f iled after 
their return to the U.S., a vacationing family alleged that upon confronting 
the cast when one of their party was sprayed with champagne
members of the cast and crew [...], without provocation, brutally and 
savagely beat, kicked, punched, scratched, jumped on and smashed glass 
on the heads of [the claimants] causing them to sustain severe pain and 
suffering and bodily injuries. (‘EXCLUSIVE’)
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The f iling against Bravo and production company Sirens Media also alleged 
that they
encourage, promote and demand that the cast [...] engage in verbal and 
physical conflict with one another and members of the public, creating 
a culture, climate and/or atmosphere of confrontation, hostility and 
violence in order to attract viewers. (‘EXCLUSIVE’)
Claimants’ passports were apparently withheld until they signed a release 
of claims drafted by lawyers especially flown in by Sirens Media and Bravo 
to the Dominican Republic. They allege that they were under ‘great duress, 
coercion and physical and emotional stress’ and signed the release in order 
that they might return home quickly and receive appropriate medical care 
(‘Manzo’s take Punta Cana by Storm’). The case was subsequently settled out 
of court for an undisclosed amount, and footage of the Punta Cana alterca-
tion was removed in its entirety from the show before broadcast. Tabloid 
gossip here not only attempts to f ill narrative voids and piece together 
reality, broken by the docu-soap into pieces of an incomplete puzzle; it 
exposes the presence of such voids altogether. Season 5’s f inale, by contrast, 
depicted a confrontation through momentary snippets of footage, in which 
a f ight at the opening of a hair salon is represented through reaction shots 
of bystanders interspersed with fades to black (‘Salon, Farewell’). The law-
suit that occurred as a result of the violence consisted of criminal charges 
f iled by a peripheral cast member, John Karagiorgis, against cast members 
Jacqueline Laurita, Chris Laurita and Joe Gorga for assault, harassment and/
or terroristic threats. In exchange for the dismissal of the criminal case in 
September 2013, Karagiorgis was granted a waiver of the show’s contract 
clause, which hitherto prevented him from filing against the network itself.
At the time of writing, it is understood that he plans to press civil charges 
against all three cast members, Sirens Media, Bravo, NBC and security 
teams for planning the altercation, manipulating individuals with a known 
propensity for violence and not intervening after the f ight had occurred. A 
copy of the contract signed by the claimants in both lawsuits was leaked 
to Radar Online in the same month, exposing through dense legal prose 
the degree to which docu-soap narratives may be f ictionalized. In signing, 
subjects agree that:
I understand that […] my actions and the actions of others participating 
in the Program may be embarrassing or of an otherwise unfavorable 
nature that may be factual or f ictional. […] I further understand that 
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my appearance, depiction, and portrayal in and in connection with the 
Program […] may portray me in a false light. (‘We Can Fictionalize The 
Footage!’)
Digital copies can, of course, be immaterially and endlessly circulated, 
reproduced and quoted as above. The ontology of the contract, however, is 
material in its essence: it is a paper document validated through signature(s), 
and digital copies are merely inadequate signif iers, unable to translate 
the physicality of their real-life referent. This signif ied, then, is a symbolic 
object, an icon for the Real of the Housewives that balances, or attempts to 
balance, the conflicting realities of ‘docu’ and ‘soap’. As well as outlining 
the control producers have over cast and their representations, it details 
the manner in which individuals may become the subject of tabloid gossip 
(‘defamatory’ or ‘embarrassing’ information may emerge ‘in connection 
with the Program’). The waiving of its terms in a court of law demonstrates 
the undoing of the docu-soap within a system predicated upon discern-
ing absolute truth, and whilst the Karagiorgis case presents implications 
specif ically for The Real Housewives, its resonation can be found in legal 
troubles concerning other high-profile programs.
Concurrent lawsuits have led to similar self-exposures whilst under oath, 
most notably in the case of Keeping Up With The Kardashians. In the March 
2013 divorce trial between Kris Humphries and Kim Kardashian, the former 
sought an annulment on the alleged grounds that he was duped into a mar-
riage conducted purely for television ratings, and after being subpoenaed to 
appear in court, a producer on the show testif ied that specif ic scenes had 
been ‘scripted, re-shot or edited’ to alter the appearance of their marital 
breakdown (‘Producer Testif ies Under Oath’). Court documents leaked in 
March 2014 detail a subsequent lawsuit brought by Kardashian and her 
then f iancé Kanye West against Chad Hurley, an uninvited guest at West’s 
lavish proposal who released amateur footage of the event online before 
its airing on the show. In her written statement, Kardashian’s mother and 
manager Kris Jenner declared that she ‘played a major role in organizing 
and running the event’, despite its portrayal on the show as solely arranged 
by West (‘Monster-In-Law!’).
The case studies used in this essay form, I hope, a trajectory of the 
docu-soap as shown through The Real Housewives, from the genre-defining 
negotiation of truth to the ultimate conclusion of this process through 
the legal system. One current case marks the most signif icant unravel-
ling of the franchise yet, not only implying a resolution of truth by virtue 
of its legal nature, but involving charges that are themselves concerned 
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with the fraudulence of cast members’ affluent lifestyles. When The Real 
Housewives of New Jersey stars Teresa and Joe Guidice were charged in July 
2013 on a 39-count indictment of f inancial fraud, their legitimacy as cast 
members—predicated upon displays of wealth and extravagance—was 
quickly undermined. The pair were charged with conspiracy to commit 
mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, lying on loan applications, bankruptcy 
fraud and failure to f ile tax returns. After initially pleading not guilty, the 
couple brokered a plea bargain in March 2014 admitting to a handful of 
charges in exchange for reduced jail time, and at the time of writing are 
currently awaiting sentencing.3 In an early stage of the proceedings, Bravo 
were subpoenaed to submit hundreds of hours of unedited footage, and it is 
through using the show itself as evidence in determining authenticity—or a 
lack thereof—that the metaphysical negotiation embarked upon by cast and 
audience is now transferred into the courts. The catastrophic impact of the 
Guidice case upon The Real Housewives is manifest in subtle but signif icant 
changes, and that such transformations work along and through the limita-
tions of genre is evidence of the docu-soap’s gradual disintegration. In the 
f inal episode of The Real Housewives of New Jersey season 5, the cut to a 
montage of news coverage of the Giudice trial—covering events between 
the end of shooting and the upcoming reunion—indicates a process of 
breakdown, in which generic integrity is broken though appropriation of 
alien media forms.4 Subsequently, a disruption of layered temporalities 
occurred in The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills season 4, itself a season 
revolving primarily around the drama caused by tabloid ‘lies’. At the end of 
the f inal episode, a brief preview of the reunion show revealed the artif ice of 
this most ‘authentic’ element of the franchise, where backstage and behind-
the-scenes footage documented the women arriving at a studio lot, sitting in 
hair and make-up and preparing for the upcoming conflicts during taping 
(‘Reunion: Part One’). This breaking open of the Housewives structure moves 
another degree closer to the documentary real, but in doing so continues 
to lay bare its meticulous construction. It reveals the uneasy co-existence 
of documentary and soap, in which the fashioning of entertainment from 
the ‘authentic’ proves to be an endless cycle of self-sabotage. Where, then, 
does the trajectory of this phenomenon point? Such outcomes can only 
be hypothesized, and we must look towards our TV screens to watch the 
answers unfold. What is apparent, though, is that we may just be witnessing 
the death of an (un)popular genre.
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Notes
1. Some clarification might be necessary to avoid confusion: when referenc-
ing ‘Reality’ or the ‘Real’, I do not intend to invoke any Lacanian terms. I use 
a capitalization to distinguish between mediated reality and actual lived 
experience. 
2. With the exception of occasional developments such as alcoholism, death 
and divorce, which are evidently not influenced by producers. 
3. As of 2 October 2014 Teresa and Joe Giudice received prison sentences of 15 
months and 41 months respectively.
4. This process of breakdown later accelerated through the course of season 
6, in which the Giudice’s legal troubles formed a substantial element of the 
core documentary footage. Cast members are shown watching television 
coverage of the couple’s court appearances, and interspersed sections of 
news footage were accompanied with dates.
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 Karaoke Americanism Gangnam Style
K-pop, Wonder Girls, and the Asian Unpopular
Jeroen de Kloet and Jaap Kooijman
The year: Unknown. The project W.G. is deemed a success as human genetics are 
combined with robotic enhancements. Yubin. Yennie. Sohee. Lim. Sum. Bionic 
women given the title of Wonder Girls. They are perfectly designed for complete 
domination. The future is now.
— Wonder Girls featuring Akon, ‘Like Money’ (2012)
Motown meets K-pop. A promotional photograph of the 2012 TNT Christmas 
in Washington television special features the show’s two headliners Diana 
Ross and PSY, both dressed in campy sequined outf its and smiling broadly 
into the camera. The two stars performed in front of America’s First Family, 
Barack and Michelle Obama with their two daughters, the latter two visibly 
most enjoying PSY’s performance of ‘Christmas Gangnam Style’. As lead 
singer of the Supremes in the 1960s and solo superstar in the 1970s and early 
1980s, Diana Ross signif ies the traditional dominance of America in global 
pop culture, currently most explicitly embodied by her ‘successor’ Beyoncé 
(cf. Cashmore); PSY, in contrast, articulates the appropriation of American 
pop culture, simultaneously reinforcing and challenging America’s he-
gemonic presence, albeit for a short moment. That PSY is a one-hit wonder 
novelty act is signif icant, as it highlights the diff iculty for non-Western pop 
acts to get accepted as ‘real’ pop music in the Western world.
In global commercial pop culture, Anglo-American pop continues to 
be perceived as ‘the original’ to be emulated, a perspective that is rein-
forced by popular global television formats such as Idol, X-Factor, and 
The Voice. Even though these formats originated outside of the US, they 
tend to present Anglo-American pop music as the standard to which non-
Anglo-American pop music is compared (cf. Bochanty-Aguero; Kooijman). 
When non-Western pop acts aim to achieve worldwide stardom, they face 
the challenge of overcoming the comparison to their Anglo-American 
counterparts, particularly from a Western perspective. For example, in 
their discussions of the attempt of South Korean pop star Rain (Bi) and 
his producer Jin-Young Park (Pak Chin-Jŏng, also known as JYP) to become 
popular in the United States, both Hyunjoon Shin and Eun-Young Jung cite 
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the negative review of Rain’s sold-out Madison Square Garden concerts in 
The New York Times of 4 February 2006. In the review, Jon Pareles dismisses 
Rain as ‘sound[ing] like a nostalgia act’ by emphasizing his ‘unoriginality’ 
in comparison to Anglo-American stars such as Michael Jackson, Justin 
Timberlake, George Michael, and Usher. Watching Rain perform is ‘like 
watching old MTV videos dubbed into Korean’, Pareles argues, concluding 
that ‘by the time [Rain’s producer] Mr. Park has f igured out how to imitate 
the latest English-speaking hit, American pop will have jumped ahead of 
him’. What stands out in this (rather condescending) review is the notion 
that K-pop not only deliberately imitates the Anglo-American original but 
also is lagging behind. Tellingly, the review’s title—‘Korean Superstar Who 
Smiles and Says, “I’m Lonely”’—does not even identify Rain by name. In The 
New Yorker, John Seabrook uses the same argument of K-pop as imitative 
and lagging behind, arguing that K-pop acts like SHINee, f(x), TVXQ!, and 
Girls’ Generation remind him of the 1980s music videos by Madonna, the 
1980s New Jack Swing sound of Janet Jackson, and the girl group sound of 
the 1960s.
While these two white male American music critics explain the un-
popularity of K-pop by arguing that K-pop is imitative and lagging behind, 
Youna Kim explains K-pop’s (cult) popularity among European audiences 
by suggesting that Western fans perceive K-pop as ‘a futuristic pastiche that 
sounds like a utopian blending of all contemporary musical genres’ (17). 
Whether considered unpopular or popular, ‘lagging behind’ or ‘futuristic’, 
K-pop does not differ from Anglo-American pop in its continual referencing 
and recycling of earlier pop styles, a practice that Simon Reynolds has 
called ‘retromania’. The only difference thus seems to be that Western 
music critics consider such a practice as ‘lagging behind’ when the referenc-
ing is done by a non-Anglo-American or non-Western pop act. Although 
K-pop is an exceptionally popular phenomenon, arguably the most popular 
part of the Korean Wave (cf. Choi and Maliangkay), the limited appeal of 
specif ic K-pop acts for Western audiences, and what we expect to be the 
one-hit global appeal of PSY, point at the unpopularity of pop-cultural 
forms from outside the West. Particularly those forms—sounds and im-
ages—that cannot be categorized as ‘exotic’ or ‘world music’ tend to be 
dismissed by Western critics as imitative and lagging behind to explain 
their unpopularity.
In this chapter, we will f irst analyze why K-pop remains globally unpopu-
lar and explain why we consider the notion of karaoke Americanism produc-
tive to help understand global cultural f lows and disjunctures. We will 
then examine Wonder Girls—a pop act that is, like Rain, ‘manufactured’ by 
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producer Jin-Young Park—as a form of karaoke Americanism, which helps to 
explain their local and regional popularity. While Wonder Girls, like many 
K-pop acts, have been very popular in South-Korea, China, and Japan, the 
group, similar to Rain, had only little success in the United States, Australia, 
and New Zealand. The regional appropriation of Wonder Girls, for example 
by Wonder Gay in Thailand, attests to the political potential of karaoke 
Americanism. Yet, our f inal example of the song ‘Like Money’ by Wonder 
Girls—with which we opened this chapter—illustrates the continuous 
power of the United States when it comes to the production of popular 
culture, rendering forms that are produced outside the West as perpetually 
unpopular. In the f inal part, we pan away from such a gloomy conclusion by 
hinting at recent developments in terms of geopolitics, fragmentation, and 
the digitization of culture that may help to change this global geo-cultural 
predicament.
K-pop as Karaoke Americanism
Since the late 1990s, the South Korean state has strongly supported its 
creative industries, resulting in what has been termed ‘the Korean Wave’ 
(Hallyu). Initially propelled by popular television drama, the Korean Wave 
soon included pop music, so-called K-pop (cf. Chua and Iwabuchi; Kim). 
The Korean Wave challenged the hegemony of Japanese pop culture in 
the region and constituted an important cultural force, termed soft power 
by Nye that lasts till today (cf. Nye and Kim). In this way, popular culture 
rather than neo-Confucianism connects cultures in East and South-East 
Asia (cf, Chua), of which the Korean Wave serves as a prime example. The 
dialectics between cultural proximity (a shared sense of ‘Asianness’) and 
cultural difference—as ref lected, for example, in the different seasons 
(which, for example, do not exist in Singapore) or the Korean language—
help to explain the regional appeal of Korean pop culture. Yet, apart from 
cultural factors, governmental and corporate support remains crucial 
to the success of the Korean Wave. As Doobo Shim has pointed out, the 
state’s creative policies were initially developed to protect the cultural 
industries against ‘threats of foreign cultural domination’ (30). In terms 
of political economy, a localist and protective rationale underpinned the 
Korean Wave. That this would lead to regional success beyond national 
borders was unintended and took the Korean government by surprise. 
As Shim argues, ‘the vitality of East Asian popular culture is growing’, 
with Japan, Thailand, and South Korea inspiring each other instead 
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of ‘refer[ing] to the West for melodramatic imagination as well as for 
modernization’ (31).
For many K-pop acts, however, Anglo-American pop culture contin-
ues to function as one of its main inspirations. Moreover, although Asia 
remains the prime market for K-pop, becoming popular among Western 
audiences and conquering the Western market is an aim—and more 
and more a possibility—for many K-pop acts (cf. Glynn and Kim 2). As 
Eun-Young Jung has pointed out, ‘this drive for “commercial success” in 
the West, and particularly in the US, is driven not purely by f inancial 
aspirations, but by the postcolonial desire for recognition and acceptance 
by the nation at the absolute peak among world entertainment economies’ 
(109). In other words, as Anglo-American pop culture continues to be 
perceived as ‘the original’, being popular in the West not only facilitates 
economic success but additionally signif ies the validation that K-pop is 
‘real’ pop music.
The global success of PSY clearly outperformed all previous Korean pop 
acts, including Rain, G-Dragon, and Wonder Girls. His celebrity status 
owes a great deal to the ‘riding an invisible horse’ dance style that was 
performed in the humorous video for the song. One may wonder whether 
the humor of PSY is inclusive (laughing with him) or exclusive (laughing 
at him), although many scholars have argued for the latter, observing in 
the music video and his image a gesturing towards orientalist stereotypes 
of Asian men as being funny, unattractive, and nerdy (cf. Glynn and Kim 
3). Such critique underlines our point that cultural counterf lows remain 
enmeshed in global cultural hierarchies. In their conclusion, Glynn and 
Kim observe that, within Britain, PSY ‘failed as an entrée to Korean culture 
because it was quarantined as a meme and/or a novelty record’ (13). Fur-
thermore, the song’s initial criticism of the Gangnam lifestyle (Gangnam 
is a posh neighborhood in Seoul) got completely lost in translation, and 
instead was repackaged as a mere prof itable celebration of the Gangnam 
lifestyle.
Hyunjoon Shih’s analysis of the globalizing aspiration of K-pop, in his 
analysis of Rain, helps to further question the global appeal of K-pop. In 
his article, Shih wonders: ‘What happens, and what will happen, when 
popular culture from the non-center (periphery) tries to intrude into the 
“center”?’ (508) He analyzes the Korean in-house system in which produc-
tion, management, and all other functions for the making of a star are 
being integrated. Shih explains how, after the crisis of the record industry, 
Rain is typical of a new star persona, one that is not only a teenage idol and 
marketing artifact, ‘the new type of star had to be seen as more “real” or 
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“authentic” in his or her own way’ (511-12). One important site for Rain to 
construct his authenticity was his muscular body, reflective also of hard 
work, an important value in Asian pop culture (cf. Chow and de Kloet), in 
combination with his angelic face, a combination that has been hailed as 
a new Asian masculinity (cf. Sun).
This development of an Asian masculinity, one that is far more sexy than 
that of PSY, underlines the importance of sex and gender in the making 
of a star. Given a generally more prudent attitude towards sexuality in 
Asia, this makes Shih observe that for K-pop stars, ‘their images were more 
“American (Western)” and less “Asian (Korean)”’, to such an extent that 
‘the border-crossing appeal of Rain at the regional level came from his 
“Asian” element, which is at best secondary’ (Shih 514). When going global, 
however, the importance of Asianness returned with a vengeance. In the 
West, Rain will be perceived an artist with an Asian background, to be 
measured against the hegemonic standards of global (read Western) pop: 
‘Asianness will only work if the artist does not care that his or her music 
is to be pigeonholed as only “world music” searching for a niche market. 
But that is another story, which is different from the world of pop music’ 
(Shih 516). Here, we would like to add that, indeed, Rain will be measured 
against the standards of global pop, but this measurement is bound to be 
f illed with prejudice as artists from the non-West are de facto perceived 
to lag behind. As Jeroen de Kloet explains elsewhere: ‘Creativities that 
emerge outside the “West”, constantly carry the burden of geopolitical 
representation as authenticating proof. Whereas “the West” can claim to 
make universal rock music, in China, this has to be Chinese rock music. Idem 
ditto for contemporary art, literature or cinema’ (7). The same argument 
can be made about K-pop.
The erasure of Koreanness in K-pop acts like Rain and Wonder Girls can 
be seen as clear examples of ‘odorless culture’, using the concept by Koichi 
Iwabuchi. Their alleged lack of cultural characteristics aims to facilitate a 
smooth travel across national and cultural boundaries. In a similar vein, 
Kim argues that K-pop travels well globally, ‘precisely because there is 
not very much Korean in K-pop that it can become such an easy sell to 
consumers abroad’ (17). However, the lack of Koreanness in K-pop may 
also feed the Western perspective of K-pop as a blank imitation, lagging 
behind and lacking any local, exotic flavor. K-pop will, especially at a global 
level, continue to be haunted by Koreanness, a haunting that is inevitable 
given the bodily appearance of the performers. The odorless products 
Iwabuchi referred to are all products that do not involve ‘real’ people: 
they are consumer technologies, computer/video games, and comics and 
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cartoons—all animate objects that are more easily to be stripped off their 
Japaneseness than more ‘organic’ forms of popular culture. In the case 
of K-pop, the emphasis on the way K-pop stars are manufactured, thus 
artif icial constructions, helps to perceive them as ‘odorless’ and ‘inau-
thentic’, while at the same time rendering the Anglo-American ‘original’ 
as ‘authentic’.
As Shih explains in his analysis of the regional and (mostly failed) global 
stardom of Rain, K-pop is just one new component of an already existing 
Inter-Asia crisscross f low of pop culture. Chua Beng Huat analyzed this 
emerging East and South East Asian cultural sphere and the related distribu-
tion of labor that turns some sites (e.g. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) 
into cultural producer and others (e.g. China and Singapore) into cultural 
consumers. ‘The group of Korean cultural industries as its agencies, is just 
a new player in this complex and multi-directional traff ic’ (Shih 507). Can 
the perpetually unpopular—Asian pop music is notoriously absent at a 
global level, with only a few exceptions that are often instrumental (such 
as ELO) or merely comical (such as PSY)—enter the domain of the popular? 
As we have argued above, the chances are small, as the denial of coevalness 
continues to haunt possible counterflows of cultural globalization. Non-
popular, non-Western pop products are generally perceived as mere copies, 
based on originals that are already outdated. Only the sounds, images, 
and styles that are geographically marked, and thus come to represent the 
specif ic sound of a region, may cross the heavily policed boundaries of 
Anglo-American pop culture.
To avoid perceiving K-pop—and Wonder Girls in particular—as 
merely imitations of an Anglo-American original, we will use the concept 
of karaoke Americanism—a term we borrow from f ilm scholar Thomas 
Elsaesser, who defines it as ‘that doubly coded space of identity as overlap 
and deferral, as compliment and camouflage’ (317). Karaoke, not as actual 
practice but as theoretical concept, is quite productive for two reasons: 
f irst, karaoke is an active form of cultural appropriation, which enables 
to move beyond the question whether or not the imitation is a successful 
imitation of the original (as white male American music critics Jon Pareles 
and John Seabrook assessed K-pop), as the focus shifts to how the copy 
transforms the original in the new context; second, karaoke openly and 
consciously uses the generic character of the original, thereby recognizing 
rather than mystifying its construction. It is important to note that our aim 
is not to ‘prove’ whether or not a pop-cultural object is a form of karaoke 
Americanism, but rather to make the cultural appropriation visible by 
perceiving the object as such (cf. Kooijman).
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MTV Wonder Girls
The girl group Wonder Girls was launched in 2007 with the South Korean 
reality television show MTV Wonder Girls, broadcast by MTV Korea, part of 
the international yet US-based media conglomerate Viacom. Throughout 
its four seasons, the show provided viewers with a backstage glimpse of 
how pop stars are created, thereby not only following the group members 
on their journey to stardom, but also functioning as a tool to promote the 
group to its local and regional audience. In this way, the show both reveals 
and is part of the construction of stardom. From the start, Wonder Girls 
have been explicitly shaped by American pop culture. MTV Wonder Girls 
is a Korean adaptation of the American MTV show Making The Band, and, 
throughout the show, Wonder Girls perform songs by American artists, 
such as Janet Jackson and the American girl groups Destiny’s Child and 
the Pussycat Dolls. In the show’s third season, Wonder Girls travel to New 
York City to f ilm the music video to their song ‘Wishing On A Star’, thereby 
literally occupying the space of ‘real’ Anglo-American pop stardom. Also 
the group name is an explicit reference to American pop culture, referring 
to Dreamgirls, the 2006 movie starring Beyoncé, which in turn is based 
on the 1981 Broadway that presented a f ictional account of the 1960s girl 
group Diana Ross and the Supremes. The connection is made explicit by 
the Wonder Girls, as the song ‘We Are The Dreamgirls’ from the musical 
is often included in their live performances. Moreover, the music video of 
their biggest hit single ‘Nobody’ also refers to Dreamgirls.
‘Nobody’ is a ‘typical idol K-pop, bubblegum pop song’ (Jung 110), which 
was released f irst in Korea in 2008 and became a major hit in South-East 
Asia. In addition to the version sung in South Korean, ‘Nobody’ was also 
released in American English (2009), Chinese (2010), and Japanese (2012). 
In each version, the choruses are sung in English, with the verses in the 
respective language. The Dreamgirls-inspired music video was used for 
the f irst three versions (resulting in some lip-synching inconsistencies), 
while a new music video was shot for the Japanese version. In Dancing in 
the Distraction Factory, Andrew Goodwin makes a distinction between the 
visual narrative—the fictional short story told by the music video—and the 
metanarrative of stardom of its performer. He uses Madonna’s ‘Material Girl’ 
as an example of a music video in which the performer’s star text is most 
signif icant, as the main narrative function of the music video was ‘shifting 
Madonna’s image from that of disco-bimbo to “authentic” star’ (100). The 
music video of ‘Nobody’ has a similar function, as the f ictional story of their 
discovery is used to present Wonder Girls as global ‘authentic’ pop stars to 
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both Asian and Western audiences. The ‘Nobody’ music video was used as a 
main promotional tool to introduce the group in the America in 2009, when 
Wonder Girls were the opening act on the US tour of the popular American 
boy band the Jonas Brothers. Not surprisingly then, ‘Nobody’ became their 
biggest hit single in the US.
After the non-diegetic text ‘JYP Entertainment: Leader in entertainment’, 
the music video opens with a performance of ‘Honey’ by JYP (the artist name 
of producer Jin-Young Park, who had a minor hit with the song in 1998) with 
the f ive Wonder Girls in white dresses performing the backing vocals. The 
setting is the 1960s and clearly inspired by Dreamgirls, with JYP in the role 
of soul singer Jimmy Early (played by Eddie Murphy in the movie) and the 
Wonder Girls as the Dreamettes. The performance by ‘Honey’ is followed by 
a flash forward to rehearsal time, during which two producers approach JYP 
with the sheet music of a ‘hot new song’ named ‘Nobody’, which JYP tries to 
sing in a high-pitched voice, with Wonder Girls dancing in the background. 
This backstory establishes JYP as the song’s lead vocalist, and Wonder Girls 
as the backing vocals, while also illustrating the production of pop culture: 
producers in black suits bring the music score to the vocalist, who becomes 
more like a laborer, the one performing the song, without any involvement 
in its creation. Moreover, the backstage rehearsal of the song implicates the 
audience in the production of pop culture and helps to authenticate the 
song. The leading role of the producers in the creation of the song is rendered 
even more self-reflexive given that JYP is the ‘real’ manager of Wonder Girls. 
The subsequent flash forward shows Wonder Girls on stage, dressed in gold, 
ready to perform, intercut with images of JYP stuck in the toilet, as there 
is no toilet paper left. While JYP fails to come to the stage, Wonder Girls 
pick up their microphones and move them front stage to perform the song 
instead. They become instant stars. Here the music video’s visual narrative 
closely resembles the story of Dreamgirls, as similar to the Dreamettes who 
become the Dreams when they move from the background to the front of 
the stage, Wonder Girls become the main stars of the show.
In reinterpreting the discovery of the ‘Dreamgirls’, the music video evokes 
the success myth of stardom, which, as Richard Dyer has argued, mystif ies 
the construction of the star image by emphasizing the accidental discovery 
of the talented star—stars are born, not made (cf. Dyer 42). The conventional 
narrative of the soda-fountain girl becoming the hottest Hollywood f ilm 
star, or, in this case, the background singers becoming stars because the 
main act is stuck in the toilet, adds to the myth of stardom. The backstory 
takes up the f irst two minutes of the music video, followed by another 
two minutes of the 1960s Wonder Girls performing ‘Nobody’ on stage. The 
k araoke aMeriCaniSM gangnaM St yLe 121
performance is interrupted by a standing ovation of the diegetic audience, 
leading into a montage sequence portraying the group’s rise to success, 
still set in the f ictional 1960s. Flashbulbs of paparazzi, black-and-white 
television performances, and several magazine covers featuring Wonder 
Girls, including the ‘Lilloard starlist’ (an obvious reference to Billboard 
magazine and its Hot 100 chart) on which they rank number 1 emphasize 
the fame of the group. However, the montage sequence also functions to 
move Wonder Girls from the fictional 1960s to the actual present. As Wonder 
Girls become more and more successful, ‘they wear skimpier and flashier 
dresses’ (Jung 111), which not only makes them more ‘sexy’ but also more 
contemporary. The f inal performance shown in the music video is set in 
the present, emphasized by Wonder Girls rapping the lyrics.
Instead of just imitating Anglo-American pop culture, with the ‘Nobody’ 
music video, Wonder Girls mimic the story of Dreamgirls, and in extension 
the traditional narrative of the success myth of a pop music meritocracy 
that is rooted in the American Dream (cf. Dyer 42). In this way, the imitation 
becomes explicit and deliberate, with a ‘light comical tone [that] f its well 
with Wonder Girls’ bubblegum pop style and their playful girlish image’ 
(Jung 111). More importantly, the overt appropriation of conventional 
Anglo-American stardom not only shows how stardom is a construction, 
but also places the Anglo-American ‘original’ in the past, the f ictional 1960s, 
enabling Wonder Girls to emerge as a contemporary pop act, rather than an 
imitation that is lagging behind. The 2012 Japanese version of the ‘Nobody’ 
music video takes the Wonder Girls metanarrative further by presenting 
them as established superstars, no longer an imitation but a full-fledged 
and contemporary—thus ‘real’—pop act.
Thai Wonder Gay
The processes of cultural appropriation, as we have discussed with Wonder 
Girls, do not stop there but instead inspire subsequent rhizomic f lows 
towards other parts of Asia. In other words, what started as an example 
of karaoke Americanism in South Korea is multiplying itself towards 
other localities in east and South-East Asia. Rather than referring to this 
as cases of karaoke Koreanism, a term we consider not appropriate given 
the continuous strong presence of Americanness as well as the ‘odorless-
ness’ of the generic conventions appropriated in these products, it may 
make more sense to see karaoke Americanism as a process that bleeds on, 
that does not involve two localities, but instead many more, and in this 
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bleeding, new appropriations occur, producing new and different meanings. 
These further appropriations instigate, as usual, debates over copyright, for 
example, entertainers in China, Thailand and Cambodia are accused by the 
management JYP Entertainment of ‘recklessly copying’ the Wonder Girls’ 
songs, dances, and even costumes. Still, more interesting than such debates 
over rights are the actual cultural appropriations taking place. Here we like 
to zoom in on one particular case, Wonder Gay in Thailand, for which we 
draw from an analysis by Dredge Byung’chu Käng.
In a video that became an instant hit on YouTube, f ive boys mimic the 
Wonder Girls’ ‘Nobody’ music video. Naming themselves Wonder Gay (a 
name in itself already charged with sexual politics), they perform in green 
school uniforms with black shorts, making gayish movements around a 
flagpole. Both the school uniform and the flagpole are signifiers for the Thai 
nation state, charging the music video with a strong political meaning. The 
music video consequently caused heated debates in Thailand, questioning 
whether or not Wonder Gay was ‘inappropriately representing Thai-ness’ 
as well as causing concern about the group’s popularity ‘encourage[ing] 
other boys to become effeminate/homosexual like them’—a topic which is 
particularly sensitive in Thailand considering the country’s global image of 
being ‘too gay’. As Käng concludes, the debate about Wonder Gay ‘exempli-
f ies the limited acceptability of male effeminacy in popular Thai discourse 
and how Thai national identity is articulated through discourses of gender 
and sexuality’ (178–79).
Even though the YouTube music video receives a good rating (and Wonder 
Gay quickly gained popularity, even being contracted by a record label), 
Käng shows how, in the end, the negative framing predominates. Wonder 
Gay ‘become a source of national shame’ as they are perceived as reaff irm-
ing global stereotypes about Thailand as a gay country and lacking in true 
masculinity, and as such ‘come to represent a nation that is already overly 
queered, and one that can only mimic others without producing anything 
original (Käng 181). The ‘Nobody’ music video thus not only became another 
site for the policing of Thai masculinity but also triggered anxiety over 
losing Thainess due to uncritical copying, echoing wider debates on the 
loss of authenticity because of intensif ied cultural globalization.
Here, then, we see the politics of karaoke Americanism at work. In their 
appropriation of the Wonder Girls’ ‘Nobody’ song and music video, Wonder 
Gay present a slippage of meaning. The song remains the same, but not quite, 
to paraphrase Homi Bhabha. In this slippage of meaning we can locate the 
politics of the song: it queers a country, stirs up public debate, and challenges 
both the heteronormative framing of the nation and its related claims on 
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Thainess. Karaoke is doing just that: it is copying with a twist, it allows for 
slippages of meaning that hold the potential for a renewed politics, a politics 
that was not that much at play in the original reception of the song. But, as 
Käng observes, these politics in the end resulted in a growing critique on 
the music video, suggesting that the securing of hetero normativity in the 
end prevailed, as did the critique on imitation and copying. Yet, Wonder Gay 
also speaks back to the ‘original’, re-infecting it with a sense of queerness as 
well. After all, after seeing Wonder Gay, Wonder Girls are also queered. As 
such, cultural karaoke inspires us to focus our attention not only on cultural 
appropriations and slippages of meaning that take place in processes of 
cultural globalization, but also vice versa, it may help us to rethink the 
original itself.
Translate to English
In 2012, Wonder Girls released the music video ‘Like Money’, featuring the 
African-American R&B singer Akon. The song was part of the television 
movie The Wonder Girls, made for the US American TeenNick channel, 
like MTV owned by Viacom. The movie, which also starred producer JYP 
as ‘himself’, tells the story of how the ‘international pop sensation [Wonder 
Girls] are coming to America to make it big’. The opening of the video is 
telling for their global aspirations. A screen flickers, and in Korean 전송시작 
( jeonsongsijag) appears, after which a robotic voice commands ‘Translate. 
Translate to English’. Then, the translation appears on the screen: ‘Transmis-
sion Begin’. What this opening suggests is that in order to make it globally, a 
translation into the lingua franca of global pop, English, is pivotal. As such, 
the opening reads as a surrender to the hegemony of Anglo-American pop. 
The robot as well as the technologized visuals gesture towards a techno-
orientalism, a conventional trope in which East Asia is constructed as the 
technological other of the West (cf. Morley and Robins). The robot voice 
continues by speaking the words with which we opened this chapter, ending 
with: ‘[Wonder Girls] are perfectly designed. Perfectly designed for complete 
domination. The future is now’.
Meanwhile, the music video shows x-rays of the spines of each of the 
Wonder Girls, overseen by a Frankenstein doctor (played by producer 
Jin-Young Park). When they are introduced one by one, they appear as 
robot-like Korean girls, and are turned around as if they are transported 
from or towards another dimension. Here, the laboratory that produces 
pop stars is not even taken as a metaphor but presented as the real thing. 
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The manufacturing of the pop star aims at complete domination, the future 
is now, and the future comes from Korea. Only not quite, as the texts are 
spoken and sung in English, and the African-American singer Akon is 
inserted as if to further Americanize the song. Who dominates who in this 
music video, or better, in this manufactured commodity? The song’s title is 
ambivalent: are Wonder Girls a purely commercial product, and thus like 
money, or do they like money themselves? Again, like ‘Nobody’ the music 
video is highly self-reflexive, literarily showing the production of stardom, 
this time not by accidental discovery conform to the star myth, but by the 
forces of genetic and robotic technology.
Wonder Girls may be designed for complete domination, but in the 
end, they fail to dominate, again raising the question of who dominates 
who. As Eun-Young Jung argues, ‘Wonder Girls’ “Like Money” is mostly an 
American team production—reflecting the American racial and sexual 
views on Asian women and the Korean (at least JYP’s) desire to be accepted 
by the mainstream US pop market even if they have to greatly compromise 
themselves to be racially, sexually, and musically acceptable’ (112). Moreover, 
as we have argued in this chapter, despite their attempts to become ‘Ameri-
can’, to produce an odorless image and sound, Wonder Girls continue to be 
haunted by Koreanness. The politics of karaoke Americanism may play out 
more interestingly both nationally, in South Korea, and regionally, in East 
and South-East Asia, as the case of Wonder Gay has illustrated, but when 
it comes to the desire to enter the US-based center of global pop the cards 
are quite differently played out. Then and there, Wonder Girls are bound to 
be framed as lagging behind, as being pop, but not quite, as becomes clear 
in some comments about ‘Like Money’ on YouTube:
Seriously, why?! take K-pop, add an American rapper and take away all 
the Korean and there’s no way to differentiate it from all that Mainstream 
shit that comes out nowadays. I don’t want this to he considered part of 
the K-pop scene... I think it’s embarrassing...
I’m glad for their American debut though... at least they made it this far… 
(AliceWWND)
Honestly, whoever chose the concept for this debut was insane; who 
in their right mind would use robots and technology as a concept for a 
music video in America, lol. Let alone the fact that the girls look so weird 
with those hairstyles, outf its and make-up, Be My Baby would’ve been a 
better debut to be honest. Besides, Akon sings/raps like 50% of the song, 
so… (Jessicasadlibs) 1
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The f irst quote puts the group back in their Korean cage, claiming that 
Wonder Girls have lost it as they betray their cultural background, whereas 
the second quote is illustrative of the assertion that they in any case lag 
behind and need the input of an American star to make it work. And it 
did not really work, in the end. Karaoke Americanism may thus help us 
to understand and indeed appreciate the multiple cultural translations 
and appropriations that are happening between Anglo-American pop 
culture and its countless cultural ‘others’ around the globe. It sets in motion 
subsequent cultural translations that hold the potential to ignite political 
debate and controversy. But when it comes to speak back to that imagined 
origin, the United States, we are confronted with mere silence, in the end, 
global hegemonic fault lines in the production of culture remain in place, 
positioning time and again the West as the best, only to be followed by 
the rest.
Final Notes on the Asian Unpopular
At this moment, K-pop acts such as Wonder Girls f ind themselves positioned 
in between the two poles embodied by Diana Ross and PSY, as presented at 
the beginning of this chapter, as they are deemed to be either an outdated 
copy of an American original (the girl group image represented by Ross and 
Beyoncé) or an exotic, Korean novelty act. However, at the end of the day, 
the new sounds of K-pop, these original copies, these absolute fabrications, 
are not likely to become popular beyond their cultural comfort zone. While 
Wonder Girls sing ‘I want nobody nobody but you’, we can imagine their 
American counterparts singing back, ‘We want nobody nobody but us’. After 
all, despite decades of intense globalization and signif icant geopolitical 
shifts, we are bound to conclude that Anglo-American pop culture remains 
hegemonic on the global scale. When taking the US as the yardstick of 
success, the rest, and especially the non-West, remains unpopular, with the 
exception of a few one hit wonders like PSY that make us dance Gangnam 
Style.
But this might well be too gloomy a conclusion. We would like to close 
this chapter with three brief observations that may open up avenues for 
future research. First, as Jeroen de Kloet’s research into Chinese popular 
culture suggests, a signif icant change has taken place over the past two 
decades. Whereas Chinese rock bands during the 1990s were still very 
much engaged with making rock with Chinese characteristics, involving 
articulations of ancient as well as communist China, today it seems they 
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care much less. They sing in English, adopt a clearly cosmopolitan style, and 
parody the predicament that they will always be seen as copycats. The ‘rise 
of Asia’ comes with an increased dose of cultural self-confidence. Today, 
Asian artists seem to care less about what others think of them, nor are they 
so much concerned with making it in the West, or more precisely, in the 
United States. Their primary market is the local and the regional market. 
To reach that market, creative practices of karaoke Americanism, as we 
have analyzed in this chapter, continue to be a productive aesthetics tactic.
Second, in a context of an increased fragmentation of cultural production 
and consumption, numerous niche cultures proliferate globally, including, 
for example, around Japanese anime culture, around the Japanese musical 
genre of Visual Kei, around Chinese art house movies, and around K-pop. 
These subcultures may not be massively popular, but they do result in 
vibrant cultural practices, Facebook pages have emerged globally where 
K-pop fans gather, just as German Visual Kei bands attract substantial 
attention. Such subcultural, rather than mainstream popular, counterflows 
may indicate a slow and gradual redrawing of cultural hegemonies, in which 
the popular and the West do not conflate as strong anymore as they do now.
Third, Japanese hologram star Hatsune Miku has performed in Los Ange-
les as well as Amsterdam, aside from her fan base in East Asia. The star does 
not exist; she is just a visual illusion projected on stage, together with a live 
band. Through specif ic software applications, audiences have co-written 
her songs that she now plays. The star as a personal being is not needed 
any more; what matters is the audience that co-produces the star, together 
with cloud technologies developed by the cultural industries. While we do 
want to steer away from either a technological utopianism or determinism 
here, what Hatsune Miku does tell us is how new technologies may open up 
possibilities for a global participation in the making and branding of a star 
and a star product. This alludes to the democratic potential Walter Benjamin 
already traced in the mechanical reproduction of culture, a potential that 
may well be globalized in the case of digital reproduction. Hatsune Miku 
illustrates that audiences may in the near future play a more decisive role 
in what constitutes the popular, and in this process, the location of the 
audience, or that of the star, may become less important, thus also allowing 
for a redrawing of global geocultural boundaries.
Note
1. All taken from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quE6Cq4Q2bs
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 ‘When order is lost, time spits’
The Abject Unpopular Art of Genesis (Breyer) P-Orridge
Florian Zappe
‘THIS VILE MAN CORRUPTS KIDS –
DEMI-GOD FEEDS POP FANS ON SEX, SADISM, AND DEVIL RITES’.
— Headline of The Sunday People, 24 July 19881
I
I want to start my exploration of the topography of one of many possible ter-
ritories of the ‘unpopular’ by looking at the identity politics of that particular 
segment of popular culture we like to call ‘pop’. Of course, when engaging 
in the discussion of ‘pop culture’, one has to be prepared to enter highly 
contested territory. Like any signif icant concept in cultural theory, this 
term also frames a discursive battlef ield fraught with numerous aesthetic 
and political implications, ambiguities, contradictions and a long history 
of transformations and theoretical reflection.2
When I speak of pop in this essay, I am referring to that specific vanguard 
offshoot of mass culture that emerged in the light of the generation conflicts 
from the 1950s onward, which were, as we know, not merely an adolescent in-
surgency but the beginning of a veritable cultural revolution. Pop reconciled 
the young postwar generation’s emerging impetus towards emancipation, 
liberation, and social change with production apparatuses, distribution 
channels, and representational modes that are usually associated with the 
culture industry. According to Andreas Huyssen’s by now classic definition, 
this understanding of pop
stood for beat and rock music, poster art, the flower child cult and the 
drug scene—indeed for any manifestation of ‘subculture’ and ‘under-
ground’. In short, pop became the synonym for the new life style of the 
younger generation, a life style which rebelled against authority and 
sought liberation from the norms of existing society. (141)
Especially in its f irst, idealistic phase3 pop culture held the utopian promise 
of constituting a counter-space to mainstream bourgeois culture. As the 
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analytical tradition of the Birmingham School (and its followers) has shown, 
it could serve as a door-opener for alternative models of recognition, com-
munity, self-expression, meaning-production and, after all, identity. The 
blueprint narrative of that identity discourse was (and to a large extent still 
is) that of the rebel who resists institutionalized and structural authority 
and frees himself from the constraints imposed on him by a society he feels 
deeply alienated from. The archetypical subject of pop strives, as Patti Smith 
programmatically shouted in her iconic 1978 song ‘Rock ‘N’ Roll Nigger’, for 
an existence ‘outside of society’.
Since the mid-twentieth century, pop culture has provided an enduring 
and ever-adjustable myth of liberation around this rebellious outsider and 
sold it (in any sense of the word) to its audiences in various guises: the at-
tractive juvenile delinquent, the sophisticated beatnik, the hyper-masculine 
biker, the hedonistic hippie drop-out, the cool mod, the libertine rock star, 
the desirable pop starlet, the tough-minded gangster rapper—just to name 
a few stereotypes.
Yet, this myth is problematic for a variety of reasons. As poststructural-
ism’s analysis of the power structures in Western societies has shown, its 
reigning logic based on an ‘inside vs outside’ binarism cannot serve as a 
successful strategy of resistance against what Gilles Deleuze described 
as the all-embracing web of micro-power regimes that govern our late 
capitalist ‘societies of control’.4 From this perspective, any notion of an 
authentic, uncorrupted ‘outside of society’—pop culture being, of course, 
just one of many discourses claiming to be a manifestation of such a cultural 
realm—appears to be just another normative discourse in disguise. All the 
archetypical rebellious identity models mentioned above are themselves 
ruled by their respective micro-regimes of normative control in regard to 
behavior, body politics, and codes of signif ication. And even the grand nar-
rative of an essential counter-identity itself carries—in its negative f ixation 
to the (petty-)bourgeois mainstream it claims to reject—the inherent risk 
of morphing into an oppressive ideological dualism.
In the light of this insight, one of the few remaining possibilities for 
cultural opposition appears to be the striving for alternative concepts of 
subjectivity and identity that have the potential to elude the incorporation 
into the binary logic that equally governs our hegemonial culture as well 
as our countercultures. These alternatives must avoid the pitfall of an all 
too simple apotheosis of the clear-cut difference of ‘the Other’ but embrace 
the complexity of hybridity, ambivalence and contradiction.
A variety of viable attempts have been made—both in cultural theory 
and practice—to frame such a cultural territory. One is the category of the 
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‘abject’ that was def ined by Julia Kristeva in her seminal essay Powers of 
Horror as that which ‘disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect 
borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’ (4).
As this volume seeks to explore the ‘unpopular’ as the excluded middle 
between the cultural realms of ‘high’ and ‘popular’ I will propose a def ini-
tion of this middle as the abject space of popular culture. Its inhabitants 
employ the classic mechanisms and media channels of popular culture: 
they write books, produce f ilms, form bands, release records or play live 
concerts. However, with regard to their identity politics and aesthetics 
they actively try to elude the traditional forms of incorporation (such as 
canonization, commodification, etc.) by employing abjection as a strategy to 
provide their audiences with aesthetic experiences that cause a radical and 
enduring disturbance of established cultural—also subcultural—concepts 
of meaning and identity.
According to Kristeva’s initial psychoanalytical def inition, the term 
‘abjection’ refers to a feeling of repulsion or nausea that emerges in the face 
of decay, f ilth, body excretions, torn tissue, sickness, effects of violence, the 
grotesque, the monstrous, the ugly, etc.—without a doubt highly unpopular 
themes that are usually kept outside of everyday experience, concealed un-
der the blanket of societal norms, confined to the realm of the unspeakable. 
But if this blanket is lifted and the individual is confronted with these taboo 
aspects of life, the experience of the abject, of that what is ‘neither subject 
nor object’ (Kristeva 1), has the power to disarrange the clear structures 
that def ine the cultural framework of meaning that we live in.
Megan Becker-Leckrone notes that ‘[a]bjection is, for Kristeva, an ex-
perience of unmatched primordial horror, putting the subject in the most 
devastating kind of crisis imaginable; but ultimately, certain modes of 
discourse have found a way of speaking that horror instead of repressing 
it’ (20). ‘Abject unpopular culture’, as I def ine it, can be understood as that 
particular ‘mode of discourse’ that uses the expressive forms of pop(ular) 
culture to articulate this staggering abhorrence of unpopular things and the 
existential shock experience provoked by them. By undermining binarisms 
such as self/other, inside/outside or the fundamental distinction of subject 
and object that forms the basis of every process of subject formation, the 
abject has the capability to cause a mind altering experience that upsets the 
notions of subjectivity and individual identity that are constructed within 
established bourgeois as well as popular culture.
Pop culture’s Promethean rebellious archetypes embody the utopia of an 
authentic counter-subjectivity in a space of freedom that is often defined 
as the antithesis of one of mainstream culture’s most powerful ideological 
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tools to police deviance—morality. Yet, as Kristeva argues, the simple nega-
tion of the hegemonial moral order does not inevitably entail the subversive 
potential associated with the category of abjection:
He who denies morality is not abject; there can be grandeur in amorality 
and even in crime that f launts its disrespect for the law—rebellious, 
liberating and suicidal crime. Abjection, on the other hand, is immoral, 
sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, a hatred that 
smiles, a passion that uses the body for barter instead of inflaming it, a 
debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you. (Kristeva 4)
‘Abject unpopular culture’ therefore operates in the shadow cast by the 
amoral grandeur of pop cultural rebellion and does not advocate the all too 
simple transgression towards ‘the other side’ but a dwelling on the threshold 
of the unsettling and intangible qualities of the ‘abject’. It is decidedly not 
to be understood as a rigid generic concept, but it might be a useful term 
to describe a variety of certain artistic expressions on the radical fringes 
of popular culture, reaching from the writings of Kathy Acker or Dennis 
Cooper to the f ilms of John Waters (at least up to Polyester), Jörg Buttgereit 
or Bruce LaBruce.
II
One of the most instructive and idiosyncratic examples to reflect on this 
peculiar notion of ‘unpopular culture’ is provided by the English-born and 
New York-based musician, writer and performance artist Genesis (Breyer) 
P-Orridge.5 He is particular interesting because his use of abjection as an 
aesthetic principle on all levels of his work and life—the symbolic, the 
performative, the musical and the corporeal—locates him, as I will argue in 
the pages to follow, not only in the excluded middle between the two poles 
of bourgeois ‘high’ and popular ‘low’ but in the intangible center of a triangle 
consisting of ‘high’, ‘low’, and what I have sketched above as ‘pop’ culture.
Born in 1950, (Breyer) P-Orridge is himself a child of the pop age. He played 
drums in several amateur psychedelic rock bands as a teenager (cf. Reed 
74) and even recorded (but not distributed) one album with a band called 
‘Worm’ (cf. Ford 1.6) before—at least for some time—choosing a different 
path of artistic practice. Inspired by an eclectic conglomerate of intellectual 
influences, ranging from the theories of John Cage, the occult spirituality of 
Aleister Crowley to William S. Burroughs’s ideas of deconditioning through 
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cut-up and tape experiments, he immersed himself in the avant-garde art 
scenes of Hull (where he had a short career as a university student) and 
London and explored a wide variety of artistic strategies.
The roots of his engagement with the abject can be traced back to his 
involvement in the Fluxus-inspired mail art movement in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In what P-Orridge retrospectively (and quite self-explanatory) 
called his ‘maggots-and-meat-through-the-mail phase’, he used the dis-
ruptive powers of the abject to confront this specif ic artistic scene with 
its pseudo-radical self-image: ‘I wanted to have something in there that 
everyone would go, “Yecchh!” Because for all their so-called radicalism, 
they were incredibly conservative and very moral’ (qtd. in Vale and Juno 14).
This was, however, just the moderate beginning of P-Orridge’s career as 
an extremist of abject aesthetics. He put hegemonial boundaries of good 
taste to even more uncompromising tests after he became involved in the 
radical performance art scene that started to burgeon internationally in 
the late 1960s. In 1969, he joined with fellow artist, occasional stripper and 
porn model Cosey Fanni Tutti (Christine Newby) and a number of changing 
collaborators to found the performance art collective COUM Transmissions, 
whose performances quickly became notorious for their taboo-breaking 
extremism. After the group had quickly achieved an infamous reputa-
tion within the art circle, it was an exhibition called ‘Prostitution’, held 
at the Institute for Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London in 1976, that gained 
them wider public notoriety. The show ‘caused a scandal chiefly because 
it featured used tampons and contained pages from pornographic maga-
zines featuring Tutti in her role as a photographic model’, and in the end 
it ‘provided evidence of the lack of understanding between contemporary 
artists and the general public, or at least the self-selected representatives 
of that public—the newspapers’ (Ford 6.19). Indeed, the British tabloid 
press scandalized the event and triggered a f ierce debate about the public 
funding system for art in the United Kingdom. As a side effect, the ‘Pros-
titution’ exhibition revealed a dialectical link between the abject and the 
unpopular in the cultural phenomenon we like to call ‘scandal’: although 
its content had no realistic possibility of f inding consensus and recognition 
within the mainstream (or, to put it in other words, to become popular), it 
gained the group an unprecedented amount of unpopularity, culminating 
in parliamentarian Nicholas Fairbairn’s much-quoted statement that the 
members of COUM Transmissions were the ‘wreckers of civilisation’ (qtd. 
in Ford 6.22).
While the general public’s rejection of the collective’s aesthetics was 
as expectable as calculated, it is a highly staggering phenomenon that 
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COUM Transmissions also managed to disturb the segment of the art world 
that—by self-def inition—considered itself as the most radical rim of the 
avant-garde of that time. The group’s eff icacy in this regard can be traced 
back to the extreme modalities in which their performances emphasized 
the materiality of the body. The concept of the abject is undeniably and by 
nature always closely tied to the corporeal. In the context of the discussion 
of the collective’s politics of abjection, however, Hanjo Berressem’s distinc-
tion between the terms ‘abjection’6 to describe ‘the production of disgust 
from “abjection”, the cultural marking of eventsǀobjects as disgusting’ and 
‘abjects’ as a term ‘to highlight the materiality of what is normally called 
“the abject”’ (19) can provide valuable insights.
Whereas many so-called ‘abject’ artists evoke the feeling of abjection 
on the symbolic or metaphorical level, COUM Transmissions played on 
both f ields by dealing with ‘abject’ themes on the level of representation 
(e.g. by employing sexually explicit imagery with the capability to evoke 
abjection) but also by staging ‘abjects’, which are, according to Berressem, 
always ‘extremely, one might even say excessively, material’ (21) and defined 
by certain characteristic attributes:
Abjects tend to centre around bodily openings through which exchanges 
with the environment are materially regulated and channelled. Abjects 
are created when these exchanges get out of bounds: for instance, when 
they become uneconomic|excessive, as when one confronts unstoppable 
f lows and fluxes such as diarrhea or haemorrhaging, or when they are 
reversed—for example in the case of vomiting or refuelling ‘waste’ into 
the system through an opening that is normally used to fuel the system 
with nourishment[.] (42–43)
The following description of a COUM Transmissions performance in Los 
Angeles in 1976, given by P-Orridge himself, illustrates how the group’s 
performative aesthetics centered around that particular moment of creating 
abjects. In order to fully comprehend the radicalness and relentlessness of 
their approach as well as the utter repulsion the collective was able to evoke 
even in audiences that were familiar with what at that time was considered 
as ‘transgressive art’, it is necessary to quote at some length:
I used to do things like stick severed chickens’ heads over my penis, and 
then try and masturbate them, whilst pouring maggots all over it. […] 
I drank a bottle of whisky and stood on a lot of tacks. And then I gave 
myself enemas with blood, milk and urine, and then broke wind so a jet 
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of blood, milk and urine combined shot across the floor in front of Chris 
Burden and assorted visual artists. I then licked it off the floor, which was 
a not-clean concrete f loor. Then I got a 10-inch nail and tried to swallow 
it, which made me vomit. Then I licked the vomit off the floor and Cosey 
helped me lick the vomit off the floor. And she was naked and trying to 
sever her vagina to her navel with a razor blade, and she injected blood 
into her vagina which then trickled out, and we then sucked the blood 
from her vagina into a syringe and injected it into eggs painted black, 
which we then tried to eat. […] Chris Burden, who’s known for being 
outrageous, walked out with his girlfriend, saying, ‘This is not art, this is 
the most disgusting thing I’ve ever seen, and these people are sick’. (qtd. 
in Vale and Juno 17)
What Burden (who, as a key f igure of the Body Art movement, was himself 
no stranger to abject performances) and the other audience members expe-
rienced in this performance is what Berressem called ‘a moment of abject 
verité’ that is def ined by the fact that it ‘pushes abjection beyond the level 
of the representational logic’ and refers it ‘back to the level of pure physics’ 
where it cannot be read as ‘either f ictional or as a special eǀaffect’ (20).
In the light of the Foucauldian insight that identity is a power effect 
inscribed in and on the body, this radical exploration of physical boundaries 
in its auratic materiality inevitably raises the general question of the perme-
ability of identity constructs. The complete collapse of the inside/outside 
logic of the culturally coded system of normalized corporeality retroacts 
with the subjectivity of both the performer and the viewer, because, as Ber-
ressem aptly puts it, ‘abjects are related to material operations that threaten 
the material as well as the psychic organisation of a human system’ (42).
III
In 1975, P-Orridge and Tutti started to expand their aesthetic vocabulary 
by ‘improvising informally with traditional rock instruments, electronic 
gear, and tape, recording long jams of mostly beatless sounds and wordless 
textures’ (Reed 72). This experimentation with sound and music fragments 
ultimately led to the formation of the band project Throbbing Gristle,7 which 
was to become the formative group of the Industrial genre that started to 
develop from the mid-1970s onwards—a genre that, according to P-Orridge, 
aimed at the disruption of pop culture’s rebel mythology of the ‘romance 
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of “paying your dues, man”; of being “on the road”—rock ‘n’ roll as a career 
being worthwhile in itself, and all that shit’ (qtd. in Vale and Juno 10).
As P-Orridge himself has pointed out, founding a band was intended to 
be a deliberate move away from the self-centered art world into the sphere 
of the popular:
When we shifted from Coum Transmissions to TG, we were also stating 
that we wanted to go into popular culture, away from the art gallery 
context, and show that the same techniques that had been made to oper-
ate in that system could work. We wanted to test it out in the real world, 
or nearer to the real world, at a more street level—with young kids who 
had no education in art reception, who came along and either empathized 
or didn’t; either liked the noise or didn’t. (qtd. in Vale and Juno 15–16)
This digression from an elitist ‘high-brow’ cultural scene that had been 
growingly infested by the hype about radical performance art such as 
Fluxus, the Viennese actionists or the Body Art movement was an intended 
democratization, an attempt to overcome bigger audiences’ inhibitions in 
terms of intellectual accessibility and reception context.
It is no coincidence that new phenomena like Industrial or Punk emerged 
at a time when the vanguard momentum of pop culture showed signs of 
serious exhaustion: ‘As a mass-marketed form of rebellious individualism, 
rock and roll culture has always peddled the “won’t be fooled again” consola-
tion prize to its consumers, but by the late seventies, the self-reflexive folds 
within its inner logic traded the oppositional ambitions (the “counter” in 
“counterculture”) for a comfy brand of elitist quietism’ (Daniel 87).
Throbbing Gristle’s injection of those abject themes and aesthetics—
which have proved to work in the art context—into the system of pop 
aimed at revitalizing its worn-out vanguard impulse by willfully shocking 
its audiences out of their comfort zones. Simultaneously, their persistent 
implementation of abject strategies and the fact that ‘they always remained 
a far more conceptual entity than the overwhelming majority of popular 
music acts’ (Kromhout 26) rendered Throbbing Gristle a more ‘unpopular’ 
than ‘popular’ pop band, as the group’s biographer Simon Ford noted:
TG thus reversed an established avant-gardist paradigm. Rather than 
translate popular cultural forms into high art, as Warhol and the pop 
artists had done, TG transformed high art into popular culture. Rather 
than tone down and aestheticise the more intense and ugly aspects of 
avant-garde art, TG chose the most debased subject matter and abstract 
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forms to present to a mass public. This lack of a concession to mass taste 
ensured that TG’s music was never appreciated by a mass audience. TG 
operated necessarily on the fringes of the music industry and this meant 
never achieving, or seeking, mass appeal and mainstream popular suc-
cess on the scale of, say, the Human League or OMD. (Ford 5.18)
Indeed, Throbbing Gristle’s musical aesthetics and performance styles 
represented the greatest imaginable revocation of the time-honored ‘social 
contract’ defining the artist-audience relationship in conventional popular 
culture. As Diederichsen tellingly notes, especially the f irst two albums—
The Second Annual Report (1977) and D. o. A.: The Third and Final Report of 
Throbbing Gristle (1978)—‘dealt with issues of control, submission, extreme 
pain, and even torture in a manner that was fascinating and definitely broke 
the taboos of the time but that no one would ever have thought to describe 
as “entertainment” (Diederichsen, ‘Entertainment’ 26). And even the slightly 
more accessible 20 Jazz Funk Greats (1979), which is ‘widely misunderstood 
as their “pop album”, [is] too perverted, willful and crude to effortlessly pass 
as “real music”’ (Daniel 3).
The band’s ‘unpopularity’ resulted from the eclectic crossover of classic 
avant-garde techniques (shock politics, the disruption of the organic work 
of art, etc.), sound and noise experiments, post-Situationist détournements 
of pop iconography, controversial subject matter (violence, pornography, 
occultism, ‘the ugly’, etc.) and the confusion of gender stereotypes. Again, 
abjection was the underlying aesthetic paradigm of the project, but Throb-
bing Gristle slightly shifted away from the corporeal extremism of the 
COUM Transmissions era, focusing more on the (a)rhythmical, performative 
and representational (in terms of lyrics and imagery) aspects of the abject 
instead of the abject materiality of bodily orif ices.
After entering the stage of popular culture, the element of language 
gained more importance for the group’s politics. Examples of abject content 
are manifold in their lyrics: they deal with serial killers and necrophilia 
(‘Very Friendly’, ‘Urge to Kill’), blood and brains spilled over a breakfast 
table (‘Hit by a Rock’), cutting an unborn child out of a pregnant woman’s 
stomach in order to cannibalize it (‘Slug Bait’), or severely burned bod-
ies (‘Hamburger Lady’). Reynolds and Press noted that even the band’s 
name—a slang expression for an erect penis—‘managed to combine 
phallic innuendo with a sense of the abject nature of f leshly existence, a 
reminder that being alive means being subject to involuntary processes 
(excretion, reproduction, decay, death) and the everpresent possibility of 
violence’ (91).
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Even history’s utmost excess of abject violence is echoed in what 
S. Alexander Reed calls Throbbing Gristle’s ‘heartstopping pseudo-fascist 
vocabulary’ (75). Especially in their early years, the group frequently wore 
camouflage and uniform-style stage outfits and used band logos that evoke 
associations of Nazi symbols. It would be too simple to read this f lirtation 
with totalitarian aesthetics (a model that other Industrial acts, most notori-
ously the Slovenian band Laibach, would follow) as a radicalized version 
of punk-style ‘bricolage’ or as a mere gesture of distinction from the tastes 
of mainstream as well as established pop culture alike. Throbbing Gristle 
employed the horrif ic repertoire of fascist imagery at a more profound level. 
In her essay on abjection Kristeva notes:
In the dark halls of the museum that is now what remains of Auschwitz, 
I see a heap of children’s shoes, or something like that, something I have 
already seen elsewhere, under a Christmas tree, for instance, dolls I be-
lieve. The abjection of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death, which, in 
any case, kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed 
to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things. (4)
It is exactly this kind of abjection related to the Holocaust that Throbbing 
Gristle evoke by using the image of a heap of skulls for the cover art of their 
single ‘Subhuman’, or by choosing a photograph as the logo of their record 
label ‘Industrial Records’ that at f irst sight shows a factory but actually 
depicts the crematorium at Auschwitz, which is, according to P-Orridge, 
‘one of the ultimate symbols of human stupidity’ (qtd. in Ford 7.18).
When it comes to lyrics, Throbbing Gristle reached the ‘apex’ of abjection 
in the song ‘Zyklon B Zombie’ on their debut album The Second Annual Report. 
Here, the traditional coordinates of humanist morality are disarranged by 
narrating—in ‘almost incomprehensible, but highly controversial’ (Kromhout 
26) lyrics—a disturbing dialogue between a young Jewish girl and a warden 
in a concentration camp: ‘I’m just a little Jewish girl/Ain’t no clothes on/And 
if I had a steel hammer/I’d smash your teeth in/And as I walked her to the gas 
chamber/I’m out there laughing/Zyklon Zyklon Zyklon B Zombie Zombie […]’.
One cannot avoid sensing an unfathomable uneasiness among critics 
and scholars writing about these references. Kromhout, for example, tries to 
overcome this by explicitly stressing that ‘Throbbing Gristle were violent as 
much as about violence. But, one could argue, they were also against forms 
of authoritarian violence. Their work aimed at uncovering and countering 
hierarchical government- and industry-controlled power’ (27). Reed, on the 
other hand, tries to express his ambiguity in regard to Industrial music’s 
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pastiche of fascist symbolism, noting that ‘[d]espite the genre’s purported 
antihegemony, its unchecked battle wounds weaken its already shaky 
stance on some key social and political grounds’ (204).8
IV
If we shift our focus from the content level towards the sonic and performa-
tive aesthetics of Throbbing Gristle, we will recognize a subversion of a 
traditional cathartic function of rhythm and music in regard to the abject 
that Kristeva traces back to Aristotle:
Rhythm and song hence arouse the impure, the other of mind, the 
passionate-corporeal-sexual-virile, but they harmonize it [...]. They thus 
soothe frenzied outbursts […] by contributing an external rule, a poetic 
one, which f ills the gap […] between body and soul. (Kristeva 28)
Although Kristeva’s statement is universal, it applies particularly well to 
rock music, in which ‘[t]he abject began looming […] when the insurrection-
ary energy of the late ‘60s started to flag, and rock turned heavy’ (Reynolds 
and Press 87). Undeniably, one can argue that the aesthetic experience of a 
traditional rock concert is coded by a logic that corresponds to what Kristeva 
has called ‘poetic purif ication—in itself an impure process that protects 
from the abject only by dint of being immersed in it’ (28). However, the 
aforementioned arousal of the ‘passionate-corporeal-sexual-virile’ through 
the performance of the rock star is merely claiming subversion, drawing on 
stereotypical phallocentric tropes of rebellion. Reynolds and Press highlight 
the conservative gender politics ingrained in ‘rock rebellion’:
In the rebel imagination, women f igure as both victims and agents of 
castrating conformity. Women represent everything the rebel is not 
(passivity, inhibition) and everything that threatens to shackle him 
(domesticity, social norms). This ambivalence towards the feminine 
domain is the def ining mark of all the classic instances of rock rebellion, 
from the Stones through the Doors, Led Zeppelin, the Stooges, to the Sex 
Pistols, Guns N’Roses and Nirvana. (3)9
Throbbing Gristle—in their intention to be, as P-Orridge once claimed, ‘a 
rock band which was actually not a rock band’ (qtd. in Ford 5.17)—were not 
interested in this cathartic ritual and tried to escape it by disrupting the 
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harmonizing, external ‘poetic’ rule of the concert situation. Their shows 
confronted their audiences with a challenging tonal amalgam of experi-
mentally sampled rock elements, amplif ied noise collages and distorted 
electronically modif ied ‘singing’ voices up to the point of abjection where 
‘sound became noise and where noise became music and entertainment 
became pain and where pain became entertainment’ (P-Orridge qtd. in Ford 
6.10). The result of this—as Diederichsen calls it—‘entertainment-through-
pain-programme’ is not the external, ‘poetic’ and identity-aff irming rule of 
the pop/rock concert, but a ‘materialist counterprogramme to all cultures 
of submission, however one wishes to construe them, whether as spectacle, 
sedation, or conditioning’ (Diederichsen, ‘Entertainment’ 32–33).
This sonic anti-catharsis is accompanied by P-Orridge’s equally anarchic 
as erratic mockery of traditional rock star poses à la Mick Jagger. A video of 
a live performance of the band’s probably best known song ‘Discipline’—
which Reed deemed an ‘overwhelming attack on the audience’ (76)—, 
recorded at SO36, the center of West Berlin’s subcultural music and art scene 
in the early 1980s, may serve as an example here. We see P-Orridge, dressed 
in a camouflage outf it and army boots—undoubtedly alluding to the style 
of skinhead culture—convulsing frantically, throwing himself on the stage 
floor, violently banging his head against the amplif iers while maniacally 
shouting lyrics to the audience: ‘Discipline! We need some discipline in here! 
[…] Are you ready boys? Are you ready girls? Discipline!’ The performance 
exemplif ies Throbbing Gristle’s
hyperbole of popular music and culture, using, imitating, and exag-
gerating its workings, presenting a mirror image of everyday pop music 
and culture. As they did with the conventions of modern art in their 
previous work, Throbbing Gristle became one of those signif icant acts 
in the history of popular music that turned it inside out, and its audience 
with it. (Kromhout 26)
Their performative and sonic disruption of the external rule of music over 
the body again serves the group’s overall attack on identity constructs in 
general. Reed notes correctly that ‘[t]he normativity they seek to dismantle 
is not to be replaced with a new standard, for that would just be as tyran-
nical’ (83). Instead, they advocate an ‘ever shifting absence’ (Reed 83), a 
domain of constant becoming—not in a nihilistic void, however, but along 
the lines of appropriated and rearranged cultural signif iers. P-Orridge him-
self poetically envisioned such a realm in a text published in the German 
underground magazine Gasolin 23:
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In a universe of flux there are no fixed answers. No fixed moments. Rapid-
ity, fusion, f lexibility are thee hard edges, thee frame of this alchemy 
of survival. Place is in thee truest sense, merely a landscape we pass 
through. It has no density. Remembrance should be more exact. There 
are lines, boundaries, in all of these places. There common language is 
one of symbols. When order is lost, time spits. (P-Orridge 26)
V
This employment of the disruptive power of the abject for the total confu-
sion of the codes of the socio-cultural imaginary established by orthodox 
pop narratives and the deconstruction of the rock star archetype have 
to be understood in the larger context of the overriding identity politics 
P-Orridge followed in all his artistic endeavors, from COUM Transmissions 
to Throbbing Gristle and also his later, more occult/esoteric band Psychic 
TV, which, according to Reed, ‘was conceived as a fully multimedia project, 
integrating music [...], video […], and a philosophical propaganda wing, Thee 
Temple ov Psychick Youth (TOPY)’ (142).
For P-Orridge—as for Throbbing Gristle—the notion of a subject, 
regardless if positioned inside or outside the mainstream, cannot entail 
true liberation as it remains caught up in the binary system of either/or 
or subject/object. So for them, the idea of an essential f ixed subjectivity 
itself has to be attacked. In a fragment of what presumably is a television 
interview with Psychic TV from the early 1980s, P-Orridge elaborates on 
this philosophy:
Well the I is what we call the flat people who assume that the person that 
they’ve been donated by social conditioning is a one dimensional actual 
person. The We is how we see the world which is that everybody is made 
up of lots and lots of different personalities, fantasies, [and] attitudes, 
and that a multi-personality is in fact the reality, not the I personality... 
(‘PTV Interview’)
Staging the ‘abject’ in the domain of the popular is one promising strategy 
to evoke this multifaceted notion of the ‘multi-personality’ as
[t]he abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed 
to I. If the object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the 
fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes 
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me ceaselessly and inf initely homologous to it, what is abject, on the 
contrary, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where 
meaning collapses. (Kristeva 1–2)
Abjection can therefore have the productive function as a ‘door-opener’ 
towards a liminal realm that offers those possibilities for a continuous 
renegotiation of symbolic orders that Homi K. Bhabha attributed to his 
concept of the ‘Third Space […] which constitutes the discursive conditions 
of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols of culture have 
no primordial unity or f ixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, 
translated, rehistoricized and read anew’ (37).
In 2003, Breyer P-Orridge started to transform his own body into such a 
space of identitarian renegotiation by literally opening it up—not only on 
the symbolic or performative level but also on that of the materiality of the 
corporeal. In a collaborative project with his second wife Lady Jaye Breyer 
he worked on the construction of what the couple called a ‘pandrogynous’ 
identity. The endeavor is in accordance with Reed’s observation that ‘abjec-
tion strives for an Artaudian rebirth into a new flesh uninterrupted by the 
real world and untouched by that most fundamental logic, the subject-
object division’ (177–78). The artist couple implemented this idea almost 
literally by cutting through their skin, which is that ‘fragile container’ that 
guarantees ‘the integrity of “one’s own and clean self”’ (Kristeva 53). The 
programmatic statement for this practice of physical disinterpellation 
by rearranging the biological signif iers of gender identity on P-Orridge’s 
website reads as follows:
Inspired by the language of true love and frustrated by what they felt to 
be imposed limits on personal and expressive identity, Genesis and Lady 
Jaye applied the ‘cut-up’ to their own bodies in an effort to merge their 
two identities, through plastic surgery, hormone therapy, cross-dressing 
and altered behavior, into a single, ‘pandrogynous’ character, ‘BREYER P-
ORRIDGE’. This project focused on one central concern—deconstructing 
the f iction of self. (genesisbreyerporridge.com)
The Pandrogeny project is the literal embodiment of the in-betweenness 
of the abject and its capacity to escape cultural containment that was 
only performed and lyrically addressed before. It presents, to frame it in 
Deleuzean terms, a ‘line of f light’ from the aforementioned cultural f iction 
of the ‘I personality’ that leads the self on ‘a path of mutation precipitated 
through the actualisation of connections among bodies that were previously 
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only implicit (or “virtual”) that releases new powers in the capacities of 
those bodies to act and respond’ (Lorraine 145).
Art and music to h/er (as s/he prefers to be referred to since the beginning 
of the Pandrogyny project) are therefore not primarily modes of expres-
sion—that would presuppose the idea of the ‘I’ of a speaking subject—but 
means of communication of this escape route from what s/he perceives 
as the prison-house of a f ixed and unif ied identity, a narrative that also 
governs traditional pop culture.
Certainly, the growing recognition of Throbbing Gristle as an important 
cultural inf luence on a variety of rock music subgenres and especially 
Breyer P-Orridge’s ever increasing canonization in the art world raise the 
question of whether h/er strategies can effectively work as a form of cultural 
resistance. To answer that problem, we might again draw on Berressem, who 
stresses that abjection as a counter-cultural strategy can escape incorpora-
tion if it leaves the level of the symbolic and turns to the materiality of the 
body:
Even if countercultures celebrate abjects, they can never be […] expe-
rienced as simply positive, a fact that makes for a deeply disturbing 
underside to these celebrations. Although abjects may be included into a 
logic of cultural subversion, they remain disturbing on their own ground; 
the ground of matter and its organizations|disorganizations. (46)
So even if Breyer P-Orridge may have become increasingly canonized (yet 
hardly commodif ied) the radical commitment to h/er life-long project of 
de-essentializing the concept of identity itself, ultimately resulting in the 
return to the materiality of the body and the disturbing re- or disorganiza-
tion of its biological signif iers in the ‘Pandrogyny’ project, might prevent 
h/er from becoming what Berressem calls a ‘faux-abject’ that ‘remain[s] 
caught within the economies of the cultural|linguistic matrix’ (44). True 
abjects however ‘are so dreadful for both culture and the subject precisely 
because they are not merely its cultural others—it is in this realm that 
faux-abjection operates, as when it juxtaposes puritan cleanliness to “dirty 
things”—but disruptive material forces that are operative in the subject 
and in culture’ (Berressem 44).
One can without any doubt claim that the ‘abject verité’ is the predomi-
nant leitmotif that runs through any aspect of Breyer P-Orridge’s unpop 
stardom. The radical materiality of h/er body modif ication renders h/
er an abject work of art in its own right that sabotages the phallocentric 
identity machine of traditional pop culture. Through h/er ongoing activity of 
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performing and recording music10 s/he will—by sheer physical presence as 
well as h/er dissonant and violent opposition against the inherited rhetoric of 
pop—remain an agent in the service of abject unpopular culture’s resistance 
to closure: h/er art eludes location, it is neither ‘high’, nor ‘low’ nor ‘pop’, and 
yet all of these at once—or to say it with Kristeva’s words, it operates in the 
territory of ‘the excluded, the outside-of-meaning, the abject. Atopia’ (22).
Notes
1. Qtd. in https://realitysandwich.com/22347/process_product/ and also—
fragmentarily—in Ford 1.6.
2. For a comprehensive overview see Hecken.
3. Diederich Diederichsen differentiates between two major eras in pop history: 
Pop I (lasting roughly from the early 1960s to the 1980s) in which the discourse 
could credibly claim the potential for revolution and subversion and the phase 
of Pop II (beginning in the early 1990s) in which pop’s transgressive promises 
have drowned in the sea of a postmodern plurality in which everything can be 
labeled as ‘pop’. He aptly notes: ‘Pop I has always been entangled with trans-
gressive movements, whereas it seems, at a first glance, to be the tragedy of 
Pop II that there is no territory left that resists being invaded by it. [Pop I war 
immer in grenzüberschreitende Bewegungen verwickelt, das Drama von Pop II 
besteht auf den ersten Blick darin, dass kein Terrain sich gegen seine Invasion 
mehr sperrt]’ (Diederichsen, Der lange Weg nach Mitte 275, my translation). 
4. Deleuze argues that, after the Second World War (in an interesting parallel 
development to the rise and decline of Pop I), the disciplinary societies, whose 
mechanisms of governance relied on the various institutions of enclosure 
Foucault has described (the family, the school, the army, the factory, etc.), 
have continually been replaced by the new societies of control, characterized 
by an inescapable ubiquity of ‘ultrarapid forms of free-floating control that re-
placed the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system’ (4). 
5. Born as Neil Megson, the artist adopted the pseudonym ‘Genesis P-Orridge’ 
in the 1960s and changed it to ‘Genesis Breyer P-Orridge’ in 2003 after starting 
a body modification art project called ‘Pandrogyny’ in collaboration with his 
second wife Lady Jaye Breyer P-Orrdige. For the sake of accuracy I will refer 
to the artist as ‘P-Orridge’ when talking about his work before 2003 and as 
‘Breyer P-Orridge’ for work since then.
6. Berressem uses the italicized ‘a’ in order to distinguish his interpretation of 
these terms from the common use within the discourse of the abject.
7. Besides P-Orridge and Tutti, the musicians and sound artists Chris Carter 
and Peter ‘Sleazy’ Christopherson, who had occasionally collaborated on 
various COUM Transmissions projects, completed the group.
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8. Especially the fact that the genre was and is up to this day predominantly 
white and masculine—the two central attributes of every fascist identity 
narrative—in many ways obstructs the use of its aesthetics for other forms 
of identity politics.
9. Of course, this characterization would also apply to other phallocentric 
forms of pop(ular) cultural rebellion such as Hip Hop.
10. Throbbing Gristle existed from 1975 to 1981 and reunited in 2004 until Chris-
topherson’s death in 2010 put a definitive end to this project. After a first 
phase of existence from 1982 to 1999, Breyer P-Orridge revived h/er Psychic 
TV project in 2003. It is active to this day.
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 ‘Famous in a Small Town’
The Authenticity of Unpopularity in Contemporary Country 
Music1
Christian Schmidt
In this essay, I aim to analyze the intricate ways in which popularity and 
unpopularity are—perhaps oxymoronically—part and parcel of contempo-
rary country music. Importantly, I focus on commercially successful forms 
of country music and thus deal with a musical genre that is truly popular 
in one sense of the term at the same time as it thrives on its self-conscious 
distance from the perceived artif iciality of popular culture and aims to 
establish itself as the true music of the common American folk—truly 
popular music in a slightly different understanding of the term. In this 
context, any study of contemporary commercial country music—thus 
my claim—needs to come to grips not only with the ways in which the 
music taps into a discourse of American popular culture, but also with its 
self-styling as this popular culture’s unpopular other. Even though country 
music truly is popular music, it relishes an image of un-popularity that 
stands in marked contrast to common ideas about popular music. At least in 
part, it does so by staging a notion of authentic Southern and Dixie identity 
that is constructed in and through the music and its visual representation in 
music videos. If we add to this claim Frith’s by-now classical observation that 
‘popular music is popular not because it reflects something, or authentically 
articulates some sort of popular taste or experience, but because it creates 
our understanding of what popularity is’ (‘Towards’ 137), the interesting 
question remains: what identity does country music create and construct? 
And how does this idea relate to the notion of unpopularity rather than 
popularity as well? In an attempt to provide partial answers to these ques-
tions, this paper analyzes how country music constructs the idea of a truth, 
a real thing behind the music, in the f irst place, and how this produced 
notion of the real takes the form of proudly unpopular forms of cultural 
expression. Country music, I argue, constructs a notion of authentic identity 
that is both widely unpopular and that plays with the image of country as 
popularity’s metronormative other, in Judith Halberstam’s terminology. In 
order to do justice to country’s simultaneous popularity and unpopularity, 
my reading will argue that country music is popular culture, yet at the same 
time pinpoint the particular strategies used by the country music industry, 
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its artists, and its audiences to mark their distance to it and construct an 
image of country music as the more authentic counterpart to supposedly 
artif icial popular culture.2
Country and/as Popular Culture
Looking at all available indicators of popularity, country music may well be 
the most popular genre of music in the United States: there are more radio 
stations exclusively dedicated to playing country music than any other 
musical genre, just as the sales f igures of physical records continue to exceed 
most other genres. A cursory look at Billboard’s so-called ‘Rich List’ of the 
forty top-selling musical acts of 2013 underlines this, as it not only includes 
more than 10 country artists but is spearheaded by two of them, namely 
Taylor Swift and Kenny Chesney (cf. ‘Music’s Top 40’). Moreover, even among 
a presumably younger audience country music is alive and kicking: From 
its f irst season in 2011, the American television casting show The Voice has 
included country star Blake Shelton among its superstar jurors. Already in 
2005, country singer Carrie Underwood won the fourth season of American 
Idol by a huge margin of audience support and since then has gone on to sell 
more albums than any other winner of that show (roughly 15 million copies) 
in addition to receiving numerous Grammy, CMA, and ACM awards. Today’s 
biggest country stars, such as Underwood, Shelton, Miranda Lambert, or 
Brad Paisley not only sell millions of records, but also reach large audiences 
through social media such as Twitter or Facebook. Recent years have seen 
further in-roads of the supposedly old and outdated country music into more 
mainstream pop-cultural terrain.3 In a related development, television shows 
such as Nashville, the Southern-themed Hart of Dixie, and reality shows like 
Duck Dynasty have taken up explicitly Southern settings, which, at least in 
part, entail a cultural atmosphere permeated with, if not dominated by, 
country music. The South and with it country music have become thriving 
markets and increasingly have crossed over from being products of regional 
culture to becoming icons of popular culture in a broader sense.4
Yet, at the same time, country music presents an exquisite paradox in 
that it refuses to stylize itself as popular. Even though its self-understanding 
is that of music made by and aimed at the common man—thus, popular 
in a very elementary sense of the term—it explicitly rejects an association 
with popular culture, understood as artif icial ‘pop’ culture. Of course, one 
can read this simply in terms of a cultural niche tailoring its products at a 
particular market, creating an offer for a closely circumscribed clientele 
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of rural, small-town people, the common folk; yet, such an analysis falls 
short when we consider country music’s often implicit claim to being the 
American music, of its being the soundtrack of American life more widely 
understood. As George Bush, Sr. phrased this when he declared October 
1991 ‘Country Music Month’ during the height of the f irst Gulf War: ‘Of 
course, while country music speaks from the heart of the American people, 
it has—like liberty itself—a great and universal appeal’ (qtd. in Mann 74). 
Yet, while country music speaks to and for all American people, it also 
restricts itself to being the music of the ‘Little Man’, as Alan Jackson sang 
in his 1999 hit single of that title. Thus, country music epitomizes a form 
of self-consciously unpopular culture: it is a highly commercialized genre 
with immense sales f igures and wide outreach and, as such, part and parcel 
of contemporary American popular culture. At the same time, however, 
everybody involved in it views this very popularity highly skeptically, 
since country music quickly runs the risk of selling out the interests of 
the small folk for whom it has to speak and sing. Despite its wide-ranging 
popularity and in spite of its own self-fashioning as the music of the people, 
country music is seldom mentioned, and even more rarely actually analyzed, 
when it comes to discussions of American popular music and culture. As 
literary critic Barbara Ching observes in her analysis of hard country and 
contemporary culture, country music is ‘one of the most popular forms 
of music in the United States’ yet at the same time has not ‘f igured in any 
of the now canonical discussions of postmodernity’ (Wrong’s 3). And she 
goes on to argue that this observation is indicative of ‘just how remote 
country music is from intellectual discourse, and thus how overlooked it is 
in contemporary cultural politics’ (3). Why is one of the most popular genres 
of music so decidedly unpopular both with academics and ‘the people’ in 
a broader sense? And why are there still strong prejudices in place against 
country music as hopelessly outdated, decidedly un-hip, something from 
which it is better to distance oneself? Furthermore, why is country music 
proud of this very unpopularity? In this paper, I want to shed some light on 
the ways in which country music is a form of such unpopular culture and 
in doing so answer the question implied in my title: Why is country music 
so dang proud of only being famous in a small town?
Famous in a Small Town? – Country’s Unpopularity
Researching unpopular cultures produces a surprising dearth of studies 
of the unpopular.5 This is surprising because the unpopular is not only the 
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dark underside of the popular but, as popular is a relational term, study-
ing its others and its opposites is necessary in order to circumscribe what 
popularity actually entails. As a wide variety of critics—in fact, more or 
less everybody writing about country music—has argued, the creation 
of authenticity is at the heart of what def ines country music (cf. my own 
‘Nashville’ for a critical discussion of the role of authenticity in definitions of 
country music). True country music, so the reasoning goes, is the unpopular 
realm of small-town folks and precisely not the glitter of Hollywood or 
Broadway and thus almost necessitates a negation of commercialism and 
popular success. It is not a part of the pop culture industry, but rather an 
honest encounter between fans and performers, who meet as equals in 
the shared space of the home of country music, which is usually located 
in an idealized, Southern small town. Thus, ‘[c]ountry music still ha[s] 
something popular music [does] not—it [is] “real”’ (Jensen 128, my italics). 
This also means, as Jocelyn Neal has shown, that the music ‘both is part 
of mainstream pop culture and stands in stark opposition to it’ (474). Yet, 
if cultural studies scholar John Storey is also correct in arguing that ‘[p]
art of the diff iculty [in def ining popular culture] stems from the implied 
otherness which is always absent/present when we use the term “popular 
culture”’ (1), where does this leave country music? If we agree that popular 
culture is, indeed, ‘an empty conceptual category’ (1), one that is always 
def ined in contradistinction to other categories, such as high culture, folk 
culture, mass culture, or the unpopular, how does country music f igure in 
this equation? It is popular culture and thus stands in marked contrast to 
forms of high culture, yet at the same time it also is unpopular culture par 
excellence, self-consciously refusing to be popular. Since country music 
partakes of both popular and unpopular culture, it becomes clear that 
these two categories are working with different scales that lie orthogonal 
to one another: one is quantitative (successful vs unsuccessful), the other 
qualitative (what truly represents the people vs what represents only an 
elite, for example). Thus, contemporary country music can be commercially 
successful—hence popular—and unpopular at the same time, and these are 
the complex cases of unpopular popular music in which this paper stakes its 
claim. Even though popular for the sake of its wide appeal, country music 
consciously distances itself from other forms of popular culture that it views 
as inauthentic, fake, or artif icial. Proudly inhabiting this subaltern space 
of unpopularity, country music then simply has to be proud of only being 
famous in a small town.
Of course, setting itself up as the other of popular music leads to the 
oxymoronic notion of an unpopular popular culture, a form of culture 
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that at the same time claims to speak for the average, common Ameri-
can as it refuses to be popular. This entails a self-positioning in explicit 
contradistinction to all other forms of popular culture in that it rejects 
the rules of pop stardom, the musical market, and the like. At the same 
time, however, the music also sets itself in explicit contrast to so-called 
high-culture and any form of elitist presumptions. The prime example for 
this can be gleaned from one of the oldest institutions of country music: the 
Grand Ole Opry, whose very name marks an explicit distinction from opera 
as the prototypical example of high culture. In 1925, WSM’s barn dance got 
its moniker to differentiate between the rich people’s opera and the folks’ 
grand ole opry, while also creating a rural, Southern identity in opposition to 
urban forms of popular culture. From its inception, then, country music has 
operated in opposition to both high culture and mass culture and thus in the 
space of unpopularity. As Lüthe and Pöhlmann state in their introduction, 
unpopular cultures are productive rather than expressive of identities, and 
they argue: ‘If popular culture—just as much as high culture—is being 
used to create the people in the f irst place, not as a culture for the people 
but a culture constructing the people as a people by giving them a history 
and an identity, the unpopular culture is the disruptive element in this 
construction, resisting its homogenizations and omissions, opposing the 
complete smoothing of a striated cultural space’ (27). In the context of 
my discussion of country music, I take this to mean that constructing the 
country folk as unpopular establishes the music as a ‘thorn in the side of 
the mainstream’ (Lüthe and Pöhlmann 9) as it sonically creates a rural 
Southern identity to oppose a homogenized national culture that I will 
describe in Halberstam’s terminology as metronormative. This, of course, 
complicates constructions of American (popular) identities, if we bear in 
mind that country music establishes itself as simultaneously popular and 
unpopular. Contrary to what the editors observe in their introduction, 
however, country music, as the popular unpopular, does not ‘sing the songs 
nobody else wants to sing, [nor does it] show the world what it does not 
want to see’ (27). Rather, it creates a particular notion of the people as pop 
culture’s other, but does so not from a subaltern position but from the space 
of the (silent) majority—and this population does want to hear and sing 
these very songs, in fact needs to hear these songs in order to make sense 
of themselves in today’s world. In order to do that, the music clings to a 
nostalgic version of a past that never was in order to give the people exactly 
what they want and need.
Aaron Fox has convincingly shown that country music def ines itself as 
music of, by, and for the common folk, the people, and thus is popular music 
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in its most basic definition. In addition, however, country music, more than 
any other genre of commercial music, sets itself up as the other of popular 
music. In Fox’s words, it stylizes itself as a form of ‘abject’ culture, which 
relishes its own status as self-avowedly ‘bad’ and unpopular music by speak-
ing from the much disabused subject position of what Wray and Newitz call 
‘white trash’.6 More generally speaking, country music is widely perceived 
as a genre that is decidedly unpopular, antiquated, uncool, something to 
be ashamed—rather than proud—of. In her study of country’s perceived 
otherness, Hubbs argues that a ‘taste for country music is the failure of 
taste that flags a lack of moral value’ (41) since a declaration of distaste for 
the music, in this context, ‘appears f irst and foremost as a gesture of social 
exclusion. Musical exclusion is secondary, a vehicle and symptom’ (24). 
In short, country music is unpopular not because of any inherent musical 
flaws, but rather due to what it is perceived to stand for.7 To urban, Northern, 
non-country ears, the music appears as ‘dumb, reactionary, sentimental, 
maudlin, primitive, and so forth’ as they ‘hear a commodification and cheap-
ening of the same supposed folksy authenticity that so disgusts [them]’ 
(Ching, ‘Acting Naturally’ 231). Ching calls this the ‘double bind of rustic 
authenticity’ (232); that is to say, the music either crudely represents the 
rustic life of rural America (and is thus nothing but folklore) or represents 
failed attempts at creating the impression of such an authenticity (and is 
therefore, perhaps, even worse). In this context, Hubbs’s conclusion that 
‘country music function[s] as proxy for the people of the white working class, 
f igured as ignorant and bigoted’ is spot on and—drawing on Bryson—she 
‘suggest[s] that shared distaste may be as culturally signif icant as shared 
taste, the usual object of inquiry in studies by Bourdieu and many other 
researchers’ (45, my italics).
In this shared distaste for the ways of small-town Southern folks, which 
f inds its way into distaste for ‘their’ country music, lies the kernel that 
explains both the unpopularity of country music and its pride in this very 
unpopularity. As Aaron Fox has elaborated, country music’s ‘working class 
fans embrace what is ‘bad’ about the music’s—and their own—cultural 
identity and meaning, as a way of discovering and asserting what is valuable 
and good about their lives and their communities’ (52). In his argument 
about the music’s badness—which is quite similar to my own reading 
of the music as self-consciously unpopular, even if I focus more on the 
producers’ than on the receivers’ end of the equation—, Fox argues that 
the working-class fans embrace country music precisely because it is bad 
for them and thus turn it into an ‘abject sublime’. This ambivalent gesture 
can productively be read in terms of what Judith Halberstam has called 
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‘metronormativity’ (36; cf. 36-38). In metronormativity, so she claims, the 
urban is established as the unmarked norm by the adjudicators of good taste 
and culture against which the rural always already is marked as the deviant 
other. The lack of critical attention to country music can be explained in 
terms of such metronormativity in that country always already is viewed as 
the (marked) exception and therefore cannot tell us anything about the peo-
ple as a whole. Interestingly, country music cedes this metronormative point 
and embraces its own non-normativity as abject bad music or, in my terms, 
self-consciously unpopular music, the ‘unpopular’ other to the unmarked 
norm of popularity. That is to say, country fans embrace the music’s ‘bad’ 
identity in a def iant gesture that both acknowledges the metronormative 
gaze as it refuses to be stymied by it. The music’s ‘sublime quality’, then, is 
to be found in this very badness, or rather, in this re-valuation of something 
bad into something good. In Fox’s words: ‘It’s all good because it’s all bad’ 
(59). Thus, it’s all popular because it’s all unpopular—or, put differently, they 
are famous because they create the credible impression of only wanting to 
be famous in a small town.
Miranda Lambert, ‘Famous in a Small Town’
Miranda Lambert’s 2007 single ‘Famous in a Small Town’ not only provides 
the title for this paper but also points to the central contradiction at the 
heart of much of country music: how is it possible to enjoy popular success 
without sacrif icing one’s own authenticity on the altar of artif iciality? In 
its lyrics as well as in its musical and visual presentation, Lambert’s music 
video addresses the trappings of fame and directly engages the economics 
of popularity by singing about the advantages of unpopularity. The lyrics of 
the song waste no time getting to the heart of the matter, as the f irst verse 
immediately establishes the contradiction between popularity and small 
town anonymity. The f irst line describes an outsider’s (metronormative) 
point of view, cryptically indicting an unreferenced ‘They’ who think that 
‘life is so much sweeter through the telephoto lens of fame’, whereas ‘around 
here you get just as much attention / cheerin’ at the high school football 
game’. The deictic ‘here’ thus juxtaposes the beauty of small-town life where 
everybody is a star and, given the upbeat driving rhythm of an acoustic 
guitar strumming in a major key, the song already implies that this is neither 
a dirge nor an indictment of this small town but a resonant celebration of it.
The song’s video stages this conflict quite effectively by showing us two 
parallel narrative strands: on the one hand, we see a small-town girl in boots 
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and dress walking through the eponymous ‘small town’, shot in black and 
white. On the other hand, the clip also showcases a musician and her band, 
playing on a bright red carpet, closely cordoned off against the backdrop of 
a marquee banner with the singer’s name. This contrast is most effectively 
introduced in the second verse of the song: after the drums and electric 
guitars have set in, the lyrics move to the possible fame of Nashville as the 
video switches from monochrome black and white to colorful shots of pop 
stardom. Here, the video juxtaposes glamour shots on the red carpet—on 
which Lambert, in shiny clothes and full make-up, and her band perform the 
song—, including flashing cameras and all the other colorful accoutrements 
of pop stardom to the black-and-white popularity in a small town. Through 
the harsh juxtaposition of these two storylines, the video shows that being 
famous in a small town may be desirable but cannot easily be reconciled 
with commercial and popular success. It is an either/or-choice, it seems, 
since the worlds are simply too far apart. In fact, the lyrics explicitly ques-
tion the need for pop-star fame and popularity, seeing that in small-town 
America everybody dies famous because everybody already is popular, 
whether it is for shooting ‘the f irst buck of the season’ or for ‘cheerin’ at the 
high school football game’. To visualize this, the video cuts various faces of 
small-town people against the artist singing on the red carpet, juxtaposing 
the two versions of popularity: real popularity vs small town popularity, 
a.k.a. unpopularity. Hitting home its point, the song’s bridge spells out the 
advantages of this latter unpopular popularity: ‘Well, baby who needs their 
faces in a magazine? Me and you, we’ve been stars in this town since we were 
seventeen’. Importantly, the black-and-white scenes do not appear bleak at 
all but come across as more grounded—more ‘real’, if you will—than the 
artif icial colorfulness of popular stardom.
Given that Miranda Lambert stars in both storylines, however, the video 
also implies that it is possible to be both successful and to remain the simple 
girl next door, popular and unpopular at the same time. And this is the 
important point: in order for the song to work as country music, Lambert 
needs to be able to negotiate the gap between pop star and unpopular local 
hero, as country music audiences do not allow for distantly aloof superstars. 
No, they want even ‘their’ biggest stars to remain normal people—’just 
folks’—rather than artif icial industrial products. They need to be both, the 
black-and-white regular girl next door and the glamorous superstar. In a 
certain sense, then, Lambert’s song relishes the authenticity of unpopularity 
in country music even as it performs the very tension at the heart of country 
music: Miranda Lambert, of course, never would have become the country 
superstar she now is if she were literally ‘only famous in a small town’. 
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Similarly, her single would not have sold in excess of 500,000 copies and 
been certif ied gold record status had it remained within the confines of 
her home town of Lindale, Texas, or within Lebanon, Tennessee, where the 
video was shot. Rather, country music sings about and for a metaphorical 
small-town America in order to distance itself from mainstream popular-
ity. Presumably, it can do so without succumbing to the allures of pop 
stardom, and the country artist can, allegedly, stay true to the expectation 
of authenticity, which requires her to remain just a small town girl. As a 
country musician, Lambert can, and has to be, both: famous and famous 
in a small town.
Brad Paisley, ‘Southern Comfort Zone’
Another song that plumbs these same depths is Brad Paisley’s 2012 single 
‘Southern Comfort Zone’. It also quite self-consciously blends the dimen-
sions of country’s simultaneous popularity and unpopularity and describes 
the need to leave behind the singer’s titular Southern comfort zone and 
venture out into a world in which ‘Not everybody owns a gun [or] wears 
ball-cap, boots, and jeans’. Just as in Lambert’s song, Paisley’s lyrics make 
no mention that its lyrical I is a musician—yet, both songs more or less 
imply that their singers are not narrating a f ictional story but are singing 
autobiographically about their own personal lives. Doing so, both Lambert 
and Paisley fold their artistic personae and their ‘real’ identities into one, 
in an attempt to create an authentic country persona who is the ‘real deal’, 
rather than an artif icial pop star. ‘Southern Comfort Zone’ tells the story 
of a Southerner who leaves home, only to be surprised that ‘not everybody 
drives a truck, not everybody drinks sweet tea’. The song opens with an 
acoustic guitar intro that is supported by the warm sound of a violin and the 
soft resonance of a mandolin, sampled into which are an excerpt from Jeff 
Foxworthy’s ‘You Might Be A Redneck’ routine and a snippet from The Andy 
Griffith Show, thus setting the story in an imaginary Southern soundscape. 
Even more outrageously, the song explicitly refers to the Southern Comfort 
Zone as ‘Dixie land’, thus taking on a historically loaded term, complete 
with associations of the old South, slavery, rural backwardness, and all 
the historical baggage that makes ‘Dixie’ a contentious and thoroughly 
unpopular topic. As if this were not enough, the song is framed by choral ren-
ditions of the song ‘Dixie’, and Paisley’s powerful electric guitar, drum, and 
banjo-driven chorus inscribes itself into the Southern tradition by directly 
addressing ‘Dixie land, I hope you understand’. Yet, in its overemphasis 
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of some of the worst stereotypes of the Southern folk as gun-carrying, 
Nascar-loving, Billy Graham-following, Dixie-singing backward yokels, 
the song embraces these very stereotypes and claims the abject otherness 
of Southern identity as country music’s legacy. Paisley’s southern comfort 
zone, thus, is the realm of the unpopular—unpopular, that is, in the sense 
that Southern pride is frowned upon (in educated circles) as backward, 
reactionary, and highly politically incorrect; and unpopular in the sense 
that the comfort zone is understood not as the wide realm of the pop world 
but refers to a more or less closely demarcated idea of home that explicitly 
does not speak for all American people. In the words of the song’s pre-
chorus, country music sings about and for a frowned-upon ‘minority’—an 
experience the singer has made on his cosmopolitan travels outside his 
Southern comfort zone—rather than for the people as a whole. In this, 
country music embraces its own outsider status, its own unpopular image, 
and revalues it from a stain into a rallying cry.
The supreme irony of the ‘Southern Comfort Zone’ becomes even clearer 
in its music video: its opening shot shows Paisley starting his tractor, dressed 
in Jeans, T-Shirt and wearing the inevitable cowboy hat.8 Different from the 
album version, the video opens with a sample from the First World War-song 
‘How ya gonna keep’em down on the Farm? After they’ve seen Paree’ (by Joe 
Young & Sam M. Lewis), which ironically highlights the central oppositions 
at play within country music’s unpopularity: the safety of the small-town 
home versus the world, the unpopular tackiness of the small town boy, who 
phonetically misspells the name of the French capital versus the draw of 
cosmopolitan popularity. Once Paisley starts singing and strumming his 
acoustic guitar, the song slowly merges the rumbling of the tractor and 
the rhythm section of the band until, eventually, the scene cuts from the 
tractor to the singer running through a variety of European cities set against 
a fairly rocky musical accompaniment. As the song ends, the video cuts 
back to the still stuttering tractor, thus framing the popular, worldly music 
within a bracket of authentic Southern Dixieness. In many ways, then, the 
video self-consciously plays with the distinction between being down-home 
and worldly: it does so through its lyrics but also in its mixing of musical 
elements from traditional country and more cross-over/rock-oriented bits, 
such as the driving rhythm of the song or the extended electric guitar solo. 
Juxtaposing the country yokel and his tractor to the worldly cosmopolitan 
hectically rushing through European metropolises, the video portrays him 
as ultimately being equally at home in both. Moreover, the video cleverly 
plays with the supposedly large discrepancy between these roles and thereby 
signals not a ‘lack of sophistication’ but openly and self-reflexively ‘functions 
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as a sly, even campy, announcement of the fact that it is a performance rather 
than a spontaneous expression of some pure emotion or state of being’, as 
Ching has argued (‘Acting Naturally’ 233). In other words, Paisley’s song 
self-consciously performs its ‘authentic’ countryness by presenting the 
music precisely through the lens of a metronormative point of view that 
pigeonholes country music accordingly. In this respect, Paisley’s tractor and 
cowboy hat are simultaneously serious and deeply ironic gestures meant to 
underline both the authenticity of the music and the awareness that this is, 
after all, a performance. Rather than being a dismissal of the stereotype of 
the backward Southern redneck, ‘Southern Comfort Zone’ echoes and thus 
updates the infamous ‘Dixie’ as it loudly bangs a drum for the small-town, 
Southern heritage of the music. Yet, as a self-conscious performance the 
song also indicates that this Southern authenticity is no longer—if ever 
it was—to be had without the cosmopolitan dimension. In its sonic and 
visual blending of these two elements, the video showcases the enmeshment 
of the modern and the traditional, the popular and the unpopular and 
thereby complicates this very distinction. Yet, like so many country songs, 
old and new, it needs to reiterate the authentic heart of country, the Southern 
comfort zone without which no country popularity could ever come about: 
In short, without the tractor, Paisley would be just another pop star.
Darius Rucker, the South, and Unpopularity
As should have become clear, one of the defining criteria of country music 
is a self-conscious questioning of what it actually means to be country in 
the f irst place. As I have claimed, part of what makes country popular to its 
practitioners, fans, and critics is its embrace of a certain authentic image of 
‘being country’ that celebrates its own unpopularity. In order to continuously 
underline this otherness from the merely popular, country music employs a 
wide variety of what Joli Jensen calls ‘authenticity markers’ that ‘certify […] 
country music as real to fans [yet which] are the same markers that seem 
corny and hillbilly to everyone else’ (13, emphasis in original). These markers 
range from the ‘ball-cap, boots, and jeans’ mentioned in ‘Southern Comfort 
Zone’ to the seemingly ever-present cowboy hat, and also include tractors, 
honky tonks, sweet tea, but also conservative values and religious beliefs, 
and a large variety of things that make country music appear unpopular 
and unappealing to certain audiences. In many country lyrics, you will f ind 
such proud celebrations of authentic country identity, all of which revolve 
around a counter-modern, anti-popular form of Southern pride.
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Telling examples of such nostalgic Southern pride can be found in the 
music of Darius Rucker, who, after a successful career as lead singer for the 
indie rock band Hootie & the Blowfish in the 1990s, has established himself 
as a mainstream country artist. Throughout his country oeuvre, Rucker 
f launts his Southern identity, exemplif ied by his third country album, 
Charleston, SC 1966 (2010), whose title references the singer’s own year of 
birth and his hometown, thus blending the singer’s private life with his 
public country star persona. The song ‘Southern State of Mind’ describes 
a Southerner’s experiences in Eastern and Western locations, where his 
way of life renders him an unpopular minority much as in Paisley’s song.9 
Coincidentally, Rucker’s song about being the Other of metronormativity 
invokes some of the same authenticity markers as does Paisley’s song, 
singing that ‘You can see it in the clothes I wear, you can hear it when I 
talk / Ball-cap, boots, and jeans, and a little Southern drawl’.10 Establishing 
the South not only as a real geographic space but as a metaphorical home, 
the song juxtaposes the quirkiness of a ‘Southern State of Mind’ with the 
modernity of urban life, in relation to which country music self-avowedly 
has fallen out of both time and space. Similarly, Rucker’s 2013 Grammy 
award-winning hit-single ‘Wagon Wheel’11 captures an image of the South 
as both sentimental home and as unpopular other to the ‘cold up in New 
England’, as the lyrics stipulate. Selling nearly three million copies of the 
single in two years (cf. ‘Wagon Wheel’), the song clearly was a popular smash 
hit that celebrates a Southerner’s running away from a Northern, urban, and 
metropolitan life. The song’s up-beat chorus with its catchy repetition of 
Dylan’s original phrase ‘Rock me, momma, like a wagon wheel’ is addressed 
not to the singer’s real mother but metaphorically establishes the South as 
nurturing mother f igure to which the lyrical I of the song desperately yearns 
to return. Just as the musician of Lambert’s song flees the lure of Nashville, 
Rucker’s singer returns to the Southern small-town life that is his home as 
he was ‘born to be a f iddler in an old-time string band’. Within the song, 
the South serves as the metaphorical bosom nurturing the singer and even 
takes on an existential dimension as the third verse builds momentum 
toward the f inal chorus: ‘And if I die in Raleigh, at least I will die free’. Here, 
reaching the South means freedom—even if this entails death.12 The music 
video of this song further underlines this impression as it shows the singer’s 
hitchhiking quest through a cold world eventually to f ind bodily warmth 
and human touch in a live music setting. On this journey, the neighborliness 
of the kind people driving him—all portrayed by members of the Robertson 
family13—stands in striking contrast to his chilly surroundings. Once the 
song reaches its f inal chorus, the singer has found the place in which he can 
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be both warm and free: a small bar where he performs ‘Wagon Wheel’ in 
front of an appreciative audience that joins him in a communal sing-along 
of the lyrics.14 Catching the musically ‘southbound train’ of the oft-repeated 
chorus, Rucker’s lyrical I yearns for—and ultimately reaches—the small-
town Southern home of authentic country life as the song celebrates the 
authenticity of unpopularity in contemporary country music.
This is Country Music—and They Do
The interaction between artists and fans, as staged in the live performance 
in the video to Rucker’s ‘Wagon Wheel’, is an important part of country 
music but also of unpopular culture more broadly understood. As the editors 
of this volume state in their introduction: ‘The study of unpopular culture, 
then, is also the study of audiences, and it tends to be concerned more 
with the reception of cultural artifacts than with their production, since 
unpopularity presupposes an audience’ (26). What is important about this 
def inition is that production and reception need to be considered together 
when talking about unpopular culture, as unpopularity is neither detect-
able in the music per se—just as music’s ‘badness’ as def ined by Fox is not 
an objectively measurable quality, or lack thereof, in the music—nor is it 
something that resides solely with the recipients of the music and thus the 
audience (or the people refusing to listen to it). Country music consciously 
encodes unpopularity into its music, i.e. produces deliberately unpopular 
music, and its audience willingly embraces this unpopularity. That is to 
say, performers and fans of country music conspire to create unpopular 
identities that f ind expression in the music. In the words of the second 
verse of Paisley’s ‘This Is Country Music’ (2010): ‘It ain’t hip to sing about 
tractors, trucks, little towns, and mama’. Here, the song pretends to take 
on the metronormative point of view that these, indeed, are topics unfit 
for popular culture, only to respond by proudly rejecting its validity; in a 
word (or three): ‘This is country music—and we do!’ In this song, the ‘we’ 
of country music defiantly celebrates its own ‘abject badness’ (Fox) and the 
proud unpopularity that the metronormative gaze ascribes to it.
Drawing on Frith’s work on the function of popular music, Hubbs argues: 
‘Country music thus performs a type of cultural work that is performed 
by popular music generally. It models subjectivity in forms relevant to its 
listeners’ (103). Yet, country music also differs from other popular music, 
Hubbs claims, in that it ‘treats real-life themes of hard times, including 
facing serious illness and facing death’ (103). And, indeed, Paisley’s ‘This 
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Is Country Music’ is an excellent example of the ways in which country 
music proudly claims unpopular topics and establishes itself as a collabora-
tive project of both producers and recipients. In the lyrics of the song we 
encounter country music’s insistence on doing things differently, as the 
second verse explicitly states: ‘It ain’t hip to sing about tractors, trucks 
/ Little towns and mama, / Yeah that might be true / But this is country 
music and we do’. The lyrics defy popular (‘hip’) tastes as does the song’s 
instrumentation, in which the plucking of a banjo carries the melody. As 
the banjo sonically represents a rural, pre-modern, old-fashioned identity, 
it underlines country’s otherness and thereby instruments country music’s 
resistance to modern popularity. While a f iddle provides the harmonies 
over a whining pedal steel guitar in the background in the f irst verse, a 
fairly modern electric guitar picks up the song in the second verse, in a 
seamless juxtaposition of modern and traditional, popular and unpopular 
musical elements to exemplify the ways in which country music is both 
similar to and different from popular music. Country music’s proud ‘We 
do’ serves as a rallying cry for the country community shouted into the 
face of popular music as a self-conscious form of othering, in which the ‘we’ 
sets itself in direct opposition to the implied popularity of ‘them’. Insisting 
on its difference from popular culture, Paisley’s country music celebrates 
its own tackiness and stoutly defends its usage of decidedly unpopular 
themes. Moreover, the chorus consciously refutes any distinction between 
the real world outside and the potentially artif icial diegetic world of the 
song as it folds its listeners and its singer into one shared authentic country 
universe. Directly addressing the audience with ‘you’ throughout the song, 
the chorus explicitly states that ‘This is real, this is your life in a song / Yeah, 
this is country music’. In short, not only does the song embrace country 
music’s unpopularity by singing about unpopular themes such as ‘cancer’, 
‘Jesus’, and the ‘little towns’ in which Lambert is so famous; no, it also 
claims that the deictic ‘this’ of country music is the authentic life-world of 
both performers and fans as they inhabit the unpopular realm of authentic 
country life together—as a ‘we’.15
Clearly, this unpopularity is celebrated as a badge that needs to be earned 
and that is to be found in the nexus between production and reception, 
residing in neither sphere exclusively. Given country music’s insistence on 
authenticity, it is not surprising to see how closely both artists and fans 
patrol the borders of what—and who—may count as authentic country 
music. This is why it is so important for any artist to establish their bona 
f ide country credentials, and it also explains why Paisley’s ‘This Is Country 
Music’ ends by namechecking a list of legendary country songs into whose 
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footsteps the song quite ambitiously steps. In its extended play-out, the song 
reiterates the authentic strength of country music by juxtaposing its titular 
phrase ‘This is Country Music’ with song titles such as ‘Hello, Darling’, ‘He 
Stopped Loving Her Today’, or ‘Stand By Your Man’. The song never bothers 
to mention the names of the artists as the fans will know who they are—
Conway Twitty, George Jones, and Tammy Wynette, respectively—and why 
their simple reference is enough to tap into the lineage of authentic country 
music. As Aaron Fox has convincingly argued, ‘the standard of authenticity 
to which country is consequently held is […] the historicized essence of ‘real’ 
country music—an originary badness, always receding into the nostalgic 
mists of a preceding generation of stars and consumers’ (44). The ‘real’ thing 
into which contemporary country music thus taps is not a real to be found 
in the world outside, an existing way of life, as Fox importantly reminds us. 
Rather, it is an artistic discourse that creates the impression of realness by 
invoking the proud history of the music and the South, relishing a nostalgic 
version of the past that never was as unproblematic as these reminiscences 
imply. Country music is real and authentic because it sounds like the music 
that has come to be accepted as an authentic expression of the real, and 
the country community is proud of this unpopularity even if—or perhaps 
because—it is deemed deviant from a metronormative perspective.
Conclusion
The ‘wheelhouse’ of much of country music is the very tackiness of its 
‘Southern Comfort Zone’, the ‘Wagon Wheel’ of Rucker’s ‘Southern State 
of Mind’, or Lambert’s small-town popularity. More precisely, country 
music is not only located in this liminal space but it has built a comfortable 
nesting spot in this position as a more ‘real’ alternative to the bland pop 
mainstream. Unfortunately, there is more to this unpopularity than just a 
stubborn refusal to be streamlined. As many critics, such as Pamela Fox or 
Geoff Mann have pointed out, country is a thoroughly white musical genre. 
This is not because of a lack of ‘black’ or non-white influences but, on the 
contrary, because it constructs and re-inscribes a certain notion of implicit 
whiteness that is not only unpopular but, at times, deeply racist. Therefore, 
the unpopularity of country music is more than a simple unwillingness 
to leave one’s Southern comfort zone. It also entails a refusal to take on 
the admittedly complicated task of honestly dealing with its own (histori-
cal) constructions of whiteness. Part of country’s unpopularity, as I have 
argued, lies in the music’s Southern pride and the concomitant politics of 
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whiteness, despite the presence of African American fans and perform-
ers, such as Darius Rucker. Viewed from a different angle, this self-image 
of country music as an unpopular minority entirely silences these much 
more uncomfortable racial politics of country music, which more or less 
whitewash country music and disregard the problematic aspect of proudly 
embracing a redneck identity with all of history’s baggage.16 That is to say, 
the music embraces a notion of authenticity that is not only unpopular but, 
in fact, highly politically incorrect and, at times, blatantly racist.
‘Accidental Racist’, Brad Paisley’s hotly debated yet rightfully unpopu-
lar collaboration with hip-hop artist LL Cool J, is one of the few cases in 
which country music explicitly deals with racial issues. Its good intentions 
notwithstanding, the song is an awkward attempt to come to terms with 
the ‘accidental racism’ that is part and parcel of so much of American life 
and country music; or, as the f irst verse of the song phrases it: ‘The red 
[Confederate] flag on my chest somehow is like the elephant in the corner 
of the south’. By ‘walk[ing the elephant] right in the room’, the song attempts 
to free Southern culture and country music from its historical baggage and 
to return to a nostalgic past back when it was okay proudly to embrace 
Southern identity and the unpopularity it entails. The song’s lyrical I is 
a proud Southerner who insists on the necessity to start talking to one 
another about the uncomfortable effects of the intricate racial histories of 
the South, even though ‘you and me can[‘t] re-write history’. In the song’s 
f inal verse and chorus, Paisley and LL Cool J have a sincere dialogue, in 
which the former’s country singing and the latter’s rapping manage to 
overcome the past and, despite their statement to the contrary, attempt to 
‘rewrite history’.17 Lyrically, the song is a horrible failure in that it compares 
black people’s ‘do-rags’ to the white man’s ‘red flag’ (the Confederate Flag) 
and, even more outrageously, compares hip-hop’s ‘gold chains’ to slavery’s 
‘iron chains’. Adding insult to injury, the song ends by proudly embracing 
the ‘Southern pride’ free of the so-called ‘Southern blame’ that accompa-
nied it in the f irst iterations of the chorus and thus quite self-consciously 
inhabits a highly unpopular, abject, Southern point of view ‘where all that’s 
left is southern pride’.18 At long last, country music can stake a claim in 
the unpopular realm of ‘Dixie’, the sounds of which permeate Paisley’s 
entire album Wheelhouse—both Dixie as country music’s metaphorical 
‘wheelhouse’ and the song ‘Dixie’. Here, it becomes clear why country is at 
the same time the music of the common people (and thus of quite a lot of 
folks) and so unpopular, out of time, and embarrassing to many other people 
(yours truly, at least sometimes, included): as it embraces the identity of 
supposedly authentic Southern, redneck identity, country music creates an 
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image that is well-nigh impossible to be proud of for quite a large number of 
people. Possibly, a country song by def inition cannot achieve what Paisley 
presumably wanted it to: that is, to go beyond the tightly drawn racial scripts 
of country music because it is so deeply enmeshed in its own unpopular 
re-production of whiteness as its default condition (cf. Mann; Fox).
In the end, country music has to be a bit corny, a tad folksy, and above all 
authentic. Paisley’s Southern comfort zone and Lambert’s small town are 
the spaces in which this unpopular culture unfolds. And there is nothing 
wrong with only being famous in such a small town as long as this proud 
embrace of the genre’s unpopularity does not entail clinging to a simplistic 
historical account of how its own whiteness was made. In that case it might 
be better if the music remained, indeed, truly unpopular and thus known 
only in a very, very small town.
Notes
1. Many thanks to Martin Lüthe und Sascha Pöhlmann for their insightful sug-
gestions on an earlier draft of this essay.
2. Simply by using their real names, most country stars mark their difference 
from the artificiality of pop stars such as Madonna or Lady Gaga. The Ger-
man term Künstlername perhaps best expresses the ambiguity of taking 
on a persona: the term literally means ‘artist name’, thus naturalizing the 
artificiality of choosing a pseudonym rather than one’s real name for the 
purpose of performing an artistic identity. For an important analysis of the 
ways in which ‘the folk’ and folklore are often read as authentic products 
rather than constructions themselves, cf. Bendix.
3. A long list of indicators could be used to document the increasing cross-
over success of country artists, such as ABC’s screening of a three-hour 
prime-time broadcast of the CMA Music Festival on 5 August 2014 (cf. 
Hudak) or the recent hype about so-called ‘bro-country’ on the general pop 
charts (cf. Dauphin and my critical discussion of the latter in ‘All Kinds of 
(Queer) Rednecks’). 
4. This recent (re-)popularization of Southern culture is, of course, nothing re-
ally new given that Southern music has shaped American (popular) music 
throughout its history; as its preeminent historian Bill Malone has argued, 
the South ‘was the land that gave rise to virtually every form of American 
popular music’ (Southern Music 4).
5. To give just two examples out of a very small number of studies available: 
Covach’s essay on ‘unpopular musicology’ only uses the term in its catchy 
title and never discusses the term’s wider implications, whereas the editors 
of The Popular Music Studies Reader limit discussion of unpopularity in 
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their introduction to a short aside on ‘live opera’ as a ‘defiantly unpopular’ 
form of entertainment, ‘in both economic and cultural terms’ (3).
6. To give just two examples for the general dislike of and hate toward country 
music: Aaron Fox has pointed out that country music is the only musical 
genre that is often negatively referenced in personal ads in newspapers 
(cf. Fox 44). In ‘Anything But Country’, the first chapter of her Rednecks, 
Queers & Country Music (23–50), Hubbs discusses the phenomenon that so 
many people feel the need to distance themselves from country music—
or, rather, not from the music per se but from country music ‘as a cultural 
category and brand’ (23).
7. In Frith’s much better formulation: ‘Authenticity […] is a quality not of the 
music as such […], but of the story it’s heard to tell’ (‘Music’ 124).
8. Thus Paisley continues the long tradition of country music’s ‘singing cow-
boys’: dressed in ‘ersatz cowboy costume’ this figure ‘had won the day in 
country music’ by the time Hank Williams and Hank Snow appeared in the 
1950s (Malone, Singing Cowboys 99).
9. Given that Rucker, as of 2014, is the only major African American country 
artist with any semblance of mainstream success, this notion of being a 
minority takes on another layer of meaning—to which I will return in my 
conclusion.
10. Perhaps not surprisingly, both songs were co-written by Chris DuBois, 
which may explain the repeated use of the exact same phrase in different 
songs.
11. The song is a cover version of the 2004 underground smash hit by the string 
band Old Crow Medicine Show, who, in turn, had written this song based on 
snippets of a song written by Bob Dylan in 1973. While the Old Crow version 
already had become something of a Southern popular phenomenon—their 
song never hit the charts until Rucker’s version was released but could be 
heard around campfires, tailgates, and college parties all over the American 
South—, Rucker exploded the popularity of this song, taking it not only to 
the top of the country charts but also reaching the top 20 on the Billboard 
Hot 100 (cf. ‘Darius Rucker’).
12. There is a certain irony in this line, considering that Rucker, sole successful 
black country artist, sings about running to—rather than fleeing from—the 
South to gain his freedom.
13. Like almost no other on-screen personalities, the Robertsons of Duck Dy-
nasty-fame stand for a Southern unpopular way of life that resists the pace 
of modernity and of artificial popular culture against which their staged 
authentic lifestyle is set. Not only have they been met with TV success; they 
have also made strong in-roads into the country music industry in recent 
years. They have recorded a CD of country Christmas songs, on which they 
collaborate with country superstars such as George Strait, Alison Krauss, 
and Luke Bryan, appeared at the 2013 CMA awards, and have starred in 
Tyler Farr’s video to ‘Redneck Crazy’ (2013). In all of these, the Robertsons 
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epitomize the figure of the redneck, a central—truly unpopular—trope in 
much recent country music (cf. my ‘All Kinds’).
14. This ending creates the impression of authentic live music. In a discussion 
of the history of country music videos, Fenster has analyzed this device 
under the heading of the ‘performance/concept combination’ (Fenster 
116). Cf. also Auslander’s argument that the music video ‘has usurped live 
performance’s authenticating function’ (105). In ‘All Kinds of Kinds’ I briefly 
address the community-constructing function of such intradiegetic live per-
formances as a form of country music’s political unconscious.
15. In this respect, it is a clever choice that Paisley did not produce a music 
video for this single but simply used a live performance from the 2010 CMA 
awards, at the beginning of which he thanks the fans for his Entertainer of 
the Year Award.
16. As Berndt Ostendorf so helpfully pointed out in his response to this paper: 
there seems to be a ‘masochistic celebration of a wound’ (Munich, 30 Oc-
tober 2013) at play in many nostalgic distortions of the past in American 
culture, an example of which can be found in country music’s embrace of 
the Southern past.
17. As many commentators have pointed out there are two main objections 
to this set-up: first, Paisley is using one black popular artist as a straw-man 
to absolve the South and country music of their historical mistakes and 
problematic silences. Second, the particular artist that he chooses has never 
been known for his political outspokenness (as opposed to, say, Mos Def 
or Public Enemy); moreover, LL Cool J, by now, is not even perceived as a 
musician anymore but much more widely known as an actor in the popular 
police procedural NCIS: Los Angeles. Paisley’s choice of him as the spokes-
person for black people, thus, is viewed as misleading at best and dishonest 
at worst (cf. Coates).
18. I am not alone among critical audiences of the song to be irritated by Pais-
ley’s choice of the words ‘Southern blame’ in the chorus, thus singing about 
an assignation of blame from outside rather than about an honest confes-
sion of guilt (shame). Thanks to Heike Paul for pointing this out to me.
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 Making Christianity Cool
Christian Pop Music’s Quest for Popularity
Bärbel Harju
‘Can’t you see? You’re not making Christianity better, you’re making rock and 
roll worse!’ Hank Hill’s assessment of Christian rock music in the episode 
‘Reborn to Be Wild’ of the animated sitcom King of the Hill corresponds with 
much of the mainstream media’s perception of this phenomenon.1 A Seinfeld 
episode, ‘The Burning’, also illustrates the poor reputation of Christian pop. 
Upon learning that her boyfriend listens to Christian rock music, Elaine 
voices concern about his taste in music, but her friend George disagrees: 
‘I like Christian rock. It’s very positive. It’s not like those real musicians 
who think they’re so cool and hip’. George’s endorsement backf ires, of 
course, as he clearly makes a distinction between ‘real’, ‘cool’, ‘hip’ artists 
and Christian rock musicians.
Christian pop’s reputation as ‘the least fashionable music on earth’ (Beau-
jon 6) is not limited to mainstream media and pop culture. When I began 
researching Christian pop music, I soon found out that this musical genre is 
quite unpopular as an academic topic. The amount of scholarly work on the 
subject pales next to the books and articles on more popular musical genres 
such as hip-hop and punk, gospel and folk music, and in fact most histories 
of popular music almost ignore the phenomenon altogether.2 The reactions 
of most colleagues when I disclosed my area of research to them ranged 
from amusement and skepticism to utter incomprehension as to what the 
motives for studying Christian rock might be. Claire Fisher’s comment on 
the TV show Six Feet Under when she f inds out that her boyfriend listens 
to Christian rock captures how most people feel about this topic: ‘Oh my 
god, you may just be the most deeply unhip person I have ever met’ (qtd. in 
Beaujon 6). Its negative connotations notwithstanding, Christian pop music, 
its cultural ramifications and contradictions, had captivated my attention: 
anything this unpopular, I supposed, was certainly worth exploring.
Making Christianity cool is a challenge. The term ‘Christian pop music’, 
to many, has an almost oxymoronic ring to it.3 Often ridiculed, marginalized 
or dismissed as unauthentic, uncool, irrelevant, and unhip, the concept of 
evangelical pop and rock music appears to be too far removed from the 
infamous triumvirate of drugs, and rock and roll. Since its inception in 
the late 1960s, Christian pop music has been a contested genre, generating 
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criticism from all sides. The development and transformations of the 
genre correspond with the changing attitudes of its critics. This essay ana-
lyzes Christian pop music’s shifting engagement with ‘secular’ society and 
mainstream pop culture since the late 1960s. An examination of its (self-)
perception as unpopular and its continuous struggle with the mechanisms, 
values, and demands of pop culture also sheds light on American culture at 
large. Christian pop music’s search for popularity derives from complex and 
often conflicting agendas. Situated between religion, commerce, and music, 
this quintessentially American phenomenon is not a fringe phenomenon, 
but it provides insight into America evangelicalism as well as the larger 
culture. Its attempts to join the mainstream can be seen as part of the 
broader evangelical movement and its strategic embrace of popular culture.
Christian pop should be understood as part and parcel within the 
framework of American evangelicalism that has always operated success-
fully in the marketplace of culture.4 As historian Robert Laurence Moore 
convincingly argues, its employment of marketing techniques and the quick 
adaptation of media innovations and popular trends helped evangelicalism 
to stay ‘lively and relevant to national life by reflecting popular taste and 
commanding media coverage’ (275).5Assertive self-commodif ication has 
allowed evangelicals to spread their message in the most contemporary 
way while reaching out to non-believers and remaining culturally relevant. 
The emulation of mainstream cultural practices attests to its f lexibility in 
terms of cultural adaption, it is important to note, however, that there has 
been a ‘tradition of dissent’, a ‘sense of dispossession from, and antagonism 
toward, dominant culture’ (Luhr 107). Taking into account the conflicted 
relationship between American evangelicalism and the larger culture, I will 
show how Christian pop has struggled with all three: notions of popularity, 
mainstream culture, and its critics.
Contrary to the widespread dismissal of Christian pop as uncool and 
unpopular, the genre is f irmly rooted in American popular culture. Chris-
tian pop has found its niche in the marketplace of culture as part of a huge 
Christian, largely evangelical, billion-dollar-a-year-entertainment industry 
(Ali). With several big music festivals, a large number of record labels, award 
shows, radio stations and magazines, Christian pop music has been one 
of the fastest growing genres of music in the U.S. during the past 20 years. 
Its records outsell those of jazz and classical music combined with a 7% 
share of overall music sales in the U.S. in 2001 (Ali).6 Despite its commercial 
success, however, Christian pop often fails to register with the mainstream 
music culture, which is either completely apathetic towards it or consid-
ers it a rather marginal phenomenon with only limited cultural impact. 
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Its popularity, measured in terms of commercial success and number of 
consumers, comes along with an astounding critical unpopularity.
This critical unpopularity of the genre has not been coherent or mono-
lithic. In fact, Christian pop music has been criticized for many reasons 
from both within and outside of the evangelical community. Some of the 
charges leveled against the genre from mainstream critics include, but 
are not limited to, the following: the alleged poor quality of the music 
both artistically and production-wise; ‘bad’, agenda-driven songwriting 
oscillating between happy-clappy Christianity and turn-or-burn rhetoric; 
the perceived lack of authenticity due to a disconnect between musical 
style and lyrical content (a favorite target here is Christian black metal 
music); a certain uneasiness relating to the f inancial exploitation of faith; 
the ‘sneaky’ employment of pop music as a tool for either evangelization 
or the promotion of (sometimes equally unpopular) right-wing politics.7
The criticism of Christian pop music by evangelicals is equally diverse: 
the allegation that rock music itself is inherently bad or ‘of the devil’—a 
concern frequently expressed by televangelists during the culture wars of 
the 1970s and 1980s; commercialization and ‘selling Jesus’ as an ungodly 
practice—spreading the gospel should be a ministry, not a business; the 
‘sell-out’ accusation: Christian pop music emulates the secular world and 
therefore falls prey to its values, succumbing to commercialism and star 
cult; bands employing subtle lyrics are accused of watering down their mes-
sage; and f inally, others argue for the dismissal of Christian pop as a genre 
altogether, claiming they are ‘Christian by faith, not by genre’ (Kirk Miller 
36) and refusing to be pigeonholed by their association with evangelicalism 
and the stigma that is attached to it.
In his essay ‘What is Bad Music?’ popular music scholar Simon Frith 
stresses the shape-shifting and constructed nature of ‘bad music’ as a con-
cept and its necessity for musical aesthetics (cf. 19).8 Judgments of music, 
Frith points out, are sociological rather than musical, criticizing the ‘social 
institutions or social behavior for which the music simply acts as a sign’ (20). 
While a lack of authenticity is the most common allegation, explanations 
often focus on production-related charges, the supposedly formulaic nature 
of a musical product, the prioritizing of marketing as opposed to artistic 
decisions, or the derivative (as opposed to original), standardized (as op-
posed to individual) production of music (cf. Frith 22–28). The multi-faceted 
criticisms of Christian pop illustrate that the identity of the listener is key to 
aesthetic and ethical judgments of music. Depending on who is listening to 
it, a song could be considered too preachy or not preachy enough. Negative 
stereotypes invoked in the mainstream media may thus say more about pop 
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culture at large than about Christian pop music. Audiences respond to the 
genre based on musical and cultural knowledge and expectation. The value 
judgments listed above are equally ethical, musical and heavily dependent 
on the identity of the listener (cf. Frith 33). The evolution of Christian pop 
music and its critics not only sheds light on the interfaces of music, com-
mercialism, and evangelical Christianity, but also on the complex cultural 
mechanisms that produce and construct this genre’s (un)popularity.
A Parallel Universe? Cultural Warriors and the 
Commercialization of Christian Pop
The counterculture of the Sixties is widely recognized as the birthplace 
of Christian pop music. Members of the Jesus People Movement—hippie-
inspired born-again Christians—committed an act of rebellion when they 
adapted contemporary rock, pop, and folk music to spread the gospel.9 
Refuting the sacred hymns and gospel songs found in churches, young 
Jesus Freaks took to the streets and claimed rock music ‘to make a joyful 
noise for the Lord’ (Diamond 48). As a ‘counterculture within a counter-
culture’ (Romanowski 61), this mass youth movement opposed not only 
the hedonistic culture of their day but also rejected established churches. 
They founded their own parachurch organizations and groups catering to 
hippie sensibilities and countercultural appearances and practices.10 Their 
rallying cry was coined by Larry Norman, one of the pioneering Jesus Rock 
musicians, who famously asked in his 1972 hit song: ‘Why should the devil 
have all the good music?’ The Jesus Freaks’ primary goal was to reach their 
generation’s lost souls through rock music with straightforward, simplistic 
Christian lyrics. Although it gained momentum among the spiritually seek-
ing youth, conservative evangelical leaders questioned the viability of rock 
music as a tool for evangelization, suspecting a depreciation of the message 
(cf. Plowman 32).11
The initial popularity of Jesus Rock at the time of the Hippie movement, 
however, quickly vanished. Harsh criticism was sparked during the 1970s 
and 1980s, when the movement and its music became increasingly com-
mercialized—co-opted and exploited by more conservative forces and 
mainstream evangelical organizations.12 Christian pop grew into a full-
fledged industry that emulated the musical styles and business models of 
the mainstream: record labels, magazines, award shows, and radio stations 
were founded, but the newly created parallel universe lagged behind the 
mainstream’s standards of production, distribution, and marketing. The 
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relative mediocrity of evangelical cultural production was not only noted 
by mainstream critics, evangelicals too criticized the retreat into a closed-
off subculture with ‘inbred artists […] rewarded by those who populate 
this little ghetto’ (Schaeffer 46), unaware of broader cultural currents and 
movements. Though evangelization remained part of the rhetoric, Christian 
pop music was almost exclusively sold in Christian bookstores, played on 
Christian radio stations and performed in Christian venues: ‘Designed 
to reach the lost, the music was being heard by the found’ (Howard and 
Streck 71).
Christian pop artists did not create new sounds; innovation and creativity 
were largely surrendered to mainstream artists. Christian singers and bands 
simply added distinctly Christian lyrics to existing popular musical styles 
from new wave and metal to punk, rock, and pop. Disregarding its cultural 
roots and social implications, they considered music a neutral vehicle to 
convey the evangelistic message. Aside from the obviously derivative nature 
of the music, the result was often a certain disconnect between the music 
and the lyrics, ‘a curiously rootless sort of music’ (Flake 182). Authenticity, 
allegedly an important ingredient of art, was glaringly missing from this 
sanitized version of pop music.
Meanwhile, Christian pop music culture indulged in self-f lagellation 
and tore itself up about questions concerning the nature of their enterprise, 
as Christian radio DJ Paul Baker remembers: ‘Is the music a ministry, or is 
it entertainment? Can it be both? Should there be such a thing as Chris-
tian entertainment? How far was too far in becoming like the pop-music 
industry?’ (133) Artists questioned their roles in the conflicting spheres of 
business and ministry, but no one matched the commitment of singer Keith 
Green. Convinced that ‘ministry of any kind should be free’ (Green 233), 
Green announced to withdraw from the commercial side of Christian pop 
and began to give his albums away for free. Since none of his peers followed 
suit, Green’s attempt to ‘un-commercialize’ the gospel (Green 230) could 
not resolve the conflict between ministry and economics. This long-lasting 
identity crisis was only gradually overcome in the 1990s.13
Contemporary Christian Music (CCM), as the genre was called by the mid-
1970s, was undeniably far removed from rock’n’roll rebellion. The rigid codes 
of moral conduct of evangelical Christianity contributed to an atmosphere 
that stifled creativity and smothered artistic experimentation. Songs and 
singers were scrutinized by unforgiving audiences and record companies, 
who routinely included morality clauses in their record contracts with 
artists to ensure Christian behavior (cf. Dawidoff 43). Gatekeepers—espe-
cially Christian bookstores, where most of the music was sold—and radio 
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stations only promoted morally acceptable music that explicitly represented 
evangelical values, sometimes counting the ‘jpm’ (Jesuses per minute), as 
opposed to the bpm (beats per minute). The consumption of alcohol, the use 
of swearwords or the sporting of even a mildly sexy outfit could legitimately 
end or stif le careers in the Christian market. ‘Safe for the whole family’, 
the governing principle for Christian entertainment, created a bad image 
that looms large in the popular imagination of Christian pop until today.
The South Park episode ‘Christian Rock Hard’ that f irst aired in 2003 
perfectly illustrates this negative image. Cartman bets Kyle that he can 
make a platinum record before him, and he identif ies Christian rock as the 
quickest way to fame and fortune: ‘Think about it! It’s the easiest crappiest 
music in the world, right? If we just play songs about how much we love 
Jesus, all the Christians will buy our crap’. This alludes to the common—and 
quite plausible—impression that ‘the Christian audience had a higher 
toleration for crap music’, as Christian rock singer Steve Taylor explained 
in a personal interview. As long as it came ‘coupled with a good message’ 
(Taylor), believers seemed to embrace it. Author and industry insider John J. 
Thompson notes that ‘by the mid-1980s, the Christian pop scene had become 
a machine that could sell a certain amount of everything, regardless of 
quality. […] The result was waves of awful Christian pop records’ (89). South 
Park’s satirizing of the songwriting process for a Christian pop song also 
refers to the lack of authenticity due to the music’s derivative, un-artistic 
production. As Cartman explains: ‘All we have to do to make Christian 
songs is take regular old songs and add Jesus stuff to them. See? All we 
have to do is cross out words like ‘baby’ and ‘darling’ and replace them with 
“Jesus”’. The aforementioned disconnect between lyrics and music becomes 
obvious, when Cartman replaces certain lyrics to boost the jpm-factor, 
thereby implying a romantic relationship with Jesus:
Don’t ever leave me, Jesus, I couldn’t stand to see you go.
My heart would simply snap, my Lord, if you walked on out that door.
I promise I’ll be good to you and keep you warm at night.
Jesus, Jesus, Jesus, why don’t you just shut off the lights.
South Park mocks the way Christian record companies try to exert moral 
control over their artists. When the CEO of the f ictional Faith Records 
comments on some of the lyrics before signing the band, he quips: ‘It appears 
you are actually in love with Christ’. The conflict between ministry and 
business is poignantly captured as the record company executive assures 
that they would ‘just like to make sure the bands we sign are in it for God, 
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and not for the money’. He then prods them to just ‘sign here and we’ll get 
your album sold’. South Park’s portrayal of Christian pop music is predicated 
on the genre’s negative image that goes back to the 1980s: a commercialized, 
both musically and lyrically unsophisticated, one-dimensional emulation of 
secular pop songs, sometimes dubbed as ‘Christian cotton candy’ (Menconi 
20).
This depiction of tame, happy-clappy Christian music is one version 
of evangelical popular music during the 1980s. Artists like Amy Grant 
became huge commercial hits—and even had some crossover success in 
the mainstream—with sweet melodies and simplistic lyrics that did not dig 
very deep theologically. At the same time, though, there existed another, 
more aggressive type of Christian rock that was deeply entangled with 
and influenced by the culture wars raging during the 1980s. Conservative 
evangelicals had been heavily politicized and rallied around organizations 
of the New Religious Right like Jerry Falwell’s ‘Moral Majority’. The rhetoric 
of political debates and televangelist broadcasts was boasting, replete with 
militaristic and triumphalist imagery. The framing of conflicts as war, the 
emphasis of clearly opposing categories like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and 
‘evil’, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ are staples in Christian pop music culture during 
the 1980s.14 Christian pop music increasingly became associated with the 
Christian Right and evoked images of self-righteous, greedy, f ire-and-
brimstone televangelists and politicians with aggressive political stances 
towards abortion, pre-marital sex, and same-sex marriage.
Petra is a case in point. One of the most successful Christian rock bands 
of the 1980s, they sold out huge secular venues with their arena rock. Songs 
like ‘The Battle Belongs to the Lord’ and ‘Armed and Dangerous’ identif ied 
the secular world as the enemy and positioned Petra as relentless Christian 
warriors. Their stage outf its resembled combat gear, and they opened their 
shows with the hymn ‘Onward Christian Soldier’ (Powell, ‘Petra’). ‘This 
Means War!’ illustrates how the band unabashedly interspersed triumphal-
ist rhetoric with military imagery:
This means war! And the battle’s still raging.
War—and though both sides are waging
The victor is sure and the victory secure,
But till judgment day we all must endure.
Their display of triumphalism and spiritual warfare appealed to the evan-
gelical audience but never succeeded in the mainstream market, nor was it 
intended to do so. The ‘world’ is clearly the opponent, as singer Bob Hartman 
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explained: ‘We know our music is aimed at the church. […] [The album 
This Means War!] deals with all three areas of our spiritual warfare. As 
Christians, our enemies are the world, the flesh, and the devil. The songs on 
This Means War! deal with one of those three issues and talk about spiritual 
warfare’ (Newcomb 99).15 The closing of ranks with the New Religious Right 
manifested itself not only in imagery and rhetoric, but also in Petra’s support 
of conservative politics, for example their promotion of a constitutional 
amendment allowing prayers in public schools (cf. Powell, ‘Petra’).
If mainstream critics took any notice of it at all, they dismissed the music 
as ‘mediocre stuff, diluted by hesitation and dogmatic formula, inferior 
to the mainstream popular music it emulates’ (Dawidoff).16 The rejection 
by mainstream audiences and critics allowed—and continues to allow—
Christian pop bands to tap into a traditional trope among U.S. evangelicals, 
namely narratives surrounding its ‘persecution complex’ (Joseph 181). The 
perceived dispossession and rejection by the mainstream enables artists to 
position themselves as ‘rock’s real rebels’ (Kevin Miller 90) and articulate 
their unpopularity in positive terms based on Jesus’ persecution due to his 
countercultural stance. Mark Stuart, singer of Audio Adrenaline, elaborates 
on the idea of Christian rebellion in the face of adverse circumstances: ‘I 
think rebellion and Christianity go together […]. Singing about sex and 
drugs is the easiest thing to do. It’s old by now. So pretty much the most 
rebellious rock-and-roll person you can be is a Christian-rock frontman 
because you get people from every side trying to shut you down’ (Ali 43). 
The framing of mainstream culture in terms of conformity to a godless value 
system emphasizes Christian pop’s claim to its potential as a subversive 
force that questions or undermines dominant ideology.17
The extent to which this potential was achieved during the 1980s remains 
disputable. Christian teenagers embraced ‘cool’ Christian bands like Petra, 
but conservative evangelists like Jimmy Swaggart publicly denounced the 
music while the mainstream was largely unresponsive. Internal struggles 
with notions of commercialized ministry and religious entertainment 
continued to plague the evangelical music industry. Overall, Christian pop 
became a deeply conflicted, self-contained subculture, predicated on its 
opposition to an allegedly corrupt ‘secular’ mainstream culture. By adapting 
and ‘Christianizing’ secular musical styles, Christian pop provided music for 
the converted, a safe and healthy alternative for the Christian youth, not a 
vehicle to ‘save lost souls’. Christian pop culture turned into ‘a cultural ghetto, 
frequently ridiculed and easily avoided’ (Powell, ‘Jesus’) that had little—if 
any—traction beyond its boundaries. This era shaped the image of Christian 
pop as second-rate, a ‘pale imitation of the real thing’ (Howard and Streck 35).
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Christian by Faith, not by Genre: Embracing the Mainstream
Since the early 1990s, however, Christian pop music has been on a quest 
for popularity, ‘hipping itself for the approaching millennium’ (Ali). The 
professionalization of the genre was spurred by secular media conglomer-
ates’ acquisition of Christian record labels. Companies like BMG and EMI 
identif ied American evangelicals as a profitable segment for the entertain-
ment industry and noticed the monetary gain to be made with Christian 
pop music. Backed by these corporations, the production, distribution and 
marketing mechanisms for Christian pop improved drastically and could 
now match the mainstream market’s standards. No longer dependent on 
conservative, volatile Christian book stores, the music is now available at 
secular outlets and garners considerable crossover success with many artists 
generating sales in both the Christian and the mainstream market.18 This 
transformation and reframing of Christian pop music came along with hip 
appearances, subtle lyrics and a new openness towards non-believers. The 
rhetoric of the culture war gave way to subtle, more marketable terminology. 
In a Newsweek article in 2001, Lorraine Ali described Christian pop music 
as the ‘hottest genre in the entire music industry’, quoting recent sales 
f igures that added up to ‘747 million Dollars in records sales last year—7 
percent of the overall sales in the American music industry’. Similar to 
country music, Christian pop has carved out a lucrative niche for itself in 
the highly competitive cultural marketplace. The music allows evangelicals 
to participate in a wholesome version of popular culture without feeling 
that they have to make sacrif ices in terms of quality and coolness.
Not satisf ied with the niche status as part of the evangelical subculture, 
however, a growing number of Christian artists have been reaching out to 
a broader audience by attempting to abandon the label ‘Christian’—and 
the stigma that is attached to it—altogether. Bands like P.O.D., SixPen-
ceNonetheRicher, The Fray, Creed and many others have left the parallel 
universe of Christian pop music behind to explore other ways of articulating 
the gospel. Presenting a ‘modern version of evangelism that uses a new 
language, a new discursive style’ (Hendershot 54), their musical message 
is more subtle and toned down. Decoding and interpreting the meaning 
of their songs requires an active role on the part of the listener. The lyrics 
avoid ‘bible-thumping’ and ‘turn-or-burn’ rhetoric and are characterized by 
ambiguity, offering a vaguely Christian perspective based on love, forgive-
ness, responsibility, and social equality. The names of Jesus or God are never 
explicitly mentioned, and often substituted with the more embracing ‘you’. 
The implication that the song might be addressing a loved-one earned them 
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the name ‘God-as-a-girlfriend-song’—a reverse strategy from the 1980s 
jpm count alluded to in the above-mentioned South Park episode. These 
artists succeeded within the framework of the mainstream music culture 
without completely abandoning religious undertones—by quietly sharing 
their worldview without reverting to preaching.
Christian pop artists’ embrace of the mainstream coincided with changes 
in evangelical culture overall: while many evangelicals were still ‘suspicious 
of mainstream culture and the cultural elite’, those in positions of cultural 
and social leadership actively ‘distance[d] themselves from the movement’s 
subculture’ that they describe as ‘“gross”, “cheesy”, and “anemic”’ (Lindsay 
121, 123). The unpopularity of evangelicalism, their image as ruthless cultural 
warriors and greedy, hypocritical televangelists required the adoption of 
new strategies. Efforts to embrace the mainstream are manifest in the 
upsurge of so-called seeker churches since the 1990s that catered to non-
Christian ‘spiritual seekers’ and their consumerist sensibilities (cf. Sargeant 
146).19 While seeker sensitivity is predicated on clever marketing techniques 
and a contemporary presentation of the gospel, the so-called emerging 
church, another trend among American evangelicals that began in the 
1990s, aims to reconcile postmodern culture and Christian sensibilities 
by discarding absolute truth claims and embracing doubt, insecurity and 
f laws while focusing more on social equality and justice.20 Evangelical 
cultural production reflected these trends. Instead of preaching to ‘unsaved’ 
people with straightforward Christian messages, this new generation of 
artists relied on ‘seed-planting’ and pre-evangelism tactics: ‘The new 
evangelical quietly “shared” with “searchers” rather than preaching hellf ire 
and damnation from a pulpit’ (Hendershot 61). The focus has shifted from 
overemphasizing the artists’ lyrics and lifestyle to focusing more on artistic 
integrity and excellence—which many evangelicals cultural leaders now 
understood to be a prerequisite for cutting edge cultural products and 
mainstream acclaim.
The new brand of Christian pop music succeeded with mainstream 
audiences, and their quest for popularity is now making progress. Key to 
mainstream acceptance is the avoidance of any overt association with the 
evangelical subculture. Jason Wade, lead singer of the band Lifehouse, tried 
to steer clear of the stigma that is attached to Christian pop: ‘My music 
is spiritually based, but we don’t want to be labeled as a Christian band, 
because people’s walls come up and they won’t listen to your music and what 
you have to say’ (Wild 45). The rock band Creed has successfully appealed 
to the music industry by shunning the Christian music subculture, as one 
observer notes:
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Whenever anyone asks Creed if they’re Christian, they say: ‘No, but we’re 
searching’. It’s obvious that they’ve either done their homework very well 
or they have some sort of a Christian foundation in their background. 
[…] It’s great that they’re careful, with the way the world is today, the 
way popular culture and the people they’re trying to sell records to are. 
Creed’s not ostracizing themselves by communicating that they’ve found 
all the answers. (Jonathan Richter qtd. in Hendershot 59)
Switchfoot, another example of the new approach in Christian rock, rejects 
the categorization as a Christian band in an often-quoted statement by 
bassist Tim Foreman. When asked by Rolling Stone Magazine whether 
Switchfoot is a Christian band, Foreman replied: ‘We’re Christian by faith, 
not by genre’ (Kirk Miller 36). Foreman challenged the label ‘Christian 
music’ by insisting that a genre should be characterized by musical style, not 
lyrical content. Carefully crafted interviews and conscientious statements 
obscure the band’s agenda in order to win over the mainstream without 
deterring Christian fans. Many of these artists quote U2—the enormously 
successful band with several Christian members—as role models, since they 
have been on ‘a long, arduous and well-planned trek, astutely avoiding the 
cultural ghetto of Christian music’ (Di Sabatino, ‘Why’) since the 1980s while 
weaving subtle Christian messages into their lyrics.21 Christian audiences 
know how to interpret these bands’ obscured messages and claim them 
for themselves, even if the artists do not identify themselves as Christian.
Ambiguity, double-coding, and subtle references also helped nu-metal 
band P.O.D. succeed in the mainstream. Early in their career, the band’s 
lyrics were seasoned with f ire and brimstone—and it didn’t shy away 
from hot-button issues of the culture wars, as their 1993 song ‘Abortion 
is Murder’ vividly proves.22 On later albums, the band toned down their 
message to reach a broader audience. Lead singer Sonny Sandoval explains 
their reevaluation: ‘We don’t do that stuff anymore, ‘cause that’s not where 
we’re at. You know, we’re not about stepping on people’s toes […]. We just 
wanna make music that’ll continue to affect people’ (Beaujon 4). The band 
signed with Atlantic Records in 1999 and achieved a global breakthrough 
success with their hit single ‘Alive’ in 2001. The song embodies P.O.D’.s new 
style and language:
Everyday is a new day.
I’m thankful for every breath I take […].
So I trust in love,
You have given me peace of mind.
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I feel so alive
For the very f irst time.
I can’t deny you […].
Sunshine upon my face,
A new song for me to sing.
Tell the world how I feel inside,
even though it might cost me everything […].
Now that I’ve seen you
I can never look away […].
I believe no matter what they say.
At f irst glance, the song presents itself as a very positive, high-energy 
rock anthem. The unspecif ied ‘you’ addressed in the lyrics might refer to 
a romantic relationship. The video supports this reading with its narra-
tive surrounding a couple and no overt allusions to Christianity. Jesus or 
God are never explicitly mentioned. A closer look at the band’s Christian 
background, however, allows for a different reading. The singer thanks 
God in the opening lines before joining the chorus—‘I feel so alive for 
the very f irst time’—in an allusion to an experience crucial in the lives of 
evangelicals. In this moment of spiritual rebirth, evangelicals believe to be 
born-again after accepting Jesus as their personal savior. The conversion 
experience lets the lyrical I feel alive for the f irst time and strengthens 
their faith—‘now that I’ve seen you, […] I believe no matter what they say’. 
The phrase ‘I can’t deny you’ signals the speaker’s Christian allegiance by 
alluding to the biblical motif of confessing to one’s faith even in the face of 
prosecution and discrimination, as mentioned in the Gospel of Matthew: 
‘But whoever shall deny me before men, him I will also deny before my 
Father which is in heaven’ (Matthew 10:33). The next lines pertain to the 
aforementioned ‘persecution complex’ of many evangelicals and deal with 
the stigma that is attached to this confession and to being openly Christian: 
‘Tell the world how I feel inside, even though it might cost me everything’. 
The video underlines this reading with the singer wearing a T-shirt that 
blazes a white hand with a hole in it—a symbol for Jesus’s crucif ixion. 
Signaling proves effective in conveying a subtle message—to believers and 
non-believers alike—because it requires decoding. Toned-down lyrics and 
cautious statements, according to the tactics of pre-evangelism, could plant 
a seed in a person’s heart that may someday grow, while being ambiguous 
and open enough to accommodate the mainstream audience.
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Have born-again Christians f inally managed then to trade the image of 
bible-thumping culture warriors for the more palatable one of culturally 
savvy hipsters? The struggle for ‘legitimacy and the desire to escape the 
“subliterate” stigma’ continues to be an issue for evangelicals who navigate a 
‘secular marketplace that they realize is wary of both evangelical faith and 
politics’ (Hendershot 54). Ultimately, making evangelical Christianity cool 
remains a challenge. It cannot be denied, however, that Christian music’s 
quest for popularity has succeeded to an astonishing degree—whether it 
manages to bind evangelical kids to their faith by presenting a hip version 
of Christian culture or by way of ‘inf iltrating’ the mainstream without 
immediately self-identifying as evangelical Christians. Either way, Christian 
pop’s pursuit of ‘cool’ caters to the demands of evangelical Christianity. 
Its embrace of popular culture and the deliberate self-commodif ication 
allow evangelicals to present their ‘product’ in the best possible way. The 
music is still scrutinized and met with criticism, but its sweeping com-
mercial success speaks for itself. Christian pop continues to be popular 
and unpopular at the same time—but it is far from irrelevant. Much like 
American evangelicalism, it remains both ‘embattled and thriving’ (Smith). 
Making accommodations to the marketplace of culture may not have 
led to universal acceptance and unanimous critical popularity. Soft-sell 
evangelism, however, helped blur the fault lines between the sacred and 
the secular, between ‘uncool’ and ‘cool’—and allowed Christian pop to 
effectively navigate the complex cultural mechanisms of the unpopular.
Notes
1. In this episode—‘Reborn to Be Wild’ is a pun alluding to the famous Step-
penwolf song ‘Born to Be Wild’ and the born-again experience of evangeli-
cal Christians—Hank is dismayed upon learning that his son Bobby’s new 
bible group consists of hard-rocking, skateboarding, tattooed punks, led by 
a youth pastor who doubles as a Christian rock band leader. While Hank 
may have an appreciation for both rock music and Christian faith, he cer-
tainly does not approve of the—in his eyes—oxymoronic and blasphemous 
amalgam of rebellious youth culture and religion, as epitomized in his son 
Bobby’s desire to get a Jesus tattoo and his T-shirt that says ‘Satan sucks’. 
2. The Rolling Stones Illustrated History of Rock and Roll, for example, notes the 
fact that U2 is a spiritual band, but does not mention Christian pop music. 
Christian pop is also omitted or neglected in scholarly publications. See for 
example Garofalo; Bennett, Shank,and Toynbee.
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3. In fact, the term Christian pop music, although widely used, is contro-
versial, not only because of the vagueness of the term—what counts as 
Christian pop?—but also because the Christian music industry is largely 
evangelical. The usage of the adjective ‘Christian’ also serves to draw an 
imaginary line between the spheres of ‘Christian’ music and ‘secular’ music, 
which in fact is hardly visible in US culture—and music especially—be-
cause of the pervasiveness of religion. In general, the affiliation with a cer-
tain denomination has been losing significance, non-denominationalism is 
trending. For a more detailed discussion of terminology see Harju (14–21) 
and Hochgeschwender (15–31).
4. Robert Laurence Moore uses the term synonymously with ‘commercial 
culture’ and notes that ‘America’s boom market in religion operated most 
effectively at the popular end of the market in cultural commodities’ (6).
5. Moore’s analysis of religious commercialization since the early nineteenth 
century refutes theories of secularization and stresses the continuing 
impact of commercialized forms of religion in American culture, observing 
that ‘a sizable portion of the Protestant evangelical community has made 
its peace with commercial culture’ (255).
6. The difficulty to obtain accurate sales figures derives from the fact that the 
term itself and the boundaries of the genre are hard to define. Sometimes 
labeled Christian Rock, Contemporary Christian Music, Faith-Based Music 
or Contemporary Praise and Worship, a clear categorization is difficult; in 
addition, some Christian artists try to avoid the stigma attached to Christian 
music by not using any of these labels, while at the same time spiritually-
inclined country or mainstream songs sometimes are included in Christian 
sales records, which makes accurate numbers difficult to track.
7. See Harju; Howard and Streck.
8. Frith points out that ‘“bad music” […] is only interesting as part of an argu-
ment,’ positioned in a ‘context in which someone else thinks it’s good’ (17). 
The object of labeling records as ‘bad music,’ he continues, is ‘a critique of 
public taste’ (18), with contempt leveled at ‘the people who like them, who 
take them seriously’ (19). The effects of music, too, elicit value judgments 
based on the belief in the ‘power of music to shape society’ (24).
9. While Christian rock music appeared revolutionary at the time, the adapta-
tion of popular music for the purpose of evangelization has actually been a 
successful strategy for centuries and can especially be found during eras of 
spiritual renewal (Harju 44–57). See also Marini.
10. David Di Sabatino notes that contrary to popular opinion—the view that 
Jesus Freaks were saved drug addicts and hippies—‘the breadth of the 
movement [...] consisted of teenagers with mainline and evangelical church 
backgrounds who adopted the spiritual hippie chic as a middle ground 
between the radical counterculture and the overly cautious and often in-
flexible traditions of their home denominations’ (Jesus People 4).
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11. Radio and television evangelist Bob Larson, for example, repeatedly 
claimed that ‘the devil’s music’ and Christian lyrics were incompatible 
(Howard and Streck 32). In an essay titled ‘Taking Stock of Jesus Rock’ that 
appeared in Christianity Today in 1971, Edward Plowman notes that owners 
of radios stations ‘claimed that the music was suggestive, desecrating, of the 
devil, and that it dwelled too much on personal experience rather than on 
doctrine’ (32).
12. The religious music festival Explo 72 held in Dallas in 1972 marks a turn-
ing point: Known as ‘Godstock’, the event organized by Campus Crusade 
for Christ drew 180,000 fans and ‘symbolized a conservative evangelical 
appropriation of the Jesus Movement: carefully planned, toned down, and 
commercialized’ (Turner 121).
13. Singer Steve Taylor, whose career in Christian music spans over three 
decades, has been one of the more forward-thinking and progressive voices 
in this debate, as this statement made in 1986 demonstrates: ‘I’m tired and 
bored with trying to figure out what’s right and what’s wrong in music. You 
know, the whole secular and sacred debate. How did we get off on that 
tangent? […] I’m convinced that there are different ways to go about this 
business of using music to change the world. Why do we insist on reducing 
it to a formula? […] When we limit ourselves, we cut off that access, that av-
enue of communication. People complain about U2 and say that they aren’t 
explicit enough about Jesus in their music. But U2 may be opening the door 
for other groups that do take a more literal approach […]. We’ve got to allow 
for diversity within our ranks or we’ll end up talking to ourselves’ (Seay 28).
14. Notions of an ongoing struggle with the secular world, however, were not 
new, as sociologist Christian Smith notes: ‘Distinction, engagement, and 
conflict vis-à-vis outsiders constitutes a crucial element of what we might 
call the ‘cultural DNA’ of American evangelicalism. The evangelical tradi-
tion’s entire history, theology, and self-identity presupposes and reflects 
strong cultural boundaries with non-evangelicals; a zealous burden to 
convert and transform the world outside of itself; and a keen perception of 
external threats and crises seen as menacing what it means to be true, good, 
and valuable’ (121).
15. This strategy was not pursued by all Christian pop bands of the 1980s, as Ei-
leen Luhr points out in her analysis of Christian crossover metal bands be-
tween 1984 and 1994. The glam metal outfit Stryper, for example, employed 
stealth tactics to get signed to a secular label but then began to use the 
rhetoric and imagery of cultural warriors. They generated some mainstream 
interest (including MTV airplay) due to their novelty value as a longhaired, 
literally Bible-throwing Christian metal act in black and yellow unitards. 
Glam metal bands like Stryper with their long hair, tight outfits and heavy 
make up raised some interesting questions concerning evangelicalism and 
gender roles that were not approved of by conservative evangelicals (cf. 
Luhr 121–22).
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16. While there certainly is some ridicule and criticism towards evangelical 
cultural products, Lindsay points out that, in general, ‘cultural leaders are 
not antagonistic towards Christianity. They’re apathetic toward Christianity’ 
(145).
17. See also Luhr 125. 
18. Many artists resort to double-distribution-deals, where two separate mar-
keting teams cater to the needs and particularities of both markets. 
19. Often mega churches, these congregations avoid denominational affiliation, 
overtly Christian symbols and rhetoric while offering a number of services 
(child care, matchmaking, etc.) and activities (sports, cooking classes, 
drama groups) in a casual atmosphere. Sargeant points out that ‘seeker 
churches present a more plausible model of Christianity—a model that 
fits with pervasive cultural understandings about choice, individualism, 
autonomy, the importance of the self, therapeutic sensibilities, and an anti-
institutional inclination common today’ (31).
20. In his book A New Kind of Christian, evangelical pastor Brian McLaren 
stresses the movement’s rejection of dogmatic faith. 
21. Di Sabatino elaborates: ‘Bono is probably as close to an international 
spokesman as the evangelical movement could ever dream of having, a 
poster child for the successful marriage of social justice and biblical faith 
[…]. Who better than the U2 singer to look to for hints on how to be cultur-
ally relevant, socially concerned and biblically faithful?’ (‘Why’)
22. The song was published through their own independent record label 
Rescue on the album Snuff the Punk. Lyrics like this would mean a swift 
end of mainstream success: ‘Abortion is murder! There’s nothing you can 
do to justify the fact that there’s a living, breathing baby inside of you […]. 
Murder! Murder! Murder!’
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 Listening to Bad Music
White Power and (Un)Popular Culture
C. Richard King
On 4 August 2012, Wade Michael Page went on a rampage at a Sikh temple 
outside of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, killing six people and wounding four 
others before taking his own life. Although his precise motivation remains 
unclear, his racist beliefs clearly played a leading role. For more than a 
decade, Page had embraced core elements of white supremacy. He was 
also an active, even visible, member of the white power music scene. In 
2005, he founded the group End Apathy. Fed up with what he saw as social 
pathologies, he hoped the band would encourage whites to better see the 
world around them and act to make it a better place. Importantly, Page 
put race at the center of his vision, using the divisive discourse of white 
power to identify both problems and solutions. As his description of the 
band highlights:
End Apathy began in 2005 […] to f igure out what it would take to actually 
accomplish positive results in society and what is holding us back. A lot 
of what I realized at the time was that if we could f igure out how to end 
peoples apathetic ways it would be the start towards moving forward.[…] 
But I didn’t want to just point the f inger at what other people should do, 
but also I was willing to point out some of my faults on how I was holding 
myself back. And that is how I wrote the song ‘Self Destruct’. (Blood)
On the group’s MySpace page, moreover, Page contrasted its music with 
pop: ‘The music is a sad commentary on our sick society and the problems 
that prevent true progress’. He concludes that whites are blind and asleep, 
an assessment that reflects a deeper white nationalist belief that whites 
are ‘zombies’ who need to wake up to their perilous situation. Clearly, Page 
hoped his music would be a catalyst for this racist revolution.
Few would classify End Apathy as popular music. The band had a 
limited audience, meager sales, and no name recognition. Moreover, the 
group openly expressed sentiments many would deem racist, hateful, and 
dehumanizing. Indeed, were it not for his act of violence, few would have 
ever heard of the band, which was destined to be bad music—offensive, 
transgressive, and of questionable quality.
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White power music remains wildly unpopular. In fact, it is hard to 
imagine a more maligned and marginalized form of expressive culture, 
whether measured by market share, public outrage and condemnation, 
or reaction from other musicians, as evidenced by songs like ‘Nazi Punks 
Fuck Off’ by the Dead Kennedys. It would be tempting to dismiss white 
power music as simply bad music: in poor taste and of questionable quality, 
it breaks with social convention as its overt racism, advocacy of violence, 
and palpable rage transgress accepted limits of speech and sentiment. 
Yet, if this is all we hear in white power music, we are not listening closely 
enough to it. This paper seeks to offer a more complex interpretation that 
complicates prevailing accounts of white power, musical expression, and 
popular culture. To this end, drawing on examples primarily from the U.S., 
this paper advances three arguments.
First, white power music is unpopular, but it is not isolated or idiosyn-
cratic. Rather, it actively engages with and appropriates musical styles to 
communicate its message, build audience, create community, recruit mem-
bers, and to crossover to more mainstream spaces. Second, the unpopularity 
of white power music has crystallized across the past century. Where white 
supremacist music, like white racism generally, pervaded popular culture 
and public life, it now largely dwells on the margins, emergent in opposi-
tional subcultures. Finally, for all of its engagements with the popular, white 
power music remains unpopular. It is perhaps best described as unpopular 
culture; that is, a set of cultural practices and cultural productions that draw 
upon and deploy popular stylings but have little claim beyond a bounded 
social f ield on audience, desire, or fashion.
Despite its unpopularity, the power of white power rock is evident not 
just in its resonance with the movement but the ways that its aesthetics 
and styles mesh with a white supremacist narrative. I build my argument 
upon the idea that ‘racist music’ becomes a space for community, for dis-
seminating the grammar, tropes, and narratives of white supremacy, and 
for cultivating a white nationalist worldview. Hate music is not innocuous 
but part and parcel of the development of the white nationalist movement. 
The Southern Poverty Law Center highlights this power:
Since the early 1990s, various forms of ‘white power’ music have grown 
from a cottage industry serving a few racist skinheads to a multimillion-
dollar, worldwide industry that is a primary conduit of money and young 
recruits to the radical right. Although the music originated in Britain in 
the early 1980s, it is now popular among hard-core racists throughout 
Europe and the United States.
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With this in mind, I begin my discussion with a survey of white power music. 
Against this background, I endeavor to complicate white power music, 
contrasting songs from the f irst decades of the twentieth century with 
more recent works. This comparative analysis allows a rereading of popular 
music as ‘race music’ that lays seeds for more radical harvests. Next, I shift 
my focus to the use of the sounds and stylings of popular music to reach 
new audiences, f irst in the recruitment of new members to the movement 
and second in an unorthodox effort to create a crossover band, a group 
that would remain faithful to white power ideals and ideologies and appeal 
to a wider audience. In closing, I reflect on the scope and signif icance of 
unpopular culture.
‘Race Music’
In 1955, Asa Carter lost his job at WILD radio station in Birmingham, 
Alabama, bringing to an end his regionally syndicated program, which 
was sponsored by the American States Rights Association. His f iring would 
also mark the end of his radio career. Rather than rethink his racist and 
anti-Semitic views, Carter redoubled his commitments to segregation 
and white supremacy. He publicly broke with longtime ally the Alabama 
Citizens’ Council, organizing the North Alabama Citizens’ Council as a 
visible alternative. The leadership role arguably gave Carter an advantaged 
position to defend Jim Crow and commandeer media attention. Almost im-
mediately, he directed attention at the evils of popular culture. Of particular 
concern for Carter and his followers was the rising popularity of rock ‘n’ roll, 
which many at the time dubbed ‘race music’. The former radio personality 
advocated a ban of the musical style, believing its content encouraged 
moral degradation and race mixing. The music itself and the behaviors said 
to be promoted by it were perceived to be a grave threat to white culture 
(cf. Martin and Segrave). Indeed, Carter saw in rock ‘n’ roll a conspiracy by 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, ‘a plot to 
mongrelize America’. As such, ‘the obscenity and vulgarity’, he and others 
found in the increasing popular genre led them to assert that ‘rock n roll 
music is obviously a means by which the white man and his children can 
be driven to the level of the negro’ (qtd. in Garofalo 145). To combat the 
animalism evoked by the banality of rock music, he laid out a plan to work 
with the owners of juke boxes to remove ‘race music’ records.
As outrageous as his reading of pop music seems today, Carter was not an 
isolated voice. His protest escalated locally and echoed nationally. Perhaps 
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dissatisf ied with the theatrics of public relations, Carter formed a second 
group in 1956, the Ku Klux Klan of the Confederacy (KKKC), which turned 
to direct action and violence. They disrupted a Nat King Cole concert, at-
tacking the singer on stage, and ‘picketed a concert featuring the Platters, 
LaVern Baker, Bo Diddley, and Bill Haley, with signs reading, “NAACP says 
integration, rock & roll, rock & roll”, “Jungle Music promotes integration”, 
and “Jungle music aids delinquency”’ (Delmont 138). Later, members of 
the KKKC would abduct, castrate, torture, and leave for dead an African 
American painter.
Racist opposition to rock music manifested itself throughout the country. 
City councils in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Texas, and 
Virginia prohibited interracial dances and concerts. Meanwhile, radios 
from Pittsburgh and Cincinnati to Chicago and Denver ‘refused to play 
rock and roll’ (cf. Delmont). And, perhaps mirroring efforts organized by 
Carter, protestors in Inglewood, California circulated fliers that depicted 
the perceived evils of rock music. They featured ‘pictures of young black 
men and white women dancing, with captions reading, “Boy meets girl…
be-bop style”, and “Total Mongrelization”’ (Delmont 138).
Carter eventually turned away from the KKKC, apparently after a falling 
out over f inances in which he shot two associates, and his crusade against 
pop music, but remained active in (racial) politics. He worked as a speech 
writer for Governor George Wallace, helping to pen the iconic phrase, 
‘Segregation Today, Segregation Tomorrow, Segregation Forever’. Later, he 
reinvented himself and became wildly popular, authoring the novel that 
served as the basis for The Outlaw Josey Wales and under an assumed name 
an equally f ictional tale that purported to be the autobiography of Cherokee 
Indian, The Education of Little Tree, which for a time was selected as an 
off icial choice of Oprah’s Book Club.
Carter did not stop rock music any more than local ordinances extend-
ing Jim Crow did throughout the body politic. Ironically, much of today’s 
music that comprises the white power scene derives from early forms of 
rock ‘n’ roll. While this might horrify the former Klansman, demagogue, 
and crusader, one imagines that he would applaud the creative energies 
and racist ideologies central to it. Much like his early career in radio, in 
which he used a popular medium for increasingly unpopular ends, today 
musicians, producers, and leaders use popular musical forms to recruit 
new members, generate revenue, stabilize white nationalist identities 
and ideologies, and create community. And like Carter, this music scene 
is vocal and theatrical, wildly unpopular, and primed for volatility and 
violence.
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Recentering White Power
In a recent interview, sociologist Peter Simi, co-author of American Swastika, 
identif ied music as the cornerstone of contemporary white power:
Music is central to the movement in a lot of ways. It played a vital role 
in terms of offering opportunities for potential recruitment, offering 
opportunities for the generation of revenue and then probably most 
importantly, you know, music pulls people together. It gives them op-
portunities to get together for music shows, music festivals; small shows, 
large ones, coming together on the Internet and talking about music 
shows.
All of these are opportunities for them to share in these kinds of oc-
casions where they’re talking, you know, spending time with, com-
municating with like-minded others who share the same view of the 
world as they do and talking about, you know, the future and what 
needs to be done.
As Simi suggests, the white power music scene matters in ways often un-
recognized and unexpected from scholars and non-scholars alike. Like all 
subcultures rooted in expression, style, and performance, it has always been 
about more than entertainment, parties, fun, and ‘distractions’. For a move-
ment pushed to the margins, it advances the movement organizationally, 
facilitates the circulation of ideological positions, anchors interactive spaces 
(both in person and online), and establishes a forum for the elaboration of 
meaningful identities.1
White power music covers a diverse range of musical styles. In addition to 
folk and country, it includes musicians producing hard rock, punk, Oi, hard-
core, and metal, notably National Socialist black metal. Its global audience 
produces and consumes it within local and regional subcultures. Although 
most visible in North America and Western Europe, it plays an increasingly 
important role in cultural politics within Eastern Europe, South America, 
and Australia. Producers of white power music have adopted emerging 
media with swiftness and relative ease, f irst embracing CDs over albums 
and cassette tapes and more recently moving onto the Internet both to 
facilitate distribution and seize upon the marketing possibilities of new 
media, tapping the potential of social media to connect with audiences and 
increase access to music through streaming audio and internet radio. Not 
infrequently, labels have ties to established or emerging white nationalist 
organizations.
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Resistance Records offers a great illustration of the scene and its organiza-
tional structures and ideological elements. Indeed, as an emblematic label, 
it has proven to be a vital institution not only within white power music 
but also for the movement as a whole. Established in Windsor, Ontario in 
1993, according the Anti-Defamation League, it operated as a ‘one-man 
hate-music distribution operation with a handful of album titles’, but rather 
rapidly expanded to become the leading hate rock distributor in the US. 
Legal problems crippled the label, leading to its eventual sale to Willis 
A. Carto, founder of the Liberty Lobby, and Todd Blodgett, who relocated 
it to the US and worked to resuscitate it. A year later, the pair sold it to 
William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries and founder of the National 
Alliance. Like Carto and Blodgett, Pierce believed Resistance Records had 
the potential to recruit young people to the movement and more easily and 
broadly communicate its message. As such, the new ownership expanded 
the label beyond its historic distribution hub, adding a monthly magazine 
and establishing a web presence notable for its scope. While the label has 
suffered as lawsuits, Pierce’s death, and factionalism devastated the National 
Alliance, it remains a major example of the promise of and problems posed 
by white power music. Labels like Resistance Records are not the only space 
of dissemination for hate music cultivation. Concerts and music festivals 
play a pivotal role in the scene, creating what Simi and Futrell dub ‘free 
spaces’ that allow participants to express themselves without reservation, 
validating identities and ideologies. Music matters to white power because of 
the ways in which it advances the movement, communicates its ideological 
messages, and opens spaces for the creation of social networks and identities.
Race, Resentment, and Rage
White power music has no singular origin. It has multiple roots and takes 
seemingly endless routes in and out of popular culture. It appears in blackface 
on the minstrelsy stage, later in the patriotic songs of the Ku Klux Klan (cf. 
Crews), and then in the guise of country and rockabilly (cf. Messner et al.; 
Wade). Most famously, it has favored the oppositional worlds of alternative 
rock—oi, punk, hardcore, and metal (cf. Duncombe and Tremblay; Dyck; 
Hochhauser). It exemplifies the transnational dialogues stitching together 
white power worldwide and the increasingly translocal articulation of white-
ness that anchors white nationalism. Perhaps ironically, it takes shape in sub-
cultures marked by resistance and known for anti-establishment, progressive, 
and even anti-racist sentiments (cf. Duncombe and Tremblay; Home; Sabin).
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Contemporary histories of hate rock almost invariably center their 
accounts around the British band Skrewdriver and its charismatic lead 
singer Ian Stuart, highlighting the ways in which the band blended class 
politics, white victimization, British nationalism, and strident racism into 
a volatile cocktail that drew on the resentment and rage of punk music 
and the utopian underground of the skinhead subculture. In a very real 
way, Skrewdriver racialized Oi music and punk more generally, offering 
a template of how to repurpose pop stylings and the sentiments of youth 
subculture. It opened a dialogue f irst within the UK and then across the 
Atlantic and into Europe around how music as a cultural technology might 
be deployed to direct political energies (cf. Brown; Ridgeway), establishing 
close ties with the National Front and encouraging violence sonically, and 
also secure niche markets through ideology, founding the record label 
Blood and Honour. These precedents of invention of genre, exploitation of 
medium, and ideological opportunism reappear in successive subcultures 
across national borders: hardcore in the United States, black metal in 
Europe, and folk in the UK (cf. Spracklen).
Less important than the actual chronology of white power music are the 
conditions that make it possible for hate rock to take shape and persistently 
shift in novel contexts. I have in mind what Dunscombe and Tremblay refer 
to as the ‘tipping point’, which transforms ‘inchoate, oppositional rage’ into 
a potent, mobilizable force that targets abject others: where punks had once 
‘allowed their rage against the status quo to slip between those in power and 
those without it, the White Power punk tips primarily into a hatred of the 
powerless’ (114). White power music becomes a vector for white resentments 
associated with globalization, decolonization, deindustrialization, and 
post-Fordism; a small, marginal, expression of a larger backlash against 
immigration, multiculturalism, and civil rights. Importantly, according to 
Dunscombe and Tremblay,
White Power punk’s sense of victimization, its valorization of opposi-
tional solidarity, its creation and mobilization of DIY cultural networks, 
its understanding of the desire of the forbidden and the shocking, and the 
simple raw emotionality and anger of its expression are characteristics 
that all punk shares. (115)
These elements were the building blocks for more expansive and penetrat-
ing dialogues, enabling hate rock to crystallize, gain traction, and eventually 
become the cornerstone of the movement and the key ideological conduit 
for it.
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Listening to Hate Rock
Hate rock addresses the preoccupations and expresses the presumptions 
of advocates of white power. As such, band names and song lyrics clearly 
illustrate the f indings of scholars concerned with the movement more 
generally. Grounded in concrete notions of naturalized racial and gender 
differences, they represent a world of constant struggle, especially an 
ongoing or impending race war; they celebrate pride, honor, and loyalty; 
they give voice to a hypermasculine and heteronormative worldview; 
they picture whites (as a people, race, nation, and/or culture) as imperiled; 
they present dehumanizing portraits of racial others, especially Jews and 
African Americans; and they offer critiques of the state of society and the 
relationship to the nation state. The most extreme lyrical themes cluster 
around racism, anti-Semitism, and homophobia. For instance, songs like 
‘Splatterday, Nigger Day’ by Grinded Nig, which depicts an attack on an 
African American, and ‘Repatriation’ by Final War, which launches an 
invective against immigrants, clearly illustrate the extremes of white power 
music (cf. Dyck). And Midtown Bootboys call for anti-gay violence:
Stop the threat of AIDS today
Cripple, maim or kill a gay
We’ve got to take a stand today
We’ve got to wage a war on gays
(qtd. in Burghart 1)
Advocacy of violence has led some critics to describe white power music 
as terrorism, a point substantiated by Aaronson who asserts that between 
1987 and 2003, ‘members of the white power music scene have been linked 
to 56 murders as well as thousands of acts of vandalism, assault’, and other 
crimes (cf. Aaronson).
Less extreme, though not innocuous, tropes include songs that wax nos-
talgic about Nazi Germany and Viking society, linking past to present, while 
laying claims to a virile and romantic versions of a supreme white masculin-
ity. An overlapping theme hails specif ic heroic f igures, often celebrating 
their sacrif ices to the movement and/or race. Other songs extol the virtues 
of contemporary white nationalism, especially embodied by skinheads, as 
a way of life. In such music, ‘[t]here is also a clear emphasis on upholding 
Aryan values through movement participation, fraternity, kinship ties, 
and racial loyalty. These lyrics speak of fostering “global brotherhood”, 
“volk”, “white pride”, and “Aryan heritage”’ (Futrell et al. 281). In sum, what 
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is important to note here is that white power music creates an abject, even 
monstrous, other and an empowered and enlightened self, reiterating some 
of the most vile and violent imagery directed at people of color, Jews, and 
gays and lesbians, and some of the most romanticized assessments of white 
(supremacist) agents.
The White Power Music Scene
The social structures and cultural meanings associated with white power 
music have spawned subcultures around the globe and facilitated the 
construction of identities. It not only creates an interactive context for the 
presentation and articulation of self, but it also provides a set of frames and 
codes through which individuals can fashion themselves. Music matters 
to white nationalists not simply for its rhythm or sound, not only because 
it gives voice to visions and values, but importantly because it provides a 
material expression to white power. It anchors a scene, opens up space, 
encourages interaction, fosters the articulation of identity, and creates 
community. While critics have rightly highlighted the lyrics of hate rock 
and often linked them to violence, such assessments threaten to offer merely 
a caricature of the scene, its attractions, and its signif icance. For clearly, 
what white power music means for its producers and audiences is multifac-
eted: part ideological, part, interactional, part identif ication. While white 
supremacist music now might be best described as marginal, if not deviant, 
manifesting many of the features of other oppositional musical subcultures, 
often interfacing, if not overlapping with them, its present formation differs 
markedly from its antecedents in tone, content, and reception.
Songs for Mary Phagan
Music extolling white supremacy, advocating hatred towards blacks, Jews, 
and immigrants, and promoting the defense of the white race (often from 
a perceived existential threat) is nothing new. In fact, this might describe 
much of American popular music up into the twentieth century. On the 
one hand, the minstrelsy tradition, in which actors staged performances 
in blackface, borrowed and denigrated expressive elements of the African 
diaspora, used caricature blackness to make commentaries on racial and 
class politics, and delighted audiences of white men with their song stylings, 
arguably constitutes a core strand of American popular culture. On the 
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other hand, as urbanization, industrialization, and immigration changed 
the face of America, scholars set about collecting endangered musical tradi-
tions, seeking pure, uncorrupted, and authentic expressions that required 
disentangling white from black stylings (cf. Taylor and Baker 2007). This 
racialized and essentialized splitting would have profound implications 
for the development of popular music as well as understandings of racial 
difference that echo down through Asa Carter and hate rock.
A measure of the centrality of white supremacy to popular music in the 
early twentieth century can be found in Ku Klux Klan (KKK) sheet music. 
While the KKK has the rightful reputation of being a violent vigilante group 
that used terror to police racial boundaries and put African Americans in 
their ascribed social place, the group remade itself in 1915 as a fraternal 
organization that was at least to the outside committed entirely to 100% 
Americanism. In the following decade, the KKK skyrocketed to prominence 
across the US, promoting family values, patriotism, and tradition, while 
campaigning against modernity, immigration, and progressivism. Public 
pageantry, from parades to socials, and ritualized secrecy were fundamental 
to the success of the reborn KKK, particularly its political influence in local 
and regional elections and the passage of immigration reform at the national 
level. Not surprisingly music played a key role, communicating values and 
principles, creating community, and crafting identities of white Americans. 
In the songs collected by Crews one sees a celebration of America, Christian-
ity (or rather Protestantism), whiteness and, to a lesser extent, denigration 
of Jews, immigrants, Catholics, and African Americans (cf. Crews). As the 
reformed KKK collapsed under the weight of corruption and disillusion-
ment, most Americans forgot its 100% Americanism and the music that 
accompanied it—so much so that a recent episode of History Detectives on 
PBS featured a segment sleuthing the origins of a KKK recording discovered 
by a surprised and disgusted antique collector at a yard sale.
After the Second World War, two fundamental shifts reinforced one 
another: f irst, American society began a slow and incomplete journey 
toward racial equality, which contrary to public opinion was neither as 
successful nor as complete as notions of a post-racial America would imply 
(cf. Dowd-Hall), and second, consumerism and media culture began to 
reshape selves and society. Asa Carter’s campaign discussed at the outset 
of this chapter represented a backlash against these twin forces. In keeping 
with these deeper shifts in racial thinking and cultural production, the 
terrain of the popular shifted as well, destabilizing the acceptability and in 
many cases the utterability of overtly racist music. In essence, white power 
music has become unpopular and yet has remained a vital means through 
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which advocates have sought to become popular, to expand the base of the 
movement and the purchase of their ideological claims.
Two songs clarify these broader shifts in white power and popular 
culture, offering keen insight into the scene and its strategies. Both songs 
about Mary Phagan, a young factory worker killed under mysterious cir-
cumstances in the Atlanta area in 1913. The subsequent investigation led to 
Jewish factory manager Leo Frank being charged with the murder. Labeled 
the American Dreyfus, an obvious reference to the fraudulent, anti-Semitic 
trial of a French off icer at the end of the nineteenth century, Frank was 
convicted and initially sentenced to death, which was later commuted by 
Governor John M. Slaton. Outraged, a group of local citizens, including many 
community leaders, formed the Knights of Mary Phagan (KMP) to avenge 
the girl and defend the race. As one speaker said to assembled members 
of the group:
This sainted girl […] who, true to her inherent high breeding and the 
teachings of her devoted mother, gave up her own life rather than sur-
render that Christian attribute—the crown, glory, and honor of true 
womanhood into the threshold of which she was just entering. (qtd. in 
Dinnerstein 136)
Shortly thereafter, members of the KMP kidnapped Frank from prison and 
lynched him. None of the participants were ever convicted for their roles in 
the ritual killing. Frank was pardoned posthumously in 1986. Importantly, 
the Knights of Mary Phagan would be central to the rebirth of the Ku Klux 
Klan, comprising its core membership at its public unveiling in 1915 (cf. 
Dinnerstein).
A folk ballad, ‘Little Mary Phagan’, began circulating after the trial. It 
was played at rallies calling for the execution of Frank. Largely a narrative 
of key events, it paints the young woman as an innocent and virtuous 
victim, while casting the accused killer as cold, calculating, and alien, an 
individual who def iled both a young woman and the traditions of region 
since he took advantage of her vulnerability and did so on Confederate 
Memorial Day.
Leo Frank he met her
With a brutish heart, we know;
He smiled, and said, ‘Little Mary,
You won’t go home no more’.
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Sneaked along behind her
Till she reached the metal-room;
He laughed, and said, ‘Little Mary,
You have met your fatal doom’.
(Snyder)
While the ballad paints a morality tale, pivoting on familiar themes of good 
and evil amplified by references to the inhumanity and marginality of the 
perpetrator, it does not invoke overt anti-Semitic slurs or celebrate the im-
pending violence of retribution. It does not have to. The audience knows that 
the ballad is as much a racial drama as it is a morality play because media 
coverage and popular sentiment have already framed it as a young, virginal 
and honorable woman mercilessly murder by a racial other and outsider—a 
Jew, an industrialist, a transplanted Yankee (though born in San Antonio, 
Texas). It was one more text in a broader dialogue about racial justice and social 
order in which the execution of the former would ensure a return to the latter.
Seventy-f ive years later, the white power band Achtung Juden would 
release Reich Songs, Volume Two, which featured a photo of the lynching 
as its cover. The CD, featuring 14 tracks, opens with ‘The Knights of Mary 
Phagan’, and also includes original songs like ‘Keep on Fighting’, ‘Burn 
the Books’, and ‘Our Pride is our Loyalty’ and covers of ‘classic’ songs by 
Skrewdriver, ‘Hail the New Dawn’, and No Remorse’s ‘Son of Odin’.2 The song 
is a simple, fast-paced, and hard-driving rock anthem marked by forceful 
guitars and drums and guttural vocals. Key passages follow.
Fetch the Rope
String up the Jew
Punish the Abraham
Leo Frank at the End of a Noose
…………
We are the Knights of Mary Phagan





Destroy ZOG, before they destroy you
…………
We are the Knights of Mary Phagan
We are the Knights of Mary Phagan
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Where the ballad reported a current event, here, the author and listener 
becomes one of the Knights, empathizing with, endorsing, and enacting 
the lynching. Violent in imagery and sound, the song celebrates the killing, 
legitimating the deed through anti-Semitic language and assumptions, 
which were absent from the ballad. This should not be too surprising given 
that the name of the band itself translates from German as Attention Jews 
and makes a fairly explicit reference to Nazism, a reference reinforced by the 
CD title (Reich Songs, Volume Two). To make Frank and the impropriety of 
his actions stark to contemporary listeners, the band foregrounds the killing 
and the pathological character of the killer. And more, it reminds listeners 
that this is not an isolated or historical act, but rather an ongoing campaign 
by the Zionist Occupational Government (ZOG, or more generally, the Jews). 
Finally, where the KMP and the ballad itself called for defense of the race 
and the honor of its women, the track calls for the reclamation of the nation, 
suggesting that necessary action goes beyond defense to recuperation and 
renewal.
These two songs highlight a number of important shifts in white su-
premacy and popular culture. First, where racially charged songs were 
once accepted and applauded (regionally, if not universally by 1915), today, 
they are unpopular, marginal, and taboo. Indeed, white supremacy, for-
merly a shared value and perceived natural fact, has become contested, a 
persistent structure held under erasure by colorblindness, new racism, and 
multiculturalism. Second, in contrast with the common sense narrative or 
recitation of the ballad, ‘The Knights of Mary Phagan’ offers an argument, 
rather explicitly advancing racialized rhetoric to make claims about the 
current condition. Third, the language, tone, and style of the songs expose 
profound changes. Not only does hard rock (somewhere between punk and 
metal) replace the f iddle and folks stylings of yore, but the imperiled state 
of whiteness is more urgent, the action depicted more vulgar and violent, 
and the references to difference more denigrating and starkly anti-Semitic. 
Fourth, the regional and racial references in ‘Little Mary Phagan’ give way 
to a new imagining of race and nation, in which whiteness has more global 
and trans historical referents, can be seen as the foundation for a nation 
distinct from and opposed to the USA, and in an existential struggle with 
ZOG (Jews). Importantly, in spite of changes in technology and the vis-
ibility of white nationalism, music sits at the core of the movement into the 
present moment. Moreover, the changing place and presence of mainstream 
popular culture and the dialectics between cultural integration and white 
nationalist formation compelled a continued emphasis on counter cultural 
production from white supremacist spaces.
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Isn’t It Ironic
Asa Carter, whose career and critique opened this essay, seized upon 
what he understood to be a fundamental contradiction that many think 
should make hate rock unthinkable. Rock music emerges from a hybrid 
space, mixing sonic traditions, cultural behaviors, and racialized bodies 
(cf. Lipsitz). For Carter and many others in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
these polycultural patterns of integration challenged the rule of Jim Crow 
and threatened their understanding of race relations, the boundaries of 
whiteness, and the social order. By and large, producers and consumers of 
popular music do not consider this origin story when writing, recording, 
performing or listening to a recent release or personally meaningful song. 
And much the same is true for participants in the white power music scene.
On the one hand, the commercial music industry, beginning at roughly 
the moment of Carter’s campaign, whitened popular music, reworking its 
polycultural beginnings for increasingly discrete, if not segregated, niche 
markets def ined by race, class, and gender. As a consequence, rock music 
does not so much conjure a multiracial social scene or musical style, as 
refer to white artists—the Beatles and Rolling Stones, AC/DC and Rush, 
Led Zepplin and Areosmith—while soul, R‘n’B, urban contemporary, Latin 
and so forth mark music by and for people of color.
On the other hand, the racial politics of popular music shifted after 
rock ‘n’ roll allegedly became white. Over the past two decades, the 
normalcy of rock has been contrasted with the deviancy, hypersexuality, 
and violence of hip-hop and the oppositional waves of (white) alternative 
music. In common with many pundits and parents, hate rock holds the 
former in contempt, viewing it as a degenerate genre and social ill. At the 
same time, it engages with the latter, drawing on punk, metal, hardcore, 
and even neofolk to communicate its ideology and hail prospective 
adherents to it.
Without setting aside the irony of white separatist and white supremacist 
music policing racial boundaries and reiterating racial hierarchies, two 
other elements crucial to the white power music scene merit emphasis. 
First, commercial music came to make and market the same racial catego-
ries that Carter sought to defend in his campaign. Second, where whiteness 
came to displace the polycultural foundations of rock music, blackness 
remained a social problem and source of moral panics over the past half 
century.
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Remapping the Musical Landscape
One map of the contemporary American musical landscape might sug-
gest a rather deep, if not complete, separation between various popular 
styles, whether rock, jazz, alternative, roots, or hip-hop, and white power 
rock. After all, the latter centers on hate, a coming race war, and imperiled 
whiteness—themes rarely found in the pop charts, not to mention polite 
conversation. Such a rendering would, however, misconstrue the contours 
of mainstream music and its entanglements with race and racism. I offer 
three fragments to render an impressionistic portrait.
Writing in the late 1970s, musician and critic Lester Bangs offered a 
scathing assessment of the place of race in the underground music scene 
(cf. also Kennedy). Lifting the veil off hipster life and its extremities, he 
probes an emerging contradiction in the wake of the civil rights movement; 
most hipsters, like most white Americans ‘don’t have to try at all to be a 
racist’. He recounts a series of incidents and observations that should trouble 
the avant-garde, but do not. For instance, he notes, in the shadow of the 
Vietnam War, a long-forgotten band called Shrapnel regularly played a song 
‘Hey, Little Gook!’, and he describes Iggy Pop introducing a song, ‘Our next 
selection tonight for all you Hebrew ladies in the audience is entitled “Rich 
Bitch!”’ His concern goes beyond shock value and pushing limits, recounting 
an appearance of Miriam Linna of the Cramps ‘posing proudly’ in ‘leathers 
and shades and pistol in front of the headquarters of the United White 
People’s Party, under a sign bearing three flags “GOD” (cross), “COUNTRY” 
(stars and stripes), “RACE” (swastika)’ (Bangs 1979).
This linkage of America and whiteness slides with disturbing ease into 
an embrace of white power imagery, which Bangs insists is about more 
than getting a rise through performance art. Like the use of Nazi imagery 
in British punk in the same era, these limit projects do more to show the 
limitlessness of white privilege and the limited capacity of hipsters to 
revalue white racist imagery. But then, as others in the underground scene 
suggest, perhaps ascribing sincerity to much of their culture work is giving 
them too much credit. As Bangs observes, Nico, member of the acclaimed 
Velvet Underground, who performed ‘Deutschland über Alles’ at CBGB, 
lamented the loss of a record contract in a later interview: ‘I made a mistake. 
I said in Melody Maker […] that I didn’t like negroes. That’s all. They took it 
so personally […] I don’t like the features. They’re so much like animals […] 
its cannibals, no?’ (Bangs, emphasis original)
At the close of his short catalog of opinion, utterances, and encounters, 
Bangs has resigned himself to a rather troubling conclusion: ‘When I started 
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writing this, I was worried I might trigger incidents of punk-bashing by black 
gangs. Now I realize that nobody cares. Most white people think the whole 
subject of racism is boring’. Of course, for the artists he discusses and many 
other hipsters at the time racism was fun, racism was powerful (both as it 
reinforced and held the promise of upsetting the system). This power, of 
course, is an unrecognized bridge between the hip, fashionable, and proper 
experiments of the avant-garde on one side and the vulgar, uncouth, and 
unacceptable stylings of white power on the other.
Speaking in 1997, Glenn Danzig (né Glenn Allen Anzalone), founding 
member of The Misf its and Samhain and later successful solo artist, sat for 
an interview with Steven Blush of Seconds magazine. While much of the 
discussion centers on his musical endeavors and business ventures, near 
the end, the conversation swerves to race. Danzig proceeds to reaff irm his 
past statements that he did not think that there was anything ‘wrong with 
being proud of being white’, adding comments on a possible race war and 
the oppressive nature of what he read as double standards. He closes with 
a flourish:
I’m going to say something very controversial: if you are African-American 
and you don’t want to live by White people, that should be your choice. 
[…] The flipside of that is why shouldn’t there be areas a Black person 
can’t go? If a White person doesn’t want to live with Black people, that’s 
their decision. This is America; do what you want to do.
In his comments, he has completely reframed racism, advocating racial 
segregation and separation (Jim Crow style) in the rubric of colorblindness 
and abstract liberalism (everyone can make an individual choice). This 
blend is at once in keeping with much of what neoconservatives say about 
race and racism amid a neoliberal backlash against the civil rights move-
ment and an endorsement of white nationalists’ embrace of heritage, love 
of one’s people, and defense of one’s race. Not surprisingly, discussants on 
Stormfront love this interview and hold Danzig in high regard (‘Danzig on 
White Pride and Racism’).
Although not as effusive, in a 2010 Playboy interview, popular singer/
songwriter John Mayer also invoked themes more familiar from white 
nationalist discussion forums.
PLAYBOY: If you didn’t know you, would you think you’re a douche bag?
MAYER: It depends on what I picked up. My two biggest hits are ‘Your 
Body Is a Wonderland’ and ‘Daughters’. If you think those songs are 
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pandering, then you’ll think I’m a douche bag. It’s like I come on very 
strong. I am a very…I’m just very. V-E-R-Y. And if you can’t handle very, 
then I’m a douche bag. But I think the world needs a little very. That’s 
why black people love me.
[…]
PLAYBOY: Do black women throw themselves at you?
MAYER: I don’t think I open myself to it. My dick is sort of like a white 
supremacist. I’ve got a Benetton heart and a fuckin’ David Duke cock. 
I’m going to start dating separately from my dick.
His hasty apologies following publication suggest he thought the broader 
public would not like the man behind the media persona, when they read of 
his multicultural heart and ‘David Duke cock’. It is quite telling that one can 
have a schizophrenic relationship with race, embracing, but not desiring, 
diversity, accepting difference as a fashion statement or marketing cam-
paign, but rejecting it as a pathway to intimacy and carnality. What’s worse, 
it is not simply that Mayer so easily compartmentalizes race, desire, and 
aspects of himself, but that he so comfortably refers to the central marker 
of his masculinity in this conversation as an infamous white supremacist: 
what does it mean to internalize such an identif ication and declare it so 
openly to the world?
The point of this remapping is not to argue that John Mayer inspires hate 
rock, or to locate its origins within the hipster scene of the late 1970s. Rather, 
in these passing comments and deeply held sentiments deeper, ongoing 
dialogues about racial difference, dialogues that call into question progres-
sive narratives of being beyond race and comfortable dissociations around 
taste and style. Indeed, it may be the case that these anecdotes reveal how 
shifting racial mores have dictated a renegotiation of stage and backstage 
performances, of public and private codes of conduct, and how these in 
turn dictate racial etiquette and self-presentation in a society committed 
to colorblindness. In turn, they likely suggest how and why producers and 
performers of white power rock continue to f ind in pop music the promise 
of conversion of and crossing over to the mainstream.
Unpopular Culture
If Asa Carter had had his way, parents and politicians would have prohibited 
rock music, putting a decisive end to what he saw as a corrupt musical 
fashion and arguably more importantly saving the white race from certain 
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moral degradation and cultural decline. Despite his best efforts, rock ‘n’ roll 
did not die, a fact many who make white power music today likely greet 
with great joy, because it constitutes a core of the social scene and political 
ideology anchoring the movement today. For all of this, while white power 
engages with and appropriates pop music for its own ends, it remains wildly 
unpopular, as evidenced by market share, public outrage and condemnation, 
and the reaction to it within other music subcultures, perhaps notably in 
punk songs like ‘Nazi Punks Fuck Off’ by the Dead Kennedys and ‘Fuck the 
K.K.K’. by the Unseen (cf. Spracklen).
This unpopularity has crystallized across the past century. Where white 
supremacist music (like white racism generally) once enjoyed a warm wel-
come in public life, especially in areas ruled by Jim Crow and that nurtured 
the reinvention of the Ku Klux Klan as a mainstream fraternal order, it now 
largely dwells on the margins, emergent in transgressive and oppositional 
subcultures. My discussion of songs about Mary Phagan underscores the 
decline and marginalization of white power, especially in popular culture. 
Nevertheless, music has proven to be especially fecund, enabling adaption 
and elaboration of style and sound. For all of its engagements with popular 
music, hate rock remains unpopular. It is perhaps best described as un-
popular culture, that is, a set of cultural practices and cultural productions 
that draw upon and deploy popular stylings but have little claim beyond a 
bounded social f ield on audience, desire, or fashion.
The unpopularity of white power music certainly derives from the 
tastes of audiences and artists in Europe and the USA. For its part, the 
music industry has never embraced it, seeing it neither as an acceptable 
market nor its producers or consumers as viable. And where new media 
has created alternative platforms that increase the appeal and audience of 
white power music, scholars of popular culture have largely neglected the 
subject, underscoring its unpopularity and reinforcing the idea that it can 
be disentangled from more popular musical forms. Even the special issue 
of Popular Music and Society on hate rock in 2007 stands as an exception 
to the overriding tendency to ignore, demonize, and/or marginalize. In 
large measure, this likely derives from the shared values of those who cre-
ate, commercialize, and consume music and those who study it and study 
them. It may arise, moreover, from the blurring of the boundaries formerly 
separating fans from scholars, and since few scholars openly embrace white 
power, and those who have done have become pariahs, there is little chance 
it will become a more popular subject in the f ield. Finally, the subcultures, 
sentiments, and stylings of white power make it diff icult to place it in 
some of the dominant narrative frames of pop culture studies. The very 
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deviance and hate that attract disaffected whites to it complicate efforts to 
speak favorably of identity or resistance, for example. Whatever its cause, 
this pattern of neglect, as I have endeavored to demonstrate in this study, 
diminishes our understanding of white power and mainstream society, 
impairing our capacity to understand the entanglements, shared histories, 
and overlapping ideologies as well as the antagonism and alienation that 
foster outburst common to the white power scene and increasingly common 
in acts like the attack on Sikh Temple in Wisconsin in 2012.
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 Hipster Black Metal?
Deafheaven’s Sunbather and the Evolution of an (Un)
popular Genre
Paola Ferrero
A couple of months ago a guy walks into a bar in Brooklyn and strikes up a 
conversation with the bartenders about heavy metal. The guy happens to 
mention that Deafheaven, an up-and-coming American black metal (BM) 
band, is going to perform at Saint Vitus, the local metal concert venue, in 
a couple of weeks. The bartenders immediately become confrontational, 
denying Deafheaven the BM ‘label of authenticity’: the band, according to 
them, plays ‘hipster metal’ and their singer, George Clarke, clearly sports 
a hipster hairstyle. Good thing they probably did not know who they were 
talking to: the ‘guy’ in our story is, in fact, Jonah Bayer, a contributor to 
Noisey, the music magazine of Vice, considered to be one of the bastions of 
hipster online culture. The product of that conversation, a piece entitled 
‘Why are black metal fans such elitist assholes?’ was almost certainly 
intended as a humorous nod to the ongoing debate, generated mainly by 
music webzines and their readers, over Deafheaven’s inclusion in the BM 
canon. The article features a promo picture of the band, two young, clean-
shaven guys, wearing indistinct clothing, with short haircuts and mild, 
neutral facial expressions, their faces made to look like they were ironically 
wearing black and white make up, the typical ‘corpse-paint’ of traditional, 
early BM. It certainly did not help that Bayer also included a picture of 
Inquisition, a historical BM band from Colombia formed in the early 1990s, 
and ridiculed their corpse-paint and black cloaks attire with the following 
caption: ‘Here’s what you’re defending, black metal purists. THIS’ (Bayer). The 
use of Inquisition as a negative example meant to mock BM purists and their 
theatrics was probably unfortunate and a little misinformed: Inquisition 
had, in fact, just recently issued Obscure Verses for the Multiverse (2013), a 
critically acclaimed album much lauded on indie webzines for its intricate 
guitar work and powerful melodies.1
The question framing the article was indeed humorous but also very 
provocative, as it pitted ‘traditional’ BM of the 1990s, here represented 
by Inquisition, against a new wave of experimental BM bands founded 
around the mid-2000s of which Deafheaven are the most popular example. 
As a result, a long-winding debate ensued in the comment section of the 
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article over the nature of ‘authentic’ BM. While comment sections on online 
music webzines are notoriously a haven for ‘trolls’ and people generally 
insulting each other’s opinions, the discussion arising from Bayer’s piece 
was surprisingly articulate and rational.2 Opinions ranged from the mellow 
live-and-let-live argument to outspoken attacks on the perceived closed-
mindedness of BM fans’ and also to more articulate and certainly debatable 
notions of what constitutes ‘real’ BM. Several identitarian positions arose: 
the uncompromising BM fan defending the genre from mass co-optation, 
the open-minded BM fan allowing for the genre’s hybridization, and the BM 
‘neophyte’, a fan extraneous to the genre’s history that happens however to 
like Deafheaven. What emerged from the comment section debate was a 
host of different ideas concerning BM’s place in the contemporary musical 
market. While the article was purposefully vague on Deafheaven’s actual 
musical production and proceeded to bash BM’s elitism (or at least the 
author’s version of it), commenters pointed to a much more interesting issue 
concerning Deafheaven’s polarizing music: the relationship between the 
band’s overwhelming popularity on indie music webzines and the historical, 
entrenched, even sought for ‘unpopularity’ of BM.
Deafheaven’s f irst album, Roads to Judah (2011), was well received on 
musical webzines and earned them some honorable spots in end-of-the-year 
lists on Pitchfork and NPR, though strictly in metal lists. However, nothing 
could prepare them, and BM fans, for the sudden and mind-blowing success 
of their next excellent album Sunbather (2013). The album received stellar 
reviews and topped Best Album lists in many indie music webzines and 
mainstream music publications like NME and Rolling Stone, and the band 
was unexpectedly catapulted into indie music stardom. Sounding like the 
lovechild of Darkthrone and My Bloody Valentine, Deafheaven are not 
your traditional BM band, and they stand at the forefront of a movement 
that sees young BM bands, especially from the U.S. and France, playing 
with the traditional boundaries of the genre in both its musical and formal 
aesthetics. The band’s overall appearance, the unusual composition of their 
audiences or the choice of a pink cover instead of the mandatory black of 
most BM releases are the elements that have drawn the most criticism 
and skepticism from BM fans. While Sunbather was indeed the spark that 
ignited the controversy concerning ‘traditional’ vs ‘hipster’ BM, and while 
it still remains the most popular object of contention, the critical interest 
in the album is not an isolated phenomenon. Deafheaven are only the most 
visible product of an undeniable trend that sees BM albums and tracks 
being reviewed with increased frequency in general interest publications 
like The New Yorker or the San Francisco Weekly or in indie music webzines 
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like Pitchfork and Stereogum.3 These two online zines are considered the 
strongholds of musical ‘hipsterdom’, and for good reason. They have quickly 
become important cultural powerhouses, musical trendsetters with the 
ability of directing musical tastes and pushing unknown artists into the 
spotlight.4
Readers of these webzines in the last couple of years could notice a 
steady increase in the number of heavy metal releases reviewed, par-
ticularly extreme metal records. Once obscure bands like the veterans 
Agalloch, Alcest, Blut aus Nord, Krallice, Locrian, Wolves in the Throne 
Room, Horseback or Panopticon and newcomers like Ash Borer, Castevet, 
Deafheaven, Cara Neir, Vattnet Viskar, Raspberry Bulbs and many others 
often feature as ‘Albums of the Week’ or as ‘Top Track’ selections in indie 
music webzines, a fact that has signif icantly increased their visibility. 
How can we therefore explain this shift of BM from the realm of the 
unpopular to that of the ‘cool’? How has the genre become part of indie 
music discourse despite the fact that it usually poses serious challenges 
to an uninitiated listener, revels in obscurity and insularity, and is usually 
perceived as static and impermeable to outside influences? And how is 
the reception of BM in indie webzines related to the stylistic evolution of 
the genre from its early Norwegian roots to the present day? I will answer 
these questions by illustrating the receptive strategies put into practice 
by reviewers in indie webzines when dealing with new BM records by 
using Deafheaven’s latest controversial album Sunbather as a case study. 
In doing so, I will rely on the methodological tools of popular musicology, 
and particularly on the analysis of musical events through the study of 
‘musical collectivities’ and their ‘musical competences’. My analysis, a 
sort of online ethnography of BM, will be based on reviews and articles 
dedicated to Deafheaven and BM in indie webzines like Pitchfork, Stere-
ogum and Noisey and on the reactions of fans in the comment sections 
to those articles.5 BM fans intervene in the def inition of BM’s identity by 
displaying their own ‘subcultural capital’ against newcomers to the genre 
and uphold an idea of BM as transgressive and alien to the mainstream. I 
will argue that the growing popularity of BM in indie webzine is a result 
of the reif ication of Deafheaven’s Sunbather as a paradigmatic shift in 
the history of genre by indie music critics, a reading counteracted by the 
fan’s own ideas concerning the nature of BM as a historically unpopular 
genre. The tension arising from this controversy reveals the way a music 
subculture as carefully protected as BM polices its own boundaries and 
how processes of cultural appropriation threaten the very identity of the 
genre.
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1. ‘Nobody burns churches anymore’. A Brief Introduction to 
Black Metal
The reasons for BM’s historical unpopularity can be attributed to several 
complementary factors relating to its origins, style and musical aff iliation. 
Indeed, musicians and fans of heavy metal, the ‘mother’ genre, have always 
characterized themselves as ‘proud pariahs’ (Weinstein 93). Since its incep-
tion, heavy metal has always been occupying a place at the margins of music 
history, being either ignored or vehemently attacked by mainstream music 
critics (cf. Walser 21). During the 1970s, Led Zeppelin and Black Sabbath were 
criticized for their harsh sound and their provocative lyrics, while in the 
1980s trash metal bands (Metallica, Megadeth and Anthrax, among others) 
were attacked by both rock journalists and subculture theorists for their 
lack of political commitment and musical unsophistication (cf. Weinstein 
240). Heavy metal has been routinely accused of instigating suicide among 
teenagers and to be symptomatic of a dangerous alienation among young 
people (cf. Kahn-Harris 598).
As an extreme subgenre of Heavy Metal, BM was bound to become 
even more controversial. Early representatives of the genre like UK’s 
Venom, Switzerland’s Hellhammer (and its later iteration, Celtic Frost) 
and Sweden’s Bathory, the so-called ‘First Wave’ of the late 1980s, used 
Satanic imagery and mixed heavy metal and crust punk in often chaotic-
sounding productions (cf. Patterson 6–16, 25–35, 36–57). However, BM’s 
musical codif ication came to fruition in the genre’s ‘Second Wave’ in 
Norway: between 1990–1994 a number of Norwegian bands from Oslo 
expanded and radicalized the musical and ideological codes of the genre’s 
f irst wave. Bands like Burzum, Darkthrone, Mayhem, Emperor, Enslaved 
and Ulver (only to cite a few) created a whole new musical subculture. 
BM’s musical style was characterized by high-pitched screaming vocals, 
full chord progressions and a droning, buzzing sound resulting from the 
guitar technique of buzz-picking6 (which created a denser and less clearly 
resonant timbre) coupled with the drumming technique of the ‘blast beat’7 
(cf. Hagen 2273–2293). The imagery was harsh and obscure: everything, 
from the convoluted and almost unintelligible band logos to the menac-
ing stage names and the use of corpse-paint, had to suggest an image of 
inaccessibility and mystery. The majority of the bands wrote lyrics relating 
to Satanism and Viking or Norse mythology and advocated a return to 
pre-Christian Paganism as a form of rebellion against the establishment. 
The scene was plagued by a series of violent incidents, namely the suicide 
of Mayhem’s singer Per Yngve Ohlin, aka ‘Dead’, the murder of Mayhem’s 
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guitarist Euronymous by Burzum’s main man Varg Vikernes and a series 
of church burnings that created a moral panic in Norway and helped to 
crystallize an all encompassing and misleading image of the entire scene 
as violent, Satanic and leaning towards National Socialist ideologies (cf. 
Patterson 209–214). While the story of the Norwegian scene is too complex 
to be dealt in full here, it is true that the sensationalistic events surrounding 
it helped to make Norwegian BM an export product, but most importantly, 
it crystallized the genre’s stylistic and aesthetic elements as integral to 
‘authentic’ BM.8
US Black Metal (USBM) as we know it today was born partly out of the 
influence of the Norwegian scene, but also as a result of the early USBM 
of the 1980s and 1990s by American bands like Von, Absu, Profanatica, 
Krieg, and Weakling. The latter band in particular was instrumental in 
codifying the more recent wave of experimental USBM with their only 
album Dead as Dreams (2000), which was in its turn heavily influenced 
by Burzum’s Filosofem (1996), a seminal record characterized by a wall of 
repetitive BM riffs accompanied by an eerie synth line and mantra-like 
lyrics (cf. Patterson 212). Weakling’s Dead as Dreams blended Burzum’s 
penchant for expansive and repetitive compositions with the emotionally 
surging riffs of post-rock, combining emotive resonance and personal 
lyrics about solitude and paranoia, with the typical BM wash of sound 
and the wailing, wraith-like vocals, through towering, twenty-minute 
long compositions (cf. Nunziata). Deafheaven, probably the most famous 
contemporary USBM band, have conflated the most important strands of 
the genre’s evolutionary pattern while subverting some its most identif i-
able trademarks. Their penchant for post-rock-infused BM is matched by 
the use of an unusually colorful artwork and the simple, unassuming 
appearance of the band members. The publication of their sophomore 
record, the highly anticipated Sunbather (2013), had a twofold effect on 
the BM scene: it spawned a debate surrounding the current state of BM, 
with some commenters declaring the death of the genre in its traditional 
form, and retroactively created an increased interest towards a genre that 
has usually been the subject of specialized metal magazines and webzines 
and the exclusive territory of BM fans. So, why is BM suddenly a popular 
topic of discussion on indie webzines? What are the processes and the 
actors involved in the sudden popularity of such an unpopular genre? And 
most importantly, what really is at stake in the debate over BM’s identity 
and its co-optation (or fears thereof) by what is disparagingly def ined as 
‘hipsterdom’?
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2. Subcultural Capital and Transgressive Power in the Black 
Metal Musical Collectivity.
One way to explain the shift of BM from the realm of the unpopular to 
that of the cool is to understand the way BM as a musical event has been 
received by the indie music audience and the meaning of this co-optation. 
Popular musicologist Richard Middleton in his Studying Popular Music 
tries to interpret musical meanings and analyze the reception of musical 
events by relying on the dynamics pertaining to ‘musical codes’ and ‘musical 
competences’ of a ‘musical collectivity’. BM can be def ined as a musical 
event characterized by a set of ‘musical codes’, i.e. characteristics that relate 
musical sounds to extra-musical factors (cf. Middleton 246). These catego-
ries allow us to describe a particular musical work according to its generic 
norms, its musical and historical context as well as its musical content. 
The term ‘musical collectivity’ has been devised by Italian musicologist 
Franco Fabbri to describe all the social actors involved in the creation and 
fruition of music and the def inition of musical genres (cf. 85). According 
to his def inition, a musical collectivity includes musicians, composers, 
promoters, label executives, fans, journalists, music critics and scholars.
Said music collectivity is endowed by what another Italian musicologist, 
Gino Stefani, has termed ‘musical competence’ (Il Segno della Musica 21), 
i.e. the way a musical message is received and interpreted by a musical 
community. Stefani has devised a general scheme of musical competences 
according to the analytical ‘tools’ used by the music ‘receiver’. All these 
codes are grouped into two specif ic competence types, ‘high competence’ 
and ‘popular competence’ (Brackett 13).9 The most common example is 
the difference between a receiver approaching a piece of music with a 
knowledge of music theory and one that approaches it at what Stefani calls 
an ‘anthropological’ level, as a daily practice (cf. La Parola all’Ascolto 12–13). 
Stefani’s model complements Middleton’s in that it introduces the concept 
of ‘context’ of the musical event by ‘telling us about the larger social and 
cultural context, about the individual backgrounds of the senders and 
the receivers of the message, and about the background of the message 
itself ’ (Brackett 14). In other words, musical works may be received and 
codif ied by a musical collectivity according to different levels of musical 
competence, a process that in turn influences the way in which musical 
works are perceived and evaluated. In the case of BM’s reception by both the 
indie and the BM musical collectivity, musical competence does not relate 
specif ically to a knowledge of the inner workings of a BM song in terms of, 
say, chord progressions, melody, or harmonic structure: BM has rarely if ever 
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been analyzed from a music theory perspective, and certainly not in music 
webzines.10 On the other hand, the musical competences of BM’s fans relate 
to a knowledge of the history of the genre, of its musical and ideological 
evolution both temporally and spatially, and of the musical characteristics 
linking the ‘old guard’ with this new host of young BM bands. This may be 
true for most fans of very specialized genres, but in the case of BM, a very 
unpopular genre now experiencing a sudden increase in popularity, this 
aspect becomes crucial and arguably unique.
The process through which members of the BM ‘musical collectivity’ 
define themselves through their level of ‘high competence’ of the genre pro-
duces two complementary effects. Firstly, it endows them with ‘subcultural 
capital’, a concept that Sarah Thornton, adapting it from Bourdieu’s own 
theory of cultural capital, has used to study dance-music subcultures in the 
United Kingdom. Translating the concept to the extreme metal subculture, 
Keith Kahn-Harris has observed how the display of musical knowledge 
within the scene produces an accumulation of subcultural capital. Extreme 
metal fans are eager to show that they know all the intricacies of the scene 
and the evolutionary paths of influence from one band to another. Secondly, 
it creates ‘hierarchies of status’ and ‘hierarchies of power’ (Kahn-Harris 
2367) within but, most importantly, as a reaction to outsiders trying to get 
in. As Frith argues, if ‘social relations are constituted in cultural practice, 
then our sense of identity and difference is established in the process of 
discrimination’ (Performing Rites 18). Part of the pleasure of belonging to 
the extreme metal scene is in fact derived from the profound knowledge of 
the genre’s history, a kind of subcultural capital that allows scene members 
to exclude or discriminate newcomers. BM fans and practitioners have 
always proudly been conscious of the unpopularity of the genre and have 
therefore reveled in the idea of being a part of a ‘secret society’ of like-
minded individuals exclusively conscious of the inner workings of the genre.
BM fans have also been proudly conscious of the genre’s ‘extreme’ or 
‘transgressive’ nature. Generally speaking, the fact that BM’s lyrics and 
imagery usually deal with death, violence and the occult is part of the 
reason of its unpopularity. More specif ically, the pleasure of transgression 
from the norm of acceptable musical practice that extreme forms of metal 
afford their listeners is crucially linked to questions of subcultural identity 
formation. Keith-Kahn Harris has individuated three types of transgressions 
in extreme metal: ‘sonic’, ‘discursive’ and ‘bodily’ (Kahn-Harris 660). Without 
going into the detail of musical analysis, extreme metal transgresses the 
‘norm’ of mainstream music and even classic heavy metal by emphasizing 
elements such as heavy guitar distortion, down-tuning and volume. Other 
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characterizing sonic elements of BM, such as the screaming vocals or the 
furious technicality of the drum signature, make the genre even more inac-
cessible. At the level of discourse, extreme metal has made themes like death 
and violence even more explicit than in classic heavy metal. As Kahn-Harris 
notes, seminal extreme metal bands like Carcass, Cannibal Corpse, Death, 
Dismember and Obituary routinely resorted to revolting images of torture 
and suffering in their lyrics and artwork (cf. 787). BM bands, particularly from 
the genre-defining Norwegian scene, have instead embraced Satanism (or 
anti-Christianity) as an extreme form of individualism. Kahn-Harris writes: 
‘Satanism is generally more concerned with liberation from the perceived 
constraints of humanity than with worshipping the devil’ (856). As such, 
Satanism in BM transforms into a form of rebellion against the establish-
ment that enhances the fans’ perception of the elitist and unpopular nature 
of the genre. Bodily transgression like heavy consumption of alcohol and 
drugs are less central to the scene and certainly not unique, and they do 
not constitute a defining factor of the genre’s unpopularity. The streak of 
violence associated with the Norwegian scene of the 1990s has instead as-
sumed a ‘mythic significance’ (Kahn-Harris 999), and the genre has certainly 
capitalized, if unwittingly, on the allure of this violent origin story. As such, 
the transgressive elements associated with BM, coupled with the fans’ deep 
knowledge of the genre’s musical codes and accumulation of subcultural 
capital constitute the building blocks of its unpopular identity. These ele-
ments intervene signif icantly in the way BM fans negotiate their own sense 
of identity and how they respond to co-optation by the popular mainstream.
The critical space generated by Sunbather through reviews, op-eds and 
their respective comment sections illuminates the dynamics of appropria-
tion of subcultural musical genres by mainstream culture and the way fans 
negotiate questions of authenticity and belonging. Fans and critic-fans 
alike are part of one or several overlapping musical collectivities, in this 
case the BM and the indie one. In fact, the blurring of boundaries caused 
by the sudden entry of BM into the world of indie webzines is one of the 
main forces behind the debate over BM’s identity. In the next section of 
this essay, I will use Sunbather as a case study in order to f lesh out the 
different voices of the BM musical collectivity: the fans, the indie webzine’s 
journalists as critic-fans, and the musicians themselves. The participants 
in the debate display their own specialized knowledge of BM musical codes 
and their accumulated subcultural capital to either reinstate or redefine 
what they believe can be considered BM and what can be excluded from 
it. The discussion of Deafheaven’s explosion of BM musical codes reveals 
how inclusionary and exclusionary processes taking place at the limits of 
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subcultural spaces amplify the fans’ concerns over cultural appropriation. 
Now that BM is up for the taking, so to speak, now that it has burst through 
its prescribed boundaries into indie cultural consciousness, its very identity 
as an unpopular genre is put into question.
3. ‘Death to Black Metal’: Deafheaven’s Sunbather and Black 
Metal in a ‘Post-Pitchfork’ World
The increased coverage of BM in indie webzines following the publication 
of Deafheaven’s Sunbather has led to an exponential rise in reviews and 
op-eds debating the current status of the genre and to the consequent 
extension of the debate among fans in the comment sections. As Sexton 
argues, the proliferation of critical discussions about music in online zines 
has signif icantly blurred the boundary between the professional rock critic 
and the critic-fan (cf. 6). Publications like Pitchfork and Stereogum can be 
described as ‘semi-fanzines’, a term developed by Frith to describe those 
music publications where the critic’s ‘knowledge and authority proceed 
not from formal, educational or professional training but primarily from 
autodidactic, amateur enthusiasm’ (Atton 9). Consequently, music criticism 
of BM in these websites does not subscribe to the classic narrative that pits 
established rock critics upholding some ‘universal critical values’ (Atton 
5) against expert fans of a subgenre. The debate surrounding BM’s sudden 
popularity in articles on indie webzines involves a musical collectivity 
where most actors involved possess high musical competence and a good 
quantity of subcultural capital.
The articles devoted to Sunbather argue for the death of traditional 
forms of BM in favor of multiple new forms of BM that take a decisive 
step away, stylistically and most importantly ideologically, from the 
‘mother’ genre. Furthermore, they argue that the musical codes of BM 
have changed dramatically for the better and Deafheaven’s Sunbather 
has been instrumental in igniting the change. An example of this kind of 
argumentation is Michael Nelson’s op-ed ‘Deconstructing: Alcest’s Shelter 
and metal in a post-Deafheaven world’ on Stereogum. Nelson, it must be 
noted, is Stereogum’s metal columnist and author of the monthly ‘Black 
Market’ column, so his musical competence on BM is beyond doubt, yet I 
take issue with his interpretation of Deafheaven’s Sunbather as a watershed 
moment in the history of BM, producing a sort of paradigmatic shift in 
the genre and a ‘post-Deafheaven’ world. In the article, Nelson introduces 
Alcest, a French BM band mixing BM with the shoegaze of Slowdive and 
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My Bloody Valentine, as another similar example of the way the genre 
is breaking away from tradition. With their latest release, 2014’s Shelter, 
Alcest have abandoned BM altogether and essentially put out a shoegaze 
record. According to Nelson, Deafheaven are direct descendants of Alcest’s 
‘blackgaze’, who provided Deafheaven’s ‘blueprint’, and he triumphantly 
proclaims Sunbather to be ‘the most important moment for American metal 
since the release of Nirvana’s Nevermind’. The publication of Shelter, Nelson 
points out, comes at a ‘fortuitous’ time, since just when Deafheaven release 
a watershed, genre-defining record, Alcest decide to ‘joyously’ abandon BM 
altogether. What Nelson seems to suggest here is that Sunbather’s unex-
pected success (according to Metacritic, Sunbather was ‘the best reviewed 
album of 2013’) has created a decisive break in the evolutionary trajectory 
of BM, and that Alcest’s Shelter marks the next logical step. In other words, 
Sunbather’s critical popularity is integral to the break with the tradition of 
BM, a tradition that will remain unpopular because it cannot survive in a 
post-Deafheaven world.
To back up his argument, Nelson cites another controversial op-ed, 
Decibel’s Michael Bergrand preface to his ‘Best Metal Albums of 2013’ article. 
In his introduction to the list, Bergrand essentially declares the death of 
metal, or at least its current status of creative ‘atrophy’. Any innovation in 
metal, according to Bergrand, comes from bands actually overstepping 
the received boundaries of the genre and embracing forms as diverse as 
shoegaze, kraut-rock, progressive, jazz, etc. Begrand states that this process 
of ‘border-crossing’ has been happening for at least the last ten years, and 
Deafheaven’s latest record is a crucial part of this process:
Deafheaven’s 2013 album Sunbather just might be the f irst major splinter-
ing that will eventually see ‘extreme music’ separating completely from 
actual heavy metal. [...] It remains the most critically acclaimed album 
of 2013, of any genre, marking the f irst time an album that has occupied 
that grey area between ‘metal’ and ‘extreme music’ has captured the 
attention of so many mainstream critics and audiences. Some critics 
still call Sunbather ‘metal’, but to do so is to forget what makes heavy 
metal heavy metal in the f irst place, merely clutching to the few metallic 
threads in an otherwise richly varied musical fabric. In reality, Sunbather 
is a tremendous example of extremity transcending the metal ethos 
entirely.
Bergrand expresses a very stylistically conservative view of metal with 
regard to style, but he makes an interesting though ultimately debatable 
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statement: that metal and extreme music are two different things. More 
importantly, he claims that Sunbather’s success with mainstream audiences 
is a result of an excision of the musical elements of metal in favor of the 
gray area of extreme music. As he goes on to conclude, while metal lingers 
in a state of crystallized motionlessness, extreme music is ‘the true limit-
less form of music’. Using Bergrand’s argument about Sunbather, Nelson 
goes even further and questions the nature of metal itself: if Sunbather 
is extreme music and thus not bounded by BM’s ‘rigid confines’ (Nelson), 
then Alcest’s Shelter is also extreme music, and so are Burzum’s with his 
‘washed-out, lulling and gentle’ records. In a post-Deafheaven world, metal 
is indef inite.
While I may spend paragraphs arguing why I f ind very little ‘gentleness’ 
in any Burzum record, my interest lies more in the way BM has been shoe-
horned into indie cultural consciousness by positing this ‘post-Deafheaven’ 
world in which BM itself is eliminated from the equation in favor of the 
all-encompassing ‘extreme’ label. Initially, Nelson seems to disagree 
with Bergrand’s uncompromising view of metal, but he then utilizes his 
def inition of extreme music to equate extremity with musical innovation 
and BM with musical rigidity. Ironically, Burzum need also to become 
undef inedly extreme because identifying them strictly with BM would 
automatically make their disciples, Deafheaven and Alcest, still BM. BM 
musical codes, the ones Burzum allegedly helped to create, are therefore 
made irrelevant because they did not exist in the f irst place. The way BM, 
and particularly Sunbather, is received by the indie music collectivity, 
in this case reviewers and fans or commenters, dramatizes exactly how 
the unpopularity of the genre has been metabolized through a narrative 
that downplays its BM elements and at the same time posits the evolution 
of BM in the ‘post-Deafheaven’ world as a decisive break rather than an 
evolutionary narrative.
Brandon Stosuy’s enthusiastic review of Sunbather on Pitchfork also 
favors this narrative of rupture in the BM continuum. First he lists all 
the influences present in the record, an impressive roster of bands that, 
quite ironically, makes you wonder where Deafheaven’s groundbreaking 
originality truly lies: we have the massive, cinematic post-rock of Mogway, 
Goospeed You! Black Emperor, and Sigur Rós, but also the 1980’s art rock 
of The Cure and The Smiths, and of course the shoegaze of My Bloody 
Valentine. He then concludes his review by also positing a ‘post-Deafheaven’ 
world where ‘black metal won’t be the same now that [Sunbather has] been 
released’. Nelson’s review of Sunbather runs along the same line of thought 
and tends to stress Deafheaven’s non-BM elements:
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If you were to remove all Clarke’s vocals from Deafheaven’s new LP, 
Sunbather, and replace them with anodyne, ethereal cooing courtesy 
of, say, Bilinda Butcher or Rachel Goswell, you would be unlikely to hear 
Sunbather as anything except a shoegazer album. Or you could axe the 
vocals entirely and just call it a post-rock record and you wouldn’t be 
wrong. Clarke doesn’t even look like what a guy in a black metal band 
is supposed to look like: He’s dapper, smartly dressed, cleanly cropped. 
You’d be more likely to mistake him for a member of Morrissey’s backing 
band than a member of Inquisition or Immortal. But as soon as he opens 
his mouth… (‘Premature Evaluation’)
He later ascribes to Deafheaven an almost single-minded need to create 
controversy by going against everything a BM record is supposed to be:
In a studio diary published earlier this year on Invisible Oranges, Clarke 
wrote: ‘I named the record Sunbather because that’s the feeling it gives 
me. It is the sadness and the frustration and the anger that comes with 
striving for perfection. Dreaming of warmth and love despite the pain of 
idealism’. I don’t (entirely) mean to question Clarke’s sincerity, but that 
seems like an enormous stretch to me. He couldn’t f ind a better metaphor 
to capture Sisyphean angst than Sunbather? Nah, I’m not buying it—as I 
said in my review of Sunbather’s lead single, ‘Dream House’, I think he’s 
trolling the trolls: Black metal bands don’t have pink album covers, and 
they don’t have album titles that refer to vapid summertime outdoor 
leisure. That is the exact fucking opposite of what black metal bands 
do. I think it’s deliberately intended to inf lame. (Nelson, ‘Premature 
Evaluation’)
As a phoenix reborn out of the f lames, Deafheaven have, according to 
this reviewer, metaphorically ‘killed’ their elders and done away with 
BM’s traditionalist and insular approach, making it f inally acceptable to a 
wider audience. Rather than accepting the fact that BM musical codes have 
evolved for the better, he needs to create a reassuring narrative in which 
pink covers and ‘vapid summertime outdoor leisure’ may never become 
part of the BM imaginary. This kind of rhetorical strategy is present in 
many articles and reviews of these new BM bands on indie webzines: the 
gist is that these bands become acceptable once their style points more to 
something other than BM. The reviews on Pitchfork and Stereogum are 
all eager to point out, for example, how the sound of new USBM bands like 
Locrian, Castevet or Vattnet Viskar owes more to the kraut-rock of Popol 
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Vuh or the post-rock of Mogwai and Godspeed You Black Emperor! than to 
Mayhem or Darkthrone. Yet, while these bands hybridize their sound with 
other genres and do away with the more spectacular elements of early BM 
(the corpse-paint, the Satanic or occult imagery), stylistically they do not, 
or at least not completely. Stereogum’s Chris DeVille pointedly states in 
an article on Deafheaven’s crossing over to the ‘dark side’ of hipsterdom 
(‘Deconstructing: Deafheaven, Disclosure and Crossing Over’), that indie 
music critics are usually eager to present themselves as open-minded 
omnivores. Reviews of Sunbather in both indie webzines and mainstream 
publications will therefore embrace the album as a break with traditional 
BM and disparage BM’s purists supposed backlash.
However, as I have already pointed out at the beginning of this essay, 
such a purist backlash is actually rare and discussions on comment sections 
to articles about Deafheaven are usually cogent and well-informed dissec-
tions of BM’s myriad influences and subcurrents. Of course, exceptions 
apply: some commenters are openly hostile to metal, feeding off the usual 
stereotypes about metal fans’ musical immaturity, herd mentality, and 
elitism. Other listeners approaching BM for the f irst time with what we 
could term ‘low’ musical competence of the genre, tend to f ind fault with 
some of its most inaccessible musical elements, but they nevertheless show 
a certain degree of open-mindedness, certainly fuelled by the hype created 
by their favorite indie webzines. A commenter on Sunbather’s reviews on 
Stereogum named ‘KiDCHAIR’ states that he would def initely listen to 
Deafheaven, he loves the melodies, the emotional surge of the blast beat 
coupled with the frantic chord progressions, but he really cannot swallow 
a singing that to him is just a series of ‘YAI, YAI, YAAAHAHAH’ that does 
not communicate any emotion to him. ‘Why can’t he sing?’ he asks (Nelson, 
‘Premature Evaluation’). Some commenters on the articles by Baher, Nelson 
and DeVille define themselves as ‘metal outsiders’ and are usually confused 
by metal’s endless breakdown into currents and subgenres, but still express 
interest in giving BM a try. A commenter on the DeVille article named 
‘spo’ for instance states how his enjoyment of the Deafheaven album has 
encouraged him to listen to other bands, like Wolves in the Throne Room.
The most interesting insights on the debate come, however, from BM 
fans, people with medium to high musical competence about the genre. 
The concern of these fans revolves around the crossover of the genre from 
the unpopular underground to the popularity of indie music culture, a fact 
signaled by the success of Deafheaven. Fans tend to respond to the hostility 
of mainstream culture by further asserting and promoting heavy metal as 
an exclusive subculture. Heavy metal fans, as Weinstein has noted, take 
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pride in the fact that they listen to good music that outsiders tend to either 
misinterpret or denigrate (cf. 143). While metal’s subcultural status has 
historically relied on several ‘external’ signif iers such as the long hair, the 
leather jackets and tattoos as well as communal gathering places like the 
metal festival or the local record store, the music has always been its most 
def ining factor. Metal is a ‘music based subculture’ (Weinstein 143) in that 
it is grounded in the fans’ assumption of its innate greatness. This, in turn, 
generates a heightened sense of commitment and social belonging: heavy 
metal fans are loyal to their favorite bands and assume a defensive attitude 
towards criticism coming from the outside. In other words, heavy metal is 
a quintessentially unpopular genre, a fact that fans take as a point of pride 
rather than as a defeat.
Some BM fans commenting on Bayer’s article actually indicate elitism 
as the force behind BM’s musical quality. They argue that BM’s co-optation 
from indie culture will inevitably result in a decline in the quality of the 
music as well as a ‘softening’ of the distinctive features of the genres. The 
‘selling out’ paradigm is indeed integral to indie music culture. Kembrew 
McLeod’s study on the mid-1990s American hip-hop scene has revealed 
the dynamics through which a subculture tries to preserve its identity 
from mainstream assimilation. He argues that when members of a musical 
community
disparage inauthentic symbols of identity and valorise authentic symbols 
of identity, they implicate themselves in a larger cultural logic shared 
by other cultures and subcultures which face the contradiction of being 
inside a mainstream culture that they def ine themselves against. (51)
BM fans’ fears of co-optation by mainstream culture induce some of them 
to assume a defensive posture and single out those features of BM that they 
deem authentic (obscure imagery and themes, traditional sound) from those 
they feel are inauthentic (mainstream music influences, imagery and style). 
Therefore, these fears are exasperated by fans’ own perception, as user 
‘Dave Emerson’ puts it, of the genre’s ‘strictly def ined boundaries’ (Bayer). 
Another user named ‘hi arc tow’ reinforces this idea of BM’s uniqueness by 
upholding elitism as a distinctive feature of metal in general. Counteracting 
accusations of BM’s lack of musical openness, ‘hi arc tow’ positions the genre 
as a force against what he perceives as a mediocre musical panorama. He 
asks his fellow commenters: ‘Not open to what?—having a distinct and 
difficult musical genre we care about absorbed by the morass of mediocritis-
ing, lowest common-denominator indie/pop/rock that western culture is 
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saturated in?’ (Bayer) As this last comment renders evident, some fans 
share a romanticized view of BM as uncorrupted by the forces of the global 
music industry. But as Spracklen points out, BM ‘is part of the Westernised, 
commercial pop and rock music industry that has imposed itself on the 
rest of the world, and as such BM reproduces the instrumental actions that 
govern that industry’ (9). In other words, whatever subcultural capital BM 
may afford its fans, the genre produces actual capital for its practitioners 
and promoters and is part of the same processes of supply and demand that 
characterize mainstream musical cultures. The co-optation of BM by other 
musical subcultures becomes therefore a battle for the genre’s identity, one 
that is still conceived by many fans as the only alternative to mass-produced 
pop or the latest indie fad.
Still other BM fans take a completely opposite view and see BM as 
naturally suited to hybridization with other genres. Commenting on 
Bayer’s article, user ‘Arif Aksit’ interestingly questions Sunbather’s sudden 
success, but most poignantly, he points to BM’s past history of musical 
innovation, discarding the reading of Sunbather by indie music critics as 
a groundbreaking, genre-altering record. A good number of fans also take 
issue with the def inition of Sunbather as a non-BM record or a generally 
extreme record that transcends BM altogether. This is most evident in the 
Nelson article on a ‘post-Deafheaven’ world, where fans competently point 
to the preponderance of BM musical elements like tremolo picking, the blast 
beat, and the high-pitched screaming vocals in Sunbather. A user named 
‘themetalpigeon’ counteracts Nelson’s argument and voices an opinion 
shared by most commenters to the article: BM, and metal in general, is 
not a static genre and Deafheaven are not revolutionary. As he argues: 
‘Metal’s malleability is its core strength after all—long before there were 
Alcests and Deafheavens metal was already branched out in a myriad of 
different directions with unique styles’. User ‘A. Darryl Moton’ re-asserts 
the same concept: ‘I like the new Alcest album, much like I enjoyed the 
Deafheaven album, but I don’t think anything truly revolutionary is going 
down here–to me, it’s pretty much the same thing that metal’s been doing 
since Black Sabbath made blues slower and louder’. These comments show 
that musically competent BM fans counter the construction of Sunbather as 
a break with the tradition and reject the fable of its threatening nature to the 
status quo on two accounts: it is not a genre-altering recording and it is a BM 
record. The fans’ reading of Deafheaven’s phenomenal success clashes with 
a dubious narrative, constructed mainly by the indie webzines, that sees 
new BM bands breaking decisively with a monolithic earlier tradition that 
is still staunchly defended by a supposed backlash of close-minded purists.
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Even the bands themselves, as evinced for example in Brandon Stosuy’s 
interview with Deafheaven and Liturgy on Pitchfork, never repudiate their 
BM roots and are quick to acknowledge their debt to traditional bands. In 
several interviews after the release of Sunbather, Clarke and McCoy refuse 
to be pinned down as ‘controversial’ or of having ‘an outlook or an agenda’ 
and just point to BM’s ‘underlying beauty’ (Stosuy, ‘Show No Mercy’) from 
the very beginning. In an interview with metal webzine Invisible Oranges 
McCoy answers a question about his BM ‘touchstones’ by acknowledging his 
major influences and unwittingly confirming BM’s evolutionary trajectory:
McCoy: Pretty much all the stuff we’re influenced by is the Ukrainian 
stuff like Drudkh or Hate Forest. Or the German bands like Lantlos or 
Cold World. More of the atmospheric, post-rock kind of thing. Other than 
that the French bands, especially. And I hate that I’m about to say this 
but Wolves in the Throne Room and Panopticon are great. [Laughs] Then 
early Darkthrone, early Burzum, Ulver.
Deafheaven’s music, as the musicians themselves also seem to imply, is 
neither modeled after a ‘blueprint’ of Alcest, nor is it an undefined form 
of extreme music that completely transcends BM, but it is rather a further 
proof of the evolutionary potential of BM’s musical codes. The linear trajec-
tory became a network after early Norwegian bands ignited BM’s global 
expansion. However, this evolutionary narrative of BM clashes with the fact 
that the genre’s musical codes are usually perceived as static, monolithic 
and thus inaccessible by listeners unfamiliar with the genre. It also clashes 
with readings in indie webzines that see Sunbather as a paradigmatic shift 
in the genre, and which have an even more controversial subtext: that 
Deafheaven’s popularity is a result of this paradigmatic shift, a f inal aban-
donment of the (problematic) BM heritage. But is this really the case? Have 
Deafheaven actually rewritten BM’s musical codes and f inally transcended 
them, thus rescuing the genre from its undeserved unpopularity? Or is 
Sunbather, an excellent album by all accounts, just a further realization of 
BM’s incredible evolutionary potential?
Deafheaven’s ‘Dreamhouse’, the opening track from Sunbather, opens 
with a somewhat typical buzz-picked chord progression, soon followed 
by the blast beat and Clarke’s screaming vocals. What makes Deafheaven 
an heir to Burzum’s and Drudkh’s tradition is the centrality of melody. 
The layers of guitar, heavily delayed, buzzing and lyrical and the fuzzy 
blast beat blend seamlessly with the vocals to create an emotional surge 
that relies heavily on melodic crescendos. The song swings from darkness 
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and ferocity to light and sweet melancholy, an effect both Burzum and 
Drudkh achieved through repetition of heavy guitar riffs accompanied 
by uplifting, melancholic tremolo-picked melodic lines or sequences of 
arpeggios. With Deafheaven, melody becomes a key element of the composi-
tion and the tremolo picked guitar crescendos are as much a product of 
post-rock experimentations of bands like Sigur Ros , Explosions in the Sky 
and God Speed You! Black Emperor as of the melodic overtures of Burzum 
and Drudkh. Deafheaven’s music is not a break or a watershed, but rather 
a continuum in BM’s ongoing evolutionary narrative of constant rewriting 
of its own musical codes. BM is ‘extreme’ insofar as it has always been the 
metal subgenre that has been playing the most with the outer hedges of 
metal, its ‘extremities’, so to speak.
Conclusion
The reason for the indie webzine’s increasing coverage of BM resides in the 
fundamentally experimental attitude of the genre since its very beginnings. 
If we set aside the corpse-paint and the Satanic or Pagan imagery and listen 
to it, we will f ind that precisely because BM is the most extreme of metal 
subgenres, always skirting at the edges and playing with other genres, 
especially electronic music, dark ambient, drone music, and punk, it is also 
the most malleable and experimental, the one most prone to a hybridization 
of its core elements. The Norwegian bands of the second wave of BM, far 
from remaining monolithic protectors of the traditional ‘true’ sound, have 
also continued to deconstruct the genre from within, a fact that has had 
a direct consequence on the experimentations of the new BM bands. This 
evolutionary reading of BM as it travels from Europe to the US and back re-
inscribes a narrative of continuity that counters some of the indie webzines’ 
narratives of appropriation, discontinuity and disavowal. One just needs 
to listen to the latest record by Norwegian BM veterans Darkthrone, The 
Underground Resistance (2012), alongside the music of newcomers Rasperry 
Bulbs; or the ‘black’ prog-rock of another BM institution, Enslaved, alongside 
the psychedelic experimentations of younger bands like Vattnet Viskar 
or Oranssi Pazuzu. Musically speaking the core elements of BM are still 
present, but they are mixing with other genres, crossing and disrespecting 
boundaries to create new brands of BM. Lyrics express anguish, pain and 
frustration with the modern world, with society and with relationships in 
a different, maybe more personal language, but the feelings typical of BM 
are all there. This is a testament to the fact that BM is today the most vital 
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subgenre of heavy metal, a genre that contrary to charges of conservative-
ness and insularity is able to reach out of its received boundaries to new 
audiences while still retaining a relation with its past.
The progressive cross-over of BM from unpopularity to indie culture 
popularity, as epitomized by Deafheaven’s Sunbather, dramatizes the battle 
over BM’s contentious identity among old and new fans and between fans 
and indie music journalists. The analysis of a selected number of articles 
on Deafheaven by critic-fans and the response from fans in the comment 
sections has revealed that while both camps share a view of BM as a genre in 
constant stylistic evolution, they do not always agree on the actual direction 
it is taking. These particular BM fans value important factors such as respect 
for the history of the genre and belonging to a musical subculture and resist 
readings of BM that reject that history and compromise its identity. In 
other words, they use their subcultural capital to assert a kind of ‘righteous’ 
unpopularity of BM, one that is connected to the history of heavy metal as 
a misunderstood niche genre and the fans’ conviction of its innate musical 
quality. At the same time, this identif ication of BM as unpopular allows 
them to protect it from co-optation from the mainstream, which they see 
as creatively stultif ied. Conversely, the critic-fans of BM mentioned here 
use their own deep knowledge of BM musical codes to create a narrative 
of rupture that sees old forms of traditional BM as obsolete and advocates 
a new course for the genre paradoxically without or beyond BM. This nar-
rative, as my analysis of Sunbather suggests, is open to contestation and 
debate, considering the band’s musical lineage. However, if we go beyond 
mere judgment of taste we can see how it is precisely this narrative that 
has propelled the band from the BM underground to instant popularity. 
Deafheaven’s global reach through such an unpopular genre as BM is in 
fact crucially related to the overwhelming power of indie music webzines 
and the gatekeeping function of indie music journalists. Older bands, like 
for instance Burzum or Darkthrone, were born in an era where web-based 
music journalism and internet-based music distribution did not exist. They 
created and cultivated a cult following fuelled by fanzines, trade-taping and 
specialized printed magazines that enhanced the scene’s circumscribed 
(un)popularity and its sense of community. Today, as Deafheaven and 
other young BM bands grow in popularity, the ripple effect produced by 
heightened media coverage puts BM and its embattled identity under the 
(uncomfortable) spotlight.
And now to come full circle. Inquisition’s guitarist Dagon, our infamous 
BM ‘purist’, recently pondered over a question about Metal’s broader accept-
ance and coverage outside of the underground:
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There is absolutely a wider acceptance of heavy music now. [...] Musician-
ship has evolved. Skills are sky high in every sense and anyone with a 
brain knows skill when they see it and hear it. What made metalheads 
different from the masses years ago is that we could hear talent through 
the muddy productions and looser performances. Today I feel that Metal 
is almost the new jazz or classical music. There is tremendous skill and 
pushing the envelope is the building block of this music much like clas-
sical music was or jazz. (Steel for Brains interview)
I may be pushing this a little too far, but there seems to be a forbidden 
pleasure in redeeming BM from its unpopularity, freezing it in perpetual 
elitism and immutability, and positing a ‘post-Deafheaven’ reality, an 
almost post-apocalyptic renewal of BM into popular indie culture that 
erases its roots and history. But as Dagon reminds us, pushing the envelope 
constitutes ‘the building blocks’ of this genre, and its staunch, sought for, and 
well-guarded historical unpopularity is linked to this intrinsic experimental 
drive and to the ‘cultural awareness’ of it by BM fans. The crossing-over of 
BM into the popular realm of indie webzines is just the realization of this 
cultural awareness.
Notes
1. Inquisition’s Obscure Verses for the Multiverse received stellar reviews from 
most specialized metal webzines (Cvlt Nation and Invisible Oranges, among 
others) as well as an 8.1 score from Pitchfork Magazine. See Kim Kelly ‘Al-
bum Reviews: Inquisition: Obscure Verses From the Multiverse’.
2. The act of ‘trolling’, described by the Urban Dictionary as the act of ‘being 
a prick on the internet because you can,’ consists of insulting or offending 
other people’s opinions and tastes in the comment sections of various spe-
cialized and non-specialized websites in order to spike controversy. Most 
webzines, for example Stereogum, apply a certain degree of censorship and 
hide particularly offensive comments, while others, like the overwhelm-
ingly popular Pitchfork, have done away with comment sections altogether. 
Wired Mat Honan has declared the death of the comment section in favor 
of social network services like Facebook and Twitter. I would however coun-
teract that, at least in the case here at hand of music webzines, a carefully 
moderated comment section creates very fruitful and focused conversations 
among musically literate individuals as opposed to social network’s disper-
sal through information overflow. See, Mat Honan, ‘Comment Sections are 
Wastelands Ruled by Trolls. Here are Alternatives’.
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3. The term ‘indie’ has quickly come to be used, starting from the 1990s, to de-
scribe the music produced by labels independent of the major record label 
system. R.E.M. are often cited as the primary example of an indie band, to-
gether with the meteoric explosion of the Seattle grunge scene, with bands 
like Nirvana, Pearl Jam, Soundgarden, Alice in Chains and others. Nowadays 
the term ‘indie’ is used in a much looser sense and indicates those artists 
walking a fine line between the underground and the mainstream. For more 
on the history of the indie genre see Azzerad and Kruse. For a tentative 
definition of indie music see Hibbet. 
4. Simon Frith defines rock critics as the ‘opinion leaders’ and ‘ideological 
gate-keepers’ (Sound Effects 117) of the musical communities they write for. 
They become veritable ‘consumer guides for adults’ and are able to stir the 
listeners’ tastes concerning the palatability of certain artists and their place 
in the pantheon of music history. The process of ‘legitimization’ of BM by 
mainstream rock and indie critics constitutes a crucial aspect of the genre’s 
problematic relationship with popularity. On the ideological function of 
rock music criticism see also Frith, Performing Rites, and McLeod.
5. ‘Online ethnography’ or ‘Netnography’ is a fairly recent anthropological 
field, originally developed for marketing and consumer research, dealing 
with online communities and online social interactions. For an introduc-
tion to the methodological tools of Netnography see Robert V. Kozinetz, 
Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online. 
6. Tremolo picking: double picking of the strings at a fast tempo. It favors 
chord progressions around arpeggios.
7. Rapid alternating or coincident strokes, primarily on the bass and snare 
drums.
8. The growing interest in the history of Norwegian BM, certainly fuelled in 
part by the mythologization surrounding Euronymous’s death, has since 
spawned a series of publications on BM of which Michael Moyhinian’s 
Lords of Chaos: The Bloody Rise of the Satanic Metal Underground (1998) is 
the earliest example. However, Moyhinian’s book focuses more on the his-
tory of the Satanic ‘inner circle’ surrounding the scene rather than on the 
music itself. A recent, interesting oral history of BM, dedicated but not lim-
ited to the Norwegian scene, is Metalion: The Slayer Mag Diaries, a volume 
collecting the Slayer Magazine, a seminal DIY metal magazine published in 
Norway between 1985 and 2010 by Norwegian BM ‘insider’ Jon Kristiansen, 
aka Metalion. Other recent publications specifically dedicated to BM offer a 
more global history of the genre’s musical output, particularly an essay col-
lection edited by Tom Howells, Black Metal: Beyond the Darkness (2012) and 
an encyclopedic volume by Dayal Patterson, Black Metal: Evolution of the 
Cult (2014). Of specific interest to Norwegian BM is the recent documentary 
by Aaron Aites and Audrey Ewells, Until the Light Takes Us (2009), which 
features an extensive interview with Burzum’s Varg Vikernes. 
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9. Gino Stefani’s musical competences are part of a much more complex 
categorization of musical codes that takes into account other intra-musical 
levels, namely ‘Tecniche Musicali’ (Musical Techniques), ‘Stili’ (Styles), 
‘Opere’ (Works), ‘Pratiche Sociali’ (Social Practices) and ‘Codici Generali’ 
(General Codes). ‘High’ and ‘popular’ competence levels work along these 
categories, with high competences being related with the first three catego-
ries and popular competences being related with the last two. See Middle-
ton and Stefani, Il Segno della Musica.
10. To my knowledge, the only essay attempting an analysis of BM’s musical 
characteristics (Norwegian BM to be exact) is Ross Hagen’s ‘Musical Style, 
Ideology and Mythology in Norwegian Black Metal.’ Hagen rightly laments 
the lack of rigorous music theory analysis in most studies on BM in favor of 
historical, cultural, literary, or critical theory approaches. It has to be noted, 
however, that BM is just part of a larger trend that has seen a progressive 
disappearance of music theory from popular music studies and more evi-
dently in music criticism on music magazines and webzines, a fact noted by 
jazz historian Ted Gioia in his controversial and much-discussed article on 
The Daily Beast, ‘Music Criticism Has Degenerated into Lifestyle Reporting.’ 
BM fits right into this polemic, since extra-musical elements relating to the 
genre’s ideology and presentation have always been an integral part of the 
its reception by mainstream audiences.
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 Unpopular Culture and the American 
Reception of Tinariwen
Barry Shank
‘Compassion […] is the disturbance of violent relatedness.’
—Nancy, Being Singular Plural (xiii)
‘I’m a fuckin’ walkin’ paradox. No I’m not.’
—Tyler, the Creator, ‘Yonkers’
I have been provoked by the topic of this volume, Unpopular Culture, 
to address some of the assumptions that traditionally underlie popular 
culture studies. Important among those assumptions is the belief that 
the spread of popular cultural forms across signif icant geographic and 
political boundaries can be a positive development. Clearly, this is not 
necessarily or universally true. Popular culture scholars have not mindlessly 
celebrated White appreciation for Black music or the Western appropriation 
of non-Western musical styles. I certainly do not assume that the global 
spread of American popular culture has produced consistently progressive 
consequences. Nor am I asserting the naïve belief that shared tastes equate 
to shared political stances. But using a slightly more sophisticated version 
of the same belief, in my case based on a theoretical framework that draws 
from Chantal Mouffe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Rancière, I have claimed 
that the spread of popular music implicates new populations in enhanced 
and enlarged conceptions of the polis, the political form of the people.1 
Voices newly heard as musical are the voices of political persons, humans 
demanding to be heard as legitimate participants in political discourse. 
In an increasingly integrated global sphere of politics, the sharing of truly 
aesthetic pleasure, when geographically and culturally dispersed groups 
share the sense that a particular set of sounds are beautiful, can change 
the boundaries of the popular. This is not an unchallenged assertion. But 
it strikes an important counterpoint to the pernicious yet dominant as-
sumption that cultures are objects that belong to groups as property, as 
the source of coherent and incommensurable identities that function as 
boundary markers separating us all from each other.2
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Raymond Williams was among the first to argue that popular culture was 
the culture of the people and should be analyzed from a perspective alert 
to their particular characteristics and needs. Following standard Marxist 
thinking, the category of the people was def ined by class, and the culture 
of the people could be known by observing what the people listened to, 
read, and watched (cf. 306–12). But we know now that cultures do not have 
boundaries; they have threads that interweave across communities and 
geographies, defying any effort to keep them in their place. Our historical 
moment is one of intense and rapid change, where traditional organizations 
of sounds and traditional organizations of life are being engulfed by global 
waves of violence. This is not a time when political or musical boundaries 
stand still. Popular music in itself cannot stop war, but newly arranged 
timbres, scales and beats can create new musical aesthetics that ratify a 
world of sound and meaning shared across borders. When a new sense of 
musical beauty spreads across new listeners, a different sense of the political 
world is produced. This aesthetic process of changing the boundaries of 
the political is not a popular one in the traditional sense. Indeed, it could 
be understood as one of the key gestures of truly unpopular culture as it 
challenges common sense conceptions of the people.
It is not obvious what happens when people from opposite sides of 
the planet share a sense of musical pleasure. Is it possible for that shared 
aesthetic to change the shape of the political in a meaningful way? This 
essay examines the case of Tinariwen, a band of Tuareg or kel Tamashek 
musicians who have been among the leading groups developing a particular 
style of what the West has come to call ‘desert blues’. Over the past decade, as 
the Western popularity of Tinariwen’s music has increased, political chaos 
has descended upon Mali, the nation state that stands upon the ground 
from which Tinariwen and Tuareg music emerged. Over the past several 
years, this turmoil has intensif ied, with multiple armies swarming across 
the northern portion of Mali. In this example, it might be worth asking what 
political force can music have in the face of war’s destruction.
During this recent period of turmoil, Tinariwen has been continually 
on the road, performing across Europe and North America. Their Anglo-
American following is drawn by the sounds of their guitars and assumptions 
about the cultural histories those sounds carry with them. Curious listeners 
to their earlier recordings were hailed by comments in Pitchfork reviews 
like this one where Joe Tangari described their 2007 album, Aman Iman:
The music of Tinariwen is at once exotic and familiar—the scales and 
arrangements are as strange to our ears as the language they sing in, 
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but there’s a force operating on a more subliminal level that unites it to 
something rattling around inside anyone who was brought up on blues or 
rock & roll. It’s music of longing and rebellion, weary wisdom and restless 
energy, and it sounds so, so good. (‘Aman Iman’)
When reviewing Tinariwen’s 2009 album Imidiwan, the same writer evoked 
the social context for its production, describing the ‘intermittent violence 
and displacement’ the Tuareg people experience ‘as they’ve fought to main-
tain their culture and lifestyle in a world that isn’t built to accommodate it’ 
(‘Imidiwan’). Listening to these recordings, the disproportionately young 
white male readers of these Pitchfork reviews could imagine a soundscape 
that integrated sounds both familiar and exotic, guitar drones amid North 
African scales, non-English lyrics—mostly Tamashek, but some French—
repeated with strophic phrasing, within a contemporary geopolitical 
struggle, conjuring the associations of global black music with the drive 
for human emancipation. ‘The blues is present’, says Tangari, ‘as a sense of 
intense longing and defiance in the face of despair that hums in sympathetic 
vibration with its trans-Atlantic cousin’ (‘Aman Iman’). In these reviews, 
Tinariwen is misrecognized as a modern inheritor of the blues impulse. On 
f irst hearing, their music sounds like the blues created by Black Americans, 
and therefore we are to assume that the struggles experienced by the Tuareg 
are akin to Black Americans’ struggles for freedom.
The power of this set of assumptions can be understood through a 
concept developed by Roshy Kheshti called the ‘aural imaginary’, which 
has signif icant implications for all forms of listening, perhaps especially 
the initial listening that might be the f irst step towards the emergence of 
new political communities. The first encounter of new sounds, that moment 
when we begin to sort those sounds into musical categories, is fraught. 
Inevitably, a kind of misrecognition occurs that results not only from the 
extreme differences between the social contexts of the music’s origin and 
the contexts of the music’s hearing, but also from deeply held and nearly 
unconscious assumptions about the social meanings of particular sounds 
(cf. Kheshti 711–31).3 In this case, Tinariwen’s droning guitars and deep 
masculine voices reverberate off ear canals trained by decades of rock’s 
romanticization of the blues impulse and stimulate the longing for political 
music that haunts the aural imaginary of many American listeners. At 
least one commentator from 2007 had a more accurate understanding of 
Tinariwen’s context. Robert Christgau wrote in a review of that same album 
Aman Iman: ‘What’s sought isn’t your affection, but your respect.’ He went 
on to quote a translation of one line from the song ‘Tamatart Tilay’, ‘We 
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kill the enemies and become like eagles. We’ll liberate all those who live in 
the places’. Christgau reminded his readers: ‘This is not a metaphor. They 
are talking about killing’. But he stood out from the crowd. Most American 
reviews were shaped by romantic associations of blues music with civil 
resistance and political progressivism.
The effects of the audible imaginary were not limited to US-based listen-
ers. When Tinariwen toured the UK a few years ago, Thomas Jones wrote in 
Crack magazine: ‘As dedicated to their music as they are to their struggle 
for independence, Tinariwen are the ultimate rebel rockers’. Yet in the 
same article, Jones quotes Ibrahim Ag Alhabib, one of the band’s founding 
members, saying, ‘Our message is about who we are as people. We are doing 
music that comes from our ancestors, with electric guitars, but with the 
lyrics, the rhythms and the ambience from our heritage. So we are musicians 
f irst, but the voice of our people at the same time’. Articulating a classic 
understanding of the popular, Ag Alhabib insists that Tinariwen’s music is 
traditional, rooted in a local heritage of musical performance.
The melodies and rhythms that sound both exotic and familiar to the 
carefully nurtured Anglo-American audience emerge from a tradition of 
guitar-accompanied warrior praise songs called ichumar or alguitara. (Ichu-
mar is the local word for the unemployed. Alguitara refers, of course, to the 
instrument.) It is an adaptation of a slightly (but only slightly) older traditional 
style called teherdent. As the ethnomusicologist Nadia Belalimat outlines 
it, the teherdent style features both male and female singers, the women 
alternating ululations with the men’s chants. The instrumentation is sparse, 
featuring rhythms beat out on a tinde drum reinforced by handclaps, while 
the melodies are echoed on the three-sting lute from which the style takes its 
name. Originally a style that was performed only by local musicians, predomi-
nantly women, for an audience of extended family and friends, its orientation 
shifted outward during the 1960s. Belalimat notes: ‘Many musician-artisans 
started performing outside their own lineage affiliations in order to provide 
for themselves, since their former employers could no longer support them’ 
(160). The teherdent style adapted to the guitar when that instrument spread 
across the region. The guitar could be both louder and more percussive than 
the teherdent, and it was just as easy to carry. When the Tuareg resistance 
began again in the late 1980s, the instrument quickly became metonymi-
cally linked to weapons of rebellion. Another of the founding members of 
Tinariwen, Keddou Ag Ossad, was praised for riding into battle with a rifle 
in one hand, a traditional saber in the other, and his guitar on his back (cf. 
Rasmussen 643). As Rasmussen explains, ‘in the early ichumar music, the 
composers, performers, and audience all were combatants’ (635). Rasmussen 
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goes on to say, ‘Early ichumar songs were composed by one rebel to praise 
another and were performed by the composer or the subject of praise in a 
tightly knit ‘circle’ of mutual support’ (639). As the alguitara or ichumar style 
developed, recordings of this music were banned by the Malian government 
and circulated only via underground cassette copies.
Just as the musical style itself emerged from local conditions, the musi-
cians of Tinariwen did not inherit the legacy of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, although apparently they have their own history of slave-trading. 
The Tuareg are an ethnic group often included among the Berbers, but 
distinguished by their language, Tamashek. When France’s North African 
colonies achieved independence in the 1960s, they found their traditional 
territory divided among the nations of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Alge-
ria. At the time of decolonization, the Tuareg were a mostly nomadic people, 
who herded cattle along the Niger River. Their way of life was increasingly 
threatened by the modernizing projects transforming the region’s economy. 
Post-colonial national boundaries made little sense to people who drove 
their cattle anywhere water and grass could be found. In addition a long 
drought period greatly reduced the landscape’s ability to support nomadic 
groups and their animal herds (cf. Zoumenou).
One of the results of these environmental and economic pressures was 
the Tuareg rebellion. The Tuareg had spent decades resisting French colonial 
domination. In 1960, when the new state of Mali was created, it forced 
different people with no independent history of political cooperation into 
one national formation. The Tuareg saw no reason they should cooperate 
with the Malian government centered in Bamako, in the southwestern 
region. Vastly different ways of life combined with elements of racial tension 
(Government off icials were largely Black Africans, while Berbers like the 
Tuareg are more light-skinned) to provoke a decades-long conflict that has 
gone through periods of greater and lesser violence. Under environmental 
and developmental pressures, the Tuareg social world has been fundamen-
tally transformed. The traditional self-suff icient way of life is now nearly 
completely eradicated. From its early days, the government of Mali had 
inherited a crippling debt, which was enforced by the World Bank, depriving 
the government of resources that could have eased some of the tensions. 
Almost no money was available for further development in the North (cf. 
Prashad). Many Tuareg moved south into the cities, where the formerly 
incomprehensible idea of unemployment, something that makes no sense 
to a nomadic people, became a lived reality (cf. Lecocq).
Some of the former Tuareg warriors moved to Libya where they joined 
with Gaddafi’s forces, gaining modern training and weapons. Several of the 
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musicians in Tinariwen, including Ibrahim Ag Alhabib, the most senior 
member of the band, and fellow founder Abdullah Ag Alhousseini, met 
during the 1980s in camps in Libya while undergoing military training 
conducted by Gaddafi’s army. This camp encounter is a central node in the 
narrative that links the sounds of Tinariwen to the romantic image of the 
camel-riding rebel (cf. Eyre).
After the fall of Lybia in 2011, armed struggle broke out again in northern 
Mali. The National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA), the political 
group that Tinariwen identif ies with, was reinvigorated when its leader 
made an alliance with a more religiously motivated group called Ansar 
Dine (Defenders of the Path) in an effort to separate Azawad from the rest 
of Mali. The rebellion received a military boost when highly disciplined 
f ighters identif ied with Islamic fundamentalist groups joined the rebellion. 
These forces quickly drove the relatively lackluster Malian army from the 
region and declared independence for Azawad (cf. Smith).
During an early 2012 tour of the UK, Ag Alhabib described the struggle 
this way:
‘This year is a special year. Although the f irst rebellion started in 1963, 
we have never been as strong as the rebellion has this year. The MNLA 
is controlling 2/3 of Mali in the North, and we need to stay strong and 
f ight for our autonomy, we want to f ind a deal with the international 
community and with the Malian government’. (Jones, ‘Tinariwen’)
On the ground in Mali, however, military leaders associated with the Tuareg 
had slaughtered dozens of the remaining Malian soldiers. The violence 
involved in the loss of the region was enough to prompt a change of national 
government in Bamako. In the ensuing governmental gap, the foreign f ight-
ers began setting up Islamic governments. By July 2012, these governments 
controlled most of the region. The worst punishments of Shari’a law were 
enacted against the remaining dark-skinned inhabitants. As Andy Morgan, 
former manager of Tinariwen, describes it: ‘Almost all the condemned were 
‘black’ Songhoi or Bozo men. Almost all those who judged them were ‘white’ 
or lighter skinned Arabs, Touareg or foreigners’ (19).
As amputations and stonings stoked the racialized divisions in the 
country, a general proclamation went out over Azawad:
‘We, the mujahedeen of Gao, of Timbuktu and Kidal, henceforward forbid 
the broadcasting of any Western music on all radios in this Islamic ter-
ritory. This ban takes effect from today, Wednesday. [22 August 2012] 
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We do not want Satan’s music. In its place, there will be Quranic verses. 
Shari’a demands this. What God commands must be done’. On that day, 
Tuareg music was banned in their own homeland. When a large group of 
Malian musicians drawn from a wide range of different styles recorded a 
special song of unity, ‘Voices United for Mali’, no one from Tinariwen, or 
Terakaft, or Tartit, the leading Tuareg bands, participated. (Morgan 21)4
Consequently, Tinariwen’s new album, Emmaar, was recorded in the Mojave 
desert in California. My copy of the album came with a sticker attached 
to it quoting Bob Boilen, the host of NPR’s ‘All Songs Considered’ and their 
leading popular music critic. It says ‘Let’s get one thing straight: Tinariwen is 
just about the best guitar-based rock band of the 21st Century’. That sentence 
became a key marketing tool in the promotion of the band’s most recent 
tour of the US as well as the new album. Fully in line with the history of the 
band’s marketing strategy and ignoring the messy details of the ongoing 
conflict, this quote situates Tinariwen in a language of rock and guitars, 
foregrounding the commonality between their music and the music listened 
to by the baby boom generation and generation X, which form the largest 
age demographic of NPR listeners. Having grown up with experience in 
or at least some awareness of the US Civil Rights movement, this group 
of listeners is primed to hear the musical similarities between Tinariwen 
and the blues musicians of the late 1950s and 60s. Through the associations 
channeled by the aural imaginary, Tinariwen’s status as romantic rebels 
f ighting for justice is reaff irmed.
Initial reviews of the album were quite positive and, in general, bet-
ter informed than reviews of the earlier albums. Many reviewers com-
mented on the power of Tinariwen’s ‘backstory’, however, without trying 
to comprehend its complexity. Pitchfork’s Tangari begins his review with 
his standard reference to the Sahara and insists that the ‘music still moves 
like a sandstorm’ before going on to discuss specif ics of the new album’s 
sound. NPR’s Anastasia Tsioulcas writes: ‘Despite the pain and politics 
that surround Emmaar’s birth, it’s a pleasure to hear how Tinariwen keeps 
f inding new ways to translate the soul of the Sahara for fans around the 
world’. Writing for the online source The 405, Lyle Bignon is slightly more 
self-aware as he comments on ‘how diff icult it often is for us, the Western 
listener, to understand the cultural and social values of Touareg musicians’. 
He continues: ‘Maybe, even in this uber-connected and super globalized era, 
Western audiences are still—generally speaking—far removed from the 
less-documented struggles of life […] in the West African country of Mali’. In 
his piece for The Quietus, Richie Troughton essays a more detailed discussion 
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of Ibrahim Ag Alhabib’s biography and the cassette-only era of the band. 
Enough context is provided that the lyrics quoted at the end of the review 
from ‘Agregh Medin (I Call on Man)’ carry signif icant affective power: ‘I no 
longer believe in unity / I will only believe in it again if those opinions serve 
a common ideal: That of the people from which they emanate’.
The best of the recent review pieces appeared in the Noisey blog sponsored 
by Vice magazine. There, Zachary Lipez gives the most detailed account of 
the current situation that Tinariwen face in Mali. The account is presented 
as a series of diff icult and questionably translated interview exchanges with 
guitarist and bassist Eyadou Ag Leche. By foregrounding the translation 
problems, Lipez lets his readers know that there is more to Tinariwen’s story 
than he can tell them and that multiple barriers lie between his readers and 
these musicians’ lives. There is nothing reductive about this move. Instead, 
it is an effort to get beyond what Lipez terms ‘dervishes on the sands of 
time, grad school othering hokum’, which is how he more or less accurately 
characterizes so much of the journalism about Tinariwen. After stating a 
number of caveats about uncertain linguistic equivalencies, Lipez asks 
Ag Leche detailed questions focusing on the band’s songwriting practices 
and how they feel about the intervention of the French military. In his 
questioning, Lipez treats Eyadou as a fully political subject with his own 
complex opinions, not as a representative of an otherwise faceless mass. 
Working through the translator, the musician says:
‘France decided to make these borders 50 years ago. France came into 
this conflict when it was a bad issue so I’m glad they came…but hopefully 
they will leave. Hopefully they won’t take everything. But the French 
know EXACTLY what the situation is. We don’t know what the French 
will give to us. Maybe they will help or maybe they will just make more 
borders and work with the bad politicians. So, actually, we don’t know. It’s 
a long bad history with the French. We don’t know what they’re bringing 
now’. (Lipez)
In Lipez’s version of the translator’s version of Eyadou’s words, the political 
situation of being an outside observer of the military imposition of a cease-
f ire creates a precise context for the opening lyrics of ‘Toumast Tincha’, the 
f irst track on Emmaar. Here also translated: ‘The ideals of the people have 
been sold off cheap, my friends. Any peace imposed by force is bound to fail 
and give way to hatred’. Set in a musical frame more fully polished and pro-
duced than any recording previously released by the band, this sentiment 
reinforces the determination and insistence that lies behind Tinariwen’s 
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lengthy career. The guitars on this track are layered with echo, and the 
drones that anchor the band’s sound are played on a pedal steel guitar. The 
song begins with spoken words in English intoned by Saul Williams. From 
production style to instrument choice to the f irst appearance of English 
words on one of their tracks, this recording addresses its Anglo-American 
audience more directly and clearly than Tinariwen ever has before. The 
touring in support of the album has been incessant. In 2014, they played 
over 130 shows solely in Europe, the UK and the US.
The video for the song, however, presents a visual narrative of isolation 
and alienation. Ibrahim Ag Alhabib rides in the back of a car across the 
Mojave. No other humans are shown. During most of the video, the camera 
shoots out the window of the moving car, showing only the desert racing by. 
Railroad tracks, electrical lines and poles, and the occasional speed limit 
sign break up the flow of unpopulated dust, scrub trees and hills. As the 
song comes to its end, the car pulls up to a f ire, suggesting the presence of 
others, but not showing them. Finally, the camera pans up, revealing a few 
old amplif iers waiting alone. The video makes clear the absence of a public 
for whom the band performs, the disappearance of the deep connection 
with an audience that grounds the pleasures of popular music, despite the 
fact that their popularity in the West continues.
In this way, these Tuareg musicians exemplify the category of unpopular 
culture. With their homeland devastated, Tuareg musicians have become 
migrant workers moving from f ield to f ield, concert house to concert 
house, laboring where the opportunity arises, touring the West, perform-
ing music that draws rapturous crowds, negotiating marketing images 
and promotional narratives that misrecognize the political signif icance 
of their music. Tinariwen and their fellow Tuareg musicians continue to 
extend their musical offerings to crowds that do not understand their lyrics 
and that often subsume their struggles into a monolithic category of rebel 
rockers derived from an earlier moment in musical and political history. 
Yet, this misrecognition makes possible their f inancial survival. Ironically, 
in this way they have become more like the great blues performers of the 
mid-twentieth century who found white college students listening to them 
after their black audiences had moved on to soul and hard-bop. Perhaps this 
is the true link between desert blues and the older form. Both musical styles 
became globally popular with White Western audiences at the moment 
when their sounds no longer connected organically with their original 
conditions of production. Both musical styles look backwards even as they 
sing the future possibility of a larger political community, one not divided 
by violence but connected through the shared experience of musical beauty.
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Returning their music to the complexities of its context does not situate 
Tinariwen as political innocents nor as heroic rebel rockers. While many of 
their Western fans retain a blurred picture of that context and a romantic 
framework for their listening, the advance in journalistic response evi-
denced in Lipez’s analysis suggests that the experience of musical beauty 
is generating a drive towards a more full understanding of the complexi-
ties demanded of a more expansive political community capable of truly 
recognizing the range of combatants in North Africa. This suggests that 
the inevitable misrecognition that frames all listening to truly new music 
can be and indeed often must be the f irst step towards the interrogative 
listening that invites the transformation of political community. Thus, the 
unpopular sows the seeds of a popular to come.
Notes
1. Portions of this chapter were first published in the ‘Coda’ to my book The 
Political Force of Musical Beauty. Thank you to Duke University Press for 
permission to reprint.
2. For a sample critique of the concept of culture as a bounded whole, see 
Crehan 36–66.
3. Bob White makes a similar point in ‘The Promise of World Music: Strategies 
for Non-Essentialist Listening’ when he asserts that consuming world music 
often leads to essentialist assumptions about the culture that produced the 
music. His analysis of the problem is less subtle than Kheshti’s, however, 
relying as it does on an unnecessary one-to-one link between musical style 
and cultural identity for his own position as well as the listening practices 
he critiques. But his list of strategies for avoiding essentialist listening is 
useful.
4. See also Whitehouse 17–18.
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 Cultural Studies and the Un/Popular
How the Ass-Kicking Work of Steven Seagal May Wrist-
Break Our Paradigms of Culture
Dietmar Meinel
‘Steven Seagal. Action Film. USA 2008.’
—German TV Guide
The f irst foreigner to run an aikido dojo in Japan, declared the reincarna-
tion of a Buddhist lama, blackmailed by the mob, environmental activist, 
small-town sheriff, owner of a brand of energy drinks, f ilm producer, writer, 
musician, and lead in his f irst f ilm (cf. Vern vii), 1980s martial arts action 
f ilm star Steven Segal is a fascinating but often contradictory f igure. Yet, 
Seagal is strikingly absent from the contemporary revival of seasoned 
action-film heroes such as Sylvester Stallone, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Bruce 
Willis, Jean-Claude Van Damme, Dolph Lundgren, and Chuck Norris in 
The Expendables (2010), The Expendables 2 (2012), and The Expendables 
3 (2014). In contrast, ‘starring’ in up to four direct-to-video releases each 
year over the last decade, Seagal has become a successful entrepreneur of B 
movies. The (very) low production values of these f ilms, however, highlight 
rather than conceal his physical demise as incongruent, confusing, and 
Godard-style editing replaces the fast-paced martial arts action of earlier 
movies. While his bulky body has become a disheartening memento of his 
glorious past, his uncompromising commitment to spiritual enlighten-
ment and environmental protection arguably elevates him above the mere 
ridiculousness of his f ilms.
In this essay, I will explore Seagal and his oeuvre as he moved from ac-
claimed martial arts action star to bizarre media f igure in order to devise a 
framework for un/popular culture. By reading the thirty-year long career of 
Seagal as consistently unpopular and consistently popular, I appropriate and 
utilize what James Storey describes as the ‘absent other’ (1). In Cultural Theory 
and Popular Culture (2010), Storey draws attention to the dualistic dimension 
of any attempt to define the popular. Since most conceptualizations juxtapose 
the popular with an ‘absent other’—whether folk, high, or working-class 
culture—any analysis will be ‘powerfully affect[ed by] the connotations 
brought into play when we use the term “popular culture”’ (Storey 1).
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Indeed, def initions of popular culture and its absent others utilize 
quantitative and qualitative categories. In his Keywords (1983), for ex-
ample, Raymond Williams describes popular culture as a phenomenon 
‘well-liked by many people’ to which ‘well-liked by few people’ functions 
as its unpopular other. While to be ‘disliked by many people’ constitutes a 
second other in the example, this notion of a detested, yet widely known 
phenomenon suggests an additional dimension of the un/popular. Rather 
than a quantitative assessment, the popular can, as Williams maintains, 
also designate ‘inferior kinds of work (cf. popular literature, popular press as 
distinguished from quality press); and work deliberately setting out to win 
favour (popular journalism as distinguished from democratic journalism, 
or popular entertainment)’ (237, emphases in original). Although differ-
ent qualities def ine the value of a text (independent of its quantitative 
distribution), often high art serves as this absent other of popular literature 
or entertainment. In Williams’s example, the notion of a ‘democratic jour-
nalism’ also foreshadows a third category of the popular in addition to its 
quantitative (known vs unknown) and qualitative dimension (inferior 
culture vs high art). As Williams also deems popular culture to represent 
‘the culture actually made by people for themselves’ (237), in this Marxist 
understanding of popular culture, an authentic culture of the working class 
or ‘the people’ exists that functions as a space of resistance against capitalist 
appropriation and commodif ication.
Similarly, among the six def initions of popular culture James Storey of-
fers, the notion of popular culture as a quantitative measure, an anti-thesis 
to high art, and as a (authentic) culture of the people f igure prominently. 
Even when Storey lists def initions describing the popular as ‘mass culture’, 
as part of the ideological apparatuses, or as an essential feature of hegemony 
(cf. 5–12), these latter notions all delineate a political function as well. In 
this sense, Storey’s def initions equally underscore the quantitative, the 
qualitative, and the ideological or conceptual dimension of popular culture 
that Williams alludes to. Linked to each other even in their absence, thus, 
the notion of the popular, the unpopular, and high art necessitate a shared 
conceptual framework I label the un/popular.
Having appeared (and often starred) in over forty f ilms, Steven Seagal 
experienced the height of Hollywood blockbuster popularity and the lows 
of direct-to-video unpopularity as he evolved from promising action f ilm 
performer to blockbuster star to direct-to-video celebrity in the course of his 
career. This eventful trajectory from box off ice draw to low-budget entre-
preneur serves to designate the intimate connections between the popular 
and the unpopular—and allows me to assess the quantitative dimension of 
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the un/popular by looking at the commercial success and failure of his f ilms. 
Given that the actor developed and maintained a particular Seagal formula 
inseparable from his public persona in his f ilms, his music, and TV shows, 
Seagal also mirrors auteur practices and postmodern authorial strategies. 
Since the martial artist further advocates an environmentalist position 
in his otherwise sensationalist action f ilms, Seagal also echoes those 
post-postmodern theories that link postmodern metaf ictional play with a 
‘sincere’ desire for political consciousness (cf. Saldivar, ‘Historical Fantasy’ 
593–96). In appropriating auteur theory, postmodern performativity, and 
notions of the post-postmodern, I analyze the cultural text ‘Steven Seagal’ 
within the context of high art and investigate the qualitative dimension 
of the un/popular in order to question the dichotomous construction of 
inferior popular art versus superior (and unpopular) high art. So instead 
of attempting to understand the popular, the unpopular, and high art as 
autonomous, individual phenomena, I explore their numerous links to 
provide a f irst understanding of Steven Seagal’s un/popularity.
Yet, when Martin Lüthe and Sascha Pöhlmann characterize the unpopu-
lar as ‘that which is not part of a (perceived) mainstream mass culture but 
not part of a bourgeois high culture either’ (18) in their introduction to 
this volume, both situate the phenomenon in-between high and popular 
culture and call attention to the individual quality of the unpopular. Look-
ing at unpopular texts may broaden our prevailing paradigm of culture, 
particularly because the abscence of popularity (as a quantative measure) 
and high cultural ascriptions often justify a disregard for these texts. Since 
scholars refer to either the artistic quality of a text or its widespread recep-
tion to legitimize the study of a particular phenomenon, in this logic, texts 
only possess validity if they are representational—of a particular social 
formation, period, or idea (cf. Hatt and Klonk 22–25). Due to its (absence 
of) particular qualities, unpopular culture disrupts this Hegelian notion 
predominant in literary studies and cultural studies. Indeed, unpopular 
texts function poorly as representations of their period and their social 
formations, because hardly anyone reads, watches, or appraises these 
productions. Unpopular culture such as the later Seagal productions even-
tually question this representationalist paradigm and necessitate novel 
approaches to conceptualizing culture.
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From Box Office Draw to Home Entertainment Entrepreneur
In his f irst four f ilms, Above the Law (1988), Hard to Kill (1990), Marked for 
Death (1990), and Out for Justice (1991), Steven Seagal established himself 
as a promising action f ilm performer. Because all of the f ilms grossed a 
multiplicity of their production costs at the box off ice,1 Seagal’s f irst four 
releases must be considered successful genre productions.2 His f ilms did 
not rival the commercial success of the most popular action f ilms of the 
late 1980s—Top Gun (1986) or Die Hard (1988)3—but Seagal could compete 
with the established stars of the genre. Although Sylvester Stallone and 
Arnold Schwarzenegger had paved the way for the action f ilm hype of the 
1980s, their f ilms often did not perform better at the box off ice or match 
the revenues of the Seagal f ilms.4 Judging by the people willing to see his 
f ilms, Steven Seagal has to be considered popular in the period from 1988 
to 1991—particularly within the context of the action f ilm genre. The com-
mercial success of his early f ilms propelled Seagal to star in the high value 
productions Under Siege (1992), On Deadly Ground (1994), Under Siege 2 
(1995), and Executive Decision (1996). In these f ilms, Seagal was supported 
by well-established actors such as Michael Caine or Tommy Lee Jones or 
starred alongside Kurt Russell and Halle Berry. But when the last three of 
these high-value productions failed at the box office, the commercial f iascos 
initiated his descent into direct-to-video obscurity.5 As his follow-up produc-
tions Glimmer Man (1996) and Fire Down Below (1997) led to even greater box 
office losses,6 his next f ilm, although initially planned for cinematic release, 
was eventually exclusively distributed in video stores: The Patriot (1998) thus 
ushered in a period of direct-to-video productions. Although Seagal reap-
peared on the silver screen two additional times with mixed success—in 
Exit Wounds (2001) and Half Past Dead (2002)7—his box off ice career ended 
in 1998 and was supplanted by a long-lasting one in direct-to-video projects. 
Starring in f ilms exclusively released for the (rental) video, DVD, and Blu-ray 
market, Seagal maintained a vocation in f ilm with almost no signif icant 
commercial success to merit high-value productions again.8 Although his 
following 23 releases in nine years (2001–2010) generated enough revenue 
to continuously f inance his next video endeavor, the martial arts actor 
Steven Seagal has virtually disappeared from public notice since the late 
1990s. While his name may still ring a bell even among people uninitiated 
to his f ilms, Seagal has become a faint memory of some cult 1980s action 
f ilms or a synonym for cheap and obscure B movies.9
This transformation from blockbuster draw to obscure media f igure 
represents a decisive quality of the Seagal phenomenon. In contrast to 
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similarly cult and obscure 1980s action stars such as Jean-Claude van 
Damme or Chuck Norris, Seagal actually became popular starring in high-
profile action f ilms.10 But in contrast to Stallone, Schwarzenegger, or Willis, 
Seagal eventually disappeared from (big budget) silver screen productions to 
submerge in the (quantitative) meaninglessness of direct-to-video releases. 
While other actors build a more popular or a more unpopular career, Steven 
Seagal functions to exemplify the quantitative aspects of the un/popular. 
As Seagal also appropriates a variety of high-art strategies throughout the 
popular and unpopular phases of his career, his oeuvre allows us to similarly 
explore the ways in which his auteur performance and post-postmodern 
practices further shape the un/popular. Much as Seagal’s commercial 
un/popularity, the artistic continuity in his work contests the traditional 
high art (unpopular) and low culture (popular) divide.
Performing the Post-Postmodern Auteur
French auteur theory considers directors to be authors who express their 
aesthetic and political visions through f ilm. With its inception in the 
Cahier du Cinema in the 1950s, auteur theory—or la politique des auteurs, 
as Francois Truffaut f irst named the approach in his article ‘A Certain Ten-
dency in the French Cinema’ (1954)—attempted to alter the status of f ilms 
and directors. ‘[A] director must exhibit certain recurrent characteristics 
of style, which serve as his signature’ (132), asserts Andrew Sarris when 
introducing auteur theory to the Anglophone world in ‘Notes on the Auteur 
Theory in 1962’. In connecting the feel, the look, and the meaning of a f ilm 
to the thoughts and ideas of its author-director, auteur theory ascribes a 
‘distinguishable personality’ to directors and defines these men and women 
to be the ‘criterion of value’ (Sarris 132). Since motion pictures had not been 
considered a valid form of art well into the 1950s and cinematic texts were 
consigned to the realm of ‘mass culture […] commonly dismissed with terms 
such as “entertainment” and “escapism”’ (Wexman 3), the rationale behind 
appropriating literary theory for f ilm analysis thus attempted to elevate the 
works of a small number of directors to the status of high art. In acknowledg-
ing the limits set by the demands of the commercial Hollywood production 
system, auteur theory furthermore locates the artistic quality of a director 
in privileged moments of a f ilm, which urges critics ‘to master the entire 
body of a director’s output (or oeuvre) so that a pattern of these privileged 
moments of personal vision could be discerned’ (Wexman 3). Because of its 
emphasis on the entire corpus of an auteur-director, its appreciation of the 
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necessities of commercial production modes, and its desire to def ine f ilm 
as high art, auteur theory offers a valuable frame within which to situate 
the work of Steven Seagal.
But since no one considers Seagal a particularly artistic director and he 
has only directed one f ilm in his entire career, auteur theory may appear 
impracticable and inadequate for his work. By starring in most of his 42 
f ilms, however, Steven Seagal is an apt example of what pop critic Vern 
labels the ‘Badass Auteur Theory’ in his Seagology: A Study of the Ass-Kicking 
Films of Steven Seagal (2012). In this theory, the ‘badass (or star) […] carries 
through themes from one picture to the next […] it is the star that connects 
the body of work more than the director’ (Vern v). This augmented version 
of auteur theory acknowledges and privileges the coherence stars create 
over the course of their f ilms.
In many respects, the characters played by Seagal encourage such a 
comparative approach. From his early performances in the 1980s on, Seagal 
established a narrow set of character traits his later roles continuously 
rehearse:
enlightened men with shadowy CIA pasts, westerners with expertise in 
Asian ways (aikido, swords, herbology, Buddhism), various types of mafia 
(Italian-American, European, Asian), music (blues, bluegrass, reggae, 
much of it performed by or written by Seagal himself), the protection of 
animals or the environment. (Vern vi)
As Seagal f ilms ‘always end up featuring some of his obsessions’ (Vern vi), 
the identity of the f ilm artist spills into the f ilms just as character traits 
transcend the cultural text. Already the very f irst shots of his f irst f ilm, 
Above the Law (1988), exhibit this entanglement of artist persona and 
f ilm character. Opening with childhood memories of protagonist Nico 
Toscani, his voice-over tells the story of a teenage adolescent fascinated by 
martial arts who eventually journeys to Japan to become a highly respected 
aikido master. While the f ilm score softly plays classical music to further 
embellish this narrative of individual success, the cinematography shows 
childhood pictures and newspaper clippings of Steven Seagal during his 
time in Japan when the actor-to-be trained to become an aikido master. By 
using the childhood photos of the artist Steven Seagal and his biographical 
experiences to introduce its protagonist, Above the Law questions their 
clear-cut distinction.11 As virtually all Seagal characters share these traits, 
his f ilms establish a pattern in which the biography of the actor is almost 
synonymous with his roles and vice versa. Intimately involved in writing 
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and producing many of his f ilms, Seagal can bring, as Vern summarizes, ‘a 
certain personality, formula and set of motifs to pretty much every picture 
he ever does’ (vi). Even when not immediately part of the creative process, 
this Seagal formula functioned as an artistic and commercial strategy, as 
the actor explains: ‘“I haven’t always been dealt scripts that were palatable 
and movies that I thought were even makeable, and I think one of the 
secrets of my success is that I changed them into something that was almost 
watchable”’ (Vern vi, emphasis in original).
This interrelation of artist persona and f ilm character is a common 
phenomenon in the Hollywood f ilm industry; producers, f ilm-makers, 
and actors have always employed biographical information to enlarge and 
embroider a star persona in order to promote a f ilm (cf. Harris 42–43).12 
Most famously, Marilyn Monroe has (been) exploited (by) the assumed 
similarities between her roles, her personal experiences, and her private 
persona as her symbolic meanings ‘far outrun what actually happens in 
her f ilms’ (Dyer 3)—the star system as such ‘is based on the premise that a 
star is accepted by the public in terms of a certain set of personality traits 
which permeate all of his or her f ilm roles’ (Harris 41). As a consequence, 
Christine Gledhill encourages intertextual readings and interdisciplinary 
analysis of stars and their roles as one coherent phenomenon (cf. xii).
Instead of an individual f ilm, then, star studies def ine the actor or per-
former as the principal analytical category and encourage to explore the 
entire body of his or her work—which includes a broad variety of material 
beyond the cinematic text. This concentration on individual artists, the 
concentration on the entire work of a performer, and the notion of a coherent 
personal vision resemble the analytical approach of auteur theory. Since 
the celebrity status of f ilm auteurs also helps ‘produce and promote texts 
that invariably exceed the movie itself, both before and after its release’ 
(Corrigan 101), star studies and auteur theory allow us to understand the 
Seagal phenomenon as part of mass culture (the star) and high art (the 
auteur).
By the time of Seagal’s f irst blockbuster production Under Siege (1992), his 
character Casey Ryback did not need an intimate introduction anymore as 
audiences already knew in advance about the superior close-combat abili-
ties of Ryback/Seagal. Neither an average street cop nor a lowly cook, Nico 
Toscani and Casey Ryback—and Mason Storm and John Hatcher and Gino 
Felino and Forest Taft—are all highly decorated elite experts in martial arts, 
weaponry, and military tactics of some sort. These characters also share a 
clandestine past as well-trained combat men who work some uneventful 
job after their dishonorable discharge from the army—usually due to their 
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insubordination to a corrupt or immoral superior. And while no similar 
military records of Seagal exist, his ambition to raise, in his words, ‘“political 
conscientiousness”’ (Vern vi) echoes the motivation of his characters to act 
by a general moral code and ‘do what’s right’ (On Deadly Ground)—even 
if this includes the disobedience of the chain of command and leads to a 
dishonorable discharge. These shared political ambitions are particularly 
highlighted in f ilms addressing ecological devastation. Condemning the 
commercial exploitation of nature, Forest Taft, Jack Taggart, or Dr. Wesley 
McClaren express an ‘“environmental conscientiousness”’ (Vern vi) in On 
Deadly Ground (1994), Fire Down Below (1997), or The Patriot (1998) that is 
also dear to Seagal.
In addition to the martial arts expertise, a potpourri of imagined Asian 
cultures, political and environmental concerns, and an aff inity for Bud-
dhism, Seagal characters also often possess talents the actor indulges in. 
As a musician, guitar player, and lead of his blues band Thunderbox, Steven 
Seagal is not only credited with composing and co-composing soundtracks; 
in Fire Down Below (1997), protagonist Jack Taggart also picks up a guitar.
Finally, the reality TV show Steven Seagal: Lawman (2009-2010) further 
blurs easy distinctions between artist persona and f ilm character. The 
show follows police reserve deputy ‘Steven Seagal’ of Jefferson Parish, 
Louisiana—something the artist Steven Seagal has been supposedly doing 
for the past twenty years. Although the reality TV format asserts to portray 
‘Steven Seagal […] as a real-life cop in Louisiana’ and maintains to be ‘No Act’ 
(as the tagline for Lawman asserts), the scripted, f ilmed, and edited nature 
of the reality TV format undermines any claim to authenticity. Throughout 
the show, people on the streets also recognize protagonist ‘Steven Seagal’ as 
a f ilm star rather than as an off icer of the law. Being asked for autographs, 
people assure Deputy Sheriff ‘Seagal’ that he could beat Jean-Claude van 
Damme but would lose to Chuck Norris in a f ight, or apologetically state 
that ‘“this is my f irst time going to jail, Mr. Stallone”’ (Vern 382). Steven 
Seagal: Lawman further underscores the performativity of identity, since 
the artist Steven Seagal stars as Reserve Deputy Sheriff ‘Steven Seagal’, a 
‘martial artist, movie star, blues musician, herbalist, acupuncturist, dog 
owner, philanthropist and swordsman turned Deputy Sheriff’ (Vern 371) 
who became a f ilm star by playing police off icers with martial art skills, 
Buddhist beliefs, blues music aff inities, and philanthropic world views. 
Because the show eventually reveals the clandestine past of star-auteur 
Steven Seagal working for a law enforcement agency, Lawman further 
authenticates his f ilm characters and f ictionalizes his biography.13
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Although this interplay of public persona and f ilm role(s) is a common 
phenomenon for Hollywood’s star system, in contrast to his action f ilm 
colleagues Stallone, Schwarzenegger, or van Damme, Seagal never ventured 
beyond the action f ilm genre to shoot romances, comedies, or science f ic-
tion—no out-of-character performance challenged the linkage between art-
ist persona and f ilm f igure. While in the work of Stallone, Schwarzenegger 
or van Damme biographical information also spills into their f ilms, starring 
as a police off icer of the twenty-second century, as a cyborg sent from the 
future to wipe out humanity, or as a video-game character distinguished 
these performers from their roles.14 Not surprisingly, the very f irst works in 
Seagal’s career already announce the amalgamation of artist persona and 
character when f ilm posters and video covers declare that ‘Steven Seagal 
is Hard to Kill’ (Hard To Kill), ‘Steven Seagal is Marked for Death’ (Marked 
for Death), and ‘Steven Seagal is Out for Justice’ (Out for Justice).
In spite of this continuous play of references, Steven Seagal does not 
merely exhibit (or appropriate) postmodern authorial strategies, since 
the performer also consistently articulates political or ethical positions. 
Indeed, his work can be considered what Ramon Saldivar has labeled ‘post-
postmodern’, since the Seagal oeuvre attempts to give ‘a sincere explanation 
for murder, cruelty, and evil, without resorting to postmodern irony or 
metafictional play’ (‘Imagining Cultures’ 12). Condemning corporate power, 
denouncing the primacy of profit, decrying a propagandistic media culture, 
demanding increased environmental f ines, and advocating people’s rights,15 
the earnest, sincere, and passionate ending of an otherwise ludicrous and 
over the top action f ilm such as On Deadly Ground (1994) fashions ‘links 
between the fantasy of the imaginary and the real of history’ (Saldivar, 
‘Imagining Cultures’ 13, emphasis in original). These intersections of 
postmodern play and ‘political and environmental conscientiousness’ is a 
def ining quality of Seagal’s work and the post-postmodern.
Unpopular Popularity
The different quantitative (known vs unknown) and qualitative (inferior 
mass culture vs high art) frames of reading Seagal provide a preliminary 
summary of what may constitute the un/popular. First, I deemed Seagal 
highly popular during the f irst decade of his career as his f ilms succeeded 
at the box off ice; and although his big-budget productions mostly failed, the 
willingness of the studios to spend large budgets on a Seagal f ilm further 
signals his initial popularity. Additionally, I appropriated auteur theory, 
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explored the conjunction of artist persona and f ilm character, and hinted 
at the post-postmodern qualities of the Seagal oeuvre to explore its links 
to different high art discourses. Since Seagal’s commercially successful 
f ilms exemplify these practices and strategies, the early phase of his career 
combines the quantitative feature of the popular and the qualitative ele-
ments of high art.
Second, after his commercial peak in the mid-1990s, Seagal descended 
into the realm of direct-to-video productions and, thus, became quantita-
tively unpopular. The B movie obscurity of his productions, however, does 
not conceal their postmodern and post-postmodern quality as numerous 
aesthetic features of his early work def ine Seagal’s later releases—particu-
larly his career as a musician and his TV show further encourage to situate 
the complete ‘Steven Seagal archive’ within high art authorial strategies. The 
direct-to-video films additionally exhibit a cinematic quality fundamentally 
different from the commercially popular Seagal f ilms. Due to the poor 
acting, the cheap mise-en-scene, the incoherent f ight choreographies, and 
the chaotic editing, the former often mirror the discontinuous f ilming 
pioneered by Jean-Luc Godard, while the inconsistencies in the plot further 
deconstruct the immersion aimed for by Hollywood cinema. In this sense, 
Seagal’s direct-to-video releases (and maybe B movies in general) share 
numerous cinematic elements with the French New Wave, whose directors 
utilized these strategies to challenge the established codes and boundaries 
of Hollywood cinema. As an artist engaged with questions of authorship, 
the direct-to-video-Seagal continues to epitomize contemporary high art 
practices, but the marginal audience interest in his DVD premiere releases 
speaks to his increasing quantitative unpopularity.
Third, despite the numerous high art practices in his oeuvre, Seagal 
achieved his commercial success in a highly conventional genre by starring 
in predominantly generic productions. Although I have not analyzed their 
politics of representation, f ilms such as Marked for Death (1990) or Under 
Siege (1992) exhibit highly normative narratives and imagery in the decidedly 
Hollywood fashion of mainstream film. As his highest grossing f ilm Under 
Siege (1992) also apes the prominent Die Hard (1988) formula, critics deemed 
the f ilm an inferior copy of the Bruce Willis vehicle upon release. Due to 
this absence of narrative originality, cinematic innovation, or ideological 
transgression, Seagal’s commercially successful theatrical releases represent 
the popular in its derogatory sense of inferior ‘mass’ culture.
Finally, thanks to the dearth of any artistic, aesthetic, or narrative sophis-
tication viewers often resent the action f ilm genre in general and the Seagal 
f ilms in particular as low forms of art or entertainment. Actually, this is not 
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an inaccurate assessment with regard to direct-to-video productions and 
Seagal. Neither watched by a noteworthy audience, nor attributable with 
considerable cultural relevance, The Foreigner (2003), Submerged (2005), 
Today You Die (2005), or Pistol Whipped (2008) could very well be considered 
completely unpopular. Since these video releases do not appear to follow 
any artistic aspirations but merely the necessities of low budget productions, 
one may f ind my assertion of auteur theory, postmodern performativity, 
and the post-postmodern stretching the boundaries of these concepts. 
As Seagal never indicated any kind of ambition or desire to utilize these 
theories in his f ilms, a fourth conclusion may simply deem his later work 
(quantitative) unpopular and (qualitative) irrelevant.
These different readings of Steven Seagal, as I have suggested in the 
beginning, should function to expose the interdependence of the popular, 
high art, and the unpopular—and complicate a coherent def inition of the 
un/popular. These categories, characterized whichever way, cannot be 
thought separately. And while the career of Steven Seagal has enabled me 
to explore the intricate conjunctions of the quantitative and qualitative 
features of the un/popular, the commercial insignif icance (unpopular 
culture) and cultural irrelevance (popular culture) of his direct-to-video 
releases—his unpopular popularity—fosters questions about the necessity 
to study this and similar phenomena. What are, in other words, worthwhile 
avenues of thought opened up by the un/popular?
One inquiry could, for example, explore the normative and subversive 
functions of the direct-to-video sphere. In analogy to the early star system, 
which emphasized the morality of its protagonists to portray the cinema as 
‘a healthy phenomenon’ (De Cordova 29), questions about the (re)production 
of social norms through the un/popular become prominent. Richard de 
Cordova, for example, situates the attempts of the f ilm industry to convey 
a proper, wholesome image of its protagonists within cinema’s (com-
mercial) competition with a theater scene that the public often perceived 
as scandalous and frivolous in the 1910s. Following highly aesthetic and 
narrative conventions, the Seagal f ilms exemplify a set of social norms 
and can similarly help to analyze hegemonic ideological formations in the 
present. Due to its commercial irrelevance, however, the un/popular can 
also function as a marginal space where subversive, aesthetically daring, 
and unruly practices f ind a realm for expression and open up novel perspec-
tives about the direct-to-video market, its stars, and their roles within the 
broader cultural industry.
Yet, in assessing the subversive and normative potentials of the un/
popular, the f inancial limitations of these projects particularly (and 
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involuntarily) impact the ‘healthiness’ or unruliness of un/popular texts: as 
the poor cinematic quality of B movies often challenges or undermines the 
seamless immersion pursued by Hollywood films, novel conceptualizations 
of the f ilm apparatus and its interpellatory possibilities become necessary. 
This (unwilling) instability of the un/popular may thus help to expand our 
understanding of the subversive and normative features of cultural texts 
in general.
A different approach to the un/popular could investigate the limitations 
posed by the star persona. By developing a household name or brand iden-
tity, stars and auteurs successfully compete in a highly volatile commercial 
market, but they are simultaneously tied to their public persona and, 
consequentially, to audience expectations. These may become inhibiting 
when stars aim to (or have to) alter their persona, yet hope to maintain 
their popularity (cf. Harris 45). While successful child actors encounter this 
challenge most prominently, the un/popularity of Steven Seagal encourages 
us to explore whether his public persona and his roles are particularly suited 
for a B movie career. In what ways, for example, is the Seagal formula bound 
to fail in large box off ice productions but especially prone to success in 
the direct-to-video context? In this sense, un/popularity offers a frame of 
analysis for different authorial strategies.
Finally, in his seminal Heavenly Bodies (1987), Richard Dyer describes 
stars as texts through which contemporary society negotiates ‘what it is to 
be a human being […] [or] the particular notion we hold of the person, of 
the “individual”’ (8). Seen from this perspective, the un/popularity of Seagal 
may offer insights, for example, into popular forms of male individuality in 
the early 1990s (cf. Malin 31-37) and its altered notions in the present. The 
revived popularity of aging action stars such as Stallone, Schwarzenegger, 
Willis, van Damme, and Norris16 as well as the continued unpopularity of 
Seagal could help to chart contemporary conceptions of male individuality 
through the un/popularity of particular star personalities.
These eclectic suggestions indicate the possibilities of the un/popular 
within studies of culture. To explore the normative and subversive potential 
the un/popular holds, to investigate the limitations of an un/popular star 
persona, or to read the un/popular within the context of individuality, how-
ever, confines the un/popular and the unpopular to the representational 
paradigm of cultural studies. Quantitatively negligible and artistically 
irrelevant, however, the unpopular challenges our conceptualizations of 
culture as these texts seemingly fail to offer any insight into a broader 
understanding of the world.
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Wrist-Breaking Hegelian Paradigms of Culture
In analyzing the transnational dimensions of American exceptionalism, 
Winfried Fluck identif ies a shared premise in national as well as trans-
national approaches to American studies. The def ining hypothesis in 
the study of culture, he asserts in his essay ‘Men In Boats and Flaming 
Skies’, is the assumption that ‘art can reveal deeper truths about an age 
or a society, because it is the result of a drive towards self-consciousness 
of the universal spirit’ (142). Although the Hegelian presupposition of a 
universal or ‘metaphysical’ spirit, as Fluck is quick to add, does not represent 
the principles of cultural studies today,  ‘the assumption that the study 
of art is important because it provides something like a privileged form 
of self-recognition of a culture, nation, or group is alive and well, even in 
such seemingly far removed approaches like race and gender studies or 
postcolonial studies’ (142). Whether referring to its cultural signif icance 
or its wide distribution, scholars often invoke one of the two to justify the 
analysis of a particular archive (cf. Fluck 143)—actually, literary studies 
and cultural studies would not be imaginable without this presupposition.
Seen from this perspective, the un/popular sustains this concept of 
culture. By exploring unpopularity in the context of the popular, the ap-
proach maintains the primacy of the latter and the supposition about art 
and culture as privileged sites of knowledge. Instead of using the unpopular 
merely as another puzzle piece within our established frame of culture, 
however, to position the unpopular at the heart of our conceptualization 
of culture would  shared fundamentally transform our understanding of 
culture. In exposing the shared Hegelian premises of national and transna-
tional approaches to American studies, Fluck asks whether we can imagine 
any alternatives to our established approaches to culture. After all, in order 
to question nationalist assumptions about culture, transnationalism can-
not merely be satisf ied with envisioning borderlands and contact zone 
or exposing intricate Atlantic and Pacif ic networks while continuing to 
employ a Hegelian understanding of culture. If we do not conceptualize 
cultural texts as representing nations, societies, or groups, however, the 
question arises ‘on what grounds cultural and aesthetic objects can still 
carry cultural and political meanings’ (Fluck 158).
Although I have highlighted the intersections of the unpopular, the 
popular, and high art throughout my essay, the particular features of un-
popular culture—the absence of any artistic quality and the highly limited 
distribution of the text—offer yet untraversed paths in developing a novel 
paradigm of cultural studies. After all, the increasing democratization 
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of the technological means to produce cultural texts (literature, music, 
f ilm) and publish them on the internet demands to engage with questions 
concerning the quantity, the politics, and the aesthetics of unpopular mate-
rial. Beneath these novel archives of unpopular texts lurk deeper issues 
about the legitimation of cultural studies. So far, any study of culture has 
rationalized and validated its signif icance by asserting to offer ‘a privileged 
form of self-recognition’ (Fluck 142) not available to the natural sciences—
particularly in, although not limited to, the continuous competition for 
f inancial funding and social legitimation. While the engagement with 
unpopular culture may further foster stereotypes about the arbitrariness 
and irrelevance of the humanities, thinking about these texts may also 
expand the democratizing potential the study of culture possesses. Neither 
of particular artistic value nor widely distributed, the utterly insignif icant 
f ilms, music, and performances of Steven Seagal in the past f ifteen years 
eventually present us with an opportunity to question the Hegelian premise 
of literary and cultural studies.
Notes
1. Above the Law (1988) cost 7.5 million dollars in production and grossed 19 
million dollars at U.S. box offices, Hard to Kill (1990) 10 million and 47 mil-
lion, Marked for Death (1990) 12 million and 46 million, and Out for Justice 
(1991) 14 million and 40 million dollars respectively (cf. boxofficemojo.com). 
2. It is worth mentioning that Steven Seagal began his career by starring in his 
first film (with Sharon Stone and Pam Grier in supporting roles).
3. Top Gun (1986) cost 15 million dollars in production and made some 180 
million dollars at U.S. box offices; Die Hard (1988) made some 83 million 
dollars at the national box office while costing some 28 million dollars (cf. 
boxofficemojo.com).
4. Sylvester Stallone’s cult film Cobra (1986) made some 49 million dollars at 
U.S. box offices (production budget not available) and his Tango & Cash 
(1989) co-starring Kurt Russell some 64 million dollars (with a budget of 
55 million dollars). Arnold Schwarzenegger was able to bring in some 60 
million dollars (at a budget of 15 million dollars) with his Predator (1987), 38 
million dollars on a 27 million dollar budget with Running Man (1987), and 
35 million dollars (production budget not available) with Red Heat (1988) 
(cf. www.boxofficemojo.com).
5. At U.S. box offices Under Siege (1992) earned 83 million dollars (production 
budget: 35 millions), On Deadly Ground (1994) 39 million dollars (produc-
tion budget: 50 millions), Under Siege 2 (1995) 50 million dollars (production 
budget: 60 millions), Executive Decision (1996) 56 million dollars (produc-
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tion budget: 55 millions). Although all these films roughly earned the same 
amount of money at international box offices (not to mention the rental 
and video market), these films were considered flops by the studios.
6. At U.S. box offices Glimmer Man (1996) earned 20 million dollars (produc-
tion budget. 45 millions) and Fire Down Below (1997) 16 million dollars 
(production budget: 60 millions).
7. At U.S. box offices Exit Wounds (2001) earned 80 million dollars (produc-
tion budget: 33 millions) and Half Past Dead (2002) 19 million dollars (13 
millions).
8. Since information about direct-to-video releases (or rental revenues) for 
individual films is hard to acquire or often not available, a direct compari-
son between the DVD premiere movies and theatrical releases remains 
challenging. In general, home entertainment revenues of all VHS, DVDs, 
Blue-Rays, and online distributions (sales and rentals) reached some 18 bil-
lion dollars in 2013 (cf. Fritz http://www.wsj.com), while studio investments 
in direct-to-video productions reached some three billion dollars in 2005 
(cf. Hettrick and Lerman). These numbers indicate the value of the video 
entertainment market in general and the value of DVD premiere movies 
in particular. Yet, blockbuster Hollywood production, successful box office 
releases, and popular TV shows dominate the home entertainment market 
nonetheless—the annual list of the 100 top selling DVDs in the United 
States (since 2006), for example, contains no single Seagal film (cf. www.
the-numbers.com). As direct-to-video productions do not necessarily aim 
for a wider audience and often struggle to compete with the high-value the-
atrical releases repackaged for home entertainment, this absence of Seagal 
films does not come as a surprise.
At the same time, the home entertainment and the direct-to-video mar-
ket present the entrepreneur Seagal with profitable business opportunities. 
The martial arts performer earns up to four million dollars ‘for his work in a 
DVD premiere movie’ (Hettrick and Lerman). Indeed, many of his produc-
tions are shot on a ten-million-dollar budget and ‘[t]he top titles in the DVD 
premiere movie segment, including Seagal’s Belly of the Beast released last 
year [2004] and The Foreigner in 2003, each covered their budgets with the 
$14.3 million and $16.7 million generated from home video in the U.S. alone’ 
(Hettrick and Lerman). While these direct-to-video budgets correspond to 
the production costs of the early Seagal films in the 1980s (without factoring 
in inflation and changed production costs), the present-day direct-to-video 
releases compete in a highly enlarged and diversified market and profit from 
a dedicated base of supporters as ‘Seagal’s audience […] remains the same 
whether it is a movie in theaters or a DVD premiere’ (Hettrick and Lerman). 
For Steven Seagal, then, his films continue to provide a source of income 
and considerable wealth, but since the home entertainment and the direct-
to-video market profoundly expanded and diversified in the last thirty years, 
his profits are not necessarily a sign of wide-spread popularity. In addition, 
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when ‘live-action DVD premiere actors, particularly in the action genre, 
still suffer professional snubs for being a “direct-to-video star”’ (Lerman and 
Hettrick) in 2005 and when ‘[t]he biggest taboo in American cinema may 
be the direct-to-video (DTV) market’ (Erickson) even in 2013, these attitudes 
capture the unpopularity of this segment of the film industry. 
9. Seagal maintained a degree of renown and visibility not just through his 
direct-to-video releases. Rather, his extra-diegetic endeavors allowed the 
martial arts experts to continue his career as a celebrity. Beyond his films, 
TV shows and music Seagal also remained visible through tabloids and yel-
low press stories (particularly surrounding his divorce). With time, his early 
films earned Seagal a cult following making the martial arts expert known 
to people who may have never seen his films. In this paper, however, I will 
not focus on these and similar strategies of forming a public (or celebrity) 
persona. 
10. Norris and van Damme had their breakthrough as leading stars at U.S. box 
offices with Missing In Action (1984) which earned 23 million dollars (pro-
duction budget: 2,5 millions) and Bloodsport (1988) which 12 million dollars 
(production budget: 1.1 million) respectively. Until their appearance in The 
Expendables II (2012) both did not appear in any high value production, and 
in the 2012 film both play supporting roles with Stallone, Schwarzenegger, 
Willis, and (Jason) Statham playing key characters in the film. 
11. In his Seagalogy, Vern writes that Seagal ‘really did go to Japan as a young 
man, he may have really hung around in the general vicinity of the founder 
of aikido, and later he definitely did run an aikido school, unheard of for 
a white man in Japan […] However, Seagal’s claims and innuendo about 
working for the CIA are at best unverifiable’ (5).
12. Hollywood developed, systemized, and subsequently exploited this star 
phenomenon from its inception in the 1910s. Whether during the tightly 
managed studio system period until the 1950s or in the less regulated Hol-
lywood era afterwards, stars were often considered to transcend their films 
and, thus, manufactured a coherence among a set of otherwise diverse films 
(cf. Barker 1–22).
13. At Seagal concerts, audiences similarly conflate the different personas when 
people chant ‘Ryback, Ryback’ (cf. Vern 482).
14. Stallone in Demolition Man (1993), Schwarzenegger in The Terminator 
(1984), and van Damme in Street Fighter (1994).
15. The following quote is an excerpt (!) from a longer speech Forrest Taft, the 
protagonist of On Deadly Ground (1994), gives at the very end of the film: 
‘The concept of the internal combustion engine has been obsolete for over 
fifty years. But because of the Oil Cartels and corrupt government regula-
tion, we and the rest of the world have been forced to use gasoline for over 
a hundred years. Big Business is primarily responsible for destroying the 
water we drink, the air we breathe and the food we eat. They have no care 
for the world they destroy, only for the money they make in the process […] 
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these people broker toxic waste all over the world. They basically control 
the legislation, and, in fact, they control the Law. The Law says, ‘no com-
pany can be fined over $25,000 a day’. For companies making $10,000,000 
dollars a day by dumping lethal toxic wastes into the ocean, it’s only good 
business to continue doing this. They influence the media so that they can 
control our minds. They have made it a crime to speak out for ourselves, 
and if we do so we’re called ‘conspiracy nuts’ and we’re laughed at. We’re 
angry because we’re all being chemically and genetically damaged, and 
we don’t even realize it […] Our most common and God-given rights have 
been taken away from us. Unfortunately, the reality of our lives is so grim 
that nobody wants to hear it. Now, I’ve been asked what we can do? I think 
we need a responsible body of people that can actually represent us rather 
than Big Business. This body of people must not allow the introduction of 
anything into our environment that is not absolutely biodegradable or able 
to be chemically neutralized upon production. And finally, as long as there 
is profit to be made from polluting the Earth, companies and individuals 
will continue to do what they want. We have to force these companies to 
operate safely and responsibly, and with all our best interests in mind. So 
that when they don’t, we can take back our resources and our hearts and 
our minds and do what’s right’ (On Deadly Ground).
16. The Expendables (2010), RED (2010), The Expendables 2 (2012), Looper (2012), 
RED 2 (2012), Escape Plan (2013), and A Good Day to Die Hard (2013) are 
some of their most prominent recent releases.
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 Unpopular Sport Teams and the Social 
Psychology of ‘Anti-Fans’
Karsten Senkbeil
It is one of the most peculiar phenomena in sports cultures worldwide that 
the most successful team with the most fans in any given country or city 
is often at the same time the most unpopular among everybody else in the 
country, city, or league. The New York Yankees, for example, continue to 
maintain a love-hate relationship with baseball fans across the USA and 
even with fans in their hometown New York City, where in the past the 
Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Mets used to fascinate urbanites with 
their image of the likable though unsuccessful underdog. The top European 
soccer teams with a comparable magnitude in their respective leagues, 
such as Juventus F.C. in Italy or Bayern Munich in Germany, experience 
the same. Fans who usually f ind it hard to agree on anything (be it referee 
decisions, the likability, or the talent of certain players) because they are 
emotionally attached to different teams come together in the same blog 
or Facebook group to agree on one thing: that Juventus, the Bayern, or the 
Yankees are simply despicable. Sport teams thus represent a simple, yet 
most f itting example of Lüthe’s and Pöhlmann’s assessment that today, 
cultural products are often popular and unpopular at the same time (cf. 21).
Why, then, do fans from across the country unite1 in their overt contempt 
for a specif ic team? What is the psychological setup and the sociocultural 
rationale of the ‘hater fan’?2 Why do people fervently and outspokenly assign 
to themselves the role of a non-member of a certain fan group, instead of 
simply ignoring that which they do not care for?
The Sociology of Sport Fandom
Sports fandom and the social psychology of people who are interested 
in sports, who cheer and care for the team of their hometown or alma 
mater, and who choose to come together in small self-selected collectives 
to amplify their emotional attachment to that sport and team, are fairly 
well-understood cultural phenomena. Sociologists and anthropologists 
in the late twentieth century have identif ied the most signif icant so-
ciocultural reasons, motivations, and mechanisms behind fan cultures 
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in sports. Landmark studies that def ined the theoretical framework in 
which sociologists understand sports fandom include Bourdieu’s essay ‘How 
can one be a sports fan?’ (1978), in which he both asked and answered the 
question in its title by applying one of his core concepts, the ‘habitus’, to 
different types of sports. Bourdieu concluded that different social strata 
are fascinated by different types of sports, which mirror and reinforce 
social cleavages by being relatively exclusive for members of different social 
classes. Fiske’s influential work on ‘The Cultural Economy of Fandom’ (1992) 
adopted Bourdieu’s fundamental idea of sports participation and fandom as 
a production and accumulation of non-monetary ‘capital’ (cultural, social, 
or ideological), while overcoming some of the oversimplifying dichotomies 
that divided sports into either working-class or bourgeois pastimes without 
any leeway for ambiguity. Still, for Fiske fandom continued to be ‘associated 
with cultural tastes of subordinated formations of the people […] particu-
larly with those disempowered by any combination of gender, age, class, and 
race’ (30). Empirical studies in sociology, psychology, and communication 
that prove Fiske’s point exist in abundance (e.g. Carrington, Miller, Kay, to 
name only three representative examples). Yet today, 22 years after Fiske’s 
insightful argument, it appears necessary to re-evaluate Bourdieu’s and 
Fiske’s central idea that sports fan communities are always spawned by a 
def icit in off icial forms of cultural capital of those involved. As I will show 
later, it appears as if the identity construction as a sports af icionado and a 
knowledgeable sports small-talker, even about sports that used to imply the 
habitus of a lower class (such as soccer in Europe and American football in 
the USA), has become a form of socially acceptable, even beneficial behavior 
also for those who are flush in money and education, i.e. forms of off icial 
cultural capital.
In a different branch of social theory, but with clear relevance to the 
dynamics of sport fan groups, Maffesoli’s hypothesis about a new Time of 
the Tribes (1996) in postmodern urban societies can be readily applied and 
connected to the Bourdieuian approach. As I show elsewhere, several core 
characteristics of sports teams (the relevance of ritualized chanting and 
singing, sport’s ability to produce heroes and induce nostalgia, their being 
rather stably tied to their respective urban centers, thus spawning local 
patriotism) in fact render them potent foci of crystallization for post-modern 
‘pseudo-tribes’ (Maffesoli x; cf. also Senkbeil, Ideology).
Numerous empirical studies aff irm some of the core arguments of said 
scholars, while at the same time differentiating and nuancing the complexi-
ties of sports fandom, and sometimes cultural differences in different parts 
of the Western world (cf. for example Sugden and Tomlinson or Whannel). 
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The established lines of argument of Bourdieu, Fiske, and Maffesoli there-
fore form the foundation for the argument outlined in this paper. Yet, it 
appears as if the phenomenon of a collective disdain or even ‘hatred’ towards 
certain teams in modern team sports represents a distinctive subcultural 
phenomenon, which the work of the scholars mentioned above fails to fully 
account for. Fiske argues that being an active fan ‘is functional, it must be 
for something’ (35, my emphasis), indicating that participation is mostly 
purposeful on a social level; now it stands to argue whether one can be a fan 
against something, and whether the social functions are still comparable 
then. Sports sociology shows that ‘normal’ sports fans seek moments of joy 
and strong emotional involvement as central motivations for their participa-
tion in the stadium, particularly as modern life has increasingly become 
emotionally stale (cf. Dunning and Elias 16). Furthermore, prestige within 
one’s peer group belongs to the strong social functions of participatory 
fandom. At f irst glance, being a fervent hater or anti-fan seems to make less 
sense, as hatred, anger, and continued frustration (because the hated team 
usually continues to dominate the league f inancially and athletically) seem 
to be neither psychologically nor socially desirable effects.
Thus, departing from those landmark texts that have been introduced 
here, I attempt to show how anti-fan-culture can be seen both as an exten-
sion of and in opposition to more ‘normal’ fan culture in today’s Western 
societies. In a second step, a tentative qualitative study of the social semiot-
ics within said anti-fan groups online will sketch a typology of anti-fans, and 
attempt to extract three central reasons for why people choose to acquire 
and perform an anti-fan identity. Firstly, I argue that class dynamics in 
developed capitalistic societies are central in pushing certain fan groups 
to the margins, thus ‘producing’ hater fans while consumerism woos the 
normal ones. Secondly, I intend to show how an almost ‘mock-bourgeois’ 
form of traditionalism informs much of the scorn and insult towards hated 
teams. Finally, I will discuss how anti-fan performances serve social func-
tions whose motivations go beyond class but rather include power dynamics 
on the axes age and gender.
Anti-Fans vs ‘Normal’ Sports Fans: A Comparison
First, it appears necessary to shortly recapitulate the reasons that the 
Bourdieu-Fiskeian school of thought def ines as decisive for ‘normal’ sports 
fans’ performances and identity constructions. Then, based on qualitative 
empirical research, it will be possible to test whether the same arguments 
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hold for hater fans and their loose collectives that can be found on Facebook 
and other forums online. Why do ‘normal’ sports fans—those who cheer 
fervently for their favorite team at every home and many away games—do 
what they do?
Bourdieu’s theory of sports participation differentiates between cultural 
tastes and competences common among the privileged members of a society 
versus cultural tastes of those deprived from economic and off icial cultural 
capital (cf. Bourdieu 352–53). As the lower classes lacked access to those 
institutions that taught the competences and tastes for off icial3 cultural 
forms (such as opera and the f ine arts), they founded counter-cultural 
forms of ‘non-off icial’ cultural and social capital among the peer group 
of likeminded fans. This countercultural habitus included rougher, more 
physical forms of behavior, which is why physically aggressive sports were 
long considered typical working-class pastimes (such as for example boxing, 
soccer, rugby, and, though to a lesser extent, American football), as opposed 
to culturally more ‘refined’ but less physical sports (such as golf and tennis). 
When spectatorship of popular (in the sense of ‘non-elite’) sports developed 
into fan culture, the commitment to that particular form of habitus thus 
always formed outside of off icial institutions and usually with an implicit 
rebellion against established off icial culture.
The ‘shadow cultural economy’ (30) of fandom, as Fiske calls it, picking up 
the Bourdieuian train of thought, usually expropriated certain mechanisms 
and characteristics of that off icial culture to which it was (allegedly) op-
posed. To name just the strongest parallels: the gate-keeping and policing 
of the borders between the community of fans for team A (versus those 
of team B) continues to work remarkably similar to gatekeeping practices 
and processes in ‘higher’ cultural forms. Also, the background knowledge 
of historical events, personalities, and ritualized forms of behavior that 
an ‘initiate’ or ‘newcomer’ needs to show before he or she can be accepted 
among the ranks are as strongly marked as (maybe even more pronounced 
than) those within the communities of off icial culture. Also, it needs hard 
work and dedication to become a leading f igure within a sports fan group, 
just as it needs hard work and lots of practice to be accepted as a knowl-
edgeable arbiter of off icial culture. Moreover, ‘authenticity’ remains an 
essential criterion in the accumulation of off icial cultural capital, as the 
authentic sound of a particular orchestra, the authenticity of a painting, 
and the competence to recognize and ultimately own said authenticity 
remains at the core of off icial culture connoisseurship. This is reflected by 
the authenticity of one’s emotional involvement as a sports team fan: among 
‘ultra’ fans, it is met with the greatest amount of scorn when non-ultras (or 
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politicians, or the media, or advertisers) try to fake the emotional highs and 
lows of the ‘true believer’ (cf. Langer 54–66).
Moreover, despite the fact that early sports fan cultures (in the twentieth 
century) were considered grass-roots movements opposed to the upper 
class, the social return of investment of sports fans strongly resembled the 
usual forms of social capital. Being an accepted member of a fan collective 
grants a young man the esteem of his peers, respect and social status within 
the group, a feeling of solidarity among his ‘pseudo-tribe’ (Maffesoli x), 
i.e. with people who are neither his family nor close friends, but rather a 
‘self-selected fraction’ (Fiske 30) of the people, whose commonalities are 
often restricted to comparably small details.
For Bourdieu and Fiske, the huge difference between off icial culture and 
the shadow economy of fans’ cultural capital was that subcultural capital 
within the sports fan peer group could not (or only with a lot of diff icul-
ties) be translated into real economic capital. If anything, being a deeply 
involved fan of a working-class sport more often than not encumbered 
social upward mobility up until the late twentieth century. In opposition, 
off icial cultural capital, and this included the cultural capital acquired 
through membership in upper-class sports circles, usually produced social 
privilege and distinction, enabled networking with likeminded members 
of the upper class, and thus often represented an important step towards 
more economic capital down the road.
Bourdieu strongly emphasized this class dimension, and in the last 
decades both theoretical and empirical works have made the point that 
this simple dichotomy of bourgeois vs working-class sports fandom must 
be problematized and extended (cf. Sugden and Tomlinson, for example). 
We know today that fandom in almost all popular cultural forms is just as 
dynamic with regard to the axes of ethnicity, gender, and age. A look at the 
demographics of sports fandom shows that age appears to be a particularly 
signif icant variable for sports fandom. The most dedicated fan groups in 
stadiums mostly consist of young men (and few young women) intent on 
differentiating themselves from the off icial cultural norms of their parents 
and teachers (cf. Langer 51). At the same time, age is the one dimension of 
difference that inescapably changes over time for each and every one of us. 
From that perspective, it comes as no surprise that the self-proclaimed coun-
terculture of sports fans emulates and reincorporates many characteristics 
of off icial culture: in fact, the quasi-bourgeois mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion mirrored in sports fan groups prepare their participants 
for similar mechanisms in later life. Not coincidentally, a large fraction of 
the most devoted, enthusiastic, noisiest sports fans are in fact students at 
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high school or university (aged 15–25)4 (cf. Schwier), i.e. young people who 
are currently preparing themselves in off icial educational institutions to 
later in their lives become parts of the off icial culture they (think they) are 
symbolically opposing in their youth.
Testing the outlined arguments about ‘regular’ sports fans for a certain 
team with regards to those who call themselves ‘haters’ of a certain team, 
we f ind only little differences in the social-psychological rationale that 
probably motivates that self-identif ication. The policing of borders and 
mechanisms of exclusion may be less strict: becoming a member of, for 
example, the Facebook group called ‘Because I’ll always hate F.C. Bayern’5—
which has more than 86,000 followers—is voluntary and unrestricted,6 
but group founders and administrators keep an eye on which posts are 
deemed appropriate. For example, hateful remarks about single players 
of that despised team are acceptable, even celebrated, unless overt racism 
plays into them: even hater fans have to obey some of Facebook’s norms 
about political correctness. Those group members with the most cutting or 
witty remarks acquire high amounts of ‘Likes’, today’s common currency 
for desirable yet non-transferable subcultural social capital. Others put 
in hard work and effort, photoshopping the colors or jerseys of the hated 
teams into images of pigs (or other unfavorable animals), players’ heads onto 
animal bodies or into photos with humiliating sexual contexts, to gather 
‘Likes’ and praise for their ‘artwork’. Participants are most often young and 
male, their sense of humor (often) decidedly adolescent and intentionally 
‘tasteless’—a hint at the fact that hater fans position themselves as opposed 
to the mainstream, though probably subconsciously (as opposed to punk 
rock bands, for example, who intentionally make ‘bad taste’ a part of their 
agenda). In that sense, the social psychology of the hater fan mirrors to a 
large extent that of the normal fan—if maybe a bit more extreme in their 
neglect of the standardized rules of politeness and political correctness. In 
fact, it appears very likely that both groups signif icantly overlap.
Particularly when it comes to the ‘rowdiness’ and ‘bad taste’ of anti-fan 
groups, it is most worthwhile to recapitulate Fiske’s statement from 1992, 
in which he discussed the same kind of behavior among (normal) soccer 
fans in Great Britain and concluded that those fans,
many of whom are socially and economically disempowered males, can, 
when wearing their colors and when in their own community of fans, 
exhibit empowered behavior that only rarely really becomes violent and 
dangerous, but which more typically confines itself to assertiveness. (38)
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Today, the internet seems to be a prime medium to enable said symbolic 
assertiveness and rudeness, which never becomes really dangerous for 
anyone because of the spatial distance between the aggressor and potential 
retaliators who might feel insulted. This symbolic act of aggression, Fiske 
continues, is willfully ‘socially offensive, and deliberately challenges more 
normal social values and the discipline they exert’ (38). This behavior 
is, in fact, intended to ‘call forth considerable adult disapproval’ (Fiske 
38). On the one hand, this idea echoes Lüthe’s and Pöhlmann’s remarks 
about intentional unpopularity as a means to def ine an ‘underground’ 
aesthetic (cf. 8). In that respect, deliberately tasteless noisecore bands and 
rowdy soccer fans share some characteristics. On the other hand, the term 
‘adult disapproval’ in the quote above draws our attention back to age as a 
signif icant dimension of difference. ‘Adult’ probably need not necessarily 
be taken literally; we should consider it a metaphor for ‘the powers that 
be’ in society. Most rowdy soccer fans are young, but in fact of age; many of 
them are well-off, young, middle-class men at university (cf. Schwier) who 
behave like responsible adults in their day-to-day lives. Thus, differentiation 
along the axis of age—the (real or metaphoric) conflict between teenagers 
and adults—may be one key to understand anti-fans. I will return to this 
idea later.
So, even though the Fiskean-Bourdieuian argument holds not only for 
‘normal’ soccer fans but also for hater fans, it appears necessary to expand 
on one dimension in which the justif ications and reasoning in these groups 
are not congruent: their entanglement with consumerism. As mentioned 
earlier, Fiske and most other Cultural Studies scholars today agree that a 
clear distinction between the so-called popular as clearly distinguishable 
from and opposed to off icial or high culture is an oversimplif ication. Also, 
the def inition of ‘subculture’ has become increasingly diff icult, since in 
virtually all f ields of popular culture we can observe mainstream culture’s 
power to absorb any new subcultural forms after a while, incorporating 
them into the hegemonic system, adapting them to mainstream aesthetics 
and values, even ‘inventing’ or creating high-cultural validity to draw the 
socially and economically privileged towards the trend. There exist vari-
ous theoretical superstructures with which to explain this; one of them, 
the hegemony-theoretical approach based on the neo-Gramscian school 
of thought would argue that cultural hegemony (of modern mainstream 
consumer capitalism) is a form of dominance that is founded on the consent 
of its subjects to prevent their opposition. The smartest form to ensure the 
consent of the young and potentially rebellious (here: sports fans) may be 
to include their subcultural forms and practices (here: highly emotionalized 
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participation in the stadium) into the midst of mainstream consumer 
culture.
A look at media communication in sports (cf. for example Senkbeil, 
Ideology; Sage) shows how for a few decades, sports fans, particularly the 
most passionate ones, have become the target of consumer culture: they are 
wooed and flattered by advertising, welcomed by TV producers as ‘intense 
background noise’ to their sports broadcasts, applauded by cultural critics 
for their ‘authenticity’ and ‘loyalty’, and increasingly accepted and pursued 
as customers by big business.
A case in point is the emergence of the so-called Fanmeilen in German 
city centers during every big international soccer event following the FIFA 
world cup in 2006. There, the possibility to communally watch the games on 
a huge screen with thousands of others is cleverly surrounded by venues sell-
ing off icial merchandise and FIFA-licensed food and drink. An American 
example is the trend towards centrally organized and brand-sponsored 
‘tailgating parties’ around American stadiums. Tailgating, after all, was 
‘invented’ as a reaction to the lack of reasonable public transportation to 
many American stadiums (which is why American fans go to the stadium 
by car) and, particularly, as a reaction to the outlandish prices for food and 
alcoholic beverages within stadiums. Thus, American fans used to barbecue 
and party out of the trunks of their cars before games to specif ically avoid 
the excessive consumerism in stadiums. Today, brands (barbecue grill 
producers, beer brands, etc.) sponsor ‘official’ tailgating parties, a perfect ex-
ample of the assimilation of a countercultural form into consumer culture.
This process is observable in the sports cultures of all wealthy (post-)
industrial countries today, and it usually goes hand in hand with higher 
ticket prices, more VIP boxes, a growing amount of ‘pay-per-view’ TV broad-
casts, and other developments subsumed under the term ‘gentrif ication’. 
England serves as a prime example: the ticket prices for the stadiums (or 
arenas) of the top soccer teams in London or Manchester (Arsenal, Chelsea, 
Manchester United, Manchester City) often start in the three-digit numbers 
(of pounds), available only to those with plenty of actual monetary capital. 
Subcultural capital among the fan community alone will not suff ice to 
participate actively in fan culture in England.
If we connect these developments with the Fiskean theory, it appears 
as if what Fiske called the ‘shadow cultural economy’ (30) of sports fans 
has thus lost its ‘shadow’ aspect. Sports fan culture today is part of off icial 
culture, a regular and acceptable part of an upper-middle-class citizen’s 
life, both in the USA and Europe. Still, while the status and prestige of 
being a sports fan has drastically changed, large parts of young, poor or 
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otherwise disenfranchised social strata certainly retain the inherent wish 
to differentiate themselves from off icial culture and the powers that be. 
Consumerism’s grasp of sports fan culture cannot extinguish the fact that 
people with little or no access to off icial cultural capital still exist, and that 
they are still interested and emotionally invested in sports. The growth of 
hater groups or anti-fan communities may be connected with the need of a 
new, symbolically rebellious cultural form for these groups. In a way, I argue, 
the disenfranchised have migrated to a ‘sub-subcultural’ form—hating a 
certain team—because ‘only’ loving a team has become too mainstream, 
too middle-class, too ‘off icial’ in Bourdieu’s terms, and too much part of the 
hegemonic system that some experience as unjust and exclusive.
As the mainstream certainly considers hatred a most irrational, intrinsi-
cally negative, and thus the most unpopular of emotions, it appears to 
be particularly ‘unsexy’ for, maybe even inherently opposed to, market 
capitalism. This renders hate the ‘weapon of choice’ for young, mostly male 
individuals who feel disregarded or disrespected by off icial culture, includ-
ing off icial sports culture. It should appear as if passionate spite against a 
popular cultural phenomenon could hardly be packaged or sold. Still, the 
mechanism of consumerism may f ind inroads into the domain of hater 
communities as well. As of recently, fan scarves—a standard accessory 
for European soccer fans—that feature scornful, though not very creative 
messages targeting the opponent (e.g. ‘Scheiß-Bayern’ as the main slogan 
on a blue-and-white Schalke 04 scarf) are sold by unoff icial, unlicensed, 
‘semi-legal’ vendors around the stadium on match day. In the United States, 
one can order a rib-knit baby one-piece (for age 3–6 months) by American 
Apparel online, carrying the slogan ‘I can’t even talk yet, and I already 
hate the Yankees’ (Skreened.com). There seems to be a niche target group 
for said items, another proof for the diff iculty, maybe even impossibility 
of subcultures to be and remain completely unpopular and outside of ‘the 
system’.
A Typology of Anti-Fan Motivations
After the deductive approach to the question at hand—applying exist-
ing theories of fan societies to this new phenomenon—a brief inductive, 
qualitative study concludes this paper. For that, I have conducted a 
discourse-analytical examination of the contents and discussions in hater 
communities online. The dataset included freely accessible texts, com-
ments, and images in comparably large Facebook groups that deal with the 
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hatred towards certain clubs in the USA (New York Yankees, LA Lakers), 
Germany (TSG Hoffenheim, Bayern Munich), and England (Chelsea F.C.). 
Obviously, users in said groups use different languages, i.e. Hoffenheim and 
Bayern haters communicate in German, which is certainly a point in case 
of the assumed restrictedness to national leagues or cultures. Soon during 
research, it became clear that visual elements—photoshopped images and 
‘internet memes’ to mock or insult players or opponent fans—also play an 
important role in these groups, which is why a combination of methods that 
pay close attention to pragmalinguistic details (such as outlined in Wodak 
and Krzyzanowski, for example) with a method that addresses the semiotics 
of visual media (cf. Van Leeuwen and Jewitt’s edited volume) was applied, 
while keeping in mind the communicative particularities of multimedial, 
‘Web 2.0’-based discourses (cf. Hinton and Hjorth).7 The result is a tentative 
typology of hater fans, which reflects some of the prior arguments well, 
while extending others.
The f irst and very central reason for the overt contempt of one team 
across a whole country or sports culture can of course still be found on the 
axis of class. Teams that dominate a certain league over a longer period of 
time usually do so because of their f inancial dominance; naturally, their 
continued success often leads to an even larger gap between ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ 
teams. One of the central problems of capitalism—‘the rich are getting 
richer, the poor are getting poorer’—seems to be mirrored in sports. Though 
of course the market logic in sports is actually much more complicated (cf. 
Sage; Senkbeil, Ideology), young men may have their f irst contacts with the 
injustices of the capitalist order through sports. Professional team sports 
are easy to understand, and they blatantly show how ‘inherited’ wealth 
and success are inseparably interconnected, which some consider unjust 
and in seeming opposition to the ideal of a ‘level playing f ield’. This makes 
it relatively easy to hate the ‘fat-cat capitalists’ in New York, London, or 
Munich. The fact that this f irst underlying principle of fan hatred seems to 
have a clearly anti-capitalist dimension should by no means be mistaken 
with the idea that all hater communities are politically left-leaning. In fact, I 
have demonstrated elsewhere that discourses of anti-commercialization in 
sports cultures surprisingly often stem from conservative, even reactionary 
political stances (cf. Senkbeil, Ideology, 136–48).
As a counterpoint to success through financial dominance, anti-fans usu-
ally argue that poorer teams have more authentic emotions and ‘passion’. For 
instance, a widely bought and worn baseball fan T-shirt from Boston reads 
that any game against the New York Yankees is a contest of ‘Passion vs Payroll’ 
(cf. Facebook.com; community ‘The Boston Red Sox Block’). Ironically, the 
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Red Sox from Boston are not a team with a particularly small payroll either; 
their self-proclaimed image of a team from and for the working class is a 
clever PR invention rather than an accurate representation of reality. A look 
at this and a large number of other statements and images online reveals 
that hater fans do not need logical reasoning or factual evidence for their 
claims. This observation is largely congruent with Maffesoli’s argument that 
postmodern pseudo-tribes often celebrate irrationality (cf. 143–45), hence 
defining a counterpoint to the rationalized work-ethic-driven everyday life 
in Western capitalist societies. Also, a related study has shown that overly 
emotional, irrational, ‘passionate’ behavior and statements belong to the 
characteristics that many sports fans (‘normal’ fans and haters alike) cherish 
most, not only among themselves but also with regard to their heroes on 
the f ield (cf. Senkbeil, ‘Apollo’).
The second pattern that can be found among hater groups, complicating 
the prior argument a bit, has to do with a differentiation of ‘old money’ 
versus ‘new money’. Recently, the newly found wealth and success of some 
teams stem from external sources, i.e. billionaires who bought themselves 
into a leadership position of a sports team and now support that organiza-
tion with money they earned in non-sports-related businesses. Leading 
examples from Europe include Dietmar Hopp, software mogul and one 
of the richest men in Germany, whose funds helped the village club TSG 
Hoffenheim join the top ranks of German soccer. The largest community 
of ‘Anti-Hoffenheim’ fans blames that club for being ‘without tradition, 
without values, whores of commercialization’8 (cf. Facebook.com; commu-
nity ‘Anti-Hoffenheim’). The choice of words here, in its offensiveness and 
explicitness, is in fact quite representative; many insults directed at players 
and managers of the hated clubs include sexualized overtones, sometimes 
interwoven with misogynistic or homophobic tendencies. I will revisit how 
gender intersects with hater fans performances later.
Another example is Roman Abramovitch, a Russian billionaire who owns 
Chelsea F.C. and whose money transformed it from a mediocre working-
class club into a UEFA Champions League winner. English fans of teams 
without such external support hence consider Chelsea the ‘scum of the 
land’ (cf. Facebook.com; community ‘I hate Chelsea, scum of the land’). 
In the USA, Mikhail Prokhorov, another Russian industrialist billionaire, 
was the key f igure behind the recent transformation of the notoriously 
unsuccessful basketball franchise New Jersey Nets into a cool, hip, urban 
brand, the Brooklyn Nets. Not only local communities were skeptical of the 
consequences of the influx of external money on the borough of Brooklyn 
and on American basketball in general. This development marks the most 
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recent one (the Nets have played in Brooklyn since 2012), and it will be most 
interesting to observe the reaction of American basketball fans across the 
nation when the Brooklyn Nets actually start winning championships.
Either way, newly found success based on external funds often generates 
strong condescension from the self-ascribed traditionalists within a sports 
community. In this respect, supporters of notoriously underfunded but 
traditional teams (a German example would be 1. F.C. Nürnberg) interest-
ingly come to fully agree with fans of traditionally big, rich, and successful 
teams (e.g. Borussia Dortmund). As mentioned above, popular cultures’ 
fan communities often adapt the mechanisms of ‘social hygiene’ from the 
off icial culture that they are allegedly opposed to. From that perspective, 
the traditionalists’ backlash against nouveau riche teams does not come 
as a surprise: traditionalism and discrimination against newcomers—and 
particularly towards the nouveau riche—is and was one of the core strate-
gies and practices of gatekeeping and exclusion in aristocratic and later 
bourgeois forms of high culture. With that argument—‘they don’t belong 
here; only we do, because we have a long tradition of being here’—anti-fans 
showcase a logic and behavior that is decidedly conservative and ‘petty 
bourgeois’. It stands to argue whether this second set of reasons for hatred 
towards a certain team is more prominent in Europe than in the USA. It 
would not come as a surprise if the different cultural and social histories 
on opposite sides of the Atlantic have rendered overt contempt towards the 
nouveau riche a European, and not a typically American reaction.
The third type of reason that I would like to discuss here functions outside 
the realm of economic realities and envy. Examining the discourses and 
semiotics in stadiums and online indicates that overt hate towards virtually 
all of the teams mentioned so far crystallizes around powerful men, whose 
name is inseparably interwoven with the rise to power of the hated team. 
Dietmar Hopp from Germany and Roman Abramovitch from England have 
already been mentioned. Uli Hoeneß, former president of F.C. Bayern, one 
of the most successful soccer clubs in Europe, f its into the same category. 
In the USA, George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees, and Jerry Buss 
of the Los Angeles Lakers played a similarly singular role over a span of 
several decades. A closer examination of these public personalities reveals 
striking similarities, even though they functioned in geographically and 
culturally very distant places. These parallels thus deserve close attention.
Obviously, these owners and managers are all male, white, comparably 
old, and rich. Neither of them was born rich, but they all stem from a 
lower social class and became self-made millionaires. A look at their public 
performance and personas reveals that all of them are widely known as 
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strong-willed, uncompromising, bold, and sometimes brash in their way 
of doing business. When they appear in the media, they are portrayed as 
highly self-confident—their opponents often call them arrogant—as they 
like to showcase their power and influence in the sports scene and beyond. 
They seem to enjoy letting their fans and opponents know that they are 
convinced of their own managerial qualities, and have only little respect 
for opponents who show less talent and willpower than they themselves 
have shown in their careers. Within their clubs, their power and leadership 
is rarely questioned; in fact, these men often talk about their organizations 
in terms of ‘a family’, in which loyalty and mutual care play a central role, 
of course under the watchful eye of the powerful patriarch.
Let us connect these striking parallels with the observations about age 
and gender made above. Sports are today’s prime f ield in which societies 
negotiate and define their desirable and undesirable types of masculinity 
(cf. Whannel 159–72). Symbolic rule-breaking and rebellion is not only a 
characteristic of hater fans, but, in fact, typical of a certain type of idealized 
masculinity (cf. Senkbeil, ‘Apollo’). Young fans (normal ones and haters) 
are at a stage in their lives in which their masculinity is yet to be fully 
def ined; many of them are still testing their limits and play with identity 
choices. Traditionally, adolescents (particularly males) have had to rebel 
against their fathers during that period, i.e. against older men, whom they 
experience as wealthier and more powerful than themselves, and who—to 
a teenager—appear arrogant and unwilling to compromise. In other words, 
I argue that sports fans ‘love to hate’ these powerful men and the teams 
they represent because they symbolically rebel against imagined father 
f igures. I hold that this may be a particularly meaningful practice today, 
because we live in an era in which the real fathers of these young men 
often do not qualify as crystallization points for teenage rebellion. The old-
school patriarch, i.e. a domineering, overpowering, sometimes tyrannical 
father, who only demands discipline and obedience from his children and 
otherwise totally inhibits their freedom, may still be a trope in popular 
culture, but is luckily rare these days in Western societies. The fathers 
of today’s sports fans in their teens and twenties themselves grew up in 
the 1970s and 80s, i.e. in a period in which the biggest battles against the 
traditionalistic tyranny of family patriarchs had been already won, both 
in North America and Europe. Simply put, many young men at college age 
today probably have rather nice dads, on average.
This is where a virtual ‘straw man’ father f igure (the old man at the 
top of the opponent team) may serve a collective psychological function 
in that he invites fans to communally join in rejecting this overpowering 
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male and his cause. This symbolic rebellion, which never becomes really 
violent or dangerous,9 may (still) be part of growing up and of def ining 
one’s masculinity. Ironically, this behavior is marked as rejection of adult 
behavior on the surface, but on the level of the peer group it prepares young 
men to be accepted into the ranks of male domains in off icial adult culture 
later in life. Specif ically, this may mean becoming a father yourself later, or 
becoming a successful, career-oriented, self-confident man at some point 
later in your life. The degree of aggression that these powerful men in the 
sports business have had to face is always caused by a mix of envy and 
pseudo-adolescent rebellion, but also by a fair share of (secret) admiration.
To conclude this tentative typology of haters based on an inductive 
analysis of Facebook group contents, it is probably safe to say that the three 
outlined rationales intersect at various points and influence each other. 
Jealousy towards the rich, a ‘mock class struggle’, and the mechanisms of a 
shadow cultural economy as an extension of and opposition to mainstream 
sports culture remain in place as strong motivations to hate a certain team. 
Yet, also in terms of the sociocultural work that this unpopular strand of 
fan culture is able to do, we should not underestimate the psychological 
undercurrents that deal with the negotiation and definition of young men’s 
masculinity in opposition to real or imagined father f igures.
Conclusion
The assessment of whether anti-fan groups are more or less comparable to 
‘normal’ sports fans has shown that many typical characteristics of fans 
of any type of pop culture can indeed be applied to anti-fans as well. The 
parallels between anti-fans and other sub- or youth cultures included the 
distinction against the larger mainstream (here: of so-called ‘fair-weather 
fans’), the active participation and creative work of individuals within the 
group, the accumulation of an elusive type of social capital (though on a 
smaller scale and nowadays mostly virtual, in social media), and also f irst 
attempts of consumerism to commodify the signifying processes of that 
subculture. To gather a full picture of the motivations and rationales of hater 
fans, who on the one hand f ind unpopular what the mainstream sports 
consumer f inds popular, and on the other hand hope to make themselves 
unpopular with this ‘mainstream other’, we probably have to combine ‘clas-
sic’ economic reasons (symbolic class struggle, traditionalism, and jealousy 
towards the nouveau riche) with the dynamics of gender, particularly in 
the complex sphere of masculinity during adolescence.
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Notes
1. In this chapter, I specifically focus on successful teams that are met with 
overt contempt throughout a nation, or more specifically the leagues in 
which they play (whose borders usually but not always coincide with 
national borders). That is to say, heated rivalries that are locally restricted 
to two cities, regions, or parts of town are explicitly not part of my argu-
ment here, as they usually follow more ‘reasonable’ rationales than those 
of the ‘united haters’ from all over the league. Bipolar sports rivalries often 
resemble remnants or aftermaths of serious political, ethnic, or religious 
conflicts in the past, such as in the rivalry of Glasgow Rangers and Celtic, 
or in the Madrid vs Barcelona rivalry in Spain (cf. Mandelbaum; Dunning, 
Murphy and Williams). Other traditional city rivalries seem to follow a 
Freudian psychological pattern, the ‘narcissism of small differences’, in their 
partly playful, partly serious teasing and mutual ridiculing, such as in the 
New York vs Boston rivalry, or the feud between Dortmund and Schalke in 
Germany. Hater fans, as I hope to show here, cannot be explained by either 
line of reasoning though, but follow different social psychological patterns.
2. For lack of a better term, I use the expressions ‘anti-fans’ and ‘hater fans’ 
synonymously throughout this paper, though clearly both are neither very 
precise nor satisfactory in explaining what these people do, and why. The 
English language in fact provides no clearer or more precise term for this 
phenomenon, a case in point of the general irritation that spawned the 
research for this paper: an ‘anti-fan’ is first and foremost an inherently para-
doxical entity (much like the title of this volume, ‘unpopular culture’).
3. The term ‘official culture’ (a translation of the French ‘culture officielle’, 
describing the culture of the elites in French sociological discourses) may 
strike us as a bit imprecise from today’s perspective. Cultural Studies schol-
ars today might opt for more exact labels such as ‘currently dominant’ to de-
scribe the same practices, hinting at the ambivalence and mobility of what 
is deemed ‘official’ and institutionalized in a given time and place. I will 
nonetheless use the term ‘official culture’ in the discussion of Bourdieu’s 
and Fiske’s arguments in this paper, as it reflects the original diction of 
those foundational works most precisely, but also because it is exactly the 
shifting status of what used to be and what is today ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
about sports fan culture that will prepare my later arguments.
4. In the U.S., the college sports system of course is a strong influence: col-
lege football and basketball games are known to draw much noisier and 
sometimes rowdier crowds than professional games, often due to the fact 
that those crowds largely consist of fellow students of the athletes. Still, in 
Europe, which does not have a comparable college sports scene, many lead-
ing figures of ‘ultra’ fan groups in soccer are eloquent and well-organized 
young men attending university (cf. Schwier 26–27).
5. ‘Weil ich den FC Bayern für immer hassen werde’ (trans. KS. Facebook.com)
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6. It is one of the ironies of the Facebook age that its members cannot simply 
indicate their ‘hate’ for anything but can only ‘like’ or ‘become a fan’. A 
thumbs-down icon does not exist. The mentioned process of declaring 
oneself a hater of the Yankees (for example) thus only works via a logical 
detour (‘I like that I hate the Yankees’), which is, on the one hand, syntacti-
cally quite revealing, and on the other hand highlights the unpreparedness 
or unwillingness of Facebook (today’s main stage to define what is currently 
popular) to account for countercurrents and anti-fans of popular culture.
7. For reasons of space, the details of this multidisciplinary methodological 
approach cannot be fully elaborated here; I refer to the mentioned original 
theoretical and methodological works. In this essay, an overview of the 
qualitative results will need to suffice.
8. ‘Traditionslos—Wertlos—Kommerzhuren’ (trans. KS). 
9. To my knowledge, none of the mentioned team owners and presidents have 
ever been really physically attacked or hurt by opponent fans. Aggression 
towards them is always limited to verbal abuse in stadiums or online.
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 Popular, Unpopular
When First World War Museums Meet Facebook
Catherine Bouko
Let us start this paper with a simple question, which many cultural educa-
tion managers are asking themselves as we commemorate the centenary 
of the First World War: how does one generate interest in this conflict 
among the younger generations when they feel so distant from it? For 
example, the British government plans to recreate the Christmas Day 1914 
football match between the British and German troops. Here, popular 
culture meets historical reconstruction, as football star and pop-cultural 
icon David Beckham will be one of the players. Although widely accepted, 
the paradigm of ‘popular culture’ is nevertheless not always clear. In the 
opinion of Eric Maigret and Eric Macé, the expression ‘popular culture’ 
is one of those concepts that emerged after the concept of ‘mass culture’ 
and which clumsily glorify the cultural practices they purport to bring 
together without really emphasizing the new forms of relationship that 
these practices entail (cf. 10). As far as the media are concerned, the cultural 
practices are currently becoming more autonomous; their legitimacy no 
longer primarily depends on the domination of one social class over another. 
While the relationship between ‘popular’ and ‘unpopular’ media practices is 
less frequently subjected to these vertical social breakdowns, this does not 
necessarily mean that domination has disappeared; rather, it is apportioned 
in a different manner and also takes into account other important variables 
(such as age). Nowadays, what differences do we f ind between the popular 
and the unpopular? How do cultural media practices express these differ-
ences? This chapter aims at enhancing our understanding of the manner in 
which historical museums, as traditionally ‘sacred spaces’ of high culture, 
integrate the codes of popular culture to make the younger generations 
sensitive to themes they are likely to consider unattractive. In other words, I 
wish to examine how an institution nowadays often considered unpopular, 
associated with the values of the traditional, unfashionable, and old, invites 
the popular in its treatment of history.
In an attempt to answer these general questions, I have chosen to analyze 
the story of the f ictional First World War infantryman Léon Vivien that 
was disseminated on Facebook. This unique experiment involved present-
ing a f ictional approach to the Great War while also incorporating the 
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communicative codes specif ic to this social network. Over several months 
in spring 2013, on an almost daily basis, the DDB communication agency 
published online messages posted by the character Léon Vivien, devised 
on behalf of the Meaux Museum of the Great War (north-east of Paris). The 
story, illustrated by a large number of (audio-)visual documents, is based 
on the museum’s substantial collection. Just as on any friend’s Facebook 
page, Internet users reacted to Vivien’s messages by commenting day after 
day. In total, nearly 7,000 messages were posted by followers and 60,000 
people became ‘fans’ of Léon’s page. We thus f ind ourselves faced with 
a media object that, in an original manner, hinges on a topic taken from 
high culture—History as presented in museums—with a media support, 
namely Facebook, that constitutes the jewel in the crown of popular 
contemporary media culture. Two paradigms intersect here: on the one 
hand, we observe the paradigm of an emotional bond and intimacy in the 
way in which History is dealt with. Initially apparent at the very heart of 
museums and in  televised works of f iction, it is now translated on Facebook 
with Léon Vivien’s personal page. On the other hand, we see the develop-
ment of practices within the paradigm of ‘connectivity’ (cf. Van Dijck), of 
sociability specif ic to online social networks. Here, I will try to investigate 
how these two paradigms f it into the Léon Vivien project in order to give 
new readability and new visibility to the First World War, rendering it a 
unique cultural practice at the crossroads of popularity and unpopularity.
This chapter consists of four parts. The f irst section evokes the changing 
paradigm of historical culture in museums and in the media that we can 
observe today. Then, the chapter explores how Léon Vivien’s Facebook page 
shows analogies with Hollywoodian codes (second section) and how its 
way of visualizing the war with photographs mixes fact and f iction (third 
section). In the fourth section, I will briefly mention my linguistic analysis 
of Léon’s fans’ comments to show how these online exchanges meet the 
specif ic characteristics of popular sociality on Facebook.
1. How History is Treated in Museums and the Media: Ever-
Increasing Emotion and Intimacy
Two concurrent phenomena appeared in France in the 1980s: the mass 
integration of television into homes and a new means of relating to History. 
The latter, supported by recourse to the emotional and an experience of 
war on a personal level, also characterizes the new approach to historical 
fact adopted by many museums.
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In a number of seminal papers, Valerie Casey describes the evolution of 
museum practices. She distinguishes three categories in her typology: the 
legislating, the interpreting (on which we will focus), and the performing 
museum (cf. Casey, ‘Museum Effect’; ‘Staging Meaning’). These three types 
imply different approaches to the relation between the exhibited object 
and the museum, as well as to the authority of the institution regarding 
the production of knowledge. The legislating type bases its authority on the 
selection and presentation of objects (cf. Casey, ‘Museum Effect’ 4-5). In that 
case, the collections’ displays tend to propose a transparent, unmediated 
relation between the object and the museum: Trofanenko quotes Ben-
nett to highlight that ‘when placed under the authority of the museum, 
artefacts become “facsimiles of themselves” (that function to represent 
their own past […].) […] This provided the illusion of certainty’ (Trofanenko 
52). In recent years, this transparent relation between the object and the 
museum’s visitor underwent profound questioning; the ‘new museology’ (cf. 
Vergo) shifts the debate to the question of the consequences of the chosen 
displays and has, for example, contributed to unearthing selection processes 
for displays and exhibitions thereby complicating the very concepts of 
neutrality and objectivity. As Sherman and Rogoff have it: ‘a broad range of 
critical analyses have converged on the museum, unmasking the structures, 
rituals and procedures by which the relations between objectives, bodies 
of knowledge and processes of ideological persuasion are enacted’ (ix–x, 
qtd. in Trofanenko 52). For Casey, the second museum type particularly 
challenges the institution’s natural authority by highlighting the processes 
of mediation. The interpreting museum no longer bases its authority on 
the intrinsic value of the object, but rather on its integration into inter-
pretative displays. Historical reconstructions are the ultimate examples 
of this approach, and the Léon Vivien project shows that par excellence. 
Here, the object’s status is modif ied: it is no longer signif icant by itself, but 
rather becomes illustrative, in the service of the museum performance. 
The interpretative performance becomes analogous with the object. The 
mediation by the museum is apparent; the visitor no longer comes in contact 
with the object but with the performance of that object. The evolution of 
the relation to f iction is important: we move from an object, which is put 
into a story, to a story illustrated by this object. To those who consider this 
a devaluation of the museum function, Casey replies that this insistence on 
mediation stimulates the visitor’s critical mind, as s/he masters the codes 
of mass mediation and is thus able to decipher the f ictionalization of the 
object. For Casey, we here f ind a marvelous opportunity to question cultural 
authority (cf. ‘Museum Effect’ 19). The third museum type—performing, as 
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in ‘living museums’—immerse the visitor into a pre-aestheticized universe, 
reconstructed in a human-size in which actors are performing. Here, the 
visitor is invited to take part in the f ictional world, even if his interventions 
are framed and limited. At such moments of encounter, ‘the performance 
replaces the museum object’ (Casey, ‘Staging Meaning’ 10) in its entirety. 
Casey’s typology highlights the evolution towards a disembodiment of the 
object: it moves from the auratic to the illustrative, and even f ictional, and 
ends up being substituted by the visitor in the museum-performance.
The f ictionalization of History reaches its zenith in docudramas. In the 
eyes of Isabelle Veyrat-Masson (cf. 113), the Franco-British docudrama D-
Day, leur jour le plus long (2004) signals a clean break in the way in which 
History is dealt with on television. Fiction now outweighs fact. History 
production in docudramas is accompanied by the controlled treatment 
of facts, leaving little room for controversy or the complexity of events. 
Notably, docudramas can exploit the assertiveness of f iction, in which it 
is not necessary to substantiate a story, in order to present true facts. In 
addition to the questions this raises regarding the relationship with the 
truth, these docudramas are designed to arouse the viewer’s emotions. 
Anne Wierviorka highlights the way in which the broadcasting of a wit-
ness account on television is presented as an intimate moment with the 
viewer, who enters into a sort of ‘compassionate pact’ (179) with the witness. 
Docudramas exploit subjectivity and emotion as much as possible, to the 
extent of superseding factual accuracy. To accomplish this, docudramas 
can call upon the world of popular Hollywood cinema. The Holocaust series 
illustrates this, whereas the Léon Vivien project shifts this mechanism to 
social networks.
2. The Great War as Media Object: The Léon Vivien 
Experience and the Hollywoodian Codes
Before analyzing the Léon Vivien Facebook page as such, let us study its 
‘promise’. In François Jost’s terms (cf. 48): to what media genre (real, f ic-
tional or playful) do the producers relate it? In other words, is knowledge 
or entertainment through f iction and/or game promised? If the promise is 
a bit ambiguous, it has also evolved over time. The press release of 10 April 
2013, which launched the experience, includes formulations that refer both 
to the categories of reality and f iction. The release insists on the ‘patronage 
by a historian’ and def ines this experience as a ‘formidable instrument 
of knowledge and collective memory’. Beyond the formulation, which 
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refers to the two registers of the real and the f ictional, the ambiguity of 
the press release also lies in the expression ‘genuine human story’, which 
functions almost like an oxymoron as it refers to seemingly contradictory 
ideas, ‘genuine’ referring to the historical truth, and ‘story’ to the f ictional 
conventions.
The last message written on the Facebook page (on 24 May 2013), which 
is written by the Museum (and no longer by Vivien), mentions more mod-
est objectives, which focus on its emotional charge: ‘This page had no other 
goal than making you feel and share, as closely as possible to the human, 
what the soldiers of 14 could have lived, as well as the relatives remained 
in the back. Your thousands of comments, coming straight from the heart, 
showed us that we succeeded’ (Musée de la Grande Guerre de Meaux on 
Léon Vivien’s Facebook page, my translation). Here, the issue is not about 
its function as learning device but more about a touching, immediate, and 
lived experience. As we can see, the promise made to the Internet user 
is plural, meandering between knowledge device, emotional experience, 
and f ictional entertainment. The studies on docudramas and other hybrid 
forms often invalidate their historical signif icance, as Brian McConnell’s 
opinion illustrates: ‘Docudrama does not represent historic fact, or history, 
or journalism, but crusading entertainment with facts carefully tailored to 
sustain a neat storyline and to suit a particular social, political or religious 
point of view’ (54). The Léon Vivien Facebook page is not concerned with 
these questions inasmuch as it proposes to follow the daily experience 
of a called-up primary teacher and does not offer any political treatment 
of the conflict. Its point of view is only human size, which makes for its 
uniqueness and pedagogical interest. The proceedings of the war are 
not mentioned, neither are the specif ics of space and geographic locale: 
we do not know the name of his training camp, of the trenches where 
he f ights, of the name of the villages the soldiers cross, etc. The action 
evolves in a space-time that is indeterminate, totally f ictionalized. The 
web surfer does not get any temporal indications either. Vivien’s posts are 
dated but these dates do not refer to dates of real events that happened 
during the war.
We can draw a parallel between the f ictionalization of this infantryman 
and some scriptwriting techniques of popular movies, and it is noteworthy 
that the museum deploys most of the successful strategies identif ied by the 
famous consultant in scenarios Linda Seger in her book The Art of Adapta-
tion: Turning Fact and Fiction into Film (cf. 52-55), which I will discuss in 
the following.
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2.1 A Rising Dramatic Line, Leading to a Strong Climax
It is interesting to notice that the building of the story, which indeed aims at 
a dramatic climax, can be divided according to Aristotle’s three acts theory, 
which Seger recognizes. Here, the division sticks with the necessary balance 
between the acts: the f irst one lasts three months and a half; it serves to 
introduce the context and then the beginnings of the conflicts from an 
external point of view, as Vivien has not been called up yet. The second 
act is the longest (f ive months and a half) as it primarily serves to recall 
the everyday life in the training camps and in the reserves, while the third 
act is the shortest one (one month and a half) and the most dramatically 
intense: Vivien bears witness to the horror of the battlefront by evoking 
many particularly violent events in great detail.
In his book Aristotle in Hollywood, Ari Hiltunen shows how most stories, 
whatever their geographical origin and the period when they appear, are 
structured around the mythic journey of a hero. Most stages of this journey 
are also visible in Léon Vivien’s story. John Truby insists on the importance 
of the quality of the plot, which is different from the story. Its quality greatly 
depends on the ways information is hidden and revealed to the reader. Léon 
Vivien’s plot obeys that principle and spreads some touches of mystery. 
Mystery is produced when some posts conceal some of the information they 
evoke, while at the same time making our mouth water. For example, Vivien 
evokes the ‘frightening rumors in the streets’1 (20/08/1914) but does not tell 
us which ones. Suspense is constructed when some central and dangerous 
events are announced step by step, which leads the reader to anticipate 
future developments and to be scared for his hero. For example, Vivien notes 
that he is ‘called up by the military doctor’; it is only the day after that he 
announces his mobilization, while he often posts several messages a day 
and could have stopped the suspense earlier. Suspense reaches a climax 
with his last message, ‘they (The Germans) are comi…’ which he cannot 
f inish. His death will be announced the day after.
2.2 Sympathetic and Univocal Main Characters
Nine characters make up the network of relationships. They all fulf ill one 
of the four character’s functions identif ied by Seger. Léon Vivien, Jules 
Derème and Eugène Lignan mainly fulf ill the ‘storytelling function’: these 
characters provide most information. Besides, their personalities are very 
much alike: all three adopt a dignif ied behavior, nuanced words, without 
any sputters.
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On the contrary, the other male characters fulf ill the ‘talking about, 
revealing or embodying the theme’ (Seger 124): less used as conveyors of 
information, their posts mainly consist of spontaneous, vivacious and not 
necessarily nuanced points of view. Most of their comments show their 
feeling of unfairness or anger with the monstrosity of the war, which is a 
much-developed topic in this Facebook experience. They also fulfill the ‘add-
ing color and texture function’ (Seger 124): these spontaneous characters, 
which contrast with the other f irst three and are never at a loss of words, 
provide a certain emphasis to the discussions. The name Lulu L’Andouille, 
which could be roughly translated as Lulu the numbskull is a f irst sign of 
it. His wife Madeleine Vivien fulf ills two functions: the ‘helping to reveal 
the main character function’ (Seger 125): as a confidante who, through their 
signs of love, reveals a more intimate side of Léon. As she comments the 
war from an external point of view, she also participates in developing the 
theme of the horrors of the war and thus also fulf ills the second function. 
The f ictionalization is furthermore created via a process of simplif ication 
and lack of development of the characters as they seem deprived of any 
ambiguity and do not change their point of view in the course of the story. 
Only Léon Vivien is subjected to transformation: while the beginnings of 
the story highlight his patriotism, his posts in the third act demonstrate a 
more bitter point of view. The Léon Vivien experience is centered on the 
human before the soldier.
2.3 The Human before the Soldier
This humanization of the war comes true through three major strategies. 
Firstly, many posts evoke the details of the soldiers’ daily experience, outside 
of military operations, or pick up personal anecdotes or precious and mov-
ing moments: he shows the picture of a human pyramid (14/12/14), the toilets 
(11/04/15), a picture of his baby (2/05/15), etc. Secondly, many posts mention 
the physical sensations felt by the soldiers, whose body is put through the 
mill. Descriptions in details of the sensations felt by the f ive senses offer 
a particularly precise sight of the ordeal endured by the soldiers: the bag 
which wrecks the back after a walking day (13/04/15), the corpses everywhere 
and the ‘mud, even colder than the inert bodies’ (22/04/15), etc. Thirdly, a 
tension between the common and the dreadful is developed. About twenty 
messages alternate between telling of the horror of the war and the daily life 
of the civilians or of the soldiers. For example, on 22 October 1914, Vivien 
announces that Madeleine is pregnant. His subsequent message indicates 
he is called up by the military doctor. Two crucial posts succeed each other, 
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and, by doing so, associate the private and military registers. This highlights 
even more its intensity; indeed, joy quickly gives way to fear.
We have already seen how some messages include a sensational dimen-
sion or a strong emotional charge, furthered by the tension between the 
common and the dreadful. The Facebook user is really invited to thrill 
with the character. Signif icantly, the post that was the most ‘liked’ (nearly 
3,000 likes) is the one of their newborn’s picture. The family also received 
many messages of congratulations. Other posts make use of the sensation 
strategy, mixed with emotion, by providing in details crude information: 
the story of a sergeant who tries to hold his entrails (19/14/15), of a foot 
snatched by a shrapnel (20/04/15), of a meal made of cat (11/05/15), of a 
soldier stabbed from end to end (15/05/15). The reader sensitivity is then 
severely tested.
The structure and the elements of the story as well as the strategies 
implemented to evoke the soldier’s humanity as closely as possible obey 
the fundamentals of f iction, according to which the story must invite the 
reader to live a genuine experience. For Truby, ‘good storytelling doesn’t 
just tell audiences what happened in life. It gives them the experience of 
that life. It is the essential life, just the crucial thoughts and events, but 
it is conveyed with such freshness and newness that it feels part of the 
audience’s essential life too’ (6). Facebook is a great device for creating such 
freshness and liveliness.
3 Visualizing Leon Vivien’s War
According to Seger (cf. 54), a story needs to be told visually. A real work 
on images has been produced for this Facebook operation. Generally, the 
docudrama’s hybridity lies in its articulation between real events and their 
audiovisual re-creation. Steven Lipkin highlights how the docudrama im-
plies a specif ic suspension of disbelief from the spectators: ‘We are asked 
to accept that in this case, re-creation, is a necessary mode of presentation’ 
(68).
In Léon Vivien’s case, the aim of authenticity is not mainly produced 
by that re-creation of events. The impression of truth is above all based 
on the plentiful use of the Museum’s rich collection of visual documents. 
Around a hundred images have been integrated into the story. These are 
authentic documents that have been f ictionalized. The story is thus not 
based on real facts, but on documents that were integrated and adapted 
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to the story. At least f ive methods were used to that purpose. Firstly, 
the creators of Léon’s Facebook page have customized blank documents. 
This method has been deployed twice by integrating the names of the 
characters and the dates in the blank spaces in these documents. For 
example, we can see Léon Vivien’s personal call under the f lag (4/11/14) 
and Eugène Lignan’s ‘war godmother’ certif icate (11/05/15). If the f irst 
document is easily understandable for the reader, the second one, less 
known, might remain unclear and ambiguous as it is not explained that 
war godmothers were soldiers’ pen pals. We see to what extent the inte-
gration of documents does not primarily aim at providing explanations 
about the war but rather serve as a support for the f iction. Indeed, the 
comment that goes along with this document only refers to the f ictional 
elements. Secondly, some objects have been contextualized through the 
use of photographs. A dozen pictures show a modif ication of the relation 
to the object: the original picture, which comprises a neutral frame and 
show the object as element of the Museum’s collection, has been modif ied 
in order to include the narrative context. Vivien’s comments emphasize 
this f ictionalization. The object’s value is no longer intrinsic but depends 
on its possible integration to the f iction. For example, the infantryman’s 
backpack has been personalized for Vivien. It is now photographed in 
his bedroom. Some objects are photographed in the soldier’s hands (an 
amulet on 27/04/15, a knife on 21/05/15). From a ‘neutral’ point of view, 
the audience moves to a subject-centered one, impregnated with the 
soldier-photographer’s sight, who lives with these objects. Thirdly, some 
pictures’ caption and context have been removed. Nearly ten pictures 
initially include a caption or a context that have been erased for their use 
in posts. These original frames are replaced by Vivien’s comments, which 
situate them in the f ictional space-time, as for the wake up in the bedroom 
(10/11/14), etc. These comments sometimes mention instants of life that 
happened before the picture, or will happen after it: the bedroom’s picture 
would have been taken after a training session, etc. The image’s production 
of a snapshot is integrated into a longer temporality. Fourthly, the portraits 
used for the prof ile pictures on Facebook have been drawn on purpose, 
in order to avoid any regrettable confusion between the character and a 
person that really existed. The characters’ faces have been added to some 
authentic documents, like on the picture of Léon with Eugène (9/12/14), 
etc. And f inally, some documents have been modif ied in order to ‘stick’ 
more with the story. One picture that is quite known has been modif ied 
so that it is no longer identif iable and not awkwardly positioned within 
the story. A half a dozen pictures have been deeply modif ied: the faces 
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and/or the frame have been changed; some elements have been added or 
suppressed. Some establishing shots have been altered (13 and 14 April 
1915, 12/05/15). Apart from an adaptation to the story, these manipulations 
could also aim to create some visual effect by highlighting some elements 
of the document. These f ive techniques show how the goal consists in 
making the images talk in the f iction, making their content alive and 
human. Far from a political treatment of the war, this use invites us to 
follow day-by-day ‘slices of life’ which are more likely than true. They are 
more like ‘symbolizations’ than representations, according to Trouche 
(200, my translation).
This important use of images raises several questions. In his analysis 
of the documentary series Apocalypse, broadcast on a French channel in 
2009, Robert Belot denounces the omission of the sources, which tends to 
de-realize the event by transforming it into f iction (cf. 172). Such as reproach 
cannot be made against the Leon Vivien experience, as it is presented as 
f iction, and thus precisely de-realizes the documents in use. But, as we have 
seen, the promise refers both to the authentic and the f ictional categories. 
The producers do not mention the methods of construction of the f iction at 
any time. Without any interpretative frame, the power of truth inherent to 
images tends to give a status of authenticity to the Facebook page – authen-
ticity that it does not claim but does not refute either. Niney reminds us of 
André Bazin’s famous warning: ‘The spectator has the illusion he observes 
a visual demonstration while in reality it is a succession of equivocal facts 
which hold together only thanks to the cement that goes along with them’ 
(112, my translation).
The absence of information about the treatment of the documents pro-
vokes a real risk of interpretative misunderstandings concerning the value 
of images as traces of real events. Some comments written by followers give 
the impression that they sometimes forget the f ictional treatment of the 
documents and approach them as a proof of reality. Here, the mediation 
typical of the ‘interpretative museum type’ (Casey) is not really visible. 
Consequently, in order to become a real pedagogical device, the Léon Vivien 
experience should go along with a reflection on the production and on 
the modes of diffusion of historical knowledge, and in particular on the 
complexity of images and their use as trace; it is necessary to show how 
it is a question of a deliberately constructed reality. In those years when 
education curriculums focus on critical analysis of historical sources, this 
Facebook experience as well as its analysis in class will become unique and 
exciting pedagogical activities.
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4. The Connectivity Paradigm, or how Facebook is Building 
Contemporary Online Sociability
In the analysis of the Léon Vivien story, we have observed the way in which 
the mobilization of Hollywood cinematographic codes contributes to famil-
iarizing internet users with the Great War, by avoiding contradictory or less 
politically correct opinions and instead focusing on an emotional approach 
to an infantryman’s life. Now we shall also see how Facebook, as the media 
support for this tale, contributes to rendering the historical treatment of 
the 1914–18 War more popular. We know that all testimonies constitute an 
undeniably social construct, consistently subjective and conditioned, in 
particular by the ideologies of the era to which they belong as well as the 
chosen distribution channel. Let us therefore briefly consider the way in 
which Facebook operates, as the foremost support for sociability and content 
sharing at the beginning of the twenty-f irst century.
According to Van Dijck, the initial ‘participatory culture’ of Facebook has 
been transformed into a ‘culture of connectivity’ (4–5); the initial utopian 
social design has been overtaken by automated technologies that strongly 
influence social practices on Facebook, which raises questions regarding 
the molding of cultural practices: with a ‘shift from user-centered con-
nectedness to owner-centered connectivity […] do social media platforms 
stimulate active participation and civic engagement, or has collectivity 
become a synonym for automated collectivity?’ (54)
What remains of the utopian ambition of the f irst few years? In Fabien 
Benoît’s opinion, Facebook still conforms to an online ‘Bisouland’ (47), 
which we can translate as ‘Kissland’, populated with ‘Care Bear’ users. 
Sharing, friending and liking are not innocuous powerful ideological 
concepts: relativism rules while conflict and contradiction have no place 
on Facebook. Above and beyond the endogamy this creates—we become 
friends with people who are like us—and the social fragmentation this 
maintains—the most privileged social classes are the ones who most benefit 
from the network, particularly from a professional standpoint—the way in 
which Facebook functions prioritizes the sharing of emotions rather than 
a rational approach to the world with its complexities and differences. The 
simple fact of being able to like nearly everything, while a dislike function 
does not exist, stands as witness to this.
It is worth noting that the forms of sociability Facebook prioritizes 
can also be found in followers’ comments. After each message from Léon 
or another character, many messages (and sometimes hundreds) were 
posted. However, the characters never replied to followers’ messages. In 
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our examination of the 6,669 written messages, we identif ied the following 
practices, drawn from the ‘aff inity space’ (Gee) surrounding Léon Vivien 
and the Great War, which confirm the hypothesis of a ‘Kissland’ conducive 
to emotion. First, it is observed that 58.2% of the comments show their 
author’s adhesion to the f iction: the majority of the fans followed Vivien’s 
story respecting his timeline, as any other Facebook friend’s page. In 36.7% 
of the comments, the fans approach his story from a past stance. Very few 
comments explicitly indicate doubts about Vivien’s truthfulness (only 0.1%). 
40.9% of the messages are ‘narrative’ (based on experiences, beliefs, doubts 
and emotions), while 54.2% are non-narrative (based on natural (physical) 
reality, truth, observation, analysis, proof and rationality). Noticeably, the 
page did not primarily stimulate exchanges of information: only 9.3% of 
the comments can be classif ied in this category. Facebook’s social mecha-
























































































































Figure 1: types of comments written by Léon vivien’s fans, who follow this character’s adventures 
on his Facebook Page
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Facebook pages, it mainly appears as a conveyor for social interactions: his 
fans f irst used it to express an empathetic relationship with the characters 
(25.3% of the comments), by encouraging, supporting or advising them. 
Léon Vivien’s fans also wrote comments to give their opinion about Léon’s 
posts (19.8%), about the war in general (10.2%) or, more rarely, about our 
present time (2.4%). The sharing of emotions was also a common reason 
for writing a comment (10.4%).
As we have seen through the analysis of the Léon Vivien story as well as 
of the comments left by his fans, this unique way of presenting the Great 
War jostles the relations between the paradigms of high culture and popular 
culture in particular. Via a knowing blend of historical fact and f iction, the 
Vivien tale prioritized emotion and united fans in an empathic experience of 
the war. In doing so, the creators of this experience on Facebook somewhat 
pay homage to the soldiers’ subjectivity. To some extent, they transpose 
the principles of the New History to this docufiction: ‘creating an empathy 
with the past is surely at least as, if not more important, than any flawed 
attempt to resurrect the past under the belief that it comes back to us as it 
really was’ (Munslow 147).
Note
1. Léon Vivien’s messages were only written in French. In this chapter, his 
messages in English are my personal translations.
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 Unpopular American Natural 
Calamities and the Selectivity of 
Disaster Memory
Susanne Leikam
Why are images [of destruction] ubiquitous? What makes disaster so 
fascinating, so thrilling, so involving? […] Who, exactly, needs disaster? 
In one sense everybody, or nearly everybody. The culture of calamity 
reveals a general psychological addiction to images and stories of 
disaster in our society, though this varies in signif icant ways across 
registers of class, gender, and race. There is also a decisive structural or 
ideological component to the American dependency on disasters.
—Kevin Rozario, Introduction to The Culture of Calamity: 
Disaster and the Making of Modern America (2)
Introduction
When it comes to the nineteenth-century United States, Kevin Rozario’s re-
flections on the ‘American dependency on disasters’ (2) and the ‘intrinsically 
fascinating’ nature of spectacles of calamity (5) in his seminal The Culture of 
Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America (2007) seem to apply 
without restrictions. Calamities such as the Great San Francisco Earthquake 
of 1868, the Great Chicago Fire of 1871, Charleston’s Great Earthquake of 1886, 
the Johnstown Flood of 1889, Galveston’s Storm of 1900, and many more 
disasters from all around the world—whether in the form of embellished 
eyewitness reports, instant histories, literary adaptations or as dramatic 
stereograph views, photo series, and sentimental postcards—constituted 
an integral part of contemporary American cultures.1 In spite of being often 
derided as frivolous entertainment, these frequently mass-produced and 
commercial items showed an immense popularity and a high circulation 
all through the nation and beyond.
This enthrallment with natural disasters2 was not limited to the 
sensationalist ‘low-brow’ approaches but also extended to more rational 
philosophical or scientif ic ‘high’ culture treatments of calamities: newly 
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established branches of the natural sciences such as meteorology, pyrol-
ogy, or geology (here especially the supporters of catastrophism) avidly 
conducted studies on these calamities to better understand the partly 
still mysterious natural phenomena; civil engineers, architects, and city 
planners were equally interested in the calamities for the purpose of 
constructing safe cities; and philosophers and theologians grappled with 
moral and ethical explanations of disasters and their implications for the 
nineteenth-century United States (cf. Cahan 3–13; Oldroyd 88–128; Tobriner 
3–104). Yet, there was another category of calamities that was on the whole 
excluded from the popular disaster culture, nor was it generally a part of 
‘high’ culture engagements with disasters.
Following Martin Lüthe and Sascha Pöhlmann’s conceptualization of 
the unpopular as a third term ‘that breaks open the dichotomy of high and 
pop culture, denoting that which is not part of a (perceived) mainstream 
mass culture but not part of a bourgeois high culture either’ (18), these 
calamities can be described as ‘unpopular’. This does not mean that they 
always remained culturally unproductive in both categories. Rather, it 
means that despite having had all the prototypical elements that made 
(natural) disasters ‘intrinsically fascinating’ (Rozario 5), i.e. a considerable 
amount of damage to human life and property as well as bizarre, sudden, 
and at the time mostly inexplicable natural spectacles, they were for a 
longer time period neither evidently popular in ‘high’ nor in ‘low’ disaster 
cultures. Unpopularity thus does not only pertain to the immediate reac-
tion to the disaster but also involves the processes of its memorialization.
Cultural memory, which arises out of the ‘production of inclusion and 
exclusion’ (Hebel x) of historical events and which is consequently inextri-
cably tied to forgetting, needs to be understood, according to Udo J. Hebel, 
as ‘the place and process where past and present interact in instances of 
individual and communal self-positioning and definition’ (x).3 In this man-
ner, an exploration of cultural (disaster) memory reveals crucial insights 
into the cultural, political, and economic concerns that necessarily have 
to be involved in a particular disaster in order for it to become a produc-
tive part of public discourses and to be visible in ‘high’ and ‘low’ cultural 
spheres. In the following, this chapter analyzes two particular case studies 
of natural catastrophes that were not (or only much later) taken up into the 
‘canon of great nineteenth-century American natural disasters’4 in order 
to illustrate that the unpopularity of natural calamities is not an inherent 
condition or arises arbitrarily. Rather, I argue, it is the result of economic, 
cultural, and political endeavors struggling for hegemony in American 
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cultures and as such also often directly related to the popularity of other 
historical moments.
The nineteenth century constitutes an apt point of departure for a study 
of the cultural memory of natural disasters in the United States for several 
reasons. First, the growth of the cities, the rising population density, and 
the increasingly vertical extension of urban space exacerbated the number 
of fatalities and also resulted in costlier and also more eye-catching dam-
ages, which put these catastrophes even more prominently on the map of 
nineteenth-century America. Besides, the burgeoning print culture and 
the progress in publication technologies enabled a cost-eff icient and fast 
dissemination of (illustrated) disaster news all through the nation and 
allowed for the publication of so-called instant disaster histories within few 
weeks after the calamities. Particularly in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the illustrated magazines Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper (1855) 
and Harper’s Weekly (1857) as well as the self-pronounced ‘Printmakers to 
the American People’ Currier & Ives satisf ied their readers’ craving for 
images of disasters (cf. Casper 40–69; Gessner; Peters).
Moreover, the nineteenth century was also the time of the profession-
alization and institutionalization of the sciences, which, together with the 
ref inement of empirical research technologies, enabled the establishment 
of specialized research disciplines concentrating on the study of very par-
ticular phenomena such as meteorology and seismology. As a result, major 
natural calamities were not only well-documented but also prolif ically 
discussed in terms of their geophysical causation and with regard to their 
prevention (cf., e.g., Kutzbach; Oldroyd 88–128). Despite the strong influence 
of Enlightenment ideas, theological and philosophical explanations of these 
disastrous events, equally aiming to make sense of them, continued to 
produce similarly powerful debates in ‘high’ culture for most of the century. 
Ultimately, departing from the nineteenth century makes it possible to trace 
changes in the ‘unpopularity’ of natural disasters over the course of several 
decades to scrutinize how their status changes over time.
The New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811/12
The f irst case study explores the so-called New Madrid Earthquakes of 
1811/12, which comprised over 3,000 distinct seismic shocks over a period of 
f ive months starting in December 1811. They would be referred to regionally 
as well as (trans)nationally as the ‘Earthquake America Forgot ’ (Steward 
and Knox) and as a natural calamity ‘gradually and inexorably forgotten, 
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the memory […] dormant for over a century’ (Valencius 11). With estimated 
magnitudes of up to 7.7, these tremors constitute the ‘largest outburst of 
seismic energy in American history’ (Steward and Knox 15). The three 
strongest shocks alone, according to the United States Geological Survey, 
rank among the greatest earthquakes ever to occur in the contiguous 
United States.5 The epicenter of most tremors, and thus also the most 
devastating damage, was situated near the small town of New Madrid, 
which was located in the very south of the Missouri Territory right at the 
Mississippi River. Yet, the earthquakes must have been felt with vary-
ing intensity from Canada to New Orleans and from New England to the 
prairies in the West. At the time of the earthquakes, New Madrid had been 
an aspiring new ‘gateway to the West’ (Zeilinga de Boer and Sanders 126) 
and an up-and-coming central trade node in the Mississippi River traff ic, 
but it was completely destroyed through the seismic shocks and therefore 
(temporarily) abandoned (cf. Rozario 57–63; Valencius 14–107; Zeilinga de 
Boer and Sanders 108–28).
At the time, there was no central authority to record the number of 
fatalities in the United States and the adjacent territories, which is why 
the f igures can only be estimated. According to recent reassessments, 
the number is in the range of about 1,000 (cf. Steward and Knox 240). The 
continual earthquakes also caused substantial changes of the visible land-
scape spreading about 600,000 square kilometers around the epicenter 
(U.S. Geological Survey): seismic phenomena included the liquefaction of 
landmasses, causing entire settlements to slide into the river or be eroded 
by the strong currents, the sinking of many boats in the agitated river waves, 
spectacular sand blows, and the appearance of deep seismic cracks in the 
ground. Raised fault blocks further functioned as dams, famously reversing 
the flow of the Mississippi River for several weeks (cf. Fuller; Penick; Rozario 
57–63; Zeilinga de Boer and Sanders 108–28).
In the early 1810s, the earthquakes constituted an immensely ‘popular’ 
subject matter for the numerous Native American tribes as well as for the 
European-American settlers in the region and they proved productive in, 
among others, news articles, religious as well as spiritual interpretations, 
and life-writing documents such as letters or eye-witness reports. Earlier in 
1811, a solar eclipse and the appearance of a comet in the night sky—both at 
the time not commonly understood as regular occurrences—had already 
heated up the mood for widespread speculations about the nature of these 
‘mysterious’ signs. When the earthquakes not only triggered a foul smell 
through the release of hydrogen sulphide from subterranean enclosures but 
later also a partial darkening of the sky due to dust dispersed in the rural 
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hinterland, these phenomena were taken as a continuation of spiritual and 
religious omens (cf. Zeilinga de Boer and Sanders 120–35).
The European-American settlers in the nearby Mississippi and Mis-
souri regions interpreted the seismic tremors predominantly in a religious 
framework. Since the puzzling changes of the landscape occurred in the 
emotional atmosphere of the Second Great Awakening, the repeated shak-
ings of the earth—some of them experienced during the actual open-air 
camp meetings—were interpreted as demonstrations of God’s power, as 
calls to repentance, and also as warnings to return to a pious lifestyle. This 
resulted in the conversion of several thousand in the area to Evangelical 
faith and brought members to the local Baptist and Methodist congregations 
especially (cf. Kanon; Rozario 57–63; Valencius 145–74). The pervasiveness of 
religious interpretations of the tremors can also be seen in the institutional 
reaction. Asking for f inancial help from the United States, the Territorial 
Assembly of Missouri, for example, referred to the earthquakes—in a rather 
Puritan elocution—as one among the ‘Catalogue of miseries and afflictions, 
with which it has pleased the Supreme being of the Universe, to visit the 
Inhabitants of this earth’ (Clark).
The numerous native communities of the Mississippi Valley and the 
New Madrid hinterland similarly interpreted the earthquakes primarily as 
spiritual signs. Most prominently and most forcefully, the Shawnee leaders 
Tecumseh and Tenskawatawa rhetorically framed the earth’s movement as 
an expression of the Great Spirit indicating the need to found an ‘Indian 
league’ to restore a bygone Indian world and counter European American 
 influences in the West. At a time when the tribes had increasingly aban-
doned their traditional ways of life and when territorial conflicts with 
white settlers were a quotidian occurrence, the spiritual revival went 
together with calls to reunite and resist the encroachment of European-
American settlers. The earthquakes, as Conevery Valencius states, hence 
‘added pressure on top of population disparities, overhunted environments, 
asymmetrical military force, and a tragically uneven burden of disease, 
forces pushing Indians out of lands that Americans wanted’ (59). The native 
movements among the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Delaware, Muscogee (Creek), 
Miami, Shawnee, and several other local tribes sparked by theses spiritual 
interpretations did not only foster political and cultural federations but also 
resulted in violent conflicts and war about territory in the West and would 
ultimately culminate in the Trail of Tears. The New Madrid Earthquakes 
were thus present and visible in the tribal communities in the months and 
years after the strong temblors and assumed a crucial role in the foundation 
of strategic alliances (cf. Valencius 106–44).
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In spite of this immense ‘popularity’ in the direct aftermath among both 
the European-American communities and the Native American tribes, 
people in the Mississippi and Missouri regions slowly grew acquainted to 
the numerous aftershocks that continued for several years, and the shak-
ing ground lost its horror. This meant, as a local history noted, that those 
living close to the New Madrid seismic zone ‘paid little or no regard to [the 
earthquakes], not even interrupting or checking their dances, frolics, and 
vices’ (qtd. in Valencius 218; cf. also Zeilinga de Boer and Sanders 111). As 
a result, a considerable part of the religious converts—at the time rather 
disparagingly termed ‘Earth-Quake Christians’ (Penick qtd. in Rozario 
57)—fell away from their faith and left the church communities again. Over 
the years, the accounts of the earthquake in the region increasingly turned 
into humorously exaggerated stories such as folk hero David Crockett’s 
A Narrative of the Life of David Crockett of the State of Tennessee: Written 
by Himself (1834). In this manner, the seismic temblors of 1811/12 ‘became 
just another part of the tradition of [the embellished] American frontier 
tall tales’ (Valencius 6), further effecting the events to lose their status as 
‘historical past’ and moving them closer to the realm of legend and folk 
mythology.
These processes of forgetting on the regional level intensif ied with the 
influx of newcomers to the region and f inally grew to such an extent that in 
the regions surrounding New Madrid ‘the great earthquakes of 1811–12 were 
virtually forgotten for several generations’ (Steward and Knox 4). This also 
meant that no measures were undertaken to prepare for the reoccurrence 
of seismic upheaval in the region well into the 1960s. While the New Madrid 
calamity was thus very present in the local disaster memory in the immedi-
ate aftermath, it soon began to fade into oblivion with new incomers that 
moved to the region and a business community seeking to minimize the 
dangers and the risks of their promoted settlements, among others. In this 
context, the drainage of the sunken lands, industrial agriculture, and the 
building of railroads partly removed the visible traces of the earthquakes 
from the land (cf. Valencius 235–49). Besides, American settlers were ‘eager 
to erase Native knowledge and claims’ (Valencius 205) to the land and hence 
disavowed Indian accounts of the earthquakes. When the New Madrid 
Historical Museum opened in 1974, it did not contain any information or 
documents on the earthquakes and, according to Steward and Knox, most 
local historians—as well as other residents—were not even aware of this 
episode in the city’s history (cf. 2–3).
Despite the spectacular natural phenomena, the considerable number of 
fatalities, and the widespread damage, the New Madrid Earthquakes did not 
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constitute immensely ‘popular’ subjects beyond the New Madrid seismic 
zone. The War of 1812 and the conflicts building up to it dominated the 
national news to a large extent, yet the lack of national exposure is neverthe-
less surprising: on the one hand, the sensational press had already started 
their triumphal procession into American homes (cf. Bulla and Sachsman), 
and, on the other hand, seismological research and other ‘high-brow’ ap-
proaches were avidly engaged in the empirical study of numerous other 
natural phenomena and technological disasters at the time. For example, 
the Richmond Theater Fire in Virginia, which killed close to 100 people 
in December 1811, ‘excited very much interest and feeling throughout the 
United States’ (Kingston 3) and, as Meredith Henne Baker demonstrates in 
her seminal study of this event, emerged as a much sought-after topic in 
broadsides, press coverage, illustrations, and book publications, which cir-
culated the entire nation for quite some time. Local newspapers did report 
on the New Madrid shakes as well as on the unfamiliar natural phenomena 
and published eyewitness accounts, but the 1811/12 earthquakes did not 
achieve the same popularity in national news or nationwide circulating 
broadsides or instant histories.6 As a consequence, they were soon largely 
missing from the popular disaster memory until the end of the twentieth 
century.
There was only one major exception to this ‘unpopularity’ in national 
disaster discourse and it occurred in a very specif ic genre: starting from 
the middle of the nineteenth century and continuing well into the 1870s, 
publications started assessing the f irst decades of the history of the United 
States, creating a Popular Descriptive Portraiture of […] Great and Memorable 
Events (Devens). With telling titles such as Historical Collections of the Great 
West (1854) or Our First Century (1876), these books performed cultural 
nationalism and sought to establish a collective past of the United States. 
As they had done in the regional frontier tall tales, the 1811/12 New Madrid 
Earthquakes signif ied the frontier setting and character traits in these 
publications. Anecdotes of the earthquakes accordingly highlighted the 
rough environment of the frontier and perpetuated the resilience of the 
‘pioneers’ as a constitutive element of the ‘American’ character.
As mentioned above, the unpopularity of the New Madrid Earthquakes 
on a national level also included supposed ‘high’-culture approaches, for 
example, in the natural sciences. This was rather unusual for the time: 
after the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755, the antipode to all unpopular 
disasters, the Marquis of Pombal Carvalho had sent out questionnaires 
to gain widespread observations about seismic phenomena, and France 
inquired about detailed on-site sketches of the damage to buildings from 
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the Portuguese government for the same reason (cf. Fonseca 95–123; Kozák 
and Čermák 133–34). The 1783 Earthquake of Calabria, Italy, incited an equal 
empirical interest in the scientif ic community, which is why the Neapoli-
tan Royal Academy of Sciences sent a ‘scientif ic expedition’ (Keller 151) of 
surveyors and artists into the cities as well as into the rural backcountry in 
order to record the natural phenomena as systematically as possible. While 
so-called naturalists, private people with an interest in their environment, 
discussed the seismic phenomena in letters and articles, there were no 
institutionalized efforts to unravel the workings of the 1811/12 New Madrid 
Earthquakes. Not even eminent English geologist Charles Lyell’s expedition 
into the region in 1846 changed this situation noticeably.
Over the years, the credibility of the reports of the New Madrid Earth-
quakes was thus disputed and at times even denied in scientif ic circles. In 
1883, geologist James MacFarlane gave a ‘celebrated paper’ (Steward and 
Knox 8) at a conference of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science titled ‘The Earthquake at New Madrid, Missouri, in 1811—Probably 
Not an Earthquake’, in which he claimed that the earthquakes had in fact 
been mere landslides. While MacFarlane’s proposition was refuted later, it 
nourished the legendary character of the New Madrid shakes and fostered 
their unpopularity (cf. Steward and Knox 8–11; Valencius 219). As a result, 
the f irst scientif ic study of the 1811/12 New Madrid Earthquakes was only 
conducted a century after the actual events, when Myron Fuller from the 
United States Geological Survey systematically recorded the visible altera-
tions to the regional geology in 1911. Yet, in the decades to come, seismology 
concentrated mostly on the costal plate boundaries of the American East 
and West coast, which is why the mid-American earthquake region did not 
yet come into focus in the scientif ic community.
It was only in the 1970s that concerns about seismic risks and possible 
interferences of nuclear power with such hazards led the U.S. Geological 
Survey and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to undertake large-
scale multidisciplinary studies in the region, which involved a multitude 
of federal agencies and educational institutions. These studies exposed 
seismic activity and reactivated faults in the New Madrid seismic zone 
and propelled the 1811/12 earthquakes (back) into the consciousness of 
many Americans, albeit mostly in scientif ic contexts (cf. Russ and Crone 
iii–iv). Those people who did not learn about the scientif ic recovery found 
out about the New Madrid calamity at the latest when in October 1989 
climatologist Iben Browning predicted a catastrophic repetition of the 
New Madrid Earthquakes for December 1990. While his forecast (luckily) 
proved wrong, the evocation of the risk of a recurrence of earthquakes along 
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the New Madrid seismic zone brought the New Madrid tremors abruptly 
back into consciousness and helped anchor them in the national disaster 
memory of both ‘high’ culture and popular culture alike (Zeilinga de Boer 
and Sanders 136–38). Last but not least, the much-publicized commemora-
tion of the earthquakes’ bicentennial, including conferences, public events, 
and information brochures by the U.S. Geological Survey certainly also 
helped strengthen this development.
The Peshtigo Fire of 1871
A second strikingly unpopular natural disaster, the Peshtigo Fire of 1871, 
occurred six decades after the New Madrid Earthquakes in the rural regions 
northeast of Lake Michigan. It annihilated an area of 2,400 square miles/1.5 
million acres of forest terrain and therein destroyed several small towns such 
as, e.g., Peshtigo, Menekaune, and Williamsonville as well as numerous farm-
ing communities. With a death toll of up to 2,400 people and an estimated 
damage of 200 million U.S. dollars (cf. Haygood 12), this f irestorm constitutes 
the ‘deadliest’ (Gess and Lutz; cf. also Pyne 7) and ‘most destructive f ire in 
American history’ (Riney-Kehrberg 125) to this day. Despite the f irestorm’s 
destructive and spectacular nature, it did not achieve the popularity other 
nineteenth-century f ires enjoyed in the public imagination and is ‘perhaps 
the least known of all major natural disasters in the United States’ (Riney-
Kehrberg 126). This is even more astounding when taking into consideration 
that by then communication and media technologies had further pervaded 
the nation and progressed in quality, reach, speed, and possibilities (cf. Bulla 
and Sachsman; Darrah). Inter alia, it was the concurrent conflagration in 
Chicago—taking place on the exact same day—that reverberated strongly 
with the changes of modernization in the nineteenth-century United States 
and thus drew attention away from the Peshtigo region. Due to its exclusion 
from the popular disaster memory, the Peshtigo blaze has been nicknamed 
‘America’s “forgotten f ire”’ (Pyne 7; cf. also Jones).
On 8 October 1871, a warm front moved north from the Gulf coast and 
collided with a cold front from Canada traveling south. This storm cell 
interacted with already ignited bushfires and turned them into a f irestorm, 
sweeping through northeastern Wisconsin and northern Michigan and 
scorching a territory of the size of Delaware. With estimated wind speeds 
of 110 miles per hour, a heat of at least 2,000 degree Fahrenheit/~1,000 degree 
Celsius, and rapid shifts in direction, extensive walls of flames razed roughly 
2,400 square miles of mostly forested land to the ground (cf. Gess and Lutz 
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101–02, 124; Riney-Kehrberg 126). As a consequence, several farms and parts 
of settlements were completely enclosed by flames from all sides, which 
accounts for the relatively high count of fatalities.
Causes for the unimpeded and rapid spread of the flames were multi-
layered: f irst off, the local towns Peshtigo, Marinette, and Menominee 
sprouted rapidly growing lumber industries at the time, which thrived on 
the increasing urbanization and urban sprawl of the nineteenth century. 
With its dense maple forests and the close proximity to a river, especially 
Peshtigo occupied a strategic location and attracted numerous investors 
such as Chicago’s Mayor William Ogden (cf. Gess and Lutz 18–24). Yet, due 
to the speedy processing of the trees, the roads and f ields were littered 
with heaps of leaves, twigs, bark, and other harvest residue. On top of this, 
as f ire historian Stephen J. Pyne illustrates, several other factors prepared 
the way for an area-wide f irestorm:
What we call the ‘Peshtigo Fire’ is a code name for a vast landscape 
burning. […] A prolonged drought, a rural agriculture based on burning, 
railroads that cast sparks to all sides, a landscape stuffed with slash and 
debris from logging, a city built largely of forest materials, the catalytic 
passage of a dry cold front—all ensured that f ires would break out, that 
some would become monumental, that f lames would swallow wooden 
villages and metropolitan blocks with equal aplomb. (7)
Furthermore, the lack of functioning telegraph lines and other means of 
communication prohibited the calling in of outside help. Insuff icient f ire 
precaution, combustible gas build-ups in the lower atmosphere, and the 
erroneous belief that f ire would eventually produce rain further aggravated 
the situation. Up to this day, the starting point of the f irestorm has not yet 
been identif ied. What is clear, however, is the fact that already weeks before 
the massive conflagration numerous wildf ires and man-made blazes—
started either to clear the way for the railroads or to clear land—had gotten 
out of hand. Simmering for days, these lines of f ire had built the base for 
the destructive f irestorm to come (cf. Gess and Lutz 13–98; Riney-Kehrberg 
125–26; Sawislak).
Just as the New Madrid Earthquakes, the Peshtigo Fire had everything 
that seemed necessary to feature prominently in public disaster memory: 
spectacular natural phenomena such as f ire tornados and spontaneous 
combustion, dramatic eyewitness reports, close escapes, and tragic deaths. 
Since the wind speed was too fast to outrun it and the strong gusts of air 
carried the flames even over clearings, ditches, and plowed f ields, bodies 
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of water were the only (more or less) safe ground. Accordingly, most of 
the people who survived either hunkered down with water up to their 
necks for hours in the cold Peshtigo River or hid in wells, where many 
nevertheless suffocated when the f ire consumed the oxygen. Due to the 
immense human losses (which in some towns reduced the population by 
half or more) and the great destruction of property, the Peshtigo Fire was 
highly visible in contemporaneous life-writing documents such as Reverend 
Peter Pernin’s eyewitness account and newspaper articles and it constituted 
a (sad) landmark in the local communities in the northeastern regions of 
Lake Michigan at the time. This also applied for ‘high’-culture approaches 
such as scientif ic studies. Two weeks after the f ire (when most reports were 
still thought to be highly exaggerated), a local committee investigated the 
genesis, course, and extent of the f ire—without, however, being able to 
fully understand the at the time unknown physics behind the f irestorm 
(cf. Gess and Lutz 165–67). Whereas religious reactions to and explanations 
of the earthquakes had featured large in 1811/12, these were not among the 
dominant reactions to natural disasters in the second half of the nineteenth 
century anymore (cf. Steinberg 4).
With the f light from the damaged rural farming areas in the long-
aftermath of the conflagration, the arrival of new settlers in Wisconsin 
and Michigan, and the gradual loss of eyewitnesses to the f irestorm over the 
course of time, the events seemed to have lost their immediate importance 
and, as in the case of many other historical American f ires (such as the Bal-
timore Fire of 1904), began to fade in the cultural memory of the residents in 
the region in the f irst decades of the twentieth century (cf. Riney-Kehrberg 
126). According to Denise Gess and William Lutz, ‘[o]ver time, the incom-
plete fragmented story took on the tone and winsome quality of a myth, 
a Paul Bunyan tale’, which ‘became a bit of regional elementary-school 
history’ (205) in Peshtigo and the surrounding communities. Beyond the 
affected regions in Wisconsin and Michigan, the Peshtigo Fire was and 
remained rather unpopular—particularly in comparison to the enduring 
nationwide fascination with the Great Chicago Fire. This started right after 
the f irestorm occurred: the remoteness of the rural settlements and the 
initial impossibility to communicate the calamity to outside communities 
(among others, due to the damaged telegraph lines) enhanced the public 
invisibility of the f irestorm considerably. As a result, when the news about 
the Peshtigo calamity reached cities such as Green Bay, Madison, or Mil-
waukee (and from there the rest of the nation) on 10 October 1871, ‘everyone 
in any position of authority had gone to the aid of Chicago’ (Gess and Lutz 
158), and with them hundreds of disaster tourists from around the country.
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With the newspapers, magazines, and parlor-tables full of visual and 
written reports on the Chicago disaster, the Peshtigo Fire did not get at-
tention in its own right outside the affected areas toward the end of the 
nineteenth century and was rather featured as a brief annotation to the 
Chicago tragedy in the nineteenth century.7 The newspapers in the United 
States that did report on the Peshtigo Fire, as Denise Gess and William Lutz 
state, did not send their own agents to obtain f irst-hand reports as they had 
done in their coverage of the Chicago Fire but ‘simply ran rewritten accounts 
from local papers in Wisconsin’ (181; cf. also Lienhard). Even though the 
Peshtigo Fire was the dominant subject matter in the affected region in 
its immediate aftermath and sparked considerable f inancial and material 
relief from other American cities, it never emerged as a popular motif in 
the fashionable graphic accounts of instant histories, stereograph views, or 
lithographic prints in nationwide circulation at the time.
Whereas the Chicago Fire, according to historian Karen Sawislak, 
hence developed into the ‘f irst great national “media event”’ (17; cf. also 
Smith, ‘Media Event’) in spite of the fact that its size and the number of 
its fatalities amounted only to a small fraction of the f irestorm that was 
raging 250 miles north on the same day, the Peshtigo Fire ended up as a 
mere ‘historical footnote’ to the events in the urban space (cf., e.g., Riney-
Kehrberg 126; Sawislak 21). Since the creation of media events requires the 
selection of specific incidents (and the dismissal of others), the unpopularity 
of the Peshtigo Fire can also be seen as a result of the popularity of the 
Great Chicago Fire of 1871. The interest in Chicago was not only limited 
to American popular culture at the time, but also included ‘high’-culture 
approaches. All over the nation, engineers and architects equally focused 
on Chicago as a research subject hoping to achieve valuable insights into 
how urban environments and specif ic building materials fared in massive 
urban conflagrations (cf. Sawislak). A good month after the Great Chicago 
Fire, an off icial commission researched the origin and spread of the f ire; 
yet, it would take almost a year for the U.S. Weather Bureau to come up with 
a similar report for Peshtigo. The fact that leading scholars contradicted 
each other regarding the proper causation of the f irestorm (cf. Gess and 
Lutz 204–09) and eyewitness reports were often still doubted as incorrect 
might also have contributed to the dismissal of the Peshtigo Fire as a crucial 
point of reference for the study of f ire and the weather up to the turn of 
the century.
Most importantly, however, like the Great Lisbon Earthquake (1755) a 
little more than a century before, the f iery destruction of Chicago seems to 
have reverberated intensely with the zeitgeist. At the time, Chicago with its 
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tall buildings, high degree of technologization, and rapid growth embodied 
progress, business acumen, and human ingenuity in the West. According to 
Carl Smith, the city’s devastation offered an opportunity for all American 
urbanites to work through their anxieties about the urban disorder, change, 
and instability that had been raised to a new level by rapid industrialization, 
immigration, and urbanization (cf. Disorder). Besides, the eyes of the nation 
were turned on Chicago in order to find out whether the nineteenth-century 
American city would prove resilient and f inally continue its economic and 
cultural rise. In this manner, Chicago presented the nation with a model of 
‘rising from the ashes’—convincing the public of the imminent comeback 
and rise of the city far beyond the previous wealth before the streets were 
even cleared of debris—which would often be repeated in natural disasters 
to come such as the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and Fire (cf. Leikam 
ch.5).
The subject of lofty poetry collections (cf., e.g., Gerty’s 1915 collection), 
socially critical novels such as Theodore Dreiser’s 1912 The Financier, and 
popular box off ice successes (cf., e.g., In Old Chicago [1937]) and as a staunch 
reference point for the (scientif ic and quotidian) discussion of all later 
American f ires (cf., e.g., reports on the Baltimore Fire of 1904 or the 1906 
San Francisco Earthquake and Fire), the 1871 conflagration in Chicago—
commonly referred to as Great Chicago Fire—showed a high cultural 
productivity in popular as well as ‘high’ culture into the twentieth century. 
The Peshtigo Fire, on the other hand, remained visible only locally—if at 
all. This changed in 1910, when devastating f irestorms in the American 
West let the U.S. Forest Service ‘unearth’ the occurrences at Peshtigo and 
include these in their research. During the Second World War, the Peshtigo 
Fire was again brought to attention, this time by the U.S. Army studying 
the creation and handling of f irestorms as possible military weapons (cf. 
Gess and Lutz 208–09; Riney-Kehrberg 126).
From then on, the Peshtigo Fire served as a particular model (the so-
called ‘Peshtigo paradigm’) in the f ield of f ire history and military use of 
f ire, which is why Stephen J. Pyne rightly points out that this conflagration 
is treated in ‘every survey of American f ires’ and has thus ‘never long passed 
from our national consciousness’ (7). Yet, despite the Peshtigo Fire being 
a household name in a very specialized f ield of science, the noteworthy 
inattention in American public cultures (to a certain degree locally, but 
mostly nationally) to it continued over the course of the century—a fact 
that both the opening of a local Fire Museum in Peshtigo in 1963 and the 
bicentennial of both f ire calamities did not seem to have radically altered. 
Writing in 1995, Karen Sawislak, a historian of the Great Chicago Fire, 
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convincingly argued that the Peshtigo Fire was still only known by few 
people outside Wisconsin (21). Since then, a burgeoning fascination with 
‘forgotten’ or ‘lost’ histories and a heightened interest in natural disasters 
following the environmental turn in the humanities have resulted in a 
wave of recent publications (cf., e.g., Gess and Lutz; Knickelbine; Pernin), 
bringing the Peshtigo Fire into the canon of great nineteenth-century f ires.
Conclusion
The two case studies illustrate that—regardless of how terrible the loss of 
life, how spectacular the geophysical and meteorological phenomena, and 
how dreadful the devastation—some nineteenth-century natural calami-
ties moved from a signif icant cultural productivity in popular as well as 
‘high’ culture approaches into unpopularity. This unpopularity was not 
accidental but produced by economic, cultural, and political struggles for 
hegemony and for visibility in American cultures. In the transformation 
from popular to unpopular disasters, the simultaneous occurrence of other 
momentous newsworthy crises of national signif icance (so-called media 
events), driving the previously popular (natural) calamities out of the cul-
tural consciousness, played a crucial role. In this manner, the impending 
War of 1812 and the Great Chicago Fire drew considerable attention away 
from the New Madrid Earthquakes and the Peshtigo Fire, respectively. 
Moreover, the Civil War also helped erase the memory of the New Madrid 
Earthquakes in the long run, since, as Conevery Valencius argues, ‘[t]he 
region of the New Madrid epicenters came to be associated with terrible 
battle, not terrible earthquakes’ (222) and with racial strife in the decades 
after 1865.
In this context, cultural memory comes forward as disputed territory 
with regard to the question of whose stories are remembered and whose 
are marginalized. More often than not, the same processes that shape 
cultural and political hegemony in the United States today were productive 
in determining which disasters were included in the canon of nineteenth-
century disasters and from which perspective(s) they should be told. Along 
these lines, the Civil War not only overwrote the New Madrid earthquake 
landscape (literally as well as metaphorically) but also obscured the long-
standing Native American presence in the New Madrid seismic zone, ‘along 
with the role of the region’s earthquakes in pan-Indian spiritual and cultural 
revival’ (Valencius 229). Whereas the recent ‘rediscovery’ of the earthquakes 
of 1811/12 also partly brought the Native American experiences (albeit often 
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mediated by ‘white’ travel reports such as John Hunter’s Memoirs or by 
records of non-native anthropologists) on the disaster back into focus 
(cf. esp. Valencius), this is different in the case of the Peshtigo Fire. Scott 
Knickelbine’s The Great Peshtigo Fire (2012), a historical nonfiction book 
for young readers, is one of the very few publications that point to the fact 
that the story of the 1871 f irestorm also includes the local Menominee and 
Ojibwe tribes. Knickelbine states that ‘[t]here is no record of how many of 
[the many Wisconsin Indians] lived through the f ire’ (53), highlighting the 
struggle for narrative authority and commemoration and how this is often 
decisively influenced by the question of which documents are culturally 
recognized as signif icant and thus archived and which are not.
Furthermore, both regions, the New Madrid seismic zone and the forested 
area around Peshtigo, were rather sparsely settled and removed from the 
next urban centers in the nineteenth century. The lack of a local publish-
ing industry and the missing communication networks prevented a rapid 
dissemination of the events and additionally diminished the credibility 
of eyewitness reports. Besides, the center of the New Madrid Earthquakes 
largely lay outside the national boundaries at the geographical periphery of 
the United States (mostly in Louisiana and Missouri Territory), which might 
have made the earthquakes not as newsworthy to scientists, publishers, 
and artists in the urban centers.
In addition, the transformation of the sciences from rather personal 
endeavors of interested ‘naturalists’ into highly specialized and institution-
alized collective undertakings also contributed its share to the unpopularity 
of some of the contemporaneous disasters. Especially in the f irst half of 
the nineteenth century, individual reasoning on the workings of the New 
Madrid Earthquakes, mostly in the form of letters, for example, was for a 
long time not accredited as ‘real’ and quality science and therefore only 
very recently taken into account by seismologists (cf. Valencius 213–15). This 
state of scientif ic standards contributed to the dismissal of many records 
and discussions of early nineteenth-century natural calamities, which in 
turn also had a share in the forgetting of these events.
In the nineteenth-century United States, commercial motives further 
played a central role in the unpopularizing of natural calamities through 
the active masking of risks. The voracious speculation in the American West 
prompted many developers to hail land and settlements without disclosing 
previous calamities, which might have evoked fears of a recurrence in buyers. 
In the New Madrid seismic zone, for instance, railroad, timber, and agricultural 
companies advocated swamp drainage as well as an expansion of cultivable 
land and the infrastructure by suggesting that the earthquakes of 1811/12 
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were mere legends (cf. Valencius 235–50). Eager to draw investors to the forest 
around Peshtigo, newspapers in the region likewise barely mentioned the fires 
after 1871 but focused on positive news (cf. Gess and Lutz 192–97). This work, in 
the long run, led to an accelerated forgetting—particularly in the contexts of 
population expansion. In both cases, the influx of new settlers was immense, 
which also contributed to the dilution of the local memory of these calamities.
The two cases in point did not stay unpopular without end, however. 
Looking at how these unpopular disasters were brought back into popular-
ity, it can be said that more often than not the driving force seems to have 
emanated from the nexus of military (research) and technology. From there, 
it subsequently also reached popular culture again. In the case of the New 
Madrid Earthquakes, the (legitimate) fear in the 1970s that nuclear power 
plants in the active seismic zone could cause radioactive contamination 
returned the tremors back into the spotlight of seismic and nuclear research 
(cf. Russ and Crone iii–iv). When climatologist Iben Browning predicted 
the recurrence of the New Madrid quakes in 1989 with much nationwide 
publicity, the potential risk caused strong fears, which bestowed a height-
ened visibility to the historical event. In the same way, the fear in the 1910s 
that f irestorms such as the one at Peshtigo in 1871 might become more 
frequent promoted scientif ic studies, which were taken up and expanded 
during the Second World War, when the U.S. military conducted research 
on the possible use of f irestorms as war weapons (cf. Gess and Lutz 208–09; 
Riney-Kehrberg 126). While issues of (national) safety and security—and 
the monetary interests and relationships connected to this—thus played 
a crucial role, there were other decisive factors at play.
In an age of information overload and the sheer endless and rapid spread 
of news, the retrieval of ‘lost’ stories seems to have gained a particular 
attraction as the recent f lood of ‘forgotten’ or ‘lost’ histories of events in 
American history indicates. Besides, ‘today’s “obsession with memory” and 
memorials’, which is ‘grounded in a vastly expanded U.S. demographic and 
in heightened expectations of rights and representations among the nation’s 
increasingly diverse publics’ (Doss 19), is not only concerned with national 
narratives but at the same time—and in particular—with the publication 
of counterstatements and less visible (disaster) narratives. The unearthing 
of unpopular disaster tales and the new wave of publications on the New 
Madrid Earthquakes and the Peshtigo Fire in research contexts (e.g. Gess and 
Lutz; Kanon; Lovett; Riney-Kehrberg; Steward and Knox; Valencius; Zeilinga 
de Boer and Sanders) and popular culture (in the form of earthquake tours, 
popular histories, news articles, children’s books, or reprints of eyewitness 
reports) hence show that the ‘rediscovery’ of the unpopular resonates with 
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the contemporary zeitgeist. In this manner, as Stephen J. Pyne remarked, 
by now the Peshtigo Fire’s ‘cachet as “forgotten” has paradoxically helped 
make it better known than almost any other rural conflagration’ (7). As of 
today, the New Madrid Earthquakes and the Peshtigo Fire are quite popular 
in ‘low-brow’ and ‘high-brow’ approaches again (albeit in very different 
contexts) and have f irmly entered the canon of ‘great nineteenth-century 
American natural disasters’. The analysis of these two case studies has 
demonstrated that the research of unpopular disasters transcends the local 
frameworks and opens up a window into the processes through which 
American cultures have made sense of the world in the nineteenth century.
Notes
1. On the nineteenth-century American culture of disasters see, e.g., Ste-
ven Biel’s American Disasters; David W. Bulla and David B. Sachsman’s 
Sensationalism: Murder, Mayhem, Mudslinging, Scandals, and Disasters in 
19th-Century Reporting; William Darrah’s The World of Stereographs (esp. 
156, 161–62); Susanne Leikam’s Framing Spaces in Motion: Tracing Visualiza-
tions of Earthquakes into Twentieth-Century San Francisco; Christof Mauch 
and Sylvia Mayer’s American Environments: Climate, Cultures, Catastrophe; 
Kevin Rozario’s The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern 
America; and Theodore Steinberg’s Acts of God: The Unnatural History of 
Natural Disaster in America. For a discussion of the ethics and aesthetics 
of picturing calamities, see Ingrid Gessner and Susanne Leikam’s Iconogra-
phies of the Calamitous in American Visual Culture.
2. By employing the designation ‘natural disaster’/calamity, I want to empha-
size that the calamities discussed here were partly composed of dramatic 
natural spectacles such as wild fires and earthquakes and thus differ from 
‘purely’ technological or industrial disasters. This terminology, however, 
should not indicate that the disastrous effects occur ‘naturally’ and are not 
triggered, aggravated, or brought about by human involvement. Rather, in 
accordance with the recent use of these terms in disaster studies, it is com-
monly assumed that, in terms of causation, there is no incident, regardless 
of how spectacular the natural phenomena involved may be, that is not 
in one way or another man-made, harming disadvantaged groups more 
than others. This conviction notwithstanding, the visible involvement of 
‘nature’ nonetheless changes how people perceive these disasters and how 
they frame responsibility and the addressing of vulnerabilities for future 
disasters, which is another reason for utilizing the label ‘natural disaster’/
calamity (cf. Aragón-Durand 17–23; Hewitt; Steinberg). 
3. While all experience is individual, experiences can be communicated and 
mediated and thus be collectively remembered. In this sense, cultural 
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(sometimes also termed collective) memory attests to the self-understand-
ing and worldview of particular cultures or communities that stipulate 
certain past events constitutive of their present identity (cf. the seminal 
works by Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, and Jan and Aleida Assmann). 
Although emphasizing the intricate entanglements of both, Marita Sturken 
has differentiated cultural memory—understood as ‘a field of cultural 
negotiations through which different stories vie for a place in history’ (1)—
from history by characterizing the latter as ‘in some way […] sanctioned or 
valorized by institutional frameworks or publishing enterprises’ (4) and the 
former as exempt from these formal boundaries. 
4. The canonization of (natural) disasters goes back at least to the Puritan ser-
mons, which in their typological readings included long lists of biblical and 
historical disasters that were taken as models for the interpretation of more 
recent calamities. The tradition of discussing contemporaneous disasters in 
a framework of historical precursors and (trans)national reference points 
was continued throughout the nineteenth century, where, for example, the 
Galveston Storm of 1900 was contextualized by medieval Dutch floods, the 
eruption of Mt. Vesuvius, earthquakes in San Francisco, and conflagrations 
in Chicago and Calcutta (cf., e.g., Lester 497–98). 
5. Estimates for the magnitudes vary according to sources. While older publi-
cations list magnitudes of 8 and higher (cf. Steward and Knox 15), the U.S. 
Geological Survey places the strongest shock at 7.7 (n. pag.). More recently 
scholars have suggested lower numbers (7.5 or slightly below), which, how-
ever, does not dispute the overall momentous and disruptive nature of the 
New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811/12 (cf., e.g., Lovett). 
6. Albeit geographically far removed, the Caracas Earthquake of March 1812 
was met with considerable concern but also sensationalist interest in the 
news. Thus, the United States Government immediately responded to of-
ficial requests for support from Caracas in 1812, while New Madrid had to 
fight hard for U.S. financial relief in the years after the calamity and only 
obtained it in 1815 (cf. Ewell 20–21). 
7. Edgar J. Goodspeed’s 1871 instant History of the Great Fires in Chicago and the 
West, for instance, devotes 38 chapters (550 pages) to Chicago’s past, the im-
pact of the fire, and the city’s future, before elaborating in three chapters (or 
slightly more than fifty pages) on the fires in Wisconsin and Michigan. Other 
works such as Elias Colbert and Everet Chamberlin’s Chicago and the Great 
Conflagration (1872) only mention the Wisconsin and Michigan firestorms 
together with a long list of other fires in world history in their appendices. 
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 The Unpopular Profession?
Graduate Studies in the Humanities and the Genre of the 
‘Thesis Hatement’
Sebastian M. Herrmann
‘Don’t do it. Just don’t! [...] [G]raduate school lasts at least six years and 
will ruin your life in a very real way’. This is the bottom line of a 2013 
article by Rebecca Schuman in the online newspaper slate.com. Noting 
that she is not the f irst to issue this warning, Schuman adds: ‘well-meaning 
academics have already attempted to warn you, the best-known screed 
in this subgenre being William Pannapacker’s “Graduate School in the 
Humanities? Just Don’t Go”. But this convinced no one. It certainly didn’t 
convince me!’ Looking back, she explains: ‘In 2005 when I began my own 
Ph.D., I should have known better, but I didn’t. Now that you know better, 
will you listen?’
At the time, Schuman’s piece attracted considerable attention, not least 
from people procrastinating away in front of their computers while writing 
on or researching for their own Ph.D. theses. It quickly garnered Facebook 
likes and shares (over 38,000 to date), it invited comments on slate.com (over 
1,800 by now), it was shared, tweeted, and retweeted, and it was responded 
to in blog posts and other articles. Writing about Schuman’s text in The New 
Yorker, Joshua Rothman remarks that the responses were so multiple that 
it was ‘as though a virtual symposium [had] been convened’. Looking at 
the social media interaction, however, one could observe that, ironically, 
Schuman’s message was ‘liked’ by exactly those people who had reason to 
dislike it; or, more precisely, that the people most vigorously engaging with 
it through likes, shares, and comments were precisely those people who, 
according to the text, most emphatically ignored its content: practicing 
graduate students, who read the text, shared it, and then continued to 
work on their Ph.D. The social media circulation thus suggests that the 
text’s audience did not read the article as intended, that they did not take 
the advice to turn one’s back to academia, and it thus underscores the 
point that Schuman’s article self-reflexively makes with regard to other, 
similar texts against graduate school: they ‘[convince] no one’. The tension 
between the text’s decidedly, self-avowedly unpopular message and its 
mass-circulation—a tension between the texts self-proclaimed meaning 
and its pragmatic effect—thus parallels the contradiction Schuman herself 
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openly performs when she says that warning people against going to grad 
school most likely is a futile task—in the very moment of engaging in exactly 
this task.
These interlocking moments of contradiction, present in Schuman’s essay 
as well as in other, similar texts, mark a particular paradox of un/popularity 
that warrants further exploration. Going to graduate school arguably is 
an unpopular life decision in several senses of the word: it is a decision 
that only comparatively few students will make, an elite decision, and it 
is one that is often emphatically and ostentatiously disliked. When asked, 
graduate students will quickly speak of the hardships of graduate school, 
not of the pleasures of learning and of grad school life. Yet, according to 
the logic of the texts by Schuman, Pannapacker, and others, getting a Ph.D. 
remains too popular a decision. Indeed, their texts work hard to tell people 
that they should like it even less, that even fewer people should do it, that 
it should be even more unpopular. These texts, in their circulation and in 
the images, stereotypes, and sentiments they invoke, constitute a popular 
genre advocating for the unpopularity of the humanities Ph.D.; clearly, they 
are shaped by complex and contradictory affective dynamics.
This paper will focus on these conflicted affective dynamics to argue that 
they are indicative of the role the humanities play in ‘Western’ society more 
broadly. My argument will proceed in four larger steps. I will f irst present 
Schuman’s ‘Thesis Hatement’ in greater detail and will contextualize it with 
regard to the larger body of similar texts it is representative of, suggesting 
that they constitute a particularly precarious form of (mis)communication 
marked by irony and hyperbole. As part of my discussion of this genre of 
writing, I will, secondly, provide a brief discussion of the politics of these 
texts, arguing that they engage in conflicted and contradictory discussions 
of labor, class, income, and academia.1 In a third step, I will then trace these 
contradictions on a textual level. To do so, I will attend to the somewhat 
limited set of metaphors this genre of writing typically employs in the 
attempt to express and come to terms with a presumed popularity paradox: 
if they convince no one, if they are advice literature that does not give advice 
to be followed, they have a particularly insincere, tropical quality, and 
this quality gets expressed and exercised in the tropes they use; attending 
to these tropes will thus help unfold the contradictions they negotiate. 
In a f inal section, I will look at the larger textual performance of thesis 
hatements to discuss in how far and how exactly these texts undermine 
their own presumed project. Thesis hatements, I will thus show, are a deeply 
conflicted genre. They do not mean what they say, they use metaphors to 
talk about this dynamic without talking about it, and they speak about 
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conflicted social constellations. As texts about the academy, they are indica-
tive of the conflicted role the humanities play in contemporary US society.
1 Thesis Hatements as Genre
Rebecca Schuman’s ‘Thesis Hatement’ is part of a larger body of texts that 
all advise students against going to grad school, and this body of texts, in 
turn, ties in to larger discourses on the subject position of the graduate 
student, on the university, and on education. Accordingly, I will briefly 
describe Schuman’s piece and discuss how both its content and its particular 
sardonic tone connect it to larger textual environments.
Rebecca Schuman’s ‘Thesis Hatement’ is a strange product all the way 
down from the two titles it bears, both of which already have a distant 
ring of (self-)ironizing mockery:2 one is ‘There are no academic jobs and 
getting a Ph.D. will make you into a horrible person: A jeremiad’, and the 
other is ‘Thesis Hatement: Getting a literature Ph.D. will turn you into 
an emotional trainwreck, not a professor’. The text describes Schuman’s 
frustration at not getting a tenured position after completing her Ph.D. in 
German, a frustration that, she diagnoses, stems not least from the way in 
which academia has conditioned her to regard all non-academic work as 
inferior. Throughout the text, Schuman laments the exploitative, damaging 
environment of academia, the way in which she was ‘broken down and 
reconfigured in the image of the academy’, and she concludes that this stole 
her years of her life and did not set her up for any kind of reward but only 
for disappointment and low-income adjunct positions. The text is organized 
around Kafka’s ‘A Little Fable’, the story of a mouse that discovers that its 
path is leading to a trap and, standing in front of the trap, is advised by a 
cat behind it to ‘only change the direction’. She uses the fable to suggest 
that her current predicament is not the result of a recent decision of hers, 
but that she had understood far too late that she had been ‘walking cat 
food’ all along. Surprisingly, then, turning around is exactly the advice that 
Schuman presents to her intended audience of prospective and current 
graduate students at the beginning and end of her essay, thus underlining 
that her text, presented as a piece of advice, is actually not that.3
In its (self-)deprecating, semi-playful disdain for the humanities educa-
tion, ‘Thesis Hatement’ is representative of a larger ecosystem of texts all 
denouncing going to grad school as a bad life decision and all painting 
graduate education, the Ph.D. degree, and the humanities as corrosive to 
a happy life. This corpus of texts can be def ined narrowly, covering the 
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‘“don’t go” advice market’ alone (Cottom), a segment or sub-genre I will 
refer to as ‘thesis hatements’ from hereon,4 or it can be understood more 
broadly, covering a larger body of texts portraying graduate education with 
a particular ironic, sardonic twist and thus echoing (and propagating) the 
ambivalent feelings American culture holds toward higher education and 
intellectualism.5 Such texts take many different forms across various media, 
often mockingly playing with clichés of what the typical graduate student 
is like and often foregrounding a distinct, semi-ironic pathos of suffering. 
Typically, they present graduate students as such an overdrawn spectacle of 
suffering, poverty, self-exploitation, and nerdiness, that it is impossible to 
not read their disdain as partly a caricature that at once invokes and mocks 
a set motif of US pop-cultural lore. To name just some examples: there is 
a grad student Barbie, complete with ‘black circles under her delightfully 
bloodshot eyes’, there is a famous Simpsons clip where Marge admonishes 
her son: ‘Bart, don’t make fun of grad students, they just made bad life 
choices’, and there is the well-known series of Ph.D. comics, which was 
also made into a movie.6 But there is also ‘So you Want to Get a PhD in the 
Humanities’, a viral Youtube clip about a professor destroying a young grad 
student’s illusions about academia, which more squarely falls into the seg-
ment of thesis hatements. The more serious of these texts, however, emanate 
from a US university context, they are published in The Chronicle of Higher 
Education or in Inside Higher Ed, and they address their audience with the 
gesture of offering well-meaning, serious advice—advice, of course, not to 
go to grad school.
Thesis hatements, those pieces of academic advice literature that tell 
students not to pursue a doctoral degree, thus participate in a larger and 
deeply ambivalent discourse about what it means to be a graduate student 
in the humanities and about what the humanities are. As a sub-genre, they 
share in how they warn students against pursuing a Ph.D. or an academic 
career more generally. Most typically, this warning comes from someone 
who has ‘made it’, someone who has tenure and who warns young students 
that getting tenure is nearly impossible, especially now. The most famous, 
most canonical of these is Thomas H. Benton’s ‘now-classic article’ (Cook 
30) ‘Just Don’t Go’.7 With a tenured person explaining the impossibility of 
ever getting tenure, one can immediately see how this is a dysfunctional 
and in itself contradictory act of communication that sets up its audience 
for a signif icant double-bind: it tells readers that tenure is near impossible 
to get, but it suggests that knowing and ignoring this is part of getting 
tenure in the end. However, there are also thesis hatements by people who 
do not have tenure, who have left academia (or at least have given up the 
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quest for tenure) and who are now warning others to enter into it, their 
bitterness, again, often complicating their message. Rebecca Schuman’s 
‘Thesis Hatement’ is a representative of this type.8 In either case, already in 
terms of authorship, thesis hatements are marked by a particular affective 
double-bind, and this double-bind, that I will trace in the next three sections 
as well, sits at the heart of how they negotiate the un/popularity of the 
humanities Ph.D.
2 The Politics of Thesis Hatements
As a body of writing, thesis hatements have a political quality that resides 
both inside and outside the academy: most immediately, they provide an 
arena to discuss changes to the job market that are particularly poignant in 
academia but that impact society at large. At the same time, they allow for 
and engage in displaced conversations about class in US society, most visibly 
so by discussing the relationship between income, education, habitus, and 
identity. Lastly, thesis hatements are about the role of higher education in 
US society, and in how they position the value of education they come with 
a politics of their own that is intimately tied to the social role both of the 
university as an institution and of the humanities as a particular configura-
tion of practices and knowledge. These three different sets of politics f irst 
and foremost focus on a US cultural context, but some of their aspects travel 
widely and f ind resonance in other national (academic) cultures, their 
mobility giving evidence both of the transnational compatibility of what 
it means to be an academic and of the global(ized) reach of the neoliberal 
changes of the university they respond to.9 Accordingly, I will use this sec-
tion to outline these three dimensions of the politics of thesis hatements.10
First and foremost, thesis hatements are a response to a particular, 
ongoing reconf iguration of the job market in US higher education. As 
such, they speak of the decline of tenured, permanent positions and of 
the rise of low-income, no-benefits, non-permanent teaching jobs. At the 
core of each thesis hatement thus stands the realization, often positioned 
as a painfully honest moment of truth-telling, that the level of education 
and the intellectual capabilities of Ph.D. students will not end up giving 
them a reasonable chance at a tenured position—simply because there 
are fewer and fewer such positions. In this sense, thesis hatements speak of 
two different, interconnected, and abusive labor markets: one, the adjunct 
market that most graduate students, despite having spent years and years 
on their degree, will end up working on, employed, paid, and valued far 
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below their qualif ication. Two, the economic situation of graduate students 
during their studies: they delay their entrance into the job market, delay 
their (potential, private sector) careers, fail to build retirement funds, and 
often provide underpaid teaching labor to their university, all as part of an 
investment in their own future that, due to the decline of tenure, for the vast 
majority of them will never pay off.11 Read thus as part of a conversation on 
the defunding of the humanities, on the reconfiguration of teaching, and 
on the need for a realistic assessment of what that means for Ph.D. students, 
thesis hatements serve a valid double function: they warn students of these 
two abusive labor markets, and they constitute a public discourse on these 
developments of the academic labor market.
In more abstract terms, however, thesis hatements are discussions of 
class. More specif ically, they attempt to negotiate the relationship between 
income, wealth, social capital, and lifestyle/habitus, a configuration that 
is particularly murky in academia.12 Thus, if William Pannapacker can 
‘only recommend graduate school in the humanities—and, increasingly, 
the social sciences and sciences—if you are independently wealthy’, the 
particular, scandalous quality of his point to his audience lies in how it as-
sociates the humanities with a wealthy class position: doing a Ph.D., in this 
perspective, is not ‘legitimated’ as a career choice by the prospect of earning 
money; it is a leisure activity for the wealthy. It is not something you do to 
earn more, it is something you do if you have enough money to not worry 
about money at all.13 This concern about the relationship between income, 
class, and education is even more pronounced in the particular imagery 
Larry Cebula evokes in his advice piece not to go to grad school: he contrasts, 
as two alternative roads to a fulf illed life, the (plausible, attainable) income 
of ‘the manager of a Hooters’ and the (implausible, unattainable) life of a 
‘happy mid-career faculty member who biked to work yesterday and met 
you in her sunny off ice with the pictures of her European vacation on the 
wall’. By setting up the contrast like this, with the barely decent Hooters 
on one end and biking and European holidays on the other, Cebula makes 
clear that there are two (upper-)middle class identities at stake: one based 
on income, an income that is solid enough to make up for the low social 
capital of operating a Hooters restaurant, and one based on habitus.14
The contrast, however, not only speaks about two different ways of 
marking class that students might choose for their life, it highlights the 
contradictory class configuration of being a graduate student in the f irst 
place: in terms of social capital, work ethic, habitus, and self-image, graduate 
students clearly align with an upper middle-class position (and part of this 
habitus precisely is not being in it for the money). In terms of income, most 
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often they do not. In terms of their daily work, research and teaching, they 
perform work that is highly valued, at least discursively, by society. In terms 
of the income this work earns them, they do not. Set against the background 
of the particularly unclear class designations in academia, thesis hatements 
thus engage a doubly contradictory class discourse: society’s feelings toward 
graduate students are contradictory, and the graduate students’ own situa-
tion, with the disparity between social and economic capital is, too.
Lastly, and in addition to the social issues they speak of, thesis hatements 
also in themselves pursue a politics of sorts. The politics of these texts and 
their circulation reside in how they individualize the social problems of 
graduate education and the adjunct market, how they depoliticize the social 
role of the university and the humanities, and how they thus participate 
in a project of delegitimizing the humanities (in the sense in which the 
humanities have claimed legitimacy since the 1970s). These politics begin 
with thesis hatements’ generic move of telling students not to pursue a 
degree. As Andrew Kalaidjian points out, this advice constitutes a form of 
‘opting out of the conversation’, and it prevents a more ‘sustained critique 
of the state of intellectual labor as a problem of modernity and a cause for 
social activism in its own right’. Telling graduate students to ‘Just Don’t Go’, 
in other words, foregrounds a private ‘solution’ to something that could and 
should be treated as a social problem instead. Indeed, Paul Cook makes a 
more fundamental point about the larger body of academic advice literature 
(under which he subsumes thesis hatements) and about the disciplinary and 
disciplining work it does: these texts not only ‘delegitimi[ze] the possibil-
ity of large-scale change’ (30), and they not only preempt any perspective 
that imagines the university as a starting point of social change. Instead, 
academic advice literature, as it is in circulation right now, ‘constructs, 
constrains, narrows, and normalizes the way graduate students think of 
themselves as individuals constantly in need of introspective work on 
themselves in order to remain [...] employable’ (Cook 25). It ‘promotes a 
„turning inward“ that has a way of deflecting attention away from social 
projects that require collective action’ (Cook 25).15 There is, in other words, a 
double impulse toward depoliticization here: thesis hatements tell graduate 
students that their economic situation is a private, not a social problem, and 
they, more generally, depoliticize the humanities/the university as a site of 
introspection rather than of social change. Schuman’s ‘Thesis Hatement’, 
then, as Tressie McMillan Cottom writes, may be ‘on the far right extreme of 
the ‘don’t go!’ advice market, but it is indicative of what that advice entails. 
It’s some combination of an assessment of the academic labor market, the 
odds of getting a tenure-track appointment, the high cost of graduate 
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school, and the emotional toil’. It is in this particular configuration that 
the depoliticizing politics of thesis hatements as a genre lie.
As a genre, thesis hatements thus not only speak about exploitative labor 
markets, about the relationship between income, habitus, and class, but they 
have a politics of their own, more often than not delegitimizing the study of 
the humanities as neither good for one’s wallet nor for one’s self. They use 
the academy as a setting in which to discuss the contradiction between how 
US society values intellectual work and how it pays it, between what counts 
for upper middle class and what constitutes an upper-middle-class income, 
and they constitute an attempt at understanding (and regulating) what the 
academy is and what the humanities are.16 While this political dimension 
of thesis hatements, or of academic advice literature more generally, has 
received some scholarly attention, it is substantially complicated by the 
texts’ internal contradictions.
3 Metaphors and the Popularity Paradox
A particular and in the context of this essay particularly telling moment of 
contradiction in Rebecca Schuman’s ‘Thesis Hatement’ is her observation 
that previous similar texts had failed to convince their readers. Notably, 
she is not the only one to make that observation, and there is even one text 
explicitly about this aspect: Nate Kreuter’s meta-article in Inside Higher 
Education, an ‘Essay on why Graduate Students Ignore Warnings about 
the Job Market’.17 Kreuter argues that, by the time they enter graduate 
school, students are well-conditioned to ignore warnings that a task might 
be diff icult. Pursuing a graduate career, to him, has much to do not simply 
with over-estimating one’s own abilities (though this might be a factor), 
but with overestimating the role that merit plays in academia and with 
underestimating the role of luck, a point that I will come back to later. 
While such explicit meta-awareness is rare, most thesis hatements do visibly 
struggle to come to terms with the fact that students keep pursuing a degree 
against what, in their logic, would be the students’ best interest. Rather than 
using this as a vantage point to question their own logic, thesis hatements 
perceive the alleged popularity of the Ph.D. degree as paradoxical and in 
need of explanation. Most often, this explanation comes in the form of the 
limited sets of metaphors these texts employ.
Not surprisingly, the f irst set of such metaphors is f inancial in nature. 
Typically, it frames graduate school as either a form of lottery, with the 
odds so insane that one should not gamble on ever getting tenure (or any 
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other job adequate to years and years of working on a Ph.D.), or it tries to 
cast academia as a form of Ponzi scheme, an economy that works only as 
long as enough gullible people keep buying in at the bottom. While the 
comparison does not work out on all levels, its central allegation, of course, 
is plausible enough to do the work: it takes for granted that students perceive 
graduate school as an economic decision, an investment into a particular 
socio-economic future. It then proceeds to shock its audience by main-
taining the larger framework—graduate school as an investment—while 
simultaneously shifting a metaphor to that of ‘unreasonable’ investments, 
investments that are almost guaranteed not to pay off f inancially. Not 
surprisingly, an article in The Economist (which was published without 
an author designation in the Christmas edition 2010 under the title ‘The 
Disposable Academic’) puts forth the Ponzi scheme, whereas the lottery 
paradigm finds use, among others, in Benton’s ‘Just Don’t Go’. In both cases, 
the popularity of graduate school, its ability to attract students despite being 
a bad decision f inancially, is cast as a cognitive mistake within a framework 
of investment and return, thus validating the question of f inancial return 
as a particularly legitimate frame of reference.
The second dominant set of metaphors pathologizes graduate school as 
either a form of addiction or as a cult. In both cases, the texts note a form 
of dependency, an addictive quality of academia that, much like substance 
abuse or membership in a cult, leads people to disregard their normal lives, 
their non-academic friends, and their self interest. If people manage to 
(or try to) leave academia, they accordingly need to detox, to rediscover 
a meaning in things nonacademic, to readjust their values and discover a 
new sense in life. In fact, many post-academia blogs trace this particular 
form of recovery. Poignant examples of this paradigm of pathology would 
be Thomas H. Benton’s much-cited ‘Is Graduate School a Cult?’ published 
in the Chronicle in 2004, and a blog, published anonymously, under the title 
Chronicles of a Recovering Academic.18 Schuman, in her text, likens academia 
to cigarettes: highly addictive, highly carcinogenic, and ultimately lethal 
to almost all. When written in a f irst-person perspective, texts operating 
within this tropical paradigm often read like autobiographical illness nar-
ratives. They tell stories of illness, of survival, and of recovery, sometimes 
even offering a hint of ‘survivor guilt’.19
The third major metaphoric paradigm attempts to rationalize the presum-
ably irrational decision for graduate school by portraying it as a mistaken 
decision of the heart. Operating the metaphor of a bad relationship, these 
texts portray graduate students as taking all kinds of abuse—long working 
hours, blows to their self-esteem, and low income (at best)—with very 
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little reward. Looking at the situation this way, graduate students seem to 
be masochistically attracted by the bad treatment they receive from their 
partner, academia. And no matter the pain, no matter the disappointment, 
they keep going back. What to outsiders looks like abuse apparently seems 
to them like an emotionally gratifying relationship, and this blindness to 
the abusive nature is at the core of this third metaphor. As one blog post, 
responding to Schuman’s article, put it: ‘We cut the same heartbreaking 
figure as a woman who has become attached to a cold man, sacrif icing more 
and more to win his love, willfully ignoring signs of his indifference because 
the alternative has become too terrifying to contemplate’ (‘In Valley and in 
Plain’). Indeed, as a metaphor, love does particularly interesting work. As, 
once again, William Pannapacker aka Thomas H. Benton observes, linking 
‘work’ and ‘love’ is characteristic of particular sectors of the job market, and 
the rhetoric of love typically ‘supports the transfer of resources from one 
group to another, typically from women to men, from minority to majority’. 
Love, in other words, is a highly gendered and gendering metaphor, typically 
reserved for sectors that are marked by economic exploitation.20 At the 
same time, it does describe a manifest and positive experience. As Benton 
explains, people often stay in graduate school because they perceive the 
‘so-called bohemian lifestyle’, the thrill of discovering new knowledge, the 
conversations, the mentoring, and even the focus on immaterial gain as a 
whiff of a good life. In fact, Benton’s piece is a particularly telling example 
of the ‘ambiguous meaning’ (Pannapacker) of love, and of how the feeling 
comes back even in the process of writing about it critically.
All of these metaphors are similar in that they try to explain why gradu-
ate students cannot be swayed away from academia. Implying a particular 
understanding of why people should or should not pursue an academic 
career, one that is rooted in individual, economic gain, they suggest that 
it would be in the students’ best interest if they simply quit. Not quitting, 
in this logic, is a weakness, a sign of impaired agency. In other words, 
these metaphors try to resolve the presumed and presumably unjustif ied 
popularity of the Ph.D. degree by reading graduate students as mistaken, 
intellectually or emotionally, and in need of treatment, psychological or 
intellectual, so that they can make a better decision for themselves. Notably, 
in using (a limited set of) metaphors, these texts attempt a ‘tropical’ solution 
to the problem they have as texts. Giving advice that ‘convince[s] no one’ 
(Schuman), struggling, in other words, with a disconnect between their 
textual project and their textual effect, between denotation and pragmatics, 
these texts use metaphors of mistaken self-perception to explain this very 
failure.
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4 The Pragmatics of Unpopularity
In this last section, I want to use a different angle to speak about this discon-
nect between thesis hatements’ textual project and their textual effect and 
about the discrepancy between graduate students’ presumed unhappiness, 
the presumably mistaken quality of their life decision, and the alleged 
popularity of the Ph.D. in the humanities. To do so, I will look even more 
closely at the discrepancy between what ‘thesis hatements’ say—’Don’t do 
it’—and the effect they have—’they convince no one’. This discrepancy 
between denotation and pragmatic effect, this textual schism, is crucial to 
understanding the complex and contradictory affective dynamics at stake, 
dynamics that inform not only this genre but also the cultural meanings 
of academia as a social institution. Accordingly, I want to use the next 
few paragraphs to explore moments in which these texts end up being 
aff irmative of the Ph.D. in the very moment in which they claim to reject it.
The f irst (self-inf licted) challenge to the argumentative effective-
ness of thesis hatements lies in the straw man nature of the argument 
they set up: their graduate students are usually ridiculously naïve. In 
Schuman’s text, this dynamic comes to the fore in the f irst paragraphs 
already: ‘Who wouldn’t want a job where you only have to work f ive 
hours a week, you get summers off, your whole job is reading and talking 
about books, and you can never be f ired? Such is the enviable life of the 
tenured college literature professor, and all you have to do to get it is 
earn a Ph.D. So perhaps you, literature lover, are considering pursuing 
this path’. Clearly, no graduate student will actually think that this is 
what a professorship is like. The effect of disillusionment, accordingly, 
does not happen, because the reader does not feel addressed. Instead, the 
text presents a foil of particularly naïve students that, ultimately, do not 
deserve success because what they are after is a utopian illusion to begin 
with. I will come back to this straw man argument below. In any case, 
it marks a f irst instance in which the textual work of a thesis hatement 
def ies its presumed pragmatic purpose. If thesis hatements project such 
ridiculously naïve implied readers, they cannot meaningfully convince 
their actual audience and instead open up a subject position from which 
to look down at such naïveté.
A similar yet slightly more complex dynamic can be traced via genre: 
Schuman’s text self-identifies as ‘a jeremiad’, and many commentators agree 
that this is exactly what it is. This designation draws attention to a form 
of textual performance whose pragmatics has been analyzed prominently 
by Perry Miller in his seminal ‘Errand into the Wilderness’. Regardless of 
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whether Schuman’s text is a jeremiad, strictly speaking, Miller’s observa-
tions hold for thesis hatements as much as for the jeremiad:
If you read them all through, the total effect, curiously enough, is not 
at all depressing: you come to the paradoxical realization that they 
do not bespeak a despairing frame of mind. There is something of a 
ritualistic incantation about them; [...] in [the realm] of psychology they 
are purgations of soul; they do not discourage but actually encourage 
the community to persist in its heinous conduct. The exhortation to a 
reformation which never materializes serves as a token payment upon 
the obligation, and so liberates the debtors. (11)
For their authors and, more importantly, for their readers, thesis hatements 
might indeed constitute ‘purgations of the soul’. If they ‘convince no one’, 
this might be because their purpose is not to trigger actual ‘reformation’—
quitting academia, quitting the Ph.D.—but to perform a ‘token payment’ 
to anybody ‘outside’ of the logic of grad school. By reading, sharing, or 
subscribing to thesis hatements, graduate students, in other words, might 
perform a particular ritualistic, symbolic gesture that replaces action in 
the real world.
Indeed, rethinking the genre aff iliations of the thesis hatement helps 
unlock yet another layer of how the textual pragmatics are at odds with 
the denotation of the text. Thesis hatements presume to offer advice, and 
they arguably fail to effectively do so. However, as Joshua Rothman points 
out in an insightful article in The New Yorker, ‘advice helps people when 
they are making rational decisions, and the decision to go to grad school 
in English is essentially irrational. In fact, it’s representative of a whole 
class of decisions that bring you face to face with the basic unknowability 
and uncertainty of life’. Other texts similarly assert that one cannot know 
whether this is a good decision. As Thomas H. Benton aka William Pan-
napacker confesses: ‘I realize that nothing but luck distinguishes me from 
thousands of other highly-qualif ied Ph.D.s in the humanities who will never 
have full-time academic jobs’ (Benton, ‘Is Graduate’). So, clearly, advice is 
not in order, but why is it given anyway? The reason is that it constitutes 
a textual performance that goes beyond the content of the advice: when 
thesis hatements cast this decision, that is characterized by the frightening 
‘unknowability and uncertainty of life’, in terms of rational knowability, 
they reintroduce, ex negativo, rationality into the game. Even though advice 
literature on the Ph.D. hardly ever gives good, rational reasons to pursue 
a Ph.D., it thus reinscribes rationality, if only so that it can be discarded.
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In other words, via thesis hatements graduate students are able to 
understand, embrace, and aff irm that their decision is ultimately not ra-
tional. About to do something that may—by normal, mainstream, popular, 
economic standards—most likely be a ‘bad life decision’, graduate students 
can use thesis hatements to make this ‘irrational’ decision a conscious one. 
Indeed the foil of the naïve graduate student who has ridiculous ideas about 
the profession, the straw man I spoke of before, feeds into this dynamic. It 
allows authors and readers of thesis hatements to discursively Other these 
naïve graduate students. After reading a thesis hatement, the decision to 
continue pursuing a Ph.D. is not less irrational, but it is done after learning 
all the rational reasons against graduate school, it is a decision whose ir-
rational nature has been accepted after rational deliberation.
Moreover, these texts that explain why something is being done against 
all good reason speak strongly of intrinsic motivation precisely in reject-
ing it. Indeed, the unpopularity of the decision, by common standards, 
might thus be what makes it particularly attractive. In reception and in 
production, thesis hatements are stories of people doing the Ph.D. despite its 
presumed drawbacks in life quality. These texts thus open up and invite into 
a subject position marked by disdain for worldly and extrinsic motivation, 
by practicality and by economic reasons. Again, Schuman’s text is telling 
in this regard in that it juxtaposes economic and intrinsic motivation:
Don’t misunderstand me. There is unquantif iable intellectual reward 
from the exploration of scholarly problems [...] even if that means doing 
bat-shit analysis like using the rule of ‘false elimination’ to determine 
that Josef K. is simultaneously guilty and not guilty in The Trial. But there 
is one sort of reward you will never get: monetary compensation from a 
stable, non-penurious position at a decent university.
In juxtaposing the ‘unquantif iable intellectual reward’ with ‘monetary 
compensation’, Schuman’s text makes clear what is at stake: quantif iable 
monetary compensation or unquantif iable intellectual reward, and no 
matter how much the text argues for the former, it still opens up and casts as 
an alternative the latter. Even if ‘unquantifiable’ here does not mean ‘big’ but 
only ‘impossible to measure’, this operation creates and maintains a binary 
rather than questioning whether this binary makes sense in the f irst place.
Ultimately, then, one central aspect of the textual work of thesis hate-
ments is how they cast the decision for academia as a decision that is 
untenable by common, popular standards while they, simultaneously, open 
up a ‘heroic’ subject position from which to make this unpopular decision 
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for an unpopular profession by upholding the notion of the unquantif i-
able reward of intrinsic motivation. Indeed, while their politics may work 
to delegitimize the decision for a Ph.D. degree in the humanities, they 
simultaneously provide the psychological mechanisms required to make 
exactly this decision: to Other graduate students as naïve, to perform a 
‘token payment’ acknowledging the irrationality of the decision, and to hope 
for unquantif iable reward in exchange for it. In other words, whenever they 
fail to convince, they simultaneously open up a position from which to take 
pride in an unreasonable decision for an unpopular profession.
Conclusion
Thesis hatements are a troubled genre: they offer contradictory advice, 
and their pragmatics are at odds with what they claim to say. Asking their 
readers to do one thing while in fact encouraging them to do another, they 
constitute contradictory acts of communication at best, and insincere ones 
at worst. At the same time, however, thesis hatements often are honest 
attempts to come to terms with a highly contradictory subject position: 
that of a graduate student, and both this textual work and the contradictory 
quality of this subject position become particularly visible in the metaphors 
thesis hatements employ. Looking at their inner contradictions, then, is 
telling: It underscores that this genre does not simply offer advice to gradu-
ate students. Instead, it wrestles with important social questions, among 
them questions of class and of intellectual labor, and it works through the 
complex affective dynamics and the conflicting values that determine 
both an individual student’s decision to pursue a humanities Ph.D. and the 
perception of the humanities in contemporary U.S. society.
Notes
1. In fact, gender also is an important dynamic in these texts, and while I do 
not have time to develop a more detailed argument about the relation-
ship between (occupational) gender (cf. Hoberek 374), academia, and class 
here, I will, throughout this paper, point out moments in which this subtext 
becomes particularly poignant.
2. The first of the two titles is used in the <title> tag of the web page, thus 
showing in the browser window only, the second, consisting of title and 
subtitle, is visible as a headline on the page itself. Using two different titles 
is a common SEO strategy employed by slate.com
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3. This derailed metaphor indeed is telling in that it speaks of Schuman’s dif-
ficulties of coherently conceptualizing the experience of graduate school. 
Assuming that, as a Kafka scholar, she does not want to use the fable simply 
as a flowery version of saying ‘bad situation’, mapping the metaphor onto 
graduate school is difficult: is the mouse the grad student? Is the trap the 
unsuccessful quest for tenure? Does the cat correspond to private sector 
employment? Ultimately, these questions seem to speak strongly about the 
ambivalent desires and fears negotiated in her piece.
4. Cf. Nicholas Barber, who also refers to thesis hatements as a ‘rapidly ex-
panding sub-genre’ of essay writing.
5. The question of how to slice genre affiliations here is not easily answered. 
One way to look at thesis hatements is as a ‘relatively packed genre of 
recent works on the decision to go to grad school or not (which is probably 
just a subgenre of bearish pieces on academia)’ (Cleveland). The larger 
segment of ironically (self-)deprecating portrayals of graduate education 
have a much longer tradition. Speaking even more broadly, the argument 
over whether studying the humanities is a good decision might be as old as 
the humanities themselves. As Anthony T. Grafton remarks: ‘To become a 
trained humanist [...] is to join a tradition, which has usually been embat-
tled, while parents scream ‘No, for God’s sake go to law school!’ (That is 
what Petrarch’s father said to him, thereby inaugurating a great tradition.)’
6. Cf. Piled Higher and Deeper. 
7. Benton is the pseudonym of William Pannapacker; the piece was also 
mentioned in the Schuman quote at the beginning of this paper. Another 
typical representative is Larry Cebula’s ‘Open Letter to My Students: No, You 
Cannot be a Professor.’
8. With tenure remaining an attractive perspective even for those academics 
who announce having given up, thesis hatements by non-tenured authors 
always smack of an attempt to scare off job market competitors. I am grate-
ful to Sascha Pöhlmann for pointing out this particular dynamic.
9. As one anecdotal case of such transnational reception: I came across Schu-
man’s piece like most of its audience must have, via Facebook. A friend of 
mine, a German scholar living in California at the time, had shared it on 
her Facebook wall. Reading it about six month away from finishing my own 
dissertation, I immediately identified with its ethos (or: pathos) of suffer-
ing, an ethos that I was very much acquainted with and that I had learned 
to embrace as well. The text also echoed my impressions at the German As-
sociation for American Studies’ Postgraduate Forum at Leipzig where a group 
discussion about German academia and one’s place in it had quickly mor-
phed into something akin to a meeting of Academics Anonymous, or so it 
had seemed: how else does one make sense of a room full of people speaking 
of the plight of the dissertation and of the lack of a perspective for the time 
after—none of them having to do it, and none of them seriously considering 
to quit? For a brief mention of the ‘prekäre[n] wirtschaftlichen Situation, in 
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der sich der Großteil der Promovierenden befindet’ cf. the conference report 
(‘Tagungsbericht’). Cf. also Bordel and Ritter, as well as the debate on the ‘aka-
demisches Prekariat’ that briefly flared in German public discourse in 2011/12.
10. This section profited greatly from discussions at the Unpopular Culture 
conference. I am particularly grateful for the remarks by Barry Shank, J. 
Jesse Ramirez, and Martin Lüthe.
11. Cf. Grafton for a particularly bitter phrasing of the use of graduate students as 
a way to provide cheap teaching: ‘Administrators, meanwhile, began to treat 
systematic underemployment as a feature, not a bug, and made of it a man-
agement tool. They realized that they could finance elementary teaching by 
taking in large numbers of graduate students, keeping them at work for eight 
or nine years on low pay, running sections and occasional courses, and then 
spewing them forth unemployed or re-employing them as adjuncts.’ Cf. also 
the attention the case of Mary Margaret received, an adjunct at Duquesne 
‘who died sick, alone and penniless’ after not being able to build up retire-
ment money from her meager payment (Flaherty; cf. also ‘Reality Check’).
12. Note in this context the debate about the study of class in academia that, 
Keith Gandal argues, has been hampered by the lack of poor professors. In 
the complex class identities at stake, it remains unclear whether ‘facing or 
anticipating economic difficulties’ constitutes enough of a ‘poor identity’ 
to energize ‘literary-critical poverty studies.’ The debate has recently been 
energized not just by the last economic crisis but also by Walter Benn 
Michaels’s 2006 The Trouble with Diversity, which opens with a discussion of 
whether the difference between rich and poor people is simply a matter of 
having or not having money (cf. 1–3).
13.  This view, of course, plays into a concern haunting the humanities at least 
since the revisionary interventions of the 1970s, the democratization of the 
university, and the broadening of university access: the concern that the hu-
manities might be a class sanctuary, that their presumably universal quality 
might hide mechanisms of exclusion.
14. Note, of course, the conspicuous gendering that aligns the economically 
responsible decision to earn money with the (presumably) male job of the 
Hooters managers and that associates the humanities with femininity, as well 
as the unspoken allegation that graduate students fail to grow up; in these ar-
guments, graduate school often features as a failure to grow up into an male 
adult breadwinner role, pointing at the nexus of gender, age, and economy.
15. Cf. also Tressie McMillan Cottom, who points out that the ‘blanket advice’ 
of thesis hatements comes from a privileged white position, and that 
minority students may require the credentials of a Ph.D. (even for non-
academic jobs) to offset the negative hiring effect of their minority status. 
‘Plainly put, black folks need credentials because without them our ‘ghetto’ 
names get our résumés trashed, our clean criminal records lose out to 
whites with felony convictions, and discretion works against our type of so-
cial capital (and weak ties and closure of information) to amount to a social 
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reality that looks and feels a lot like statistical discrimination.’ As Kalaidjian 
summarizes her point: the advice to opt out of academia ‘ignores questions 
of race, gender, and class, indeed, the very social bedrock upon which the 
humanities staked many of its claims in the 1960s.’ 
16. Cf. also Michael Bérubé’s observation that ‘the contemporary university is 
so amorphous that it can be described as the research wing of the corporate 
economy, the final resting place of the New Left, the last best hope for criti-
cal thinking, the engine room of global technological advance, the agent of 
secularization and the advance of reason, the training ground for the labor 
force, the conservatives’ strongest bastion of antifeminist education, the 
progressives’ only bulwark against the New Right, the natural home of intel-
lectual isolates, the natural home of goose-stepping groupthinkers, and the 
locus of postmodern skepticism and fragmentation’ (147).
17. This text, too, bears two titles. One, marked down in the html title tags, is 
given above. The main title on the page reads ‘You Aren’t the Exception.’
18. Cf. also Newhouse’s ‘Deprogramming form the Academic Cult.’
19. On the sub-genre of survival guides in academic advice literature, cf. Cook. 
For an example of ‘survivor guilt’, cf. Thomas H. Benton’s self-indictment 
that ‘nothing but luck distinguishes me from thousands of other highly-
qualified Ph.D.’s in the humanities who will never have full-time academic 
jobs’ (‘Is Graduate’), a quote I will come back to below.
20. Outside of academia, nursing comes to mind as one such sector. Note that 
Pannapacker also sees this dynamic inside the academy with the humanities 
on the one side and the ‘male-dominated ‘hard’ fields, such as physics or en-
gineering’ on the other. On the particular class dimension of the metaphor, 
cf. also Jacqui Shine’s article on ‘Love and Other Secondhand Emotions’. 
Shine argues that people from lower class backgrounds have a fundamen-
tally different understanding of what it means to ‘love’ one’s work. She thus 
asks ‘whether our reliance on using love as a way to measure one’s suitability 
for their work has the effect of excluding low-income and working-class 
people from the academic professions. If the love question is, in fact, a kind 
of gatekeeping thing—and I think it is—then we run the risk of stacking the 
deck with people from middle- and upper-income backgrounds, folks who 
can understand and answer the question affirmatively and who have the 
luxury of ignoring the hard economic realities of the academic job market.’
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